

D. M. SCHENKEVELD

PAP. HAMBURG. 128: A HELLENISTIC ARS POETICA

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1. In 1954 Bruno Snell published Papyrus Hamburgensis 128 ffr. a and b under the title Theophrast *περὶ λέξεως* I (?).¹ The papyrus is dated about 200 B.C.; fragment b contains some incomplete words and can be left out of discussion here, but fragment a, especially its columns II and III, is of great interest because of its many similarities to as well as divergences from Aristotle's list of kinds of ὄνομα in Poetics 21, 1457b1-58a7. After a long discussion in the shape of a running commentary Snell thinks it right to ascribe this text "mit grosser Wahrscheinlichkeit" to Theophrastus; it would form part of the first book of his *Περὶ λέξεως*. This work has been of great influence on later rhetorical theory, as e.g. Joh.Stroux has shown in his 1912 thesis.² If Snell is right, this would be an important discovery. Yet after its publication a few scholars only paid attention to this text, and that to a small extent. It was almost totally ignored in studies on Hellenistic and later rhetoric³ and got a few glancing remarks in those on the Poetics.⁴ Thus in his commentary on the Poetics D.W.Lucas several times refers to parallels in this papyrus to Aristotle's treatment⁵ and for obvious reasons does not give an exhaustive treatment; he speaks of "the probable frag. of Theophrastus' *Περὶ Λέξεως*" (p. 203). In the new edition of Theophrastus' fragments⁶ Snell's text with some changes and a translation has been published in the Appendix, nr. 9 (vol. II pp. 612-7). I do not know of any extensive discussion of this papyrus except Snell's one, and Doreen Innes is the only scholar to doubt explicitly Snell's ascription of this text to Theophrastus.⁷

I agree with Doreen Innes on this point but think that though not being from the hand of Theophrastus the text deserves more attention than has been given to it. This text is older than the works of Philodemus, Demetrius, the Auctor ad Herennium and Cicero and may give us new insights into the development of some part of poetical and/or rhetorical theory in the Hellenistic period, a period notorious for its lack of this kind of texts. My discussion will focus on col. II, ll. 33-64, which gives the best legible text and contains an interesting part

¹ Veröffentl. Hamburger Staats- und Univ.-Bibl. vol. 4, pp. 36-50. In Pack² it is no. 1502.

² De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi (Leipzig).

³ Neither the general ones like Kennedy (1963), Grube (1965) or The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism (1989) nor specific ones such as my Studies in Demetrius On Style (1964).

⁴ Nothing in the translations or studies on Poetics by Dupont-Roc & Lallot (1980), Halliwell (1986 and 1987) or Janko (1987). In his Aristotle on Comedy (London 1984, 183-4) R.Janko only says "Theophrastus [] in the papyrus of his *Περὶ Λέξεως*", thus accepting Snell's attribution.

⁵ Oxford 1968, 202-5.

⁶ Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence ed. and tr. by W.W.Fortenbaugh et al. (Leiden 1992).

⁷ Theophrastus and the Theory of Style in W.W.Fortenbaugh et al. (edd.), Theophrastus of Eresus. On his Life and work (Rutgers Univ. Stud. in Class. Hum. 2) (New Brunswick N.J. 1985), 252.

on metaphor, epithet and metonymy, and on the problem of ascription but in order to do the latter I shall also pay some attention to the whole of the papyrus and more to its relations with later theory. I shall avoid repeating points made by Snell, whose commentary is very instructive.

2. With frag. a, col. I, ll. 5-12, we are in the middle of a discussion of ὄνομα reminiscent of Poet. 20, 1457a10-14. Aristotle had said that the parts of an ὄνομα have no significance in themselves and referred to the element δῶρος in the compound Θεόδωρος. The papyrus very probably argues along the same lines but makes this point more clearly by saying that in Δῶρος the syllable ρος, which is left after removing the first syllable, has no meaning at all. This is the first time we see the author agreeing with Aristotle in general and correcting him at the same time.

About the contents of the next twenty lines (13-32) we can only make the reasonable guess that at one point the author starts an enumeration of the kinds of ὄνομα, first κύριον, but this part is lost barring a few words. However, at ll. 46-8 he defines the ἐπίθετον as τὸ μετὰ κυρίων ὀνομάτων λεγόμενον and it is very unlikely that a discussion of κύριον was not given before. The best place for this is in ll. 13-32. At lines 32-col. II., 37 the examples καμπτή]ρα νύσσαν and κλάδος, ἔρνος, βλακτός as well as μέλαν, δνοφερόν, ἐρεμνόν suggested to Snell the presence of a discussion of either γλῶττα or συνώνυμον. The first suggestion follows from a comparison of the list of Poetics 21 with that of the papyrus as given by Snell 48 (but I add more precise information about the legibility of certain terms).

Aristotle

κύριον
γλῶττα
μεταφορά
ἀπὸ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος
ἀπὸ εἶδους ἐπὶ γένος
ἀπὸ εἶδους ἐπὶ εἶδος
κατ' ἀναλογίαν
<κόσμος>

πεποιημένον
ἐπεκτεταμένον
ἀφηρημένον
ἐξηλλαγμένον

Papyrus

missing
[γλῶττα, συνώνυμον]
μεταφορά

ἐπίθετον
μετουσία
ἀπὸ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος
ἀπὸ εἶδους ἐπὶ γένος

[πεποιημέ]νον
ἀφ[ηρημένον]
ἐπεκτετα[μένον]
[συγκεκομμέ]νον
ἐ]ξηλλαγμένον

The correspondences are striking and insertion of γλωττα looks justified. To Aristotle a γλωττα is a strange word, "one which others use" (Poet. 1457b4, cp. Rhet. 1406a7), not primarily an archaic or rare word, e.g. one used by Homer, the sense usual in later times. In the papyrus 1. 32 first comes a (to speakers of Attic Greek) common word, then a Homeric one (καμπτή]ρα νύσσα). Therefore, it may well be that indeed the author is here discussing γλωττα in the later sense. As to examples in ll. 35-7 we should observe that in comparison with μέλας the two other words (δνοφερός, έρεμνός) may count as poetic γλωτται, but out of the first triad (κλάδος, έρνος, βλαστός) only the second one is of this kind, not, however, the third as we would expect. I think, therefore, that in ll. 33-37 the author adds a remark on synonyms to his discussion of γλωττα. If this is right, he introduces not only a new item but by linking it to γλωτται changes at the same time the connotation of synonym the word had in Rhet. 1405a1-2. For there Aristotle speaks of κύρια which are synonyms, like πορεύεσθαι and βαδίζειν. Apart from this, the triples have not become traditional examples of synonyms; instead, grammarians mostly give the list of ᾄορ, ξίφος, μάχαιρα, σπάθη, φάγανον (thus *Techne* 36,5 Uhlig).

3. It is preferable to look first at the lines 46-59 on επίθετον and the third column, lines 70-96 on πεποιημένον etc. and to postpone a discussion of the part on μεταφορά (ll. 37-46) after that on μετουσία (ll. 59-70) because of the problems involved.

The section on επίθετον first proves those right who interpret the Aristotelian κόσμος of Poet. 1457b2 as 'epithet', specifically the epitheton ornans.⁸ The epithet is defined as τὸ μετὰ κυρίων ὀνομάτων λεγόμενον, which makes Snell interpret κύριον ὄνομα as "Substantiv", and he adds: "weil ein 'gewöhnliches' Wort durch das schmückende Beiwort gehoben wird" (42). The definition of epithet in the *Techne* ascribed to Dionysius Thrax (34, 3-4), τὸ ἐπὶ κυρίων ἢ προσηγορικῶν [ὀμωνύμων] τιθέμενον (v.l. λεγόμενον) καὶ δηλοῦν ἔπαινον ἢ ψόγον shows Stoic influence in its distinction between proper names and appellatives, which distinction is absent here as well as in Aristotle's works, and explicitly mentions the ornans-characteristic implied in the papyrus. The examples in the papyrus are typically epitheta ornantia (κίδηρος αἶθων, χρυσὸς αἰγλήεις) and the same is true for most of those mentioned in ll. 50-59, where it is first said that "there is also double and triple (epithet) and (that) in respect to what does not apply" (tr. Fortenbaugh) and the instances are κακεφόρον, ἀρηίφιλον, [βο]τροκαρποτόκον and ἀστερομαροφεγγές (those of the last category I shall discuss later on). Snell fails to observe that to Aristotle διπλᾶ are any kind of compound words, whether ὄνομα (Poet. 1457a32-34) or verb (Rhet. 1406a35-7, χρονοτριβεῖν) and that at Rhet. 1406a30 and 08b10 he clearly distinguishes between διπλᾶ and ἐπίθετα, although his examples of *dipla* in 1405b35-06a5 mostly concern compound adjectives. Of course, in the lacuna of Poet. 1457b33 concerning κόσμος Aristotle may have mentioned compound epithets but this

⁸ See Snell 48 and my *The Lacuna at Aristotle's Poetics 1457b33* (forthcoming in *AJPh* 1993).

seems unlikely, as I have argued in my article referred to in note 8. We may, therefore, have a new partition of epithets here.

The last category is called κατὰ τὸ μὴ συμβεβηκός (Il. 51-2, τὸ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός in Il. 57-8),⁹ after which words is added ὃ δὴ κτέρησιν τινες καλοῦσιν. These latter words look like a reference to Aristotle for in Rhet. 1408a6-9 he mentions the use of κτέρησις and means by this a privative adjective (μέλος) ἄλυρον as a metaphor for κάλπικος), as Snell duly notes. The first typification of privative adjectives, however, is not known from Aristotle, he only offers the formal parallel ἢ μὴ κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός μεταβολή (Phys. 224b27-8), but in contrast to what Snell says ("er scheint aber auch später nicht vorzukommen") I found some parallel expressions. First, in his discussion of Hippocrates' description in Prognosticon 7 of the hypochondrium Galen says: <ἀνώδυνον> μὲν οὖν ὑποχόνδριον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ συμβεβηκότητος αὐτῷ λέλεκται. Two lines before he had observed that Hippocrates' use of this privative qualification was based ἐκ τῶν οὐχ ὑπαρχόντων, ἃ δὴ καλεῖν ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις ἀποσυμβεβηκότα.¹⁰ The latter term ('negative symptoms'. LSJ) is found in Sextus Emp., Adv. math. 7, 281-2. There he criticizes the definition of 'man' in [Plato], Def. 415a11 (ζῷον ἄπτερον, δίπουν, πλατυώνυχον) because it does not give essential qualities and only τὰ συμβεβηκότα καὶ ἀποσυμβεβηκότα. The word ἄπτερον is an ἀποσυμβεβηκός,¹¹ whereas δίπουν belongs to the συμβεβηκότα, the accidental properties. Evidently, these passages display both formal and material correspondences to the expression of the papyrus.¹²

In discussing properties Aristotle always sharply distinguishes between natural and accidental qualities. Absence of a property can be natural, e.g. a serpent is ἄπους φύσει (HA 491a24), or accidental (Metaph. 1022a22). In Metaph. 1022a32-6 Aristotle connects αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ α ἀποφάσεις with κτερήσεις, which latter word is also used in Rhet. 1408a8-9 (see above). We can only guess at the reason our author had to put the rather clumsy expression κατὰ τὸ μὴ συμβεβηκός instead of κτέρησις.

The examples the papyrus gives for privatives are ἄπλου and ἄπτερον. According to Snell the first word occurs in prose only (And. 3,5 etc.) and because in his opinion the text focuses on poetic usage he changes this word to ἄπουν, which occurs from Soph., Phil. 632 onwards.¹³ The error, he says, will have been made under the influence of the preceding words in -πλου. Snell may be right, but for the wrong reasons. I leave aside the occurrence of ἄπλοος in a poetic context (A.R. 4, 1270-1 ἄλμη ἄπλοος) and do not stress the fact that in treatments of metaphors and other tropes later rhetorical handbooks

⁹ Snell rightly explains the difference as a case of variety, well-known from the Corpus Aristotelicum.

¹⁰ In Hippocratis Prognosticum commentarii libri tres (CMG 5.9.2), 18b, 85,12-86,4.

¹¹ Many instances of this verb from patristic authors will be found in the lexica of Sophocles and Lampe.

¹² After Aristotle Stoics and grammarians call privative nouns and adjectives κτερητικά ὀνόματα (FDS 938-9; Ap.D., adv. 133,23).

¹³ The other example, ἄπτερος, is found in poetry from Homer onwards but Snell fails to remark that it also occurs in prose, see immediately hereafter.

most times adduce instances from poetry, not from prose. Of more importance, I think, is that ἄπουσ and ἄπτερος are to Aristotle his usual illustrations of absence of properties.¹⁴ These words may well have become standard examples of privative adjectives and for that reason got into the text.

Compared to Poetics 21 our text replaces the Aristotelian κόσμος by ἐπίθετον. Already Aristotle uses the latter word in connection with adjectives (Rhet. 1405a10, b21-2 and 06a10-35), and κόσμος in this sense occurs in Poet. 21 only. At other times it has the wider meaning of ornatus and this sense is the usual one later on. This may be the reason why in the papyrus it has not been taken over.

4. Text and interpretation of col. 3, ll. 70-96 do not ask for much comment after Snell's discussion. The presence of paragraphoi in ll. 70, 77, 79, 82 and 91 make it very probable that at those lines a discussion of new notions starts.¹⁵ With Snell I think that in l. 79 we have to read ἀφηρημένον, in l. 83 ἐπεκτεταμένον and in ll. 91-2 ἐξηλλαγμένον. The insertions of πεποιημένον in l. 70 and συγκεκομμένον in l. 86 are almost certain because of the sequence in Poet. 1457b33 and the probable occurrence of the example [θυ]γατέρων θυγ[ατρῶν], which words in later theory (Hdn., Gramm.gr. 2, 244) illustrate συκοπή. As we have seen, the list of kinds of nomina is very much alike to that of Poet. 21, be it that it is longer by συγκεκομμένον and ἀφηρημένον and ἐπεκτεταμένον have changed places. But also to Aristotle they are closely related and he treats them together.

More than anything else in the papyrus the wording of these terms shows the close imitation here of the list in Poet. c. 21: they all are participles perf. pass. used as a substantive to indicate a species of ὄνομα. In later lists of tropes we meet more often with original nouns such as συκοπή, ὀνοματοποιία and ἀφαίρεσις.¹⁶

5. In Poet. 21 Aristotle offers a quadruple classification of metaphors: transfer from genus to species (1), from species to genus (2), from species to species (3) and that based on analogy, a proportion (4). In the discussion of metaphor in the papyrus (ll. 38-45) such a division is absent but in that of μετουσία (ll. 59-68) it is said that this notion is classified in two ways (διτταχῶς ἐγλαμβάνουσιν).¹⁷ In what follows there is a distinction between μετουσία ἀπὸ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος and its mirror image. Notwithstanding the illegibility of the examples both Snell and Lucas take it that the Aristotelian notion of metaphor is split up into metaphor and μετουσία. Metaphor, they think, is now being restricted to the proportional kind (# 4) and the types ## (1) and (2) have been moved to μετουσία, the third type, transfer

¹⁴ Cp. Bonitz s.vv.

¹⁵ "Very probable" only because in ll. 53 and 63 these critical signs introduce, not a new notion, but an explanation. Moreover, in l. 59, the start of the discussion of μετουσία, a paragraphos is lacking.

¹⁶ But see already Poet. 1458b2 αἱ ἐπεκτάσεις καὶ ἀποκοπαὶ καὶ ἐξαλλαγαὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων.

¹⁷ For this expression cp. Arist., An. pr. 32b26 τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι [...] διχῶς ἔστιν ἐκλαμβάνειν.

from species to species, apparently being dropped.¹⁸ In principle I agree with this view but a somewhat longer discussion looks necessary.

First the lines 59-68 on μετουσία. The first part of Snell's comment is right: "μετουσία, das später (Polyxenos b. Alex. Aphr. zu Arist. Met. 84, 16, Plotin, Proklos) die Bedeutung von μέθεξις hat, erscheint hier zuerst in philosophisch-grammatischer Bedeutung",¹⁹ but the second part not: "Eine ähnliche Bedeutung wie hier scheint das Wort sonst nicht zu haben", for there are several exact parallels and one comparable case, all of them of later date. The first parallel is Schol. b on Iliad X 441 (δίπλακα πορφυρέην, ἐν δε θρόνα ποικίλ' ἔπαρσε): θρόνα· τὰ βαπτὰ ἔρια κατὰ μετουσίαν, ὁμοίως τοῖς ποιούδι τὰ ποιούμενα.²⁰ Eustathius' comment is similar (1278, 46 = IV, 648, 117 vdValk): θρόνα δὲ κυρίως μὲν τὰ ἐκ θηρίων ἢ τὰ ἐκ γῆς ἀναθορόντα φάρμακα, νῦν δὲ κατὰ μετουσίαν θρόνα ἡγουν φάρμακα ἔφη τὰ βεβαμμένα λῖνα ἢ ἔρια.²¹ Both the scholiast and Eustathius explain the occurrence of θρόνα at X 441 as a case of figurative use of a word, which use they call 'participation': the product, 'flowers embroidered on cloth' (LSJ), is indicated by the material from which it is made. A further parallel comes from scholium c on Pindar, Nem. 6, 85. In ll. 50-1 Pindar tells that Achilles kills Memnon "with the point of his wrathful spear" and a scholiast a.1. explains the use of ἔγχεος ζακότοιο thus: ζακότον φησι κατὰ μετουσίαν τοῦ φέροντος καὶ αὐτὸ συμπνέον τῇ ὀργῇ, ἀπὸ τῶν παρ' Ὀμήρω· "πολλὰ δὲ [...] ἴταντο, λιλαίόμενα χροὸς ἄσαι" (Λ 573; O 316).²² It is interesting to note that Aristonicus-Aristarchus on Λ 574 speaks of ἐκ τῶν ἐμψύχων μεταφέρει, a classification we shall meet with later on but which has its origin in Aristotle's remarks on "making the lifeless living through metaphor" (Rhet. 1411b24 ff.), where he quotes Λ 574 as an example of a proportional metaphor which πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποιεῖ. The comparable case to our papyrus I found in Doreen Innes' paper mentioned in note 7; it stands in Anon. # xxix, De tropis iii, 208 Spengel. He instances catachresis by "e.g. if one calls a box made of bronze by way of participation (μετουσιατικῶς) pyxis for only one made of box-wood is properly called pyxis. In like

¹⁸ The sequence of the types (1) and (2) in the papyrus is not certain. Snell reads ἐνίοτε μὲν [ἀπ'] εἶδους ἐπὶ γένος, <ἐνίοτε δ' ἀπὸ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος>· οἷον ἀπὸ γένους μὲν ἐπ' εἶδος] κτλ. thus giving sequence (2)-(1). D.Sedley ap. Fortenbaugh suggests sequence (1)-(2), which is the Aristotelian one. However, Snell's order with the following (partly legible) illustration has the advantage of giving the common Greek sequence abba.

¹⁹ But "in philosophisch-grammatischer Bedeutung" begs the question of the papyrus' authorship.

²⁰ "(Pieces of) dyed wool by participation, the product in like manner with the material".

²¹ "θρόνα properly the material taken from animals or the useful herbs sprung from the earth, but now by means of participation Homer called the (pieces of) dyed linen or wool θρόνα, i.e. φάρμακα". Note the etymology θρόνα from ἀναθορόντα and/or θηρίων.

²² "He uses ζακότον by participation with its bearer, the spear itself breathing together with his anger. Taken from (or: model is) Homer's lines "the spears were standing [...], longing to taste flesh". Schol. b a.1. has a different explanation, which has no connection with figurative usage.

manner we speak of the 'neck' of a jar etc." ²³ So far some parallels for the papyrus' term μετουσία.

Its author says that this kind of word is classified in two ways "from what follows" (ἐκ τοῦ παρεπομένου). Aristotle distinguishes between 'the accident' and 'the consequent' (e.g. Top. 128a38 and 131a27) and in Rhet. 1401b15-29 he discusses first the 'fallacy of the accident' (τόπος διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός), then the 'fallacy of the consequent' (τόπος παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον).²⁴ The interpretation of these two fallacies is not without problems²⁵ but can be left aside here. From Top. 117a7-15 we learn that the enquiry ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔπεσθαι concerns not only what follows later but also what is immediately preceding. In Soph. El. 181a22-30 a different split of ἡ τῶν ἐπομένων ἀκολουθήσις is being used, one of which being ὡς τῷ ἐν μέρει τὸ καθόλου, οἶον ἀνθρώπῳ ζῶον. This latter text uses the distinction between species and genus, as we would put it. Aristotle, however, may also speak of τὸ ἐπάνω γένος and τὸ ὑποκάτω γένος, e.g. Top. 143a15-28 with the example ὁ γὰρ φυτὸν εἶπας οὐ λέγει δένδρον. The author of the papyrus, we may conclude, has taken over an Aristotelian term which matches the distinction of species and genus. Unfortunately, the text of Il. 64-70 is almost totally illegible and we do not know which examples are given.²⁶

The choice of the term μετουσία as 'participation' will have been stimulated by Aristotle's discussion of the relationship between species and genus. In Top. 121a10-20 he says that obviously the species participate in their genus, but not conversely. He uses the verb μετέχειν here and in 132b35-33a11 in a similar context μέθεξις. Already Snell pointed out the interchangeability of μέθεξις and μετουσία in later commentaries on Aristotle. When looking for a fitting term for this kind of word someone may have chosen μετουσία, and not μέθεξις, perhaps because the latter word had already become a technical term with specific associations, such as in Plato's philosophy. The term was not successful; later on we shall look at its successor, metonymy/synecdoche.

6. The interpretation of the part on metaphor is hindered by a textual problem in Il. 37-42, the very definition of metaphor. Snell gives it as follows: μεταφορὰν δὲ <τὸ> τῶν αὐτῶν ὀνομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων συνθέτων ἀπὸ ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐπ' ἄλλο πρᾶγμα μετενηνεγμένον. As its examples we get τὸ γῆρας δυσμάς βίου, τὴν ἔρημον νῆσον χηρεύειν ἀνδῶν and τὸν βασιλέα ποιμένα ἀνδρῶν.²⁷ The insertion of <τό> is based

²³ Spengel gives μόνη γὰρ κυρίως ἢ ἐκ πύξου μετουσιατικῶς πύξις ὀνομάζεται, which I do not understand. I move μετουσιατικῶς to the foregoing phrase ὡς εἶ τις <μετουσιατικῶς> λέγει πυξίδα τὴν ἐκ χαλκοῦ κατεσκευασμένην.

²⁴ Cp. Soph. El. 166a25 and 176b1 ff. In these cases there is no difference between ἔπεσθαι and παρέπεσθαι.

²⁵ Cp. W.M.A. Grimaldi S.J., Aristotle, Rhetoric II. A commentary (New York 1988), a.1.

²⁶ See Snell a.1. for conjectural supplements after the still legible ὑ]ποκριτάς.

²⁷ Resp. Plato, Leg. 770a (in Poet. 1457b25 example of the proportional metaphor); Homer, Od. ι 124 and Il. A 263.

on its occurrence in definitions in ll. 46, 70 etc.²⁸ To Snell the text of ll. 37-42 is anything but acceptable and he suggests a different text, which, however, to his mind gives problems and which, moreover, takes τὸ μετενηνεγμένον in the sense of "die Übertragung", whereas the substantival participle cannot have this sense.²⁹ Fortenbaugh translates "Men (call) metaphor the transfer of unchanged substantival or verbal composite expressions from something similar to another thing" and is right in adding: "The Greek text is awkward and probably corrupt". Hence a new attempt to constitute a better text is unavoidable.

It is certain that to the author metaphor has to do in some way with the transfer of words from one πρᾶγμα to another because of a similarity. Aristotle's definition, "movement (ἐπιφορά) of an alien name (ὄνομα)" (Poet. 1457b6-7), says nothing about resemblance being the guarantee for transfer but in 1459a8 we read τὸ γὰρ εἶ μεταφέρειν τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἔστιν. What is transferred is ὄνομα in its widest meaning of 'word', words being symbols of pragmata (Soph. El. 165a6-10). From Aristotle's examples in Poet. and Rhet. it follows that he excludes the possibility of transfer of conjunctions, pronouns etc. and restricts metaphor to nomina (substantives and adjectives) and verba. Such a restriction is explicitly made in the papyrus' definition; later theoreticians are less precise and speak of the transfer of a word, but once Quintilian (8, 6,5) puts it thus: *transfertur ergo nomen aut verbum*. To understand the words τῶν αὐτῶν we have to keep in mind that in later theory (Auctor ad Herennium, Cicero etc.) the main difference between metaphor (and catachresis) on the one hand and metonymy and synecdoche on the other is that metaphor concerns transfer of a word used to indicate properly one thing to a different thing, whereas in the other two tropes one word replaces another word, which is closely related ('substitution') and in which case, moreover, the 'leap' is less big. In this view the occurrence of τῶν αὐτῶν is correct. What Aristotle indicates as the movement of an (in its original context properly used) alien word is here the transfer of the same words. Under this interpretation there is no need to change these words into αὐτῶν τῶν (Snell 42).

Why the plural ὀνομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων? This question is related to the problem of συνθέτων. Following a suggestion of Snell, Fortenbaugh relates this word to the discussion about compound words in ll. 6-12, but I do not know of any restriction of metaphor to this kind of words and the examples of the papyrus for metaphor immediately disprove this interpretation. The position of συνθέτων makes it advisable to take it with both ὀνομάτων

²⁸ A *verbum dicendi* in the third person plural, e.g. λέγουσιν (cf. ll. 61, 66, 70) can be supplied mentally; such a form does not imply that this author summarizes what someone else said before, as Snell on l. 60f. suggests. The use of "subjektlose 3. Person Plural für den Begriff 'man'" is common in Hellenistic prose, not only in the case of *verba dicendi*. See L.Rydbeck, *Fachprosa, vermeintliche Volkssprache und Neues Testament* (Uppsala 1967), 36-8.

²⁹ His suggestion is <τὸ> τῶν ὀνομάτων αὐτῶν ἢ ῥημάτων συνθέτων ... μετενηνεγμένον, and its sense would be: "Die Übertragung von einzelnen Wörter selbst oder von zusammengesetzten Wendungen". As to the pair ὄνομα (Einzelwort) and ῥῆμα (Wendung) he refers to Plato, *Crat.* 399b, but in these cases Aristotle uses ὄνομα and λόγος.

and ῥημάτων. Indeed, σύνθεσις ὀνομάτων is the usual term in rhetorical-poetical treatises for 'putting words in a context'. Quintilian (8, 3, 38) makes the interesting remark *translata probari nisi in contextu sermonis non possunt* and also observes in his introduction to the discussion of tropes (8, 6, 2) that *verti formas non verborum modo, sed et sensuum et compositionis*. Though the first remark aims only at the evaluation of metaphors and ancient treatises always define metaphor as the transfer of a word, not of words, it is clear that to interpret a word as an instance of metaphorical usage can only be done in its context. To interpret *δυσμαί* as referring to old age we need a context. This can be very small, like here, viz. *δυσμαί βίου*. All three examples of metaphor consist of a combination of two words, one of which forms the context for the other, transferred word. Apart from discussions on metaphor we find *συντιθέναι* and *σύνθεσις* in the sense of 'putting words in a context, combining a word with another' in Aristotle's discussion of sophisms based on linguistic means (*παρὰ τὴν λέξιν*, *Soph. E1. I. 4*). One of these is called *παρὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν*, and its counterpart *παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν*. An example of this sophism is *'εγὼ ε' ἔθηκα δούλον ὄντ' ἐλεύθερον* with two possible meanings.³⁰ One of the clearest examples of the use of the verb occurs in 166a17-21 in the treatment of the sophism *παρὰ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν*: 'a third type occurs when the combination (*τὸ συντεθέν*) has more than one meaning but taken apart (*κεχωρισμένον*) one only, e.g. *ἐπίσταται γράμματα*. For here each word means one thing, the word *ἐπίσταται* and the word *γράμματα*, but both together more than one, either that the letters themselves have knowledge or that someone else has knowledge of letters.' Therefore, I interpret *συνθέτων* in ll. 39-40 as meaning 'combined with another word, put in a context.' In this interpretation the use of the plural is understandable. The context can be that of nouns only, but also one of noun+verb, and the Greek conjunction ἢ admits the sense 'and/or.'³¹

As to the transfer "from one similar thing to another" Snell rightly remarks that one would expect the more logical expression *ἀπὸ πράγματός τινος εἰς ἄλλο τι ὅμοιον*. However, as it stands the expression is lucid enough.

Thus the separate parts of the definitions look alright but the whole not yet.³² E.g. *μετενηνεγμένον* in itself may look acceptable, especially in combination with an inserted <τό> in l. 38, and this insertion is quite defensible, as we have seen. However, the participle perf. pass. cannot stand for the nomen actionis ("Übertragung") and it looks as if we should read *μετενηνεγμένων*, thus bringing it in accord with *ὀνομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων*. Without inserting <τό> we now have *μεταφορὰν δὲ* (sc. *λέγουσιν*) *τῶν ... ῥημάτων*

³⁰ 'I set you free (enfranchised you) when you were a slave' or 'I made you slave (enslaved you) when you were free'.

³¹ Cp. the remarks of Ap.D., conj. 219,11-15 on ἢ παραδιαζευκτική.

³² One additional observation concerns the word order and the position of the definite articles in the examples of metaphor: *οἶον τὸ γῆρας δυσμάς βίου κτλ.* The metaphor is *δυσμαί βίου* and *τὸ γῆρας* is not predicate nominal as one would expect. The solution is the author's adherence to Aristotle's text in *Poet. 1457b22-5* *ἐρεῖ τοίνυν ... τὸ γῆρας ἐπέραν βίου ἢ δυσμάς βίου*.

..μετενηνεγμένων, which words mean: 'They speak of metaphor when the same nouns and/or verbs ...have been transferred'. In theory this is acceptable Greek but I do not know of any definition in Greek literature formulated by means of an absolute construction. More acceptable and involving minimal change is to read instead of δέ in l. 38 δ' ἐ<κ>. For 'to call something after' the Greek uses expressions like λέγειν, προσαγορεύειν, ὀνομάζειν, κολεῖν ἀπό or ἐκ.³³ Keeping to μετενηνεγμένων we now get a dependent construction, in which the participle expresses the main idea:³⁴ 'They call metaphor after the transfer of the same nouns and/or verbs, in a new combination, from one similar thing to another. This text has a twofold function: explicitly it says why metaphor is called thus, implicitly it defines metaphor. The absence of a formal definition is not an unsurmountable obstacle for in ll. 59 ff. there is not even a start for a definition of metousia. All in all, I accept this latter reading of the Greek text³⁵ be it with some doubt.

7. The interpretation of the three examples of metaphor is linked with the question what type of metaphor the author is thinking of. Does he restrict his notion of metaphor to Aristotle's fourth kind, the proportional metaphor, as Snell supposes (see § 5)? In favour of this view Snell can refer to the first example, δυομαὶ βίου, which to Aristotle is a metaphor of analogy (Poet. 145b24-5). The two other instances permit a similar reading: inhabitants: to be deserted::husband:to be widowed, and king:subjects::shepherd:sheep.³⁶ We may add that in later theory the notion of ὁμοιότης (to a lesser extent, apparently, similitudo in Latin texts) used in connection with metaphor mostly corresponds to the Aristotelian notion of analogy³⁷ and that a restriction of metaphor to this type is very common. In fact, Aristotle's insistence on the proportional metaphor being the best of all four types (e.g. Rhet. 1411a1) will have stimulated this limitation. Besides, in the Aristotelian theory of metaphor the fourth type requires a big mental leap from one notion to another, which is being made possible by detecting a common function for both: what the shield is to Ares is the wine cup to Dionysus, the common factor being that both shield and cup are standard attributes of deities. Such a big leap is absent from the transfer from species to genus and vv. (## 1 and 2), whereas type # 3 (species to species) is much like the proportional metaphor, witness the example in Rhet. 1410b13-5: "When [Homer] calls old age 'stubble', he creates understanding and knowledge through the genus, since both old age and stubble are [species

³³ E.g. Arist., EN 1152b7 διὸ ὀνομάκασιν τὸν μάκαριον ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν, GC 322b31 τὰ δὲ ἕτερα ὀνόματα ἀπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων λέγεται, Phys. 187b3 προσαγορεύεσθαι ... ἐκ τοῦ μάλιςτ' ὑπερέχοντος.

³⁴ In this case in the translation the use of the word 'transfer' is justified.

³⁵ A third possible text is <τὸ ἐκ> τῶν αὐτῶν ...συνθέτων ...μετενηνεγμένον, or even to change συνθέτων in σύνθετον, but these have problems of their own too.

³⁶ Cp. [Georg. Choeroboscus], de tropis 245,23-25, ὡς περ τοῖς ποιμέσιν ὑποτέτακται τὰ ποιμνία, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς βασιλευσίν οἱ ὑπὸ χεῖρα; ποιμὴν γὰρ κυρίως ὁ τῶν προβάτων νομεὺς λέγεται, and other references given by H.Jürgensen, Der antike Metaphernbegriff (Diss. Kiel 1968), 45.

³⁷ Jürgensen, o.c. 43-50.

of the genus of] things that have lost their bloom".³⁸ In fact, Aristotle's distinction of types ## 3 and 4 is more due to his wish for a logical classification than to their use in practice.³⁹ For these reasons we can understand why in later Greek theory *ὁμοιότης* was restricted to the proportional metaphor. As I have said, this resemblance is one in function. In e.g. HA 48617-9 Aristotle explicitly tells us that in the case of some animals parts like a bird's feathers and scales of fish are the same, not because of their form but according to an analogy. Here a distinction between similarity of function and resemblance in form occurs. Hence we understand the contrast made by Demetrius, *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* 88 when he says:⁴⁰ "Note, however, that when *ρφόνδυλος* καὶ *κλείς* καὶ *κτένες* are applied to parts of the body, these terms are not being used *κατὰ μεταφοράν*, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὁμοιότητα διὰ τὸ εἰκέναι κτλ." In this section Demetrius, as I have argued elsewhere,⁴¹ restricts 'metaphor' to the metaphor of analogy and introduces a contrast between metaphor and resemblance,⁴² whereas before in § 78 he asked for metaphors which are not far-fetched but derived from a resemblance (ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου); οἶον ἔοικεν ἀλλήλοις στρατηγός, κυβερνήτης, ἡνίοχος· πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ἄρχοντές εἰσιν. ἀσφαλῶς οὖν ἐρεῖ καὶ ὁ τὸν στρατηγὸν κυβερνήτην λέγων τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ἀνάπαλιν ὁ τὸν κυβερνήτην ἄρχοντα τῆς νηός. Demetrius does not say so explicitly but his argument concerns the transference from species to species under the genus of being a leader, which comes close to the proportional metaphor. The apparent contradiction is solved if we realize that in § 88 Demetrius is speaking of outer, formal resemblance not of a functional similarity, which latter meaning is present in § 78.

The foregoing serves to explain how and why in the Hellenistic period the Aristotelian theory of metaphor was modified and his notion of metaphor was split into metaphor proper, the proportional one (including the third type of species to species), and another group of the types ## 1 and 2, which now asks for attention. Snell 44 explains it thus: "Die 'Metusie' kann also entweder darauf gehen, dass ein allgemeiner Ausdruck das Spezielle oder aber ein spezieller Ausdruck das Allgemeine bezeichnet. Von der Metapher, die etwas von einem Fremden und Andersartigen 'herüberholt', ist also die Metusie mit gutem Grund geschieden." Taken by itself this explanation is right but lacks a setting in later theory. The following survey serves as an indication of this setting and, at the same time, shows the confusion reigning in this field. It is well-known that from the Auctor ad Herennium

³⁸ Transl. G.A.Kennedy, Aristotle, *On Rhetoric* (Oxford 1991).

³⁹ Lausberg §§ 555.3 and 558.

⁴⁰ References to and comparisons with Demetrius' theories are specifically apt in this treatment of a Hellenistic papyrus for "though written much later, [his] work is highly anachronistic, drawing on fourth- and third-century sources and ignoring or ignorant of late Hellenistic theories" (G.A.Kennedy (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism*, vol. I: *Classical Criticism* (Cambridge 1989), 196.

⁴¹ *Studies in Demetrius On Style* (Amsterdam 1964), 94-96, but I posited too big a difference with Demetrius' foregoing statements on metaphor.

⁴² I cannot follow Jürgensen's objection (48-9) to this explanation.

onwards handbooks give a collection of tropes which to Aristotle come under metaphor. There are four main types: metaphor (in the restricted sense), catachresis (cp. Poet. 1457b28), metonymy and synecdoche. The papyrus has no trace of any distinction of catachresis, whereas e.g. Demetrius "appears to know the theory in 86-7, though [he] does not use the term"⁴³ and, we may add, has nothing to say on metonymy and synecdoche either. Differentiation between metonymy and synecdoche is known to e.g. Auctor ad Her. (4, 43-5, *denominatio* and *intellectio*) and Cicero (*De orat.* 3, 167-8), but Cicero is less precise in his terms; he calls metonymy *transductio et immutatio* but only characterizes cases of synecdoche as *finitima illa [...], cum intellegi volumus aliquid aut ex parte totum eqs.* He takes metonymy and synecdoche together when saying that *immutata [...]* *sunt translata quodam modo* (§ 169). In *Orator* 92-3 (cf. *Part. or.* 17) he ignores synecdoche and distinguishes between *verba tralata* and *mutata*. In the latter group of 'altered words' "another word is substituted for the correct one, meaning the same, but drawn from some associated idea"⁴⁴ (*sumptum ex re aliqua consequenti*), which words remind one of the papyrus' ἐκ τοῦ παρεπομένου! Cicero adds that this device is called by rhetoricians ὑπαλλαγή because of the exchange of words,⁴⁵ by grammarians μετωνυμία because *nomina* are transferred and that Aristotle ranges under *transference* both these phenomena and also *catachresis*. It is clear that the papyrus' *metousia* corresponds to Cicero's *transductio et immutatio* (*verba mutata*). According to Jürgensen 32 and 34, who, however, does not discuss this papyrus, the types ## 1 and 2 of the Aristotelian metaphor return later as species of the trope synecdoche. This is true but even then examples are put under different species. Thus e.g. Quintilian 8, 6, 19 has the subtype *ex genere speciem* but his example *ferrum pro gladio* belongs according to Trypho, *De trop.* 3, 196, 5-7 to the subtype ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα. This reminds us of the use of μετουσία in Sch. II. X 441b, quoted above. Moreover, the Auctor ad Herennium, who distinguishes between *denominatio* and *intellectio*, defines metonymy as *quae ab rebus propinguis et finitimis trahit orationem eqs.*, thus coming close to Cicero's definition of *immutatio* in a wider sense. Cocondrius, *De trop.* 3, 233, 22, to take another example, explains metonymy as a substitution κατά τινα κοινωνίαν τῶν πραγμάτων and κοινωνία recalls μετουσία. To my mind, therefore, it is preferable to say that the papyrus' μετουσία represents what in later theory has become metonymy and synecdoche.

Taken in this way the papyrus' concept of μετουσία shows both distance from and adherence to Aristotle's ideas, distance for μετουσία is taken away from metaphor and

⁴³ Doreen Innes, *Cicero on Tropes*, *Rhetorica* vi, 1988, 325 in reaction to my *Studies* 97-8.

⁴⁴ Tr. M. Winterbottom in Russell-Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism* (Oxford 1972), 243.

⁴⁵ Cf. D.H., *Comp.* 3, p. 11, 16-8 U.-R., οὔτε μεταφοραὶ τινες εὐγενεῖς οὔτε ὑπαλλαγαὶ οὔτε καταχρήσεις κτλ. and Sch. II. O 52b ὑπαλλακτικῶς. In *Pomp.* 2, p. 228, 9-12 Dionysius censures Plato's misuse of ἐπίθετα, μετωνυμῖαι, ἀναλογία ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς and ἀλληγοραὶ. These parallels to Cicero's statement are often ignored in secondary literature.

adherence in far as the distinction of species to genus v.v. is being kept. This notion also establishes a link with later theory of the tropes metonymy and synecdoche. It will not do, however, to reconstruct a kind of Darwinian scheme of evolution of the ancient theory of tropes for we have to reckon with various attempts which came to nothing next to successful ones. It is impossible to put together in one neat, single scheme the different data from Philodemus, Demetrius, Dionysius, Auctor ad Herennium, Cicero, Trypho and our papyrus.

8. Evidently the list in the papyrus is a list of various types of ὀνόματα, not one of e.g. tropes and figures. By analogy with Poet. 21-2 Snell 48-9 concludes "dass der Pap. eine Übersicht über die Arten (poetischer) Worten gibt, um auf Grund davon die ἀρετὴ λέξεως zu behandeln, wie Aristoteles es im 22. Kapitel tut." This sounds quite reasonable but is not certain at all and a different context is very well imaginable. But the conditions for such an endeavour are determined by the preliminary problem of authorship and style of this text. Snell 49-51 ascribes this treatise to Theophrastus: "Bei einem frühhellenistischen Text, der geradewegs auf die ἀρετὴ λέξεως zusteuert, der von Aristoteles anhängt, aber dessen Gedanken und Terminologie doch selbständig ausbaut, denkt man zuerst an Theophrasts Schrift περὶ λέξεως." He has two arguments, one the statement made by Porphyry and transmitted by Simplicius, in Cat. p. 10, 20-11, 2 (= # 683 Fortenbaugh), that Theophrastus in his On the Elements of Speech as well as his associates⁴⁶ worked up the subject of words in so far as they are expressions, not categories. They inquired whether noun and verb are the only elements of speech or also conjunctions etc., καὶ τίς ἢ κυρία λέξις, τίς δὲ μεταφορικὴ λέξις, καὶ τίνα τὰ πάθη αὐτῆς οἶον τί ἀποκοπή, τί ἀφαίρεσις, τίνες αἱ ἀπλαῖ, τίνες αἱ σύνθετοι, τίνες αἱ ὑποσύνθετοι, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα and discussed the various qualities of style. Snell admits that because of the reference to the associates Porphyrius' report is not an exact reproduction of the order in Theophrastus' book but according to him this text shows that in some part of his περὶ λέξεως Theophrastus closely followed Poetics 21. This will have happened - this is the second argument - in his discussion of the first virtus orationis, ἐλληνισμός. We will, therefore, have a neat parallel between Poetics 21-22 (list of kinds of words followed by a discussion of their use in order to get ἀρετὴ λέξεως) and this papyrus (list of words followed by a discussion of ἐλληνισμός, being the first quality of style). After a sensible observation on the question why Theophrastus' book, which is commonly seen as dealing with rhetoric, has so much to say on poetical words and means as is being done in the papyrus, Snell 51 concludes: "Man wird also mit grosser Wahrscheinlichkeit unseren Papyrus dem Theophrast zuweisen dürfen. Der notizenhafte Stil wird bei den Verfasser der "Charaktere" nicht wundernehmen; andererseits fehlt nicht eine gewisse Sorgfalt, z.B. ist der Hiatus vermieden."

⁴⁶ Like most scholars, Snell quotes after the Berlin edition οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν γεγραφότες, but already Stroux 24, n. 2 pointed out that the reading οἱ περὶ αὐτῶν γεγραφότες is preferable to the usual one, because then both the verb and the perfect participle give a good sense.

Snell's stance on the authorship has been doubted by Doreen Innes, who observes (see note 7): "It is perhaps suspicious that later theory fails to use the term *metousia*." Indeed, if this text were by Theophrastus, we would expect more traces of its influence. But the fact is that e.g. Demetrius often quotes from Theophrastus' work, also on the subject of metaphor, and shows himself to be a sturdy representative of the Aristotelian tradition but gives no indication at all of any awareness of the notion of *metousia*/metonymy. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, too, quotes from and uses *Περὶ λέξεως*, in his works the terms *ὑπαλλαγαί* and *μετωνυμῖαι* occur once each but not *μετουσία*. Moreover, we have a few literal quotations from *Περὶ λέξεως*, e.g. Dionysius, *Lys.* 14 (= # 692 Fortenbaugh). These quotations remind us of the style in *Poet.* 21 by their personal remarks and arguments or conclusions about agreements or differences between the kinds of words. All these traits are absent from the papyrus.⁴⁷ Its style is rather that of a *τέχνη*, like the *Techne* ascribed to Dionysius Thrax, and which has been well described by Fuhrmann and Wouters:⁴⁸ short definitions, some examples, systematic arrangement of the elements to be described, no argumentation or some only, sometimes an indication of a divergent opinion or a reference to a different term. For these reasons the authorship of Theophrastus is unlikely in the case of the text of our papyrus. The author may have been one of those other men who have written on elements of speech and are referred to by Porphyry.

From the rejection of Snell's ascription to Theophrastus follows that it is no longer necessary to see the text of the papyrus as a preparation to a discussion how to achieve virtue(s) of style. It may have been so but this is only one possibility. Another is to view the papyrus as part of one of the earliest *τέχναι γραμματικά*. In the authentic part of Dionysius' *Techne* the second task of *γραμματική* is *ἐξήγησις κατὰ τοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντα ποιητικοὺς τρόπους*, in which description the term 'poetical tropes' has the wide meaning of 'poetical modes of expression.'⁴⁹ To perform this second task an introduction on kinds of words would not have been amiss. But much here is pure hypothesis and it seems preferable to characterize the text of Pap.Hamb.128 as a Hellenistic *ars poetica*.

Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit

D.M.Schenkeveld

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⁴⁷ The text is not an epitome. See note 28.

⁴⁸ M.Fuhrmann, *Das systematische Lehrbuch* (Göttingen 1960), 29-34; A.Wouters, *The grammatical Papyri from Graeco-Roman Egypt* (Brussel 1979), 41-5.

⁴⁹ See my *Figures and Tropes* in G.Ueding (ed.), *Rhetorik zwischen den Wissenschaften* (Tübingen 1991), 153-6.