F. W. Walbank

Antigonus Doson's Attack on Cytinium (REG 101 (1988), 12–53)


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ANTIGONUS DOSON'S ATTACK ON CYTINIUM (REG 101 (1988), 12-53)

Our knowledge of the reign of Antigonus Doson has been considerably enriched by J. Bousquet's recent publication (REG 101 (1988), 12-53) of a long inscription of 110 lines found on a stele in the Letoon at Xanthus in 1965. This contains four documents dealing with an appeal made by ambassadors from the town of Cytinium in Doris to the Xanthians for financial help in the restoration of its town walls, destroyed partly by earthquake and later by the troops of Antigonus Doson. After some earlier confusion, due to a misreading of the text at line 3, Bousquet has now firmly established the date of the decree passed by the Xanthians as 2 Audnaioi of the 17th regnal year of Ptolemy Philopator (206/5); but the disasters at Cytinium, which led after a delay of many years to the eventual sending of the embassy to Xanthus, occurred earlier, in the reign of Antigonus Doson, who died in 221.2

It is the date of Doson's invasion of Doris which I want to discuss. The evidence for this is in the third of three documents appended to the decree of the Xanthians, a letter from Cytinium to the council and demos of Xanthus, describing the circumstances of the disaster which had befallen the city (lines 87-110). The first two documents are a résumé of an Aetolian decree authorising the sending of the embassy from Doris (lines 73-9) and a letter from the three chief Aetolian magistrates accrediting the three envoys in the name of the federal synedrion (lines 79-88). I reproduce here the relevant part of the letter from Cytinium (lines 93-9):

\[\begin{quote}
\text{συμβαίνει γὰρ ἄμων, καθ' ὁν καιρὸν}
\text{ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγonus ἐνέβαλε ἐν ταῖς Φωκίδαις, τῶν τε}
\text{τειχῶν μέρη τινὰ καταπεπτόκειν ὑπὸ τῶν εἰσιμῶν πα-}
\text{cosity πολίων καὶ τῶν νεωτέρων εἰεθοθῆκε(ί)ν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ[ν]}
\text{τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς· παραγενόμενος δὲ ὁ βασι-}
\text{λεὺς ἐν ταῖς Δωρίδαις τὰ τε τείχη ἄμων κατέκαψε παῦ-}
\text{τῷ πολίων καὶ τὰς οἰκίας κατέκαυσε.}
\end{quote}\]

96 Bousquet suggests \text{εἰς(βε)βοσθοθῆκε(ί)ν} with reference to the king Antigonus invaded Phocis, that certain parts of the walls of all the cities had fallen down as a result of the earthquakes and the younger men had

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1 Cf. Bousquet, art.cit. 22-3, for details.
2 The delay of (as we shall see) around 23 years before the appeal was sent to Xanthus is to be explained by the almost continuous hostilities caused by the Cleomenean, Social and First Roman-Macedonian Wars. The Peace of Phoenice (205) at last allowed the Cytinians to send their embassy to Lycia (cf. Bousquet, art.cit. 23).
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gone to bring help to the temple of Apollo in Delphi. Arriving in Doris, the king destroyed the walls of all our cities and burnt the houses.'

The rest of the letter is an appeal for financial aid in view of the kinship of the Xanthians and the Cytinians, going back to Heracles and expounded in detail in the Xanthian decree, and it ends with the claim that such help will be most acceptable not only to the Cytinians, but also to the Aetolians and all the other Dorians (τοῖς ἄλλοις Δωρικῶις πάσι) and especially to King Ptolemy 'since he is kin to us through the kings' — a reference to the Ptolemaic claim to kinship with the Argeads, descendants of Heracles (as mentioned earlier in line 40). It is clear from the inscription that at the date when the embassy was sent to Xanthus Doris formed part of the Aetolian League and Xanthus belonged to Egypt, hence the regnal dating of the Xanthus decree.

Bousquet has proposed a historical context for Antigonus Doson's destruction of Cytinium and the other Dorian cities. He puts it in the spring of 222, when Antigonus' Macedonian forces returned from wintering in Macedonia to join the king for the final confrontation with Cleomenes of Sparta at Sellasia. Antigonus himself had remained in Achaea during the two winters of 224/3 and 223/2; the first of these winters he spent near Sicyon and Corinth, the second first at Aegium, but then at Argos, having already sent his army back to Macedonia for the winter and keeping only his mercenaries in the Peloponnese. In Bousquet's opinion the troops which destroyed the cities of Doris, including Cytinium, were the Macedonian forces returning from their winter quarters in the late spring of 222. These, he believes, included the 1,000 Agrianians and 1,000 Galatians who fought later in the year at Sellasia. Having crossed into Euboea and marched south to Chalcis, the army returned to the mainland at that point and proceeded thence through Boeotia and Phocis, touching on Thebes, the southern shore of Lake Copais and Orchomenus, to ascend the Cephissus valley into Doris. Having destroyed the towns in that area they turned south to Amphissa and Cirrha, whence they crossed to Aegium, which Bousquet takes to be Antigonus' headquarters (on this see below). The young men were absent from Cytinium as the result of a deliberately spread rumour that the Galatians (the dread enemy of 279/8) were marching on Delphi by a route south of Parnassus.

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This reconstruction is open to several serious objections:

(1) In 222, Bousquet's date for the attack on Cytinium, Phocis, like Boeotia, was an ally of Macedonia, since by then Antigonus had already set up the Hellenic Symmachy, of which

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3 Art.cit. 45-53.
4 Polyb. II 54.5, 64.1.
5 See below, n.28.
6 Polyb. II 55.1; cf. Plut. Cleom. 25.4.
7 Polyb. II 65.2.
Phocis was a member. This he did most likely in the winter of 224/3.  
M.Errington argues for 223/2, which I find less probable; but in either case by spring 222 Phocis was an ally of Macedonia, as Bousquet agrees. However, the phrase καθ’ Ὀν καιρόν ὁ βασιλεύς Αντίγονος ἐνέβολε ἐν τάν Φοκίδα (lines 93-4) suggests hostile action. ἐμβάλλειν used intransitively with ἔις (or, as here, the Doric ἐν) normally means 'to invade' and it would be very unusual to find it used to describe a friendly march through allied territory.

(2) The attack on Cytinium implies that a state of hostilities existed at the time between Macedonia and Aetolia; and this Bousquet apparently assumes to be the case in 222. But the refusal by the Aetolians to allow Antigonus to march south through Thermopyle and their threat to oppose him should he attempt to do so is no proof of a state of war between Aetolia and Macedonia, but may merely be the defensive action of an unfriendly neutral. The Aetolians had invaded Thessaly shortly after Antigonus' accession, but they had been expelled after a serious defeat at Antigonus' hands. This invasion, together with the joint action along with Achaea against the Illyrians and Acarnanians off Paxos, was the last Aetolian initiative in the war between the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues and Macedonia, which had occupied the greater part of the reign of Demetrius II. But it is hard to believe that Antigonus can have embarked on an overseas expedition to Caria in 227 without first bringing his war with the Aetolians to a formal conclusion. And from the time he returned from Caria onwards he was extremely circumspect in his relations with the Aetolians and careful not to provoke them in any way. The reason for this is not far to seek. From 227/6, when a Megalopolitan embassy went with Achaean approval to Pella to sound Antigonus out over the possibility of help against Cleomenes, the king was aware that the present course of events in the Peloponnese might soon allow him to re-establish the Macedonian position there. In that context any provocation of Aetolia would have been the greatest folly; and it is hard to imagine a piece of more flagrant provocation than sending a Macedonian army up the Cephissus to sack and burn the cities of Doris and then to march south through Amphissa past Delphi to the Gulf of Corinth. When, from 221 onwards, the Aetolians were

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8 Polyb. II 54.3; IV 9.4; cf. H.H.Schmitt, SVA III 507.
9 Geschichte Makedoniens, Munich 1986, 165 and 254-5 n.17.
10 Art.cit. 49.
11 Bousquet himself (art.cit. 20) translates 'l'époque où le roi Antigone a envahi la Phocide.'
12 Polyb. II 52.8.
13 Cf. Walbank, CAH VII 1,453; for the defeat of the Aetolians see Frontinus, Strat. II 6.5.
14 CAH VII 1,455 (where 'alongside the Acarnanians' should be corrected to 'also against the Acarnanians').
15 This peace may be the kernel of truth behind the distorted account in Polyb. II 45.2 of a compact made in 228 between Antigonus and the Aetolians (and Cleomenes of Sparta).
16 Cf. E.Will, Histoire politique du monde hellénistique I, ed.2 Nancy 1979, 363, 'soupble à l'égard des Aitoliens.'
17 Polyb. II 47.7.
encouraged by the minority of the new king Philip V to embark on an aggressive policy in Messenia, the states composing the Symmachy, including Macedonia, resolved to declare war on Aetolia, embodying their reasons in a decree — clear evidence that at that time Aetolia was not technically at war with Macedonia and the other members of the Symmachy.

(3) A further difficulty arises from the fact that the letter of the Cytinians states clearly that it was Antigonus himself who invaded Phocis. He is mentioned twice, first as ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος and then as ὁ βασιλεὺς. Yet on Bousquet's hypothesis Antigonus was all the time in the Peloponnese and the invasion was carried out by his troops under subordinate commanders. Bousquet is aware of the difficulty but argues that 'nous ne sommes pas obligés de prendre au mot les ambassadeurs kyténiciens: 'Lorsque le roi Antigone envahit la Phocide...' Il peut s'agir seulement de ses soldats.' In support of this he observes that when we say that 'Hitler and Stalin invaded Poland' we do not imply their actual presence in the field. That, however, is not a convincing parallel, for the heads of modern states do not normally lead their armies into battle or on campaign, whereas Hellenistic kings did. It would have been easy for the Cytinians in their letter to Xanthus to say: 'When the Macedonians invaded Phocis...' if that was what they meant; that indeed is what one would have expected.

(4) A further difficulty in Bousquet's hypothesis is the assumption that the Macedonian troops returning from winter quarters in Macedonia in 222 were making for Aegium. This view seems to rest on a misunderstanding of Antigonus' movements between 224, when he first marched south to aid the Achaeans, and the Sellasia campaign of 222. After describing Antigonus' original march south via Euboea, Bousquet continues: 'Ayant pris l'Acrocorinthe, il a fait sa jonction avec les Achéens, et a installé son quartier général à Aigion où se tient l'assemblée fédérale (Polyb. II 54.13). De là partirent des incursions vers Argos, Orchomène d'Arcadie, Mantinée. A la fin de l'hiver 223/2 les troupes de Macédoine rallièrent Aigion, en vue de l'affrontement avec Cléomène.' This account is in several respects misleading. In 224, after marching south and seizing Acrocorinth, Antigonus

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19 Polyb. IV 25.5-6.
20 Art.cit. 46.
21 In explanation of Antigonus' having remained in the Peloponnese Bousquet (art.cit. 46) alleges his ill health ('c'est un homme malade, qui mourra d'épuisement après son triomphe de Séllasie'); but in fact Antigonus did not die until 221, a year after Sellasia, and we only hear of his ill-health after he had defeated the Dardanians. In the meantime he had campaigned vigorously in the Peloponnese before Sellasia. His continuous presence in the Peloponnese from 224 to 222 is easily explained by the importance of the setting up of the Symmachy and the establishing of firm relations with Achaea through Aratus, without the assumption that he remained there 'pour ménager ses voies respiratoires dans un climat plus doux de celui de la Macédoine' (art.cit. 46), an explanation which does not figure in any ancient source.
22 Polyb. II 52.6-8.
23 Art.cit. 47.
advanced to Argos and from there conducted a campaign to the borders of Laconia. He then arrived in Aegium for the Achaean assembly of autumn 224. After that he went into winter quarters near Sicyon and Corinth, and it was from there (not Aegium) that in 223 he joined the Achaeans near Tegea, which they took, afterwards going on to take Orchomenus, Mantinea, Heraea and Telpusa. Having sent his Macedonians home for the winter, he made a second visit to Aegium for the assembly of autumn 223, during which time Cleomenes carried out a coup d’etat at Megalopolis, and then went into winter quarters at Argos. From this sequence of events it is clear that Aegium was not Antigonus’ headquarters for his campaign in the Peloponnese in 223, nor was he there in the spring of 222. Hence there was no reason for the Macedonian troops to make for Aegium on their return to Greece in that year. Their more natural route will have been via the Isthmus and on to Argos, where the king was wintering.

Furthermore, as Larsen has shown, there are no ancient roads fit for an army linking northern and southern Euboea, and the likelihood is that both in 224 and in 222 the Macedonian troops, which had crossed to Euboea to avoid the Aetolian held Thermopylae, returned to the mainland, not from Chalcis after a laborious march thither through much of the island, but rather from Aidepsa to Cynus and from there via Hyampolis and the Cephissus valley to Thebes and the Isthmus of Corinth. This route led through Opuntian Locris and the eastern part of Phocis, but that would create no political problems in 224, since the former had been Macedonian since 228 or a little earlier, and Phocis was by this time allied to the Boeotians and to the Achaeans, whom Antigonus was marching to assist.

24 Polyb. II 54.1-3.
25 Polyb. II 54.3: ήνε... είς Αιγίου; Paton’s translation (Loeb edition) ‘he returned to Aegium’ is incorrect.
26 Polyb. II 54.4-12.
27 Polyb. II 54.13; Plut. Cleom. 25.2.
28 Polyb. II 64.1. Bousquet, art.cit.46, says that Antigonus passed the winter of 223/2 at Aegium. But it is clear from Plut. Cleom. 25.2 that Polyb. II 55.1, Ἀντίγονος μετὰ τῶν μισθοφόρων ἐν Αἰγίῳ διατρίβοντα, refers to the period of his visit to the Achaean assembly. How long he stayed at Aegium after the assembly was over we do not know; but certainly the latter part, and perhaps indeed most, of the winter of 223/2 was spent at Argos.
29 Bousquet, art.cit. 47 n.68, quotes my Commentary on Polybius I 273, for the late assembling of the allied army in early summer of 222 ‘à cause du temps mis par les soldats macédoniens à rallier la côte Nord du Péloponnèse.’ This passage of the Commentary does indeed discuss the late arrival of the Macedonian troops in southern Greece, but it makes no reference to the north coast of the Peloponnese.
30 J.A.O.Larsen, Phoenix 19,1965,117-19. Bousquet, art.cit. 50, knows and approves of this article; but his assumption that the Macedonian army marched from northern Euboea to Chalcis takes no account of what Larsen says about communications in that island.
31 Polyb. II 52.8. Polybius mentions ‘other measures’ adopted by the Aetolians to prevent Antigonus helping the Achaeans; but Polybius does not say what these were and it is clear that prejudice against the Aetolians plays some part in his account.
32 See R.Etienne and D.Knoepfler, Hyetos de Béotie et la chronologie des archontes fédéraux entre 250 et 171 avant J.-C. Athens, 1986,331-41; it was independent of Boeotia in 228/6 (cf. IG VII 4136 line 1).
33 See F.W.Walbank in Hammond and Walbank, op.cit. (n.18), 341. The evidence for the Phocian alliance with Boeotia is IG IX 198 = ISE II 83. On its date see P.Roesch, Etudes béotiennes, Paris 1982,359-
By 222, as we have seen, the Symmachy had been set up and Phocis was a Macedonian ally. In the light of all these circumstances the route postulated by Bousquet for 222 would clearly have involved a long and purposeless diversion at a time when Antigonus wanted his army back in the Peloponnese.

(5) The letter of the Cynthians records but does not explain the absence of the νεώτεροι bringing aid to Delphi at the time of Antigonus' invasion of Doris. As we have seen, Bousquet suggests that the Macedonian forces had deliberately spread a false rumour that the 1,000 Galatians in Antigonus' army intended to attack Delphi by a route south of Parnassus. We are not in fact entirely certain that the 1,000 Galatians and the 1,000 Agrianians who fought at Sellasia came south to join Antigonus along with the Macedonian army; but it is on the whole likely, for they are distinguished at Sellasia from the mercenaries who had remained in the Peloponnese with the king. There is, however, no evidence to support Bousquet's hypothesis of a deliberately spread rumour; and against it is the fact that by the time the Macedonians reached Cytinium the young men had already left for Delphi. Yet if their despatch was caused by a rumour disseminated by the Macedonian army and spreading ahead of its advance, it follows that the people of Cytinium must have learnt simultaneously of the advance north of a hostile army from Chalcis (ex hypothesi) and the rumour that the Galatians were taking a southern route against Delphi. It is hard to believe that the inhabitants of a city with half-demolished walls would have deliberately denuded themselves of their fighting men if they knew that a hostile Macedonian army was marching in their direction. Hence we must, I think, look for another context for the absence of the young men from Cytinium consistent with the assumption that when they were sent away the inhabitants of Cytinium had no reason to expect an enemy assault.

64, who successfully counters Moretti's view that it was after 189 and himself puts up a strong case for c. 228. If that dating is correct, Phocis probably broke away from Aetolia following Antigonus' attack in that year. The evidence for the alliance of Phocis and Boeotia with Achaia is Syll. 519, recording honours later accorded to the hostages of the two former states. Bousquet (art.cit. 49) dates both treaties to 224 or thereabouts and he connectsthat of Phocis and Boeotia with Achaia with the entry of those states into the Symmachy set up by Antigonus. In Walbank, op.cit. (n.18) 341 and 623, the Phocians are incorrectly said to have thrown off Macedonian control: read 'Aetolian control', as in CAH VII 1, 455 n.3. Though indeed only northern and western Phocis had formed part of the Aetolian League; see Walbank, op.cit.(n.18) 328-9; G.Nachtergaeel, Les Galates en Grèce et les Soteria de Delphes, Brussels 1977, 281. Why the Aetolians did not surrender any votes in the Amphictyonic Council following their loss of Phocis is part of the general problem of the high number of votes exercised by them in the 220s (cf. R.Flacelière, Les Aitoliens à Delphes, Paris 1937, 404 no.33 (c. 229) = Nachtergaeel, op.cit. 478 no.63, dating this list more probably to '225/4(?')). The likelihood is that the Aetolians continued to exercise the votes of areas already lost (cf. Walbank, op.cit. (n.18) 338-9).

34 See above, n.10.
35 Lines 96-7.
36 Art.cit. 50-1; see above p.185.
37 Polyb. II 65.2-5.
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With great generosity Professor Bousquet sent me a copy of the text of the Xanthus inscription in advance of publication and with his consent I used it in my discussion of the reign of Antigonus Doson in Hammond and Walbank, A History of Macedonia III, 339-40. In the course of that discussion I proposed an alternative context for the sack of Cytinium by Antigonus and it is the view set out there that I wish to defend and elaborate. At the outset we may note that the account of the attack in the letter of the Cyninians to Xanthus implies that this probably occurred at a time when (1) Macedonia and Aetolia were at war, (2) Doris and at least part of Phocis belonged to Aetolia, and (3) the inhabitants of Doris and Phocis had no reason to expect hostile action. These conditions can be met only in the early part of Antigonus’ reign and this we must now consider.

On the death of Demetrius II the Macedonians had to meet a Dardanian invasion in the north and a Thessalian revolt in the south. The latter was accompanied by an Aetolian invasion of Thessaly and the annexation of many areas to the Aetolian League. The evidence for this invasion and annexation consists partly in the later Aetolian possessions of Phthiotic Achaean and partly in the increase in the number of votes claimed by the Aetolians on the Amphictyonic Council. In 229/8 (Delphic archon: Herys) the Aetolians had still only eleven votes (probably including northern Phocis and Malis); but by 225/4(? these have risen to fourteen, the additional votes probably being those of Thessaliotis, Hestiaeotis and Phthiotis. Antigonus repelled the Dardanians and put down the Thessalian rebels; and he also inflicted a major defeat on the Aetolians, wiping out their force. The most probable context for the attack on Cytinium would seem to be as a sequel to the destruction of the Aetolian army in Thessaly in 228. Bousquet argues that the reference to the ‘invasion of Phocis’ (line 92) implies, for a Cyninian, that the Macedonian troops came from the east. But this need not be so. The words κοθ ὁν καιρόν ὁ βασιλεύς Ἀντίγονος ἐν τῶν Φωκίδω (lines 93-4) indicate the occasion when (a) the walls of all the cities were down and (b) the young men had been sent to help Delphi. The collapsed walls will be those of the cities of Doris and Phocis, all of which had most likely been affected, if unevenly, by the earth tremors, and the

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38 Justin. XXVIII 3.14.
39 Syll. 499. On the dating of the relevant inscriptions, which is much debated, Nachtergaele’s scheme seems to me the most convincing and I follow his dates, op.cit. (n.33).
40 SEG XVIII 237 = Flacelière, op.cit. (n.33) 404 no.33 = Nachtergaele, op.cit. (n.33) 478 no.63; cf. GDI 2525 = Flacelière 405 no.34 (archon Nicarchus), GDI 2544 = Flacelière 405 no.35a (archon Callias) and Syll. 509 = Flacelière 406 no.35b = Nachtergaele 477-8 no.62. The Aetolians probably continued to exercise these votes after losing the areas which they represented (see above, n.33).
41 Justin. XXVIII 3.14.
42 Frontinus Strat. II 6.5. According to this account ‘Antigonus, rex Macedonum’ penned up Aetolian forces in an unnamed town and then, having given the impression that he was allowing them an opportunity to escape, annihilated them as they fled. Antigonus must be Doson since Gonatas did not fight against the Aetolians.
43 Art.cit. 42.
young men too may be those of both Doris and the part of Phocis under Aetolia. Phocis was larger and more important than Doris; consequently the name of Phocis is used to describe the occasion, probably well-known then, though not hitherto well-known to us, when Antigonus invaded the area. His arrival in Doris can perfectly well have occurred on the way to Phocis and need not have taken place after he had marched through that state.

In 228, as we have seen,\(^44\) Phocis or at least its northern and western parts, were Aetolian and Antigonus' purpose was evidently to exploit his victory over the Aetolians in Thessaly by making a retaliatory raid into Aetolian areas south of the Spercheius and perhaps even detaching them from Aetolia. But the alliance concluded shortly afterwards between Phocis and Boeotia\(^45\) is evidence that Antigonus did not annex the former. Doris, as the inscription under consideration shows, remained Aetolian.

This scenario for Antigonus' invasion of Doris and Phocis, unlike that proposed by Bousquet, explains how the young men can have been absent at Delphi. For it is clear that Antigonus' destruction of the Aetolian forces in Thessaly must have come as a complete surprise to the League authorities and to the inhabitants of the areas concerned. When the young men were sent to Delphi, it was no doubt thought that Antigonus was fully occupied in the north, with an Aetolian army standing between him and the nearest parts of the Aetolian Confederation. The nature of the threat to Delphi remains unexplained. In A History of Macedonia III, 340, I suggested that it may have come from pirates. That now seems to me less probable, since pirates are unlikely to have given warning of their approach, nor would one expect to find them so far within the Gulf of Corinth. It has occurred to me that the help implied in εἰς ἐπάθειαν ἐπανέστηκεν ἐπὶ διαφθοράς τῶν κτήσεων may have been sent to deal with damage caused by the earthquakes, if indeed these extended to Delphi, and not to guard against a foreign enemy. Young men could repair damaged buildings as well as fight. But it is probably safer to admit that on our present information we can only speculate on why the young men were absent at that time. The new information provided by the Xanthus inscription underlines the great gaps which still exist in our knowledge of this period.

There is one objection that might be levelled against the above reconstruction of Antigonus' invasion of Doris. The inscription refers to Antigonus as 'the king' though in fact he first took control in Macedonia in 229 as strategos, army commander, and epitropos, guardian to Philip, the young son of Demetrios II.\(^46\) He is still described as guardian to Philip, and not as king, in 227, when he sailed through the Euripus, probably en route for Caria;\(^47\) but when shortly afterwards he quelled a mutiny at Pella by offering to hand back...

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\(^{44}\) Above, p.188 with n.33.
\(^{45}\) Ibid.
\(^{46}\) Polyb. II 45.2; XX 5.7; Plut.Aem. 8.3.
\(^{47}\) Polyb. XX 5.7. Bousquet rightly observes that we do not know for certain that when Antigonus was delayed by running aground in the Euripus he was on his way to Caria.
the purple and the diadem, clearly he had already been elected king.\textsuperscript{48} If Antigonus invaded Doris in 228, he was not yet, strictly speaking, king. But in view of his accession shortly afterwards this must later have seemed little more than an internal constitutional nicety, no doubt highly important to the Macedonians at the time, but very unlikely to seem so to the authorities in Cytinium, when they sent representatives to Xanthus nearly 23 years later, in 206/5.\textsuperscript{49} This slight discrepancy in terminology can scarcely be regarded as an obstacle to the reconstruction I have proposed.

Antigonus Doson's invasion of Doris and Phocis is a pendant to his defeat of the Aetolians in Thessaly. It probably led to the detaching of those parts of Phocis held by the Aetolians from their confederation and so precipitated the new alignment between Phocis and Boeotia. But Antigonus made no annexations south of Thessaly, perhaps because his ambitions were already centred on Caria. It was only the new situation, provoked by Cleomenes of Sparta, which presented him with the unexpected opportunity for a Peloponnesian policy. When that opportunity was offered and seized, the Phocian-Boeotian alliance fell conveniently into place within the new Hellenic Symmachy. Doris, meanwhile, continued to belong to the Aetolian Confederacy.

\textsuperscript{48} Justin. XXVIII 3.10.  
\textsuperscript{49} Frontinus, Strat. II 6.5, also calls Antigonus 'rex Macedonum' at the time of his victory over the Aetolians. But this too is a context in which one would not expect to find constitutional distinctions observed.