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Alcibiades in the Rhetorical Tradition
P. Strass. Inv. Gr. 2346 (= P² 2497)

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P. Strass. Inv. Gr. 2346 (=P² 2497) was first published in *Études de Papyrologie* 3 (1936) 79-87 by Naphtali Lewis. It is a fragment from a fifth century papyrus codex, originally measuring at least 25 cm. in height, containing two columns per page. Actual column height can no longer be reconstructed; there are now between 24-30 letters per line surviving. *Ed. pr.* applied the term recto to the side written along the fiber, verso to the side with writing against the fiber; however, the order of writing the pages can no longer be determined. Therefore, I have employed the terms 'front' and 'back' instead of 'recto' and 'verso'. The hand is a large, rather ungainly semi-cursive. Diacritics include an apostrophe to indicate elision of a final letter of a preposition (once with κατ'ελυcα) and after οὐκ (on which phenomenon see *Greek Manuscripts of the Ancient World*.², BICS Supplement [1987] 11 and note 51). Stops occur rarely, and there are occasional *nus* in suspension. Expunging dots are used for correction at back I 29. There are a number of itacisms (ε > αι), interlinear corrections, and a persistent habit of omitting or metathesizing c (see Gignac, *Grammar* I 124-31: on omission of final c, 124-25, and on insertion of c, 130).

This papyrus preserves four fragmentary columns from a complete speech, or perhaps from selected arguments for a speech, about Alcibiades. The original editor was doubtless correct when he identified it as a rhetorical exercise; Alcibiades was second only to Demosthenes in his popularity with the school masters as a subject for declamation, both because of the ambivalence of his character and for the political intrigues that had come to be associated with him. The background for this particular exemplum will ultimately have been derived from the classical historians. There is, for example, a clear allusion to the incident of the profanation of the Mysteries (front II 11), mention of the Sicilian expedition (back I 18 and 24), the fortification of Deceleia (back I 21), and the victory at Cyzicus (back I 24-5).²

On the front, Alcibiades is directly addressed several times by a speaker, who states that the purpose of some decree is the safety of the city, not the disenfranchisement (*atimia*) of Alcibiades and that the good of the many must be preferred to the good of the individual. On the back, Alcibiades is nowhere named, but the singular "you" (I 17) and explicit details of Alcibiades' career guarantees that he is being addressed on this side also. A series of rhetorical questions and answers begins at front II 21 and may be continuous with the series found on the back. If so, this suggests that the order of the pages is as set out by the *editio princeps* (and maintained in this edition) and that there is one speaker throughout. Further, a speaker refers to himself (or herself) and the demos as "we", and in two places seems to be speaking in the first person as the city herself (back I 21, 25). It is possible that not only on the back, but throughout the whole of the fragment a speaker has either taken on the persona of the city to speak out against Alcibiades, or that the exercise itself is conceived as a speech of the city

[2] The main historical sources are Thucydides 6.91-93, 7.18, Xen. *Hell*. 1.1.5-22 and 1.4.18, Diodorus 13.45-69 and Plutarch's *Life of Alcibiades* §32.

indicting Alcibiades. Such a rhetorical ploy is hoary with age—note, for example, the speech of the personified Laws in Plato's *Crito*, 50A6ff. Alternatively, since it is such a common feature of ancient speeches, there may be two different speakers using the same device of argument proceeding by question and answer.

The opening lines of the front suggest that the matter at issue is a decree exacting penalties from those involved in the profanation of the mysteries. On the back, initially the speaker contends that the needs of the city must be balanced against the conferring of rewards. Then, alluding to the notorious fickleness of the Athenian democracy, he continues with a statement about the "drafting of a law to suit immediate circumstances" as the column breaks off. The back may represent a rhetorical position opposite to that of the front, in which the speaker is suggesting that it is acceptable to exempt Alcibiades from the consequences of an earlier decree because the populace has been known in the past to reverse itself, particularly in dealing with Alcibiades, but it is usual in these exercises for Alcibiades to speak in his own behalf; therefore, we should expect the anonymous speaker to present the opposing position.

Both sides contain arguments suitable to an *aristeus* exemplum. This is an exceedingly familiar type of exercise in which a man who excels in valor is given whatever reward he chooses by his city, only to find that choice to be in conflict with some other person, or the city's laws or customs.[3] On the basis of the front, it is possible to construct a case in which Alcibiades, after he is restored to the good graces of the demos in 408 B.C. asks the Athenians not to hold him subject to some prior decree enacting penalties for those convicted of participation in the profanation of the mysteries, and our speaker is arguing against him. But this does not quite match details on the lower back, which suggest a certain affinity to the subject of Alcibiades's aiming at tyranny (*epithesis tyrannidos*). This is another rhetorical exemplum, well attested in the handbooks, that can be adapted to the *aristeus* type. For example, in Sopatros' *Diareseis Zetematon*, we find Alcibiades, after Cyzicus, choosing to ask for a bodyguard as his reward for valor and being accused of attempting to become a tyrant.[4] Like the Sopatros, our exercise is also to be located around 408 B.C. after Cyzicus (see back I 24-25), but whether there are other points in common is moot. Our speaker's argument on the back may be as follows: if Alcibiades is granted his reward (whatever it may be), a necessary consequence is that the demos will lose its autonomy and be subject to the will of one man, which is de facto tyranny. In contrast, the independent demos, whatever the mistakes it may have made in the past or will continue to make, has the ability to reverse itself and correct its own faulty judgments. While asking for a bodyguard makes sense as a threat to the people's political autonomy, just how exemption from a penalty would present the same danger is a mystery, unless any display that sets one man above another is susceptible to the interpretation that the so-privileged individual is "aiming at tyranny". Of course, nothing prevents the the two sides from contains portions of two different sketches.

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[3] For a thorough and delightful discussion of the type, see D. A. Russell, *Greek Declamation* (Oxford 1983) 21-39. By no means all of the extant rhetorical exempla featuring Alcibiades are of the *aristeus* type. The majority require the student either to defend against (as Alcibiades) or to mount the case for charges of hubris or impiety.

[4] Sopatros, *RG* VIII 2,1ff. For a discussion of the Sopatros exemplum, see D.A. Russell, *Greek Declamation*, 123-128 on the topic: μετὰ τά Κύζικον Ἀλκιβιάδης αἰτήσας φρουρὰν τοῦ σώματος κρίνεται τυραννίδος ἐπιθέσεως.

For a list of the themes connected with Alcibiades in the rhetorical literature, see R. Kohl, *De scholasticarum declamationum argumentis ex historia petitis*, Rhetorische Studien 4 (Paderborn 1915) nos. 112-129, pp. 34-38. His appearances in oratorical prose of the Classical period includes Andocides' *Against Alcibiades*, Isocrates' *On the Team of Horses,* and Lysias' *Against Alcibiades* I and II (these last three feature his son), all of which may belong to the category of rhetorical exercise rather than actual dikanic speech. Rhetorical fiction takes even firmer hold in the Second Sophistic: Libanius' fifth declamation features Timon the misanthrope in love with Alcibiades! Other papyri that testify to the popularity of Alcibiades as subject include: Plato's *Alcibiades* I, *P. Oxy.* 3666 + *P. Harris* 12 (P² 1407); an anonymous commentary on *Alcibiades* I, P. Princ. Inv. AM 11224C + *P. Oxy.* 1609 (P² 2569)[5] Plato's *Alcibiades II*, *P. Oxy.* 52.3667; the *Alcibiades* of Aeschines Socraticus, *P. Oxy.* 1608 (P² 19); a 5th century parchment codex containing a life of Alcibiades, *P. Oxy.* 3.411 (P² 2077); and *P. Köln* 6.250, a series of topics for rhetorical exercise, one of which concerns Alcibiades; however, this piece is now too broken even to guess at the context. For a discussion of the characterization of Alcibiades in classical literature, see I. Bruns, *Das literarische Portrait der Griechen*, Berlin 1896, 493ff.

It remains to comment on the style of this exercise. As we should expect at this period, hiatus is avoided. Further, D.A. Russell points out that by the fifth century A.D., the time at which this copy was made, rhetorical texts can be expected to obey Meyer's law with respect to clausulae. The fact that this exemplum does not suggests that the original composition may have been composed at a somewhat earlier period, and that we have a later copy. In addition, there are a number of linguistic peculiarities. On the front, τὸ βουλευ|τήριον [ἔ]χομεν (II 20-21) may indicate a Latin speaker who is mentally translating *senatum habemus*. ἀπόπλη-ξιc (II 27) may equal *insania*, and ἐπὶ coῦ (I 18) suggests *super te*. On the back, the phrase may be δόγμα τ[ῆc βουλῆc], that is *senatus consultum*. If this is indeed the product of a native Latin speaker undergoing Greek rhetorical training, it should occasion little surprise. From the period of the late republic, such training would have been usual for the well-to-do. Whatever the native language of the author, his Greek is unprepossessing.

Front (→)   **col. i**

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4        .[
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         .[
         .[
8      η.[
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[5] See F. Decleva Caizzi, M.S. Funghi, M. Gigante, F. Lasserre, A. Santoni, *Varia Papyrologia*, Studi e Testi per il Corpus dei papyri filosofici greci e latini 5 (Florence 1991) 7-23 and F. Vendruscolo, *ZPE* 99 (1993) 279-285.

π̣[
ε[
ε[± 20   ]πο
12   χ̣ [± 18   ]ινεται
αν̣[± 18   ]ημη-
τρι νομ̣[± 13   ]αυτοῖς
δεξαμ̣εν[± 13   ]μεν
16   αυτη τον[± 13   ] ἀπέ-
φανον α̣[± 9   ]τ̣ηρ

col. II

— — — — — — — — — — — —

[. . . . .]γραμμάτων του
[. . . . . . .]ουτ̣ο ζῆν ἄψηφοι ̣ ̣
[. . . . .]. . . . πείθομαι, ἂν μὴ
4   [. . . . .] ̣ ̣ης ἔτι παρά cοι. μέγα
[πρά̣γ]μα δικάζεται. ἐγὼ περὶ του
[. . .]ετ᾽ ἐθέλω βουλεύεϲθαι η̣ ̣[
[. . . ̣] τὰ ψηφίϲματα· ὥϲτε κ[αὶ]
8   [cὺ π]α̣ῦϲαι λέγων ὅτι μνηϲικακ [̣ ̣]
[̣] δικαϲτηρίοιc ἐμέ παραδου ̣[
[̣ ̣ ̣ ἡ]λωκόταc νῦν διὰ ψηφίϲμα-
[τοc ̣ ̣] ω γὰρ ὅτι τὴν Κόρην δικάϲου-
12   [ϲαν] φέρω. καὶ cωτήριον ἔχει τῆc
[πόλ]εωc, οὐκ ἀτιμίαν ᾽Αλκιβιάδου
[τὸ] ψήφιϲμα. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κακωτῶν
[ἀμε]λεῖν τιμωρίαν ἔχει καὶ δίκα⟨c⟩
16   [λα]βεῖ̣ν πρὸc ἐκεῖνο χρήζομεν, τὸ δὲ
[οὕτ]ω̣ κινδυνεύουcαν τὴν πόλιν βου-
[λεύειν] δέον ἐcτί, καὶ πρὸc τοῦτο βλέ-
πει [τὸ] ψήφιϲμα. τοῦ δήμου γὰρ νῦ-
20   ν, οὐκ ᾽Α[λ]κιβιάδου χάριν τὸ βουλευ-
τήριον [ἔ]χομεν· πόϲοι τὴν πόλιν οἰ-
κοῦμεν, ᾽Αλκιβιάδη; πόϲοι πληροῦμεν
τάc φ[ύ]λαc; πόϲοι τοῖc δήμοιc ἐγγρα-
24   φόμεθα; τί οὖν; ἄπαντεc καθ᾽ ἕνα ἄξεc-
θαί φαμεν, ὅτι μὴ πάντεc ἀγωνοθέ-
τοῦμεν τῇ πόλει; καὶ τίc ἂν ταύτηc, εἰ-
πέ μοι, τῆc ἀποπλήξεωc ἀνά⟨c⟩χοι{c}-
28   τ̣ο; τί μεταποιεῖc, ᾽Αλκιβιάδη, τοῖc

νόμοιϲ; τὰ πράγματα τιν ‿ ϲοφ[ί-]
ζῃ τὴν τύχην ε ‿ ω πρῶτ[ο]ν οὐκ ἀγο[
ρε ‿ [‿ ‿ ‿ ‿]αϲτιμ[‿]ϲ διὰ τ[ὴν]
32   πόλ[ιν ± 14]ν οὐκ ελα[
το ‿ [± 14]νον τιϲ ουν [
‿ ‿ [± 12 πα]νηγυρίζειν
‿ [± 14]δυνω ϲε
36   πολιτη[± 12]τὸν γραφό-

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2 οι· pap.   3 πειθομεαν pap.   4-5 μετὰ | [τὰ ἐ]μά ed. pr.   5 δικαζετε· pap.   5-6 τού|[των] ed. pr.   8 [ϲὺ π]αῦϲαι D. A. Russell   8-9 μνηϲικακὸ[ν <δεῖ> | τοῖϲ] ed. pr.   10 ἡ]λωκότα{ϲ} ed. pr. taking it to refer to Alcibiades alone?   10-11 ψηφίϲμα|[τοϲ] ed. pr.   11 ν]όω ed. pr.   11-12 δικάϲου|[ϲαν] D.A. Russell : δίκαϲ ού|[τωϲ] ed. pr.   14 [τόδε] ed. pr.   15 δικα pap.   16 ? [μά]την ed. pr.   17[οὔτ]ω K.J. Dover   18 δεων pap.   23 ενγρα pap.   24 τεϲϲεν κατ α pap.   24-25 ἔν<α> λάζεϲ|θαι ed. pr.   25-26 ἀγω-νοθέ|το<ι> μ[ή]τε ἡ πόλι(ϲ) ed. pr.   26 πολι pap.   26-7 εἰ|πέ μοι D.A. Russell : εὐθ|ὺϲ με[τὰ] ed. pr.   27 αναχοιϲ pap.   28 τε ed. pr.   29 δόμοιϲ ed. pr.   30 πρῶτ[ο]ϲ ed. pr.   34]νηγυριζιν pap. : ἀ]νηγ<ρύ>ζ(ε)ιν ed. pr.   35 ἐλ]αύνω ϲε ed. pr.

Back (↑)   **col. I**
— — — — — — — — — — —

ὑμῶν ‿ ‿ ‿ ‿ ‿ [± 16]
τοντι τῶν νόμων [± 10]
διὰ τί τὴν ἀρχὴν α ‿ [± 10 ἐ-]
4   δεήθημεν δόγματ[± 10]
αν καὶ τὸ ϲώζεϲθαι τοῦτο ‿ [‿ ‿ ‿ ‿]
τὴν ἀρχήν. τούτου γὰρ χάριν [βουλευ-]
όμεθα. οὔκουν ὁ μὲν ϲώζει τ[ὸ δόγμα]
8   τοῦτο τοῖϲ νόμοιϲ ἀκολουθ[ῶν, ὁ δ' ἐ-]
λυμήνατο τοῖϲ πράγμαϲιν τού[τοιϲ δι']
ἐναντίαϲ παρὰ νόμον; οὕτωϲ [γάρ,]
οὕτωϲ οἱ πατέρεϲ ἡμῶν, οὕτωϲ μ[ετὰ]
12   θεῶν δικάϲαϲ ⟨ὁ⟩ δῆμοϲ ἐπολίτε[υϲε.]
κἂν ἔτι ταῦτα διὰ τὸν ϲτέφανον [‿ ‿ ‿ ,]
τίϲ τῶν πραγμάτων ὑπομνήϲ[ει; ἔτι]
μᾶλλον δεῖ τούτοιϲ τοῖϲ δικ[αίοιϲ]
16   ἀντιθέϲθαι τὰ πολιτεύματα. κα[ὶ γὰρ ἔ-]
ξεϲτι τῷ δήμῳ μεταβάλλεϲ[θαι· ἃϲ]
οὖν ἐπὶ ϲοῦ μετὰ Ϲικελίαν [ἐψηφι-]
ϲάμεθα, πῶϲ τὰϲ ϲτήλαϲ [καθ]εῖλον;
20   πῶϲ κατέλυϲα τὰ ψηφ[ίϲ]ματα;
καλὰ μέν μοι διὰ Δεκελείαν ἐδόκει,
ἄλλα δὲ μετὰ τὸν Ἑλλήϲποντον

ἔδοξεν. οὐκ ἐκρατοῦμεν μετ' Εὐμολ-
24 πίδων ἀρὰ⟨ϲ⟩ διὰ Ϲικελίαν· ἐπὶ Κυζί-
κῳ μεταβέβλημαι. τίϲ οὖν μοῦ τὴ[ν]
μεταβολὴν παραγράφεται; τί πέ-
πονθεν ἡ πόλιϲ οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον;
28 οὔτε γὰρ τὸ γράφειν κατὰ τῶν πρ[ο-]
χείρων [οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον] κεκώλυ-
[κ]ε διὰ τοῦ[το]ωθ [ ] . . . . οὐ-
[δέ]να καὶ κ[± 18   ] ν-
32 [τ]αϲ οὔτε τ[± 18   ]θαι
πάλιν ἐκ[± 18   ] ν
[ϲ]ώζει γὰρ[± 18   ] . . . . . .

2 τωντιτων B. Snell (in ed. pr.): τῶν τρίων ed. pr.   νόμω[ν ed. pr.   4 δεήθη μὲν: δεήθημεν?
ed. pr.   6-7 [δε]|όμεθα ed. pr.   8 ἀκόλουθ[ον ed. pr.   8-9 [ὁ δὲ] | λευμηναν
τὸ ed. pr.   9 ναντοτοιϲ pap. It looks as if the first τ was written over the ν as a correction, then
a second τ added above it   11-12 ἐ[κ τῶν] | θεὼν ed. pr.   12 δικὰϲ ἄϲ ⟨ὁ⟩ ed. pr.: δικα-
ϲαϲ pap.   13 ἔτι Snell (in ed. pr.) ἐπὶ ed. pr.   13-14 [θέλ]|ῃϲ ed. pr.   14 ὑπόμνηϲ[ιν ed.
pr.   16 αντιθεϲθε pap., read ἀντιθέϲθαι   17-18 [ἀϲ] | οὖν D. A. Russell: [οὐκ]|ουν ed. pr.
19 πῶϲ D. A. Russell: πωϲ ed. pr.   [καθ]εῖλον D.A. Russell [ϲτή]ϲειν ed. pr.   20
κατ'ελυϲα, pap.   ]ματα pap.   21 δεκελιαϲ pap., read Δεκελείαν   εἰ δοκεῖ ed. pr.
23 ουκ' pap.   μετ' pap.   24 αρα pap.: ἀρὰ⟨ν⟩ ed. pr.   26 φετετι pap.   [ἢ] τί ed. pr.
27 ουκ' pap.   29 οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον deleted by dots.

col. II

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                     ] .
                     ] .
                  ]ρο
4   ]αϲ
               ] . . α
              ]μη(ν)
              ] . ω(ν)
8   ]'το
              ] . ια
              ] . . ν
μετ[   ]ων
12 θεῶν [   ]νω
μητω[   ]κα-
τηγε[. . . . .] ειν ἐφυ-
γεϲε[. . . . .]ζικον ἐπεδί-
16 δουν [. . . . .]ν μετεβου-
λευόμην [. . . . .]κτρον οὐκ

6 μῆ pap.   7 ῶ pap.   11]ων̄ pap.   16 μετ' pap.   17 ουκ' pap.

Front, col. I

12-13. Δ]ήμη|τρι? See the reference to Kore below II front 11. For Κόρῃ καὶ Δήμητρι see Sopr. 8.124.9

col. II

2. Initially either τ]οῦτο ζῆν or -τ]ου τὸ ζῆν. "To live without the vote" may refer to punishment of those who were engaged in the profanation of the mysteries (and this is suggested by the next few lines where there is mention of ἀτιμία) or it may refer to the necessary consequence for the citizens if a decree is passed that grants Alcibiades extraordinary favors.

3. Either πείθομε (read αι) ἄν or πειθομ' ἐάν. Given back I 16 (ἀντιθέcθε for -θαι; see also note on line 5) the former articulation is probably correct.

4. παρά coι: Alcibiades is intended, not the city as a whole (cf. back I 17 ἐπὶ coῦ).

5. Either [δ]ικάζεται or [δ]ικάζετε would suit. The former is more likely because there does not appear to be a subject for [δ]ικάζετε ready at hand.

5-6. περὶ τού|[. . . .]: τού|[του], the "important matter", seems a bit short and would result in hiatus with
following ἔτι. περὶ τοῦ | [δήμου] or sim. would be long enough but still result in hiatus. Ed. pr.'s περὶ τού|[των] might do, but its referent is unclear.

6.]ετ' ἐθέλω: ἐθέλω is the usual prose form, with θέλω being used following a long vowel, presumably to avoid hiatus. Occasionally in Libanius, θέλω occurs even after a short vowel so, ἔτι θελω would be acceptable here. However, the shape of the iota is anomalous, so probably ἔτ' ἐθέλω was written.

6. η ̣ [: the letter shape suggests only eta, with ιc as an outside possibility. ἤ is a possible articulation ("or", if not "rather than"), but there may be at least one more letter to the right.

7. [. . . .] ̣ τὰ ψηφίcματα: if ἤ is correct, then an infinitive might fill the lacuna. Either cῶcαι or λῦcαι
would do, though neither seems particularly apt for what precedes. Also possible are κατά or παρά, "in reference to", "in accordance with", "or in violation of" the decrees.

The decrees seem to have something to do with the profanation of the mysteries, to judge from the reference to Demeter above and Kore below. The argument, if I have it rightly, is that the speaker's objection to the current proposal, whatever its precise form, is not because he bears a grudge for the Demeter incident, and wishes to punish Alcibiades--although Alcibiades would seem to accuse him of doing so--but because the city needs to be able to pass such laws to protect itself, whatever the consequences for the individual.

8-11. Two constructions are possible following cὺ παῦcαι λέγων ὅτι· (1) μνηcίκακο[ν ἦν with an articular infinitive as its subject, i.e. μνηcίκακο[ν | ἦν τὸ] δικαcτηρίοιc ἐμὲ παραδοῦν[αι] | [τοὺc ἡ]λωκόταc νῦν διὰ ψηφίcμα|[τοc ("Stop saying that my handing over to court those now condemned by decree was an act of malice"). Or (2) cὺ παῦcαι λέγων ὅτι is intended to introduce direct speech, i.e. "μνηcικακε[ῖ or -ε[ῖc | τοῖc] δικαcτηρίοιc ἐμὲ παραδοὺc | [ὡc ἡ]λωκότα{c} νῦν διὰ ψηφίcμα|[τοc" (Stop saying: "he is" or "you are [sc. the speaker] bearing a grudge to hand me over to the courts, as one now condemned by decree."). Spacing at the beginning of lines is insufficiently consistent to prefer one restoration over another; for example, on the back, πῶc (I.20) and ἔδοξεν (I.25) occupy spaces of equal length. And while (2) requires emendation near a lacuna (ἡ]λωκότα{c}), the correction is quite consistent with the orthography of the rest of the text. For the second option, παραδου ̣ [must be a participle, since μνηcικακέω is not normally constructed with accusative and infinitive. Whatever the correct text, the sense is virtually the same.

9. παραδου ̣ [: there is a high trace following upsilon, consistent with the upper left tip of nu, but less likely as part of sigma. If παραδοῦναι is written the line would be longer than normal, but note line 22 below where -μεν projects two letters further than the other lines. For the idiom cf. And. 1.17 παραδιδόναι τῷ δικαcτηρίῳ.

11. Initially, λέγ]ω γὰρ is possible, either as part of the preceding complaint or as a rhetorical strategy of the speaker. In the latter case Kore, not the city, should be speaking on the back. If so, she would seem to wait in the wings for some time before entrance; the rest of this column cannot be spoken by Kore. D.A. Russell suggests a question along the lines of οἴ]ει γὰρ; that is, "do you imagine that I am introducing Kore to pass judgment?" While]ει cannot be ruled out,]ω is better suited to traces.] οὐ γὰρ must be ruled out.

14-15. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κακωτῶν | [ἀμε]λεῖν τιμωρίαν ἔχει: Cf. Menander, *Pk*. 504-5 (253) Gomme οὐκ ἔχει τιμωρίαν γὰρ τἀδίκημ’, ἔγκλημα δέ.

14. κακωτῶν: the word is rare; LSJ cites Ph. 1.54.4, Ptol., *Tetr*. 159 Vett. Val. 49.4; add Philo, *de congr*. 171 and *Leg*. 92.

15. δίκα⟨ς⟩: the ς seems to be absent (see above description).

16. Most likely [λα]βεῖν is to be restored, but with πρὸς a verb of motion (e.g., [φέ]ρειν) cannot be ruled out.

20-21. τὸ βουλευ|τήριον [ἔ]χομεν: the expression is not normal Greek for "assemble." See above introduction.

21-28. I take the gist of the argument—phrased as a series of rhetorical questions— to be that those enrolled in the tribes and demes (lines 21-24) constitute a large population whose continued political enfranchisement should survive along side of or in spite of the existence of the privileged few (ἀγωνοθετοῦμεν), and no one in his right mind (lines 26-28) would wish to change this.

24-25. Apparently ἅπαντες who are treated καθ’ ἕνα are distinct from μὴ πάντες, the privileged few, who can furnish the city with games. But the expression καθ’ ἕνα ἄξεσ|θαί is not familiar. Normally, καθ’ ἕνα means "one by one" or "individually" or "equals". However, LSJ s.v. εἶς 1f records a rarer use with the opposite meaning of "as a unit." In that case, the phrase could mean to "treat as one" and would refer to the de facto disenfranchisement of the individual. This latter option seems to me to yield somewhat better sense. "What then? Do we all agree we shall be treated (or led) as one, because (≈ if) we do not all produce games for the city?"

ὅτι μὴ: the construction is fairly common in later prose, where it may occasionally assumes the sense of εἰ μή. See, e.g., Lib. *or*. 58.27 οὐκοῦν οὐδ’ ὁ κτείνας ἕνα ἄνδρα ἀνδροφόνος, ὅτι μὴ πάντας; *ep*. 676.4 καὶ μὴ - - - , ὅτι μὴ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι, μέμφιν ποιοῦ; 362.2.5 ἢ ἐτεθνήκειν ἂν ἢ ζῶν ἐπενθούμην ὅτι μὴ ἐτεθνήκειν, or 959.1.3 καὶ γὰρ ἂν χαλεπήνας ὕς τερον ἀκούσας, ὅτι μὴ πρότερον ἤκουσας.

26. Either τῇ or ἐν would suit the traces.

26-8. καὶ τίς ἂν ταύτης, εἰ|πέ μοι, τῆς ἀποπλήξεως ἀνά⟨ς⟩χοι{ς}|το; For shape of this sentence, cf. Sopatros 8.156.28-157.1 (Walz) πόθεν ταύτην, εἰπέ μοι, τὴν ἀξίαν ἐπέγνωκας; or 8.272.21-22 (Walz) τίνι ταύτην, εἰπέ μοι, τὴν τιμωρίαν παρέσχηκας;

28-30. The articulation is difficult. Problems are (1) line 29 where τι, with ι corrected from ο, is readable, followed by ν, or less probably μ, but the next two letters are anomalous. Possibly τίν’ οὐ or τίνει, read τίνι, but neither inspires confidence. (2) Line 30 ε ω, where the vertical is visible, but seems to be missing ink to the right. Either ἐγώ (so *ed. pr.*) or ἐρῶ might suit traces. Possible articulations include: (1) τί μεταποιεῖς - - - τὰ πράγματα; ("Why are you altering the situation with your laws?"). Or τὰ μεταποιεῖς - - - νόμοις; τὰ πράγματα; ("What are you altering with the laws? Your circumstances?"). (2) τίν’ οὖ⟨ν⟩ σοφίζῃ; τὴν τύχην; ("What then are you dissembling about? Fortune?"). Or τίν’ οὐ σοφίζῃ; ("Whom are you not deceiving?"). (3) τὴν τύχην ἐρῶ; ("Shall I speak about your fortune?"). Or ἐγώ belongs with the following πρῶτ[ο]ν.

28-29. τί μεταποιεῖς - - - τοῖς | νόμοις: if the reading is correct, this probably refers to the classic paradox that confronts the *aristeus* in these exercises—he may legally choose to overset social convention or previously enacted laws.

29. νόμοις: Ed. pr. read δόμοις. However, the plural δόμοις is poetic and would contravene normal prose usage. K.J. Dover points out that the use of such a poetic form δόμοις could indicate a Latin speaker unfamiliar with the Greek idiom, but a simpler solution is to read νόμοις. Cf. Dem. 19.121 μεταποιῶν νόμους.

30. τὴν τύχην: Alcibiades may be maintaining the pretence that the present circumstances are a matter of luck, not of his devising, or alternatively, that the misfortunes that had befallen him and the city were a matter of bad luck. Cf. Plut. *vit. Alcib.* §33.5 καὶ τὰ μὲν αὑτοῦ πάθη κλαύcαc - - - τὸ δὲ cύμπαν ἀναθεὶc αὑτοῦ τινι τύχῃ πονηρᾷ καὶ φθονερῷ δαίμονι.

30-32. πρῶτ[ο]ν̣ οὐκ ἀγο̣ρ̣εύc[ω τὰc c]ὰc τιμ[ὰ]c διὰ τ[ὴν] | πόλ̣[ιν or sim. might be restored.

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3-6. Three articulations are possible: (1) either διὰ τί τὴν ἀρχὴν through δόγματ[forms a question answered by the repetition τὸ cώζεcθαι τοῦτο - - - τὴν ἀρχήν ("Why did we need a decree [- - -] the government? [Through - - -] and the maintenance of it [we save] the government). Or (2) the question διὰ τί is answered by [ἐ]δεήθημεν ("Why? We needed/ asked for a decree to [- - -] the government [- - -] and the maintaining of it [- - -] the government"). Or (3) the whole is one conditional sentence with a question in the apodosis ("Why [- - -] did we ask for a decree [- - -], even though preserving it [- - -] the government?). In the latter case, however, we should expect a future or a present tense in the preceding apodosis before [ἐ]ὰν καί.

4. δόγματ[: any case could be restored. The entire phrase might be δόγμα τ[ῆc πόλεωc or sim. In Sopatros the distinction between νόμοc and δόγμα is not all that clear. See, e.g., 8.180.19-24 (Walz). In *DH* 8.87. 3, however, the phrase δόγμα - - - τῆc βουλῆc has the distinctive meaning of *senatus consultum*. In this passage the distinction may be between legislation previously enacted (νόμοc) and the desire of the people to grant Alcibiades a reward as an *aristeus* (δόγμα). If so, then the δόγμα is different from the δόγμα on the front.

4-5.]αν: the reading is certain and requires a vowel to precede. This limits articulation to a noun like, e.g., [ἀτιμί]αν (preceded by τήν), an infinitive like, e.g., [ἐᾶν (sc. τὸ μὴ ἐᾶν), or the particle ἄν, [ἐ] αν or sim.

5. τοῦτο, sc. the δόγμα, is more likely here than τοῦτον, sc. Alcibiades.

6-7. τούτου γὰρ κτλ.: cf. front II 19-21.

7-9. The referents for ὁ μὲν and ὁ (or οἱ) δὲ are not obvious. Sense seems to demand "the one course of action" (i.e., refusing Alcibiades' request) vs. "the other course of action" (i.e., granting Alcibiades his reward). Alternatively, if the city is imagined to be speaking, she may be referring to the speaker against (ὁ μὲν) and Alcibiades (ὁ δὲ).

8-9. []λυμήνατο: the correction of this form is made in such a way that it is not absolutely clear whether [ὁ δ᾿ ἐ]λυμήνατο or [οἱ δ᾿ ἐ]λυμήναντο was intended. This whole sentence would appear to be a statement, framed as a question, of the paradoxical position that Alcibiades (or indeed any *aristeus*) regularly finds himself in, namely, that in abiding by the terms of the "law" that grants to an *aristeus* whatever reward he wishes, he has violated another law. Hence, a singular verb is required.

9. τοῖc πράγμαcιν̣ τού[τοιc: cf. Isoc. 20.9 for λυμαίνομαι with dative. Or Libanius *prog.* 4.1.5 καίτοι τούτων οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν, εἰ cωφρονεῖν ἤθελε καὶ μὴ τοῖc ἑαυτοῦ λυμαίνεcθαι πράγμαcι.

11-12. μ[ετὰ] | θεῶν δικάcαc: cf. Plato, *Laws* 921c4-5 νόμοc ὁ βοηθῶν ἔcτω τῷ τῆc πόλεωc cυνδέcμῳ μετὰ θεῶν.

13. cτέφανον: see Plutarch, *vit. Alcib.* §33.2 cτεφάνοιc μὲν ἐcτεφανώθη χρυcοῖc, where the granting of the crown was coupled with other rewards. From this "historical" circumstance, it is an easy step to turn Alcibiades into the rhetorical figure of the *aristeus*.

13-14. The structure of this sentence appears to be a more vivid condition (κἂν with subjunctive, followed by future indicative) with a question in the apodosis. It is tempting to restore a verb like διδῶ, where "I" is the city, as below in lines 19, 21, 25. Alternatively, δῶμεν, δῶτε or even κομίcῃ (i.e. "you receive") are possibilities. I take the sense to be that if Alcibiades is granted immunity from prosecution because he asks for it as a reward, in the future no one will remember the special conditions under which such immunity was granted. This particular sentence makes little sense if Alcibiades is asking to become tyrant.

14. ὑπομνήc[ει: ed pr. restores as ὑπόμνηc[ιν, but another accusative noun in this sentence is almost impossible to construe.

18. ἐπὶ coῦ: ἐπί followed by a personal pronoun meaning "in reference to" or "regarding" is usually accompanied by a verb of sense perception (see LSJ s.v. A I 2 f). This particular phrase may reflect the Latin *super* with ablative, "concerning" or "about."

19. τὰc cτήλαc [καθ]εῖλον: cf. Andocides 1.103 ἀνελεῖν τὰc cτήλαc = take up the stones of record.

21. διὰ Δεκελείαν: initially a final c seems to have been written, but an accusative would be preferable, as below, διὰ Cικελίαν. On Alcibiades' advice to the Spartans to fortify Deceleia see Plutarch, *vit. Alcib.* § 23. 2.

23-4. μετ' Εὐμολπίδων ἀρὰ⟨c⟩: cf. Plutarch, *vit. Alcib.* § 33.3 τὰc ἀρὰc ἀφοcιώcαcθαι πάλιν Εὐμολπίδαc καὶ Κήρυκαc ἃc ἐποιήcαντο τοῦ δήμου προcτάξαντοc. (Also DS 13.69.2, Nepos, *Alcib.* 6.5). Given the parallels and frequency with which c is either omitted or metathesized in this hand, the plural ἀρὰ⟨c⟩ is better restored than ed. pr.'s ἀρὰ⟨ν⟩.

24. διὰ Cικελίαν: the Sicilian expedition, see Thuc. 6.91-93.

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14-15 ἔφυ|γεc ἔ[κει μετὰ Κύζ]ικον or sim. will supplement.

"(Front, col. II) writs of the…to live without the vote…I am persuaded, If not,…still in your power. An important matter is being decided. I still want to debate about this (?)…the decrees. So do stop saying that my handing over to the courts those now condemned by decree is bearing a grudge, … I introduce Kore to pass judgment. And the decree implies safety for the city, not disenfranchisement for Alcibiades. For on the one hand, the neglect of oppressors earns retribution and we need to exact a penalty on that account, but on the other, it is necessary for the city so endangered to deliberate, and the decree looks to this. For the sake of the demos, not of Alcibiades, we are holding this council. How many of us dwell in the city, Alkibiades? How many of us fill out the tribes? How many of us are enrolled in the demes? What then? Do we all agree we shall be treated (or led) as one, if we do not all produce games for the city? Who—tell me—would endure this madness? Why are you altering the situation (?) with your laws, Alcibiades? Are you deceiving fortune… I will not be the first to proclaim your honors though this city… to deliver a panegyric…

(Back, col. I) of you…of the laws…why…we needed a decree…even if its maintenance this… For on account of this we are [debating]. Is it not the case that the one preserves this decree by obedience to the laws, while the other has undermined the entire situation through opposition against the law? For thus, thus our fathers, thus the demos by adjudicating in accordance with the gods governed; and if [I grant?] these things because of the crown, who will recall the circumstances? Even more is it necessary to balance the measures by justice (?) For indeed it is possible for the demos to change its opinion. So why did I pull down the *stelae* we voted after Sicily in respect to you? How is it that I have rescinded the decrees? Now if it seemed a good idea to me because of Deceleia (to pass the decree), it seemed otherwise after the Hellespont; we were not victorious after the curses of the Eumolpidae on account of Sicily; I reversed myself because of Cyzicus. Who now is going to indict my change of heart? What has the city experienced that is not the part of human nature? For neither has the drafting of a law to suit immediate circumstances prevent…

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