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THE PHYSICIST AS HIEROPHANT: ARISTOPHANES, SOCRATES AND THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE DERVENI PAPYRUS


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for Martin Ostwald, and all those persecuted for freedom of thought

I. Findspot, dialect and philosophical affiliations

The papyrus found in 1962, carbonised among the remains of a funeral pyre, at Derveni near Thessaloniki is of extraordinary importance, for numerous reasons. Written in the fourth century B.C., it is probably the earliest Greek literary papyrus known; it gives an allegorical interpretation of a cosmogonical poem ascribed to ‘Orpheus’, proving the antiquity of the latter, which had been widely doubted; it quotes Heraclitus, offers a distinctive version of Presocratic physics and provides unique information about Greek religion; and its style dates its composition to 400 B.C. or before. Its nature and authorship have proved highly controversial. Is the main purpose of the work religious, literary or philosophical? Is the author opposed to traditional Greek religion and mystery-cult, or offering a novel defence of it by interpreting the gods in terms of Presocratic physical theory? Scholars have had good reason for the greatest caution in discussing its authorship, in that the text is still not definitively published, and most of it was not known at all until 1982. However, it still seems even more extraordinary that, although several candidates for its authorship have been suggested, the most obvious ones have not been proposed, although two of them have been mentioned several times as being closely similar in approach to the papyrus.

We have been misled by several mistaken beliefs. The finding of the papyrus on the remnants of a funeral pyre made us expect that it would be a secret text of an eschatological nature, resembling the Orphic gold leaves in function, whereas in fact this is a book which circulated widely enough to be quoted by Philochorus, as Obbink has shown. Also, there has been a widespread misconception about the dialect in which the text is composed. Moreover, it is simply not true, as an influential article has claimed, that ‘of allegory in the sophistic period we appear to know little more than that it existed’; evidence is plentiful, as we shall see, although there is nothing to associate allegory with the sophists. An even more important factor, I suspect, has been a reluctance to imagine that this, our oldest Greek papyrus, a source of tremendous significance for archaic Greek poetry, literary criticism, Greek religion and Presocratic thought, could be by a member of a group who were already described in antiquity as raving lunatics.

Our knowledge of this text has now been greatly enhanced by the appearance of a collection of essays on the papyrus, edited by André Laks and Glenn Most. This contains not only the first published

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1 ‘Der orphische Papyrus von Derveni’, ZPE 47 (1982), after p. 300 (anonymous and unauthorised publication based on a preliminary transcript).

2 Since Philodemus (De Piaete p. 63 Gomperz, = P. Herc. 1428 fr. 3.14-18) says Philochorus cited (perhaps in his Peri manthn or Peri phusikwn) as from ‘Orpheus in the hymns’ the very same line of an Orphic hymn which is quoted by the Derveni papyrus at col. XXII 11-12, Obbink discusses the possibility that Philochorus, who was a seer active in 306/5 as well as an Atthidographer, was the author of the papyrus (Cronache Ercolanesi 24 (1994) pp. 111-36, esp. 124-5 with n. 31). He rightly concludes that the chronology is impossible, as Philochorus must have been born around 340 (cf. W. Burkert, in Laks and Most p. 174 n. 32); the dialect is impossible too. Note that Philochorus, in his Peri manthn I, said that Orpheus was himself a mntns (Clem. Strom. I 134.4, = OF T 87 Kern).


4 So R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship from the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age, Oxford 1968, p. 35, who, however, could point to only one allegorist; we shall find two.

translation of the whole, prepared by the editors, but also the text of the first seven columns, two of them entirely new, supplied by K. Tsantsanoglou, who is preparing the definitive edition of this treatise. From my own knowledge of the difficulty of putting together the carbonised papyri from Herculaneum, I can well appreciate the immense labour and difficulty of the reconstruction, evident from the total transformation of these columns vis-à-vis the preliminary version. We now know the final numeration of the columns, greater by four than in the text published in 1982. The new column-numbers will be used below.

Let us first dismiss from our minds the fact that the papyrus was preserved by being burned on a funeral pyre. This does not necessarily prove anything about its content; its combustion could have been accidental, in that it might have been used as waste paper to help ignite the blaze, much as we use discarded newspapers, a practice attested by Martial’s phrase *arsura struitur Libitina papyro.* That it was burned as a roll rather than torn up might speak against this; it may after all have been a precious possession of the person with whom it was burned. Valued books could be inhumed with their owners, as perhaps in the case of the roll of Bacchylides and certainly those of Hyperides in the British Museum, the volume of Timotheus known to have been found in its owner’s wooden sarcophagus at Abusir, or the roll discovered in the hand of the deceased (where it at once disintegrated) in a grave of the 4th. century B.C. at Callatis near Constanza in Rumania; the same would presumably apply to cremations. But this book might have been valued for various reasons, speculation about which ought to follow, rather than precede, any identification of the author; archaeological facts rarely ‘speak’ as clearly as do texts.

Secondly, although it is commonly held that the dialect of the text is Attic with some Ionic features, this is mistaken. The text exhibits a dialect which is in essence Ionic with an Attic overlay, as M.L. West rightly affirmed: ‘the writer’s dialect is basically Ionic, though there are some Atticism, which might be due to the transmission’. Conspicuous Ionic features are γίνεται and γινώσκει (18x), ἔπειτε ‘since’ (2x), ἀκκα (3x), θέλειν (2x), the neuter plural of an s-stem uncontracted in -έα (ἄλεα, col. XXV 8), εἴδησις as future of εἴδη, and -εις- (7x, including ἀκκα), never -τε-. A writer unsure of his aspirates, as Ionians were, is implied by κι'[ο]θεν ἐπος (col. XIII 6). Features also found in Attic, but shared with some branches or periods of Ionic, are -ον- as the contraction of -εο- (11x), the dative plural -οις (32x) rather than -οι (never), ὁπος (7x) not ὁκος etc., μὸνον (1x) and ἔνεκεν (2x), never μονον and εἰνεκεν, πυν (7x), never ξυν, μικρο- beside μικρο- (1x each), θέλω (3x) beside one possible case of ἐθήλω, and ἐωτοῦ (3x) and αὐτοῦ (2x) beside ἐωτοῦ (1x). Several features are mixed: Attic ὀντα (6x) is rarer than Ionic ὁντα (17x), Attic Ζίνα etc. (1x) is rarer than the Ionic (and Doric) form Ζάνα (4x). In the case of Attic ον instead of Ionic ἐν after ε, ι and ρ, the Attic vocalism is

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6 Ibid. pp. 9-22.
7 Ibid. pp. 93-108 (including a full commentary on these columns).
11 ‘The commentator’s language shows no sign of distinct dialectal influences. Its basis is Attic, with an admixture of Ionic forms or words’ (Maria Serena Funghi in Laks and Most, p. 36).
13 In the absence of a definitive text, the statistics are necessarily for ostensive purposes only, but give some indication of the reliability and prevalence of the phenomenon. Poetic quotations, the citation of Heraclitus and words doubtfully supplied are excluded.
14 On these forms, found alongside those in η in Pherecydes, see H. S. Schibli, *Pherekydes of Syros,* Oxford 1990, 17 n. 1.
found 8x,\textsuperscript{15} the Ionic 5x, plus one Ionic feminine genitive plural in -éov. However, these are a lot of Attic features, and it seems unlikely that they are owed to the transmission alone. Other features are more puzzling: the most significant is the use of ἐνὶ for μῦν.\textsuperscript{16} This is not Attic, pace West, but tragic and Doric.\textsuperscript{17} Compare also, perhaps, the frequent use of έχομενος to mean ‘next’, used in Thucydides\textsuperscript{18} only where he is apparently borrowing from the Syracusan historian Antiochus. Another possibly Doric feature is the etymology of ἡλιος via a hitherto unremarked pun between the Doric form ἀλλος and the Ionic adjective ἄλλος (which has initial ἄ) in col. XXV 8-9: συνέλθοι (ἐν suppl. West) ἄληκα ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχει, ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἡλιος συνεπτάθη. It is striking that this same pun reappears (with ἀλλίζο instead of ἄλλος) in Plato, \textit{Cratylius} 408e-409a. Although these apparently Doric features seem isolated, it is unlikely that ἐνὶ is owed merely to a Doric-speaking scribe, since it occurs twice. One remarkable stylistic trait is the ubiquitous omission of the copula (7x) in the phrase ὅποιον τε (col. VII 3, X 1, 4, XII 5, XIII 10, XVI 11, XX 2).

The treatise presents a curious amalgam in its philosophical affiliations. It not only quotes Heraclitus of Ephesus, but is generally agreed to reveal his influence at several points.\textsuperscript{19} Yet, as W. Burkert observed,\textsuperscript{20} its terminology overlaps several times with that of the Atomists, and especially with Leucippus, the forerunner of Democritus of Abdera. But its most obvious debt is to the philosophical doctrines of Anaxagoras and his followers, notably Diogenes of Apollonia.\textsuperscript{21} The affinity with these

\textsuperscript{15} This excludes the name 'Πέα, which may be quoted from poetry, and is already in Homer, \textit{II}. \textit{XIV} 203 (for a discussion of the vocalism see my \textit{ad loc}).

\textsuperscript{16} Col. XI 3, and in the quotation of Heraclitus at col. IV 9, where it is substituted for μῦν, which is how Plutarch quotes it (Mor. 604a) and is certainly what Heraclitus wrote (D. Sider, in Laks and Most p. 131 n. 7).

\textsuperscript{17} This is used in literary Doric, e.g. \textit{Dissoi Logoi} 8.13, and is attested in inscriptions from Epidaurus (C.D. Buck, \textit{The Greek Dialects}, Chicago 1955, pp. 98, 290 l. 18). There is no evidence for which form Aeolic preferred. The form ἀνάρθρος (2x) rather than ἀνήρθρος is probably not Doric, since it may be a modification containing a short ο by analogy with ἀρθρός.

\textsuperscript{18} VI 3.

\textsuperscript{19} For references see Maria Serena Funghi in Laks and Most p. 34 (especially R. Seaforth, ‘Immortality, Salvation and the Elements’, \textit{HSCP} 90 (1986) pp. 1-26). Also, in Laks and Most, the remarks of D. Obbink (p. 53), C. Kahn (pp. 60-2), K. Tsantsanoglou (p. 115) and especially D. Sider (pp. 129-48), who makes several new points. These are: the distinction between (mere) learning and knowledge (col. XX 7-8, cf. Heraclitus 22 B 17 and B 55 DK); the suggestion that each person has a διάμος (col. III 4, δίαιμαν γίνεται ἔκ τοῦ έλθει, cf. 22 B 119, ὡς ἀνήρθρο παράδομα); that intelligence should be called Ζεὺς (ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ μοίου λέγειθαι σὺς θελεί καὶ θέλει ζηνόν όνομα, Heraclitus 22 B 32 DK); the reference to ‘nowing’ at col. XXIII 9-10, compared with the later appellation of Heracliteans as ‘fluxers’; the double meaning of οὐδοῖος (col. XIII and 22 B 15); and the author’s Heraclitean tone in distinguishing himself from the ignorant herd (cols. VIII 6, IX 2, XII 4-5, XVII 16, XXIII 1-2). Heraclitus’ equation of Hades with Dionysus (22 B 15 DK), discussed by Sider (p. 145-6), is similar to the equations of deities with each other in the papyrus, and justified by the same sort of word-play. T.M.S. Baxter, \textit{The Cratylius: Plato’s Critique of Naming}, Leiden 1992, pp. 131-2, thinks the papyrus is dissenting from Heraclitus.

\textsuperscript{20} In Laks and Most p. 167, citing the importance of κρούων in cosmogony (col. XIV 4, 7), cf. Leucippus 67 A 1.31 DK = Diog. Laërt. IX 31, δινὴν... καθ’ ήν προσκοριῶνα καὶ παντοδεῖσαν κυκλοφοίραντα διακρίνεται χωρί στὰ ὦμοι πρὸς τὰ ὄμοια; Leucippus 67 A 6 DK, κροομενός πρὸς ἀλλήλους κυκλοβιβήτα διά ὄμοιος; with col. XV 1, cf. Leucippus 67 A 1.31, A 6 DK; κατὰ μικρὰ μεμεριζέωνα, col. XXI 2-4, cf. XXV 2; see W. Burkert, ‘Orpheus and die Vorsokratiker. Bemerkungen zum Derveni-Papyrus und zur pythagoreischen Zahlenlehre’, \textit{Antike und Abendland} 14 (1968) pp. 93-114, esp. 98f.; M.J. Edwards, \textit{art. cit.} p. 209. Note also the parallels between the following passage and Leucippus: ‘There are also other (bodies) now floating in the air far apart from each other, but during the day they are invisible, since they are dominated by the Sun, whereas during the night they clearly exist, but are dominated (by the Moon?) on account of their smallness. Each of them floats by necessity, so that they do not come together with each other’ (col. XXV 3-9). For the relation between invisibility and smallness cf. Leucippus, 67 A 7 DK = Ar. \textit{De gen. et corr.} 1.8.325a23ff., (atoms are) δόρφος διὰ μικρότιτά τῶν ὄμοι. For necessity cf. 67 B 2 DK, = Aëtius 1 25.4, = Dox. Gr. p. 321 Diels (from his \textit{Peri Nou}), οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου καὶ ἀνάγκης (the only verbatim fragment of his which we have).

\textsuperscript{21} So Laks and Most, \textit{op. cit.} p. 4.
two thinkers was first suggested by Burkert; he has been followed by R. Merkelbach, A. Laks and M.L. West, and more recently in important studies by T.M.S. Baxter, D. Obbink and D. Sider. The parallels between their doctrines are instructive; let me briefly recapitulate them.

1. **Nothing comes to be or passes away, but it only appears to do so; rather, things combine and separate.** Things are named according to which of the elements dominates (ἐπικρατεῖν) in them. This doctrine recurs several times during the commentary on the Orphic poem:

   So, knowing that fire, when mixed with the other (elements), agitates and prevents the things that exist from combining because of the heating, he alters (?) it so that it is able, once altered, not to prevent the things that exist from coalescing. Those things that are ignited are dominated, and what is dominated mixes with the other (elements).

   (Mind) makes the things that exist, having first been separated, stand apart from each other. For when the Sun is separated and cut off in the middle, (Mind) fixes and holds fast both those things above the Sun and those below. … His arche is explained because, (supply ὅτι τὰ ἐνὸς) by thrusting the things that exist against each other, he caused them to stand apart and made (supply διακτίσας ἑπόνεις) the present transformation, not (making) different things from different ones, but different ones from the same (supply οὐκ ἐξ ἐπὶ ἑτέραις ἑτερεῖς ἕπεται ἀλλῷ ἑτερεῖς ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν).

   The things which exist have always existed, and those which now exist arise from those that are existent.

   (Air) existed before it was named, and then it was named. For Air existed even before those things which now exist were put together, and it always will exist. For it did not come to be, but existed.

   (Since) each single thing is named after its dominant (element), all things were called ‘Zeus’ by the same reasoning; for Air dominates all things so far as it wishes.

   By saying ‘leaps’ (read ὁμοῦν), (Orpheus) makes clear that (the elements), divided up into small pieces, leapt and moved in the air, and by leaping were put together with each other. They kept leaping until the point when each came to its like… (It was named) ‘Harmony’ because (the god) fitted many of the things which exist to each other; they had existed even before, but were said to come to be once they had been separated.
With the first part of this doctrine we may compare the following report of the views of Anaxagoras and others:35 Ἀναξαγόρας … καὶ πάντες ὁσια κατὰ συναθροισμὸν τῶν λεπτομερῶν κοσμοτο-οῦς συγκρίσεις μὲν καὶ διακρίσεις εἰσάγουσι, γενέσεις δὲ καὶ φθορὰς οὐ κυρίως. Both parts of it appear, but not ascribed to Anaxagoras by name, in another such report:36 (those who believe in) τὰ ἅτομα καὶ τὰ ὁμοιομερή (hold that) … πάντ' ἐν πᾶσι τὰ αἰσθήματα ἀναμεμείθησαν, … παρὰ δὲ τὰς ἐπί-κρατεῖς ἀνομίαξεθάντοι ή τοῖον ἢ τοῖον. The emphasis on the naming of existent things according to their predominant element is characteristic of our author. Consider Theophrastus' more precise testimony to Anaxagoras' views in Simplicius:37 πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὁμοιομερή … ἀγένετα μὲν εἶναι καὶ ἀφθαρτα, φαίνεται δὲ γινόμεναι καὶ ἀπολλύμεναι συγκρίθης καὶ διακρίσεις μόνον, πάντων μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ἕνωσιν, ἔκτοτε δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπίκρατον ἐν αὐτῷ χαρακτηριζομένῳ. The first half of the doctrine survives in Anaxagoras' own words in his Physica Book I:38 τὸ δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπολύσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς νομίζομεν οἷον Ἑλληνες: οὐδὲν γὰρ χρήμα γίνεται οὐδὲ ἀπόλυται, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ ἑνὸν θρημάτων συμμίσθησα τε καὶ διακρινέται. The second half does not, but is unquestionably his also; however, its expression is not. The technical term for 'predominate', ἐπίκρατης, found in the papyrus, is also used by Theophrastus in his paraphrase, whereas Anaxagoras himself used κατεχέν.39 Moreover, the expression οὐκ ἐξ ἐτέρω[ν] ἐτέρ' ἀλλ' ἐτέρ[π' ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν] (col. XV 9-10) recalls the material monism of Diogenes of Apollonia:40 πάντα τὰ ὁντα ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐτεροοὐθεῖαν καὶ το τοῦ ἐναι.

2. A second principle is that, in the process of coalescence, is drawn to like:

… (neither the hot to the hot) nor the cold to the cold. By saying 'leaps' (read θορυβ(υ)η) he makes clear that (the elements), divided up into small pieces, leapt and moved in the air, and by leaping were put together with each other. They kept leaping until the point when each came to its like (τὸ σύνηθες). (col. XXI 1-5).

W. Burkert41 well compares Anaxagoras’ words τὰ συγγενῆ φέρεσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα.

3. Thirdly, God is Mind (Νοῦς), and (according to the Derveni papyrus) is Air (Ἀήρ) and breath (πνεῦμα) as well:

As for the next verse, ‘Sky son of Night, who ruled first of all’, after naming the Mind (Νοῦς) that thrust (the elements) against each other "Kronos", he says that it 'did a great deed' to Sky: for it took away his kingship. (col. XIV 5-9)

As for the phrase ‘he himself was born alone’, by saying this he makes it clear that Mind itself is equal in value to all things, as if the rest were nothing. For it would not be possible for these things to exist without Mind … (col. XVI 8-12).

It was explained earlier why it was called ‘air’. It was thought that it came to be because it was named ‘Zeus’, as if it had not existed before. (col. XVII 3-6)

… all other things are in the air, as it is breath. Now Orpheus named this breath ‘Moira’. The rest of mankind commonly say ‘Moira spun’ for them, and ‘what Moira spun will be’,

37 Phys. 27.2, = Anaxagoras 59 A 41 DK.
38 59 B 17 DK, quoted by Simplicius, Phys. 163.18.
39 So D. Sider, in Laks and Most pp. 136-7, citing 59 B 1 DK.
40 64 B 2 DK. I thank R.W. Sharples for pointing this out to me.
41 In Laks and Most, p. 169 (59 A 41 DK, = Simplicius, Phys. 27.2ff.). Cf. also Leucippus 67 A 1.31 DK, cited above.
speaking correctly but unaware of what ‘Moira’ or ‘spinning’ is. Orpheus called wisdom ‘Moira’, for this seemed to him the most apt of the names that all mankind has given. For before being called ‘Zeus’, Moira was the wisdom of God forever and always. (Col. XVIII 1-10)

(since) each single thing is named after its dominant (element), all things were called ‘Zeus’ by the same reasoning; for Air dominates all things so far as it wishes. (Col. XIX 1-4)

‘Ocean’ is the Air, and Air is Zeus. (Col. XXIII 3)

With this we may compare the following report, in which our author seems closer to Anaxagoras’ followers Archelaus and Diogenes of Apollonia than to the master himself, who is not recorded as saying that Nous is Air:42 Ἀρχέλαος αέρα καὶ νοὸν τὸν θεόν, οὗ μέντοι κομισοιοῦν τὸν νοὸν. Ἀναξαγόρας νωὸν κομισοιοῦν τὸν θεόν. Yet Archelaus’ denial that Mind made the kosmos is contradicted by the Derveni papyrus. Much closer to the papyrus’ position is Anaxagoras’ other disciple Diogenes, who held that God, Air and Zeus are the same:43 Διο[γε]νῆς ἐπαι[νεί] τὸν Ὄμηρον ὧς [οὗ] μυθικ[ῶς] ἄλλη ἄληθ[ῶς]. ὁπερ τ[ο]ῦ θείου διειλε[γ]ένον· τὸν ἄερα γὰρ εὐτὸν Δία νομίζ[ει]ν φησίν, ἐπειδὴ πᾶν εἰσέναι τὸν Δίο λέγει. Moreover, he held that these were the same as Mind (Nous), which had created all things:44 καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τὴν νόησιν ἔχον εἶναι ὁ οἵρ καλοῦμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦτο πάντας καὶ θυμερνάθαι καὶ πάντων κρατεῖν· αὐτό (Usener: ἀπὸ codd.) γάρ μοι τὸ τόθε (Usener: ἐθος codd.) δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀφίχθαι καὶ πάντα διατιθέναι καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἐνείναι.

4. A fourth physical doctrine relates to the composition of the moon, but raises an apparent contradiction in our sources:

(The elements of which the Sun consists have both heat) and luminosity.45 But those of which the Moon consists are the brightest of all and (καὶ κατὰ inserui) divided up according to the same principle, but they are not hot. (Col. XXV 1-3)

For Anaxagoras, the moon derives its light from the sun, and has dark and light areas because it contains an admixture of cold and earthy elements:46 Ἀναξαγόρας ἀνωμαλότητα συγκρίματος διὰ τὸ ψυχρομιτής ἰμα καὶ γεώδες. But another report says that Anaxagoras and Democritus regarded the moon as a stereōμα διάσπων,47 and Diogenes of Apollonia likened it to an ignited pumice-stone (κυψηρεῖδες ἀνάμμις τὴν σελήνην).48 The contradiction in these reports has been brilliantly resolved by Dmitri Panchenko,49 who has demonstrated that Anaxagoras held that the moon is not hot in itself, but shines with light derived from the Sun, which also heats it red-hot; hence, during lunar eclipses, the moon may still appear to glow faintly red, like a heated coal. The same doctrine fully explains this passage in the papyrus.

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43 64 A 8 DK, in Philodemus, On Piety p. 70 Gomperz.
44 64 B 5 DK.
45 For my reconstruction of the sense of what must have preceded, see below.
II. Aristophanes’ *Clouds*: the Physicist as Hierophant

These parallels, as W. Burkert observed, place our author firmly in the orbit of Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia. We shall return to his philosophical relationships below; what of his attitude to religion? He certainly reproaches *mystai* for undergoing initiation in ignorance of the true meaning of the ceremony, and for expecting to receive such knowledge from those who perform it (col. XX 1-12):

… of those persons (who) saw (the Mysteries) while performing holy rites in the cities. I am less amazed if they do not understand them—one cannot hear what is said and understand it at the same time; but as for those who (hope to understand) the rites from the person who practises the art, these people deserve amazement and pity: amazement, because, although they expect, before they perform the rite, that they will know, they perform the rite and depart without knowing, and do not ask questions, just as if they knew something of what they saw, heard or learned; and pity, because it is not enough for them that they spent their money in advance, but they depart deprived of their intelligence as well. Hoping before they perform the rites that they will know, they depart after performing them deprived even of their expectation.

Earlier in the text, he seeks to explain what the *magoi* do in terms of the *mystai*. Opinions have also differed as to whether the author is opposed to Orphism or in favour of it. In fact, he seeks to show that Orphic poetry is holy and not scandalous, because it encodes the Anaxagorean Weltanschauung. This appears clearly from col. VII, now much improved textually thanks to K. Tsantsanoglou, where the ‘commentary’ on the poem of Orpheus begins. I suggest that the passage opened in indirect speech, as follows (suggested supplements are bracketed):

(people are wrong to think that Orpheus did not compose a) hymn that says wholesome and lawful things; for (they say that) he utters riddles (?) (supply [οὐκινοιτ]ο) by means of his composition, and it is impossible to state the solution (accepting [λύ]ιν) to his words even though they have been spoken. But his composition is strange and riddling for human beings. Orpheus did not wish to say in it disputable riddles, but important things in riddles. For he tells a holy tale even from the first word right through to the (read (το)I’o) last, as he shows even in the well-known verse: for by bidding them ‘put doors on their ears’ he is saying that he is not legislating for the many, (but is addressing) those who are pure in hearing …

Just as the ordinary initiate participates in the Mysteries in ignorance of their true significance, so too the average hearer of the Orphic *logos* is unaware that the bizarre and scandalous acts there recounted, in which Zeus dethrones his own father and sleeps with his own mother (the cardinal sins in Greek thought), are not to be taken literally, but require interpretation, by the methods which we call philo-
logy, allegory and etymology. This interpretation of writer’s attitude is supported by col. V 3-12, which is now, thanks to K. Tsantsanoglou’s new text, much more intelligible:

… for them we will call by at the oracle to ask, for the sake of those who seek prophecies, whether it is right to disbelieve in the terrors of Hades (supply θέμι[ε ἀπειτεῖν τά]).57 Why do they disbelieve in them? If they do not understand dreams or even any of the other things they see (I conjecture ὁραμάτων for the transmitted προσμάτων),58 what sort of examples would induce them to believe? For, since they are overcome by error and by pleasure as well,59 they do not learn or believe. But disbelief and ignorance are the same thing; for if they do not learn or understand, it is impossible that they should believe even when they see …

The Derveni author offers his audience of would-be initiates true faith, a faith achieved not through oracles, dreams or visions, but through knowledge: error, i.e. ignorance of the real significance of the traditional stories, leads to lack of faith. One wonders whether he is developing Protagoras’ work, presumably sceptical in tone, entitled On the terrors in Hades (Περὶ τῶν ἐν ’Αιδοῦ).60 Perhaps Protagoras there deployed the argument later used by Sextus Empiricus:61 since everyone accepts the stories about the terrors of Hades, which are obviously false, we can’t accept that gods exist, just because everyone accepts that they do.

But how can the writer embrace Ionian natural philosophy while at the same time holding the beliefs that he does? For example, this same author believes that the Eumenides are souls, and believes in the power of daimones to disturb our souls (col. VI). I am reminded of a thinker like Xenocrates, who succeeded Speusippus as head of Plato’s Academy, yet who believed, if we are to trust the doxographers, a very strange set of doctrines, that combined a distinctly Anaxagorean physics with faith in the heavenly bodies as gods and in sublunary ones as daimones. Let me briefly quote a report of his views:62

Several features remind us of the papyrus: the equation of Zeus with Mind ruling in the Heaven; the recognition of a female deity also ‘like the mother of the gods’; the divinisation of the Sun, Moon and stars; the notion of unseen bodies below the moon; and the explanation of the traditional gods as named allegorically after their predominant elements, are all features reminiscent of the writer from Derveni,

57 My supplement (and stop after δεινά) needs to be tested against the traces of fragmentary letters reported here.
58 A.H. Griffiths inspired this, by first conjecturing παραδειγμάτων (personal communication); προσμάτων makes little sense.
59 For this translation of τῆς ἄλλης ἡδονῆς cf. LSJ σ. v. ἄλλος II.8. Laks and Most, op. cit. 11, offer ‘by something else, pleasure’ or ‘by another kind of pleasure’, but this is not convincing. The significance of ‘pleasure’ here remains unexplained.
60 Diogenes Laërtius IX 55.
whose influence might be suspected. However, Xenocrates’ doctrines are not close to the Anaxagoreans, in that his Pythagorean tendencies, instanced here by the monad and dyad, are not paralleled among them, and in any case he probably lived too late to be our author. His dates are 396-314, and it is hard to imagine that a treatise so early in style could have been written in 375 or thereafter (we might expect Xenocrates’ style and dialect to have resembled rather that of Plato or even Aristotle).

However, this is not a merely frivolous comparison, since it makes the point that early philosopher-scientists could sometimes present their work as a revelation of the mysteries of nature. It is a remarkable fact that even Isaac Newton published as much on theology as he did on physics, and saw his physics as vindicating his theology; and the Stoics used allegory as well as etymology to reinforce their Weltanschauung. But some early physicists went further. Empedocles is a case in point. Peter Kingsley has radically revised our understanding of this thinker. Until recently his pretensions to magical powers and claims to divine status have been neglected; indeed, the most important fragment, fr. 111 DK, where he claims that he can teach his disciple (and him alone) how to control the weather and raise the dead, has actually been denounced as spurious, because it did not fit into our image of a scientist. Led on by Aristotle’s classification of him as a physiologos rather than a poet, we have tended to overlook his credentials as a holy man as well. In the light of Kingsley’s work, we can no longer do so: he was what his contemporaries called a μάγος. Moreover, he employed the terminology of mystery-cult in his poem; Kingsley remarks that ‘this "initiation-vocabulary" is no more a metaphor or allegory than the promises in fragment 111 … it forms a fundamental part of the framework and context in which Empedocles’ poetry needs to be approached’.67

Empedocles was not alone in presenting himself as a hierophant initiating his hearers into mystery-rites, blurring to an extraordinary degree the boundaries between philosophy, science, religion and magic. It is of course anachronistic to describe these arts thus; one should really say that the differences between them had not yet been understood, save by all but the most radical of thinkers. Anaxagoras himself belonged to the class of those free from all superstition, too honest to wish to compete with the purveyors of more traditional mumbo-jumbo and exploit their discourse in order to attract adherents. Given that the Hippocratic author of On the Sacred Disease still had to argue against theories of spirit-possession and traditional healing, it would not be surprising if others adopted a less enlightened approach.

Still more significant is Aristophanes’ presentation, in the Clouds, of Socrates and his Thinking-shop. The seeker after knowledge is depicted as a would-be initiate. When first Strepsiades approaches the place, he is told that it is ‘not holy’, οὐ θέμενον, for an outsider to learn of Socrates’ ideas. These are ‘mysteries’ (μυστήρια). The pupils are initiates (τελωμενοι), and are to learn true knowledge of the gods. Dover explained this as follows:67

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63 Xenocrates may even have offered an allegorical interpretation, viz. that the shield of Agamemnon in Iliad XI was a μάμμα τοῦ κόσμου (Schol. ad ll. XI 40a, cf. 160 Isnardi Parente, = fr. 55 Heinze); however, Reinhardt emended his name, with great plausibility, to Κράθος, and is followed by Mette (fr. 23c) and Erbsse ad loc.


66 Ava Chitwood, AJP 107 (1986) 175-91, on fr. 111 DK.


68 Ar. Nub. 140.

69 Ibid. 143.

70 Ibid. 258.

71 Ibid. 250f.

The second element [peculiar to the play] is the extensive treatment of entry to the school as initiation into the mysteries. There is nothing in our evidence for the sophists to suggest that they used the language or procedures of mysteries and initiation, and from earliest times the nearest approach to this is the 'secrets' of the Pythagoreans (Arist. fr. 192 = 132 [Ross]; Pythagoras A7); but the analogy between initiation and admission to a course of instruction is an obvious one—Plato’s Socrates exploits it humorously in *Euthyd.* 277D and more seriously in *Smp.* 209E—and the reasonable explanation is that Aristophanes is not caricaturing here but presenting a metaphor in concrete form.

However, the ‘reasonable’ explanation no longer seems the correct one. The author of the Derveni papyrus purports to give a more accurate account of the nature of the mysteries, and of holy Orphic scripture, than the professional priests can. He alone holds the hidden keys to their correct interpretation—and that interpretation is Anaxagorean physics, which Orpheus knew about all along, and encrypted into his poem for the benefit of the *cognoscenti*. In fact Aristophanes’ joke works better if some of the natural scientists did indeed clothe themselves in the language of the hierophant and the *magus*; indeed, Empedocles actually dressed in their garb as well, as witness the story of his bronze sandal. It is funnier to parody the actual pretensions of some natural philosophers rather than merely give a metaphor a comically concrete expression. Moreover, the target of his parody is not a sophist, as Dover wrote, but rather a believer in Anaxagorean physics. As Dover noted elsewhere, ‘several of the doctrines which Aristophanes puts into the mouth of Socrates are those of the contemporary philosopher Diogenes of Apollonia’, a notable follower of Anaxagoras. The old consensus for this view has since been strengthened by Paul Vander Waerdt, who has shown that all the physical doctrines ascribed to Socrates in the *Clouds* actually belong to Diogenes; indeed, there are powerful reasons for believing that Socrates did at some stage hold Diogenean opinions himself. I shall return to this below.

III. Authors previously suggested

Let us turn to the question of authorship and see which candidates have been canvassed so far. Apart from the impossible Philochorus, they are four:76

(a) Epigenes (of Athens?);
(b) Euthyphro of Athens;
(c) Stesimbrrotus of Thasos;
(d) Prodicus of Ceos.

In addition to these, we shall discuss five more:

(e) Anaximander of Miletus;
(f) Glaucos (of Teos?);
(g) Metrodorus of Lampsacus;
(h) Diogenes of Apollonia;
(i) Diagoras of Melos.

Let me start with the first four.

(a) The first,77 a certain Epigenes, claimed, in a book called ‘On the poetry <ascribed> to Orpheus’ or ‘On the poetry of Orpheus’, that the *Descent to Hades* and *Hieros Logos* were really by Cercops the

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76 For a convenient survey see Maria Serena Funghi in Laks and Most, p. 36. On Philochorus see above, n. 2.
77 Advanced by S.G. Kapsomenos, ‘The Orphic Papyrus Roll of Thessalonika’. *Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists* 2 (1964-5) pp. 3-12; M.J. Edwards, *art. cit.* (n. 2), for whom he is the sort of figure who could appropriately be the author; cf. West, *The Orphic Poems* p. 10 (‘Epigenes’ allegorical interpretation may of course have been as arbitrary as that of the Derveni papyrus’).
Pythagorean, and the *Robe and Physika* were by Brontinus (to whom Alcmeon of Croton dedicated his book at the end of the sixth century). West noting that some believed him to be the author of Ion’s *Triagmoi*, well suggests that this was because in fact he had written an exegesis of that work, which shows Pythagorean influence. But West’s further hypothesis that Epigenes’ discussion of Orphic poetry formed part of that exegesis seems unnecessary in the face of the specific book-titles given by Clement, and the fact that Clement mentions Ion’s *Triagmoi* immediately before his reference to Epigenes, as was noted above. On the contrary, Epigenes must have discussed in his book on Orphic poetry the information given by Ion in the *Triagmoi*, since we know independently that Ion stated in the *Triagmoi* that Pythagoras ascribed some of his own poems to Orpheus. Epigenes offered an allegorical interpretation of a number of phrases from an Orphic poem, e.g. ‘shuttles with bent conveyance’ and ‘warp-threads’, as symbolic of the ploughing and sowing of the earth.

West well argued that he may be the same as the disciple of Socrates seen in Xenophon and Plato. From the latter we learn that he was the son of Antiphon of the deme Cephisus; from the former, that he was physically unfit when he was a young follower of Socrates. Whether or not he also wrote about Orpheus, he was an Athenian. He can surely be excluded on grounds of dialect; what we know of the content of his work does not resemble that of the Derveni papyrus either.

(b) The second candidate, the seer Euthyphro, known to us only from Plato’s dialogues *Euthyphro* and *Cratylus*, is of similar merit. Kahn believes that both he and the Derveni author were self-employed manteis, and that in each case their account of their art derives in part from ‘the oracular utterances of Heraclitus and the *nous*-cosmology of Anaxagoras’. This expertise allows them ‘to recognise in old poems and stories a deeper meaning that the many do not understand’. Kahn well brings out the parallels: ‘in Plato’s dialogue as in the papyrus text, we encounter an allegorist who discovers the wisdom of Ionian natural philosophy in a cryptic subtext of sources available to all but incomprehensible to the many: in one case the names of the gods and the basic terms of the common language; in the other case the poetry of Orpheus’. Were there no other evidence available, Euthy-


79 Ath. XI 468c, with the variant ‘Epimenes’.


81 *Diog. Laërt. VIII 8, = 36 B 2 DK. The *Triagmoi*, incidentally, affirmed that there were three basic principles: *éνεκες, κράτος* and τύχη (36 B 1 DK), whereas the Derveni author excludes chance as shaper of the kosmos (col. IV 3-4, with K. Tsantsanoglou in Laks and Most, p. 107-8).

82 *σοί καὶ ἔπεισεν ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς Ὀρφέου ποιήσεως τὰ ἱδιὰζοντα παρ’ Ὀρφεὶ ἐκτιθεμένον φητὶ κερκίς καμπυλοχοιτικὸν* (Lobeck ex Hesych.: καμπυλόχροισι MS L) τοῖς ἀρότριοις μηνύεσθαι, ἐστημοί δὲ τοῖς αὐλαζῇ-μίτον δὲ τὸ σπέρμα ἀλληγορεῖθαι, καὶ ἰδίας διὰ τὴν ὅμβρον δῆλον, Ἔοιμας τε αὐτῷ τῶν μέρη τῆς σελήνης, τρισκάδα καὶ πενταεκατεκάτη καὶ νομηματικός διὰ τὴν ἑκοτοτόλογος αὐτὰς καλεῖν τὸν Ὀρφέα φωτὸς σύκας μέρη. πάλιν ἰδίων μὲν τὸ ἔρι διὰ τὴν φύσιν ἢ ἀργίδας δὲ τὴν νύκτα διὰ τὴν ανάπυζον, καὶ Ἡμίροστον τὴν σεληνήν διὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ πρόκειται, Ἀφροίδεσιν τοὺς την καρπὸν καθ’ ἄν δὲ σπέρματα λέγεσθαι παρὰ τῷ ἡκατόμῳ (OF F 33 Kern, = Clem. Strom. V 8.49.3); the passage is longer than may be inferred from West, *loc. cit."


84 *Mem. III 12.1.*

85 *Apol. 33e.*


87 In Laks and Most, p. 63.
phro’s authorship would remain a plausible conjecture, which has already attracted several supporters. 88 There is no firm evidence that he wrote anything, but it is likely enough. However, although his family owned land on Naxos, he too was an Athenian, from the deme Prospalte, 89 and it seems unlikely that he would have written in the dialectal mixture of the Derveni papyrus.

(c) The third candidate is the rhapsode Stesimbrotus of Thasos. 90 He is mentioned by Plato’s Ion as one of the leading experts at Homeric exegesis, 91 as well as by Xenophon, 92 and he taught the poet Antimachus of Colophon. 93 He must have been active in the 430s and/or 420s. 94 He was capable of offering detailed explanations of Homeric cruces which have survived into the scholiastic tradition. 95 He offered recondite versions of myths, e.g. on the Cabiri or the Argonauts, 96 and aetiologies (e.g. moles were blinded by Earth for harming the crops). 97 He could cite or invent bizarre etymologies to go with them: thus he explains the name Dionysus, via a (real or alleged) variant ‘Dionyxus’, with the story that the god was born with horns, and ‘butted’ (ἐνυξώ) the thigh of Zeus. 98 Likewise, the Idaean Dactyli were so called because they were born of Zeus and the nymph Ida, when Zeus ordered his nurses, presumably on Ida, to pick up some dust and throw it behind them, and they were so called when the dust ran through their fingers. 99 In addition, Stesimbrotus equated different gods with each other, e.g. Ammon with Dionysus or Apollo. 100 If the text of Philodemus’ On Piety is reliably restored, 101 he is cited for three bizarre details from succession-myths: (i) that Earth bore Artemis and abandoned her; 102 (ii) that the gods fought each other; 103 (iii) that, after Zeus received power over the universe from his mother Rhea, she took it back from him and gave it to the goddess Artemis, who was the same as

89 His deme: Plato, Cratylus 396d. Naxos: Euthyphro 4c.
90 His name was suggested by W. Burkert, ‘Der Autor von Derveni: Stesimbrotos Περὶ τελετῶν’, ZPE 62 (1986) 1-5, and earlier by K. Tsantsanoglou (see Maria Serena Funghi, in Laks and Most p. 36).
91 οὔμας κάλλιστα ἀνθράπων λέειν περὶ Ὀμηροῦ, ὡς οὔτε Μητρόδωρος ὁ Λαμπυκηνὸς οὔτε Στησίμβροτος ὁ Θάσιος οὔτε Γλαύκων οὔτε ἀλλὸς ούδείς τὸν πάσοτε γενομένον ἔχειν εἰπεὶν οὔτα πολλάς καὶ καλὰς διανομὰς περὶ Ὀμηροῦ ἄλλος ἔγω ( Ion 530c, = FGH 107 T 3).
92 —Οἷθα τι οὐν ἤθος, ἐφι, ἤλθουσαν ραψώδων.—Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί’, ἐφι ὁ Νικήρας, οὐκοιν έμοιν δοκεῖ. —Δήλον γάρ, ἐφι ὁ Δαρκᾶτις, ὡς τὰς υπόνοιας οὐκ ἐπίτανται. εῦ δὲ Στησίμβροτος τα καὶ Ἀλεξιανδρὰ καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς πολυτέκτους ἀγγέλιοι, οὐκέ εἴδον εἰ τὸν πολυτού ἄξιον λέθη ( Symp. 3.6, = FGH 107 T 4).
93 Suda s.v. Antimachus, = FGH 107 T 5 Jacoby, = T 3 in V.J. Matthews, Antimachus of Colophon, Leiden 1996 (cf. pp. 1, 16-17, 47).
94 Matthews, op. cit. pp. 16-17.
97 FGH 107 F 18 (= Photius and Suda s.v. θυσίατερος εὐόλαχος).
98 Διόνυσος: οἱ μὲν Διόνυσοι αὐτῶν ὀνομάζομεν διὰ τοῦ ξί, ὡς ἂν κέρας γενομένως ἐνυξώ τὸν Διός μηρόν, ἢς Στησίμβροτος (FGH 107 F 13, = Etym. Magn. p. 277.35 et Et. Gen. s.v., cf. schol. T ad Hom. II. XIV 325 with Erbse ad loc.). Jacoby assigns this to the Περὶ τελετῶν. Just afterwards, a different etymology is assigned to the unknown Alexander of Thasos: οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλά διανύει καὶ κατορθώθει, ὡς Ἀλεξιανδρὰ ὁ Θᾶσιος. Erbse suggests Alexander οῦτε Μύνθιος, regretting that Alexander Polyhistor is excluded (the source for all this information is given at the end as ‘Επαφροδίτος in a Commentary on Ξ’). Could this alternative etymology also come from Stesimbrotus ος ἢ θάσιος, or is οδύος merely misplaced from the mention of Stesimbrotus?
99 FGH 107 F 12a (= Etym. Magn. 465.27) with 12b (= schol. ad Ap. Rhod. I 1126). This is the only fragment where the source is explicitly given as Περὶ τελετῶν.
100 FGH 107 F 14 (= Philodemus, De Pietate p. 22 Gomperz, = P. Herc. 248 fr. 1.2-4, = p. 108 Schober).
102 So the text of Schober, which is more reliable than that of Gomperz, who is followed by FGH 107 F 15 (= Philodemus, De Pietate p. 41 Gomperz, = P. Herc. 1088 fr. 5.27-9, = p. 91 Schober).
103 FGH 107 F 28 (= Philodemus, De Pietate p. 28 Gomperz, = P. Herc. 433 fr. 1.11-15, = p. 91 Schober).
The Physicist as Hierophant

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Athene: [Στην]σύμβροτος διε λέγει τὸν Δία παρὰ [Ῥεός] τῆς μητρὸς [τήν] ἄρχην λαβόντα [τὴν] ἀρχὴν πάλιν ὑπὸ αὐτής ἀφαιρεθήναι, τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τῇ [πώς] καὶ Ἀθηνᾶι τῇ[ν] βασιλείαν δούλης.105 Burkert builds his case on this detail, but it differs from the succession-myth in the Derveni papyrus, although the equation of two deities with each other occurs there (but not that of these two).

Now most of these details might derive from an explication of various mystery-cults, notably those of the Cabiri and of Dionysus (alias the Orphic mysteries).106 Stesimbrotus’ Περὶ τελετῶν might well have been such a work; hence W. Burkert’s suggestion that it is identical with the Derveni papyrus. Moreover the equation of gods with each other is an essentially allegorical procedure, and it is conceivable that Stesimbrotus also offered allegorical explanations. The citation in Xenophon implies that he was not like the ordinary rhapsodes, who knew only how to recite the poems of Homer but did not understand their underlying sense (ὑπόνοιαι). This is the normal term for ‘hidden meanings’, and denoted both allegory and etymology.107 But it is unlikely that any example of this survives; in the only possible instance, an allegorical interpretation by Crates of Mallos has become attached to a textual emendation by Stesimbrotus. At Iliad XV 189, the gods divide up ‘all things’ (πάντα), allotting the sky to Zeus, the sea to Poseidon, and the Underworld to Hades, with earth and Olympus common to all. If some things are common to all, how can all things have been divided up? Stesimbrotus solved the problem by writing πάντα as πάντα ἢ, ‘all things which’, assuming an Ionic psilosis (an arbitrary and impossible hypothesis), perhaps comparing επίστρων at Od. 6.265.108 But the MS of the scholia provides no evidence that he offered an allegorical explanation to support this, rather than merely obviated the illogicality by textual manipulation. F. Buffière109 believed that, in the Iliadic scholia in MS Venetus A, Stesimbrotus’ reading is followed by an explanation of it, to the effect that ‘the earth is common to all, because the remaining three elements are also found in it; the water curves round it in a sphere; outbursts of fire are produced at its surface, as at Etna in Sicily and around Hephaestus’ Craters, and likewise around Cragus in Lycia and so on. Likewise the air surrounds it. Homer does well to say that Olympus too is shared, since sky too has its genesis from the four elements.’110 Hence Buffière concluded that this explanation goes back to Stesimbrotus. However, according to H. Erbse ad loc. Stesimbrotus’ reading is actually followed by the A-scholium which he prints as 189c.111 Surely the truth is that Stesimbrotus’ reading was taken over by Crates, and the mention of the oceans ‘curving round the earth in a sphere’ is redolent of the latter; it is hardly conceivable that this detail was anticipated by Stesimbrotus, given that even Anaxagoras and the Atomists still regarded the earth as flat or drum-shaped. Pfeiffer was surely right to say that there is in his fragments ‘not the slightest trace of allegorical interpretation’.112

Moreover, although the Ionic/Attic dialect of the Derveni papyrus might seem compatible with Stesimbrotus’ authorship, there is also no trace of Anaxagorean influence on his thought. Indeed, it can be shown that Stesimbrotus and Anaxagoras were on opposite sides in Athenian politics: for Anaxagoras was (to his cost) the close associate of Pericles, whereas Stesimbrotus was the author of a

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104 This supplement is owed to W. Luppe: Gomperz had proposed τε for the τε[.]τι in the papyrus, and is followed (perhaps rightly) by Schober p. 85.
105 On Piety p. 45 Gomperz, =FGH 107 F 17 (P. Herc. 1088 fr. 9 + 433 fr. 6a).
106 For a general account of the environment which called forth such explanations see W. Burkert, Ancient Mystery Cults, Cambridge MA and London 1988, pp. 69-88.
108 This comparison is in schol. Τ on ll. XV 189.
110 = schol. D to ll. XV 193.
111 = schol. D ad ll. XV 18.
pamphlet On Themistocles, Thucydidès and Pericles,113 apparently written in the 430s.114 This contained vitriolic attacks on the private lives and grandiose ambitions of both Themistocles115 and his protégé. Stesimbrotus savaged Pericles for his overweening imperialism,116 but also, I believe, for his impiety. First, Stesimbrotus records that Pericles, eulogising in 439 B.C. the Athenian dead in the siege of Samos, said that they had become ‘immortal like gods’;117 this may seem a mere cliché to us, but to one hostile to Athenian ambitions against fellow Greeks it might well seem blasphemous indeed (after all, Pericles’ proud boast in the same speech that the Athenians had taken only nine months to defeat the Samians, whereas the Greeks had taken ten years to defeat Troy, scandalised Ion of Chios).118 More telling is Stesimbrotus’ attack on Pericles for an incestuous liaison with his own daughter-in-law, the wife of his son Xanthippus, who, according to the Thasian, spread the rumour himself. Plutarch (echoing Stesimbrotus’ phrasing?) calls this a δεινὸν ἀκεβήμα καὶ μυθόδευς, ‘a dreadful impiety worthy of myth’.119 Stesimbrotus’ stance is confirmed by his very different attitude towards Pericles’ adversary Cimon, who is characterised (despite the fact that he had been the conqueror of Stesimbrotus’ native isle of Thasos) as unaccomplished but free of clever Attic chatter, and very noble and truthful like a Peloponnesian.120 Indeed, Stesimbrotus observed that Cimon’s wife was a Peloponnesian (a fact for which Pericles abused him),121 and quoted a pro-Spartan saying of his.122 Now among Stesimbrotus’ claims about Themistocles was that he was a pupil of Anaxagoras and enthusiast for Melissus (as Plutarch noted, this is likely to be false on chronological grounds).123 Given the other slanders which he disseminated, this was presumably an invention meant to discredit his target. Since the latest datable event mentioned in his attack on these Athenian radical politicians (with a positive portrait of the

113 For the title see Ath. XIII 589d-e = FGH 107 F 10a.
114 F. Jacoby’s theory that it was written during the Archidamian War rests only on the assumption that it was related to the Ionian opposition to Athenian rule that led to the revolt of Mytilene, whereas in fact this hostility must have existed throughout the 430s, as witness the famous jibe that Pericles was using allied money to doll up Athens like a whore (Plut. Per. 12). This seems to me a more plausible dating for the pamphlet, especially given that the politicians of the 420s are not known to have been mentioned. Jacoby is followed by A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydidès I, Oxford 1945, p. 36.
115 Plut. Them. 4.3, = FGH 107 F 2 (Themistocles transformed the Athenians into a nation of sailors, in the face of opposition from Miltiades—a chronological impossibility); 24.4 = FGH 107 F 3 (a tale that Themistocles went to Sicily and asked for the hand of King Hiero’s daughter in marriage, contradicted by the same Stesimbrotus’ other statement that his wife and children were sent to him in his exile, as well as by Theophrastus’ report of Themistocles’ hostility to Hiero, evinced by his attack on his booth at Olympia, in 25.1).
116 Plut. Per. 26.1, = FGH 107 F 8: Pericles had designs on Cyprus during the revolt of Samos. This claim, rightly dismissed by Plutarch as incredible, is designed to show Pericles as a rampart imperialist, just as Themistocles’ alleged request for the hand of the daughter of Hiero of Syracuse is meant to show him as a megalomaniac as well as a bigamist, and is intended to motivate his attack on Hiero’s booth at Olympia.
117 Plut. Per. 8.9, = FGH 107 F 9; N. Loraux notes the restraint of his statement, but as this epitaphios lies at the recorded origins of genre it was perhaps extreme for its time, and outdone only by later hyperbole (The Invention of Athens, tr. A. Sheridan, Cambridge MA 1986, pp. 40-1).
118 Plut. Per. 28.7, = FGH 292 F 16, with N. Loraux, op. cit. pp. 70-1; Cimon’s sister Elpinice thought it improper too, and got a rude reply (Plut. Per. 28.6).
119 Plut. Per. 13.16 and 36.6, = FGH 107 F 10b.
120 Plut. Cimon 4.4, = FGH 107 F 5. Jacoby considered the portrayal of Cimon hostile (loc. cit.)
121 Plut. Cimon 16.1, = FGH 107 F 7. Plutarch’s nearby statement that Cimon dealt mildly with the allies might come from Stesimbrotus too.
122 Plut. Cimon 16.3, = FGH 107 F 8. He also noted that Cimon’s sister Elpinice successfully persuaded Pericles, despite the latter’s rude riposte to her advances, to moderate a suit of his against her brother (ibid. 14.3 = FGH 107 F 6).
123 Plut. Them. 2.3, = FGH 107 F 1; Στησίμβροτος Ἄνασαγόρου τινὰ διακωκέα τὸν θεμιστοκλέα φηλι καὶ περὶ Μελίσσου εποιήθη οὗ τοὺς χρόνους ἀπόμενους. To obviate the chronological difficulty, K.J. Beloch suggested that they met in Magnesia (Griechische Geschichte, ed. 2, Berlin and Leipzig 1912-17, II 2.9).
laconising Cimon) is the siege of Samos, he probably wrote it in the 430s B.C. For all these reasons, it seems to me very unlikely that Stesimbrotus could also have written the Derveni treatise.

(d) The fourth candidate for authorship, the sophist Prodicus of Ceos, has been advanced by A. Lebedev. His approach has been especially valuable, since it broadened the debate and challenged the usual assumptions about authorship, pointing instead to sophistic circles in Athens. His strongest piece of evidence is likely to be from Themistius: τὴν Προδίκου σοφίαν ... ὀς ἱερογράφιν πάσαν ἀνθρώποι καὶ μυστήρια καὶ τελετὰς τῶν γεωργίας καλῶν ἐξάρθησε, νομίζων καὶ θεῶν ἐννοιαν ἐνέπαθεν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἑλθείν καὶ πάσαν εὐσέβειαν. This theory that the human benefactors of early mankind were worshipped and became the traditional gods, just as Egyptians worshipped the Nile, is not really allegory, but Euhemerism: note however that the sophist deems the beauties of agriculture the origin of all cult, mysteries and rites. Prodicus was certainly interested, as is our author (e.g. in col. X), in the exact nuances of words (ὁρθοέπεια), but seems to me unlikely because of the lack of evidence that he offered allegorical interpretations of specific texts. However, there is new evidence from Epicurus, quoted by Philodemus, that Prodicus, along with Diagoras and Critias, altered the names of the gods in order to explain the origin of belief in them, i.e. practised etymology.

IV. Rhapsodes and lunatics

Let me now offer some new candidates for authorship.

(e) Alongside Stesimbrotus, Xenophon mentions one Anaximander as expert at understanding the hidden meanings (ὑπόνοιαι) of Homer. He is referring to Anaximander of Miletus. Active in the first half of the fourth century, he wrote in Ionic dialect and is called a ἰστορικός. The only works of his which we know of by title are the Συμβόλων Πυθαγορείων εξήγησις, which was an explanation of Pythagorean superstitions, and an Ἡρωολογία, quoted by Athenaeus for an account of Amphitryon. He also stated that the Curetes were the parents of the nymph Creta, and that Danaus brought writing to Greece. He did not, so far as we can tell, employ allegory, unless he is the author of an allegory of Apollo and the Muses in terms of the ten parts of the mouth. This is cited as from Anaximander of Lampsacus, and is better ascribed to Metrodorus of Lampsacus.

(f) A similarly obscure candidate is Glaucon, mentioned by Plato’s Ion with Stesimbrotus and Metrodorus of Lampsacus as fine interpreters of Homer. Since Metrodorus certainly was an allegorist, as we shall see, Glaucon could conceivably have belonged in the same category. However, little is

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124 His proposal, referred to by D. Sider (in Laks and Most, p. 129 n. 2), was advanced at the conference on the Derveni papyrus at Princeton in May 1993; I was fortunate to hear a version of his arguments at the Institute of Classical Studies in London in 1996. Since these are unpublished, they are not addressed here.

125 Or. 30 (p. 422 Dindorf), = 84 B 5 DK.


128 Symp. 3.6, quoted above, = FGH 9 T 3.

129 FGH 9 Jacoby, the only collection of his fragments.

130 Diog. Laërt. II 2.

131 Suda s.v. Ἀναξίμανδρος Ἀναξίμανδρου = FGH 9 T 1.

132 Ath. XI 498a-b, = FGH 9 F 1.

133 Pliny, NH IV 58, = FGH 9 F 2.

134 Schol Dion. Thrax. p. 183.5 Hilgard, = FGH 9 F 3.

135 FGH 9 F 4; it is spurious according to Jacoby, who already assigned to Metrodorus; it will be discussed fully below.

136 Ion 530c, quoted above.
known of him, unless he was the same person as Glaucus of Rhegium, which seems unlikely; 137 indeed, the reference to Glaucon in Aristotle’s Poetics has now become even less informative than before, as a result of a textual improvement. 138 He is probably identical with the Glaucon of Teos mentioned in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 139 as having written on hypokrisis in poetic performance (a mention of tragic and rhapsodic performances immediately precedes). 140 From this scanty evidence we can form no clear impression of Glaucon’s work.

What is remarkable about the next two candidates whom I shall consider is that they were not only allegorists but also followers of Anaxagoras—exactly the combination which we find in the Derveni papyrus. There is no evidence that Anaxagoras himself practised allegory, although he did advance at least one etymology, that of aither. 141 Diogenes Laërtius 142 states that he was the first to claim that the poetry of Homer was about virtue and justice: (Anaxagoras) δοκεῖ δὲ πρῶτος, καθὰ ἴησι Θαβαρίνος ἐν Παντοδαπῇ ἱστορίᾳ, τὴν Ὄμηρον ποίησιν ἀποφήγασθαι εἶναι περί ἀρετῆς καὶ δικαιοσύνης. His claim that Homeric poetry is about virtue and justice begins the ethical tendency in Homeric criticism, and, as Pfeiffer remarked, 143 does not mean that he explained Homeric poetry as moral allegory. But his followers were a different story.

I begin with an extraordinary passage in the Byzantine chronicler George Syncellus, to which David Sider has just drawn attention: 144 ἐρμηνεύουσι δὲ οἱ Ἀναξαγόρειοι τοὺς μιθοθέτους θεοὺς νοῦν μέν τὸν Δία, τὴν δὲ Ἀθηνᾶν τέχνην, ὃθεν καὶ τὸ τῇ ἱερῷ ὀλλομένῳ ἔρρει πολύμητς Ἀθήνη”, the Anaxagoreans interpret the gods of myth, Zeus as mind, Athena as art, whence comes the verse “when hands have perished, skilful Athene is gone”. Here is at last a proof not only that followers of Anaxagoras allegorized the gods of myth, but also that they applied this technique to Orphic poetry: for the verse quoted is elsewhere ascribed, with a variation in its latter half, to Orpheus. 145 Unfortunately we do not know which of his disciples said this. Let us look at some of them.

(g) Anaxagoras’ weirdest follower of all has been mentioned in several discussions of the Derveni treatise, and his methods often compared to those of its author; but he has always been mentioned only to be dismissed. 146 I refer to Metrodorus of Lampsacus, who is not to be confused with either

137 G. Lanata, op. cit. pp. 279-81, points out that we would have to allow that both Plato and Aristotle made the same mistake in the name. Glaucon did discuss the date of Orpheus, as of Homer, Terpander, Archilochus, Thaletas, and Xenocrates, as well as of Meton, and seems to have been an orthodox historian of literature, music and thought.

138 At Poet. 25.1461a31, after the phrase κατὰ τὴν κοινωτικὴν ἡ ἡ Γλώσσαι λέγει we used to read the Renaissance conjecture ὅτι for the τί of the other sources, but the Arabic indicates that we should instead read ἐτι, beginning a new point, and punctuate before it (R. Janko, Aristotle’s Poetics, Indianapolis 1987, p. 150-1). Hence only what precedes pertains to Glaucon, i.e. a discussion of what to do when a word seems to have a contradictory meaning, in the context of the problem at II. XX 267-72, i.e. the order of the layers of metal in Achilles’ shield. Buffière (op. cit. p. 133) suggests that, as the shield was a common topic of allegory, Glaucon proposed an allegorical interpretation of it.

139 III.1.3.1403b26-7.

140 He is perhaps also the same as the author of Γλώσσαι mentioned at Ath. XI 480 f.


142 II 11 = 59 A 1 DK.


145 This is assigned to Orpheus by Orion, Etym. 163.23, with the text ἔρρειν πολύμητος Ἀθηνᾶ. = Orphicorum Fragmenta F 347 Kern.

146 So Pfeiffer, op. cit. p. 237 (‘though elementary, [the Derveni papyrus] is in the line of Metrodorus’); West, op. cit. p. 82 ([the Derveni author] ‘seems to stand in the same tradition as that other Anaxagorean allegorist, Metrodorus of Lampsacus: not necessarily as early, but scarcely generations later’; A.A. Long, ‘Stoic Readings of Homer’, in R. Lambertson and J.J. Keney, Homer’s Ancient Readers, Princeton 1992, p. 65 n. 53 (‘this practice [of demonstrating Homer’s knowledge of philosophical truths] seems to be well under way by the end of the fifth century, on the evidence of Metrodorus of Lampsacus, and it can also be observed in the Derveni papyrus’); and T.M.S. Baxter, op. cit. p. 127 (quoted below), and
Metrodorus of Chios, the pupil of Democritus, or Metrodorus of Lampsacus the younger, the friend of Epicurus. No doubt the plethora of similar Metrodori has caused confusion among their fragments, and some may well turn out to have been misassigned when they are restudied. Perhaps it has caused confusion among scholars too, and, combined with disdain for the lunacy of his thought, helps to explain their neglect of this peculiar personage.147

I just cited Diogenes Laërtius for Anaxagoras’ view that Homer’s poetry is about virtue and justice. This passage continues as follows: ἐπὶ πλεῖον δὲ προστίθηκα τοῦ λόγου Μητρόδωρου τὸν Λαμψάκην, γνώρισον ὃντα αὐτοῦ, ὃν καὶ πρῶτον εὐποδάσατε περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὴν φυσικὴν πραγματείαν.148

According to this source, dependent on Favorinus, Metrodorus carried further Anaxagoras’ view of Homer, as he was an acquaintance of his, and was also the first to study Homer’s φυσικὴ πραγματεία. This can only mean that he was the first to study the physical world presupposed by Homeric epic; and, for an Anaxagorean, the physical world should mean the world according to Anaxagoras.

Tatian149 gives us our longest account of Metrodorus’ methods:

καὶ Μητρόδωρος δὲ ὁ Λαμψάκην ὕμφα τῷ Περὶ ὁμήρου λίαν εὐθύθως διείλεθη, πάντα ἕως ἄλληγοριῶν μετέχων, ὥστε γὰρ Ἡραν ὦτε Ἀθηνῶν ὦτε Δία τοῦτο εἶναι φησιν ὑπὲρ οἱ τῶν περιβάλλουσαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τεμεῖν καθεδρύσαντες νομίζωσιν, φύσεως δὲ υποτάσσεις καὶ στοιχείων διακοσμήσεις. καὶ τῶν Ἐκτορος δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἀχιλλέα δηλαδὴ καὶ τῶν Ἀγαμέμνων καὶ πάντας ἀπαξιαλῶς Ἐλληνας τε καὶ βαρβάρους τὸν Ἐλένην καὶ τὸν Πάριδι τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως ὑπάρχοντας χάριν οὐκονομίας ἐν τῇ ποητείᾳ παρεικῆς ἢ,150 οὕδενός ὡντος τῶν προειρημένων ἀνθρώπων.

Metrodorus of Lampsacus in his book On Homer has argued extremely foolishly by transferring everything to allegory. For neither Hera, nor Athena, nor Zeus is what those who found sanctuaries and temples for them believe, but (they are) natural principles and arrangements of elements.151 Hector and Achilles, obviously, and absolutely all the Greeks and Trojans, together with Helen and Paris, being of the same nature, were introduced in the poetry (merely) for the sake of skilful composition, although none of the aforesaid persons existed.

It has been thought that ‘what those who found sanctuaries and temples for them believe’ is commentary by Tatian, but I see no reason why it should not be part of Metrodorus’ claim: he knows, better than do those who practise conventional religion, what these gods and heroes in Homer’s epics really stand for. The Derveni commentator adopts a similar posture in col. XX, as we saw. In case we doubt what Tatian means, let us look at two last fragments, which overlap in a felicitous manner. The first is Hesychius

more generally pp. 127-39. Most recently, cf. D. Sider in Laks and Most, pp. 137-8: ‘the Derveni author belongs to a circle of allegorizing Anaxagoreans, such as we know to have existed in Lampsacus … Metrodorus himself is clearly not our author, but someone else of this circle, whether a younger contemporary or someone a generation later, could well be … This second combination of Anaxagoras, allegory and Orpheus cannot be coincidence; rather it strongly points to Lampsacus as the source for the writing of the text of the Derveni papyrus.’


148 Metrodorus 61 F 2 DK, = Diog. Laërt. II 11, = G. Lanata, op. cit. p. 244-5.

149 Oratio ad Graecos 21, p. 24.5-14 Schwartz, = 61 F 3 DK, = Lanata loc. cit.

150 ἐν τῇ ποιητείᾳ παρεικῆς ἢ is the reading of the oldest MSS, V (saecc. xi), whereas the other two (M, saecc. xii and P, saecc. xiv) have ἔρειτε (ἐρείτε Μ) παρεικῆς, which is printed in all editions I have seen but does not make sense, even if one were to repunctuate the last sentence as a question. The latter reading is translated as ‘no doubt you will go on to say’ by Molly Whittaker, Tatian: Oratio ad Graecos and Fragments, Oxford 1982, p. 45. It is especially surprising that the text passed unquestioned in the edition of E. Schwartz (Tatiani Oratio ad Graecos, Leipzig 1888), since Wilamowitz scrutinised his text and made many improvements.

151 J. Porter, in Lamberton and Keaney, Homer’s Ancient Readers p. 110 n. 114, suggests that the word διακοσμήσεις goes back to Metrodorus himself.
R. Janko

s.v. Ἀγαμέμνονα· τὸν αἰθέρα Μητρόδωρος εἶπεν ἄλληγορικῶς. Bizarre enough, we may think, that Metrodorus equated Agamemnon with the aither; but a passage in Philodemus’ *On Poems* shows that he went even further:


... they want the poet to present other <meanings>, as does Crates with the making of the globe; but some are openly insane, like those who say that Homer composed his two poems about components of the world and about laws and customs <used> among humankind, and <that> Agamemnon is the aither whereas Achilles is the sun, Helen the earth and Paris the air, Hector the moon, and the other <heroes> have been named [my emphasis] in an analogous manner. And among the gods <they say that> Demeter is the liver, Dionysus the spleen, Apollo the gall-bladder ...

Combining this with the evidence in Hesychius, we can say with certainty that Metrodorus is among those meant; Philodemus avers that his allegories were so insane that they made those of Crates of Mallos look mild by comparison.

One other allegory may possibly belong to Metrodorus. One Anaximander of Lampsacus is cited by Fabius Planciades Fulgentius (the North African mythographer dated to c. A.D. 467-532), alongside a certain Xenophanes of Heracleopolis, for an explanation of the myth of Apollo and the nine Muses in terms of an allegory of ten different parts of the mouth. This could be a mistake for the rhapsode Anaximander of Miletus, whom I discussed above. But Jacoby suspected, rightly I believe, that this is an error for Metrodorus of Lampsacus. If so, we have another case of Metrodorus allegorising the traditional gods as parts of the body.

But do these allegories match those of the Derveni papyrus? Although the emphasis on naming is the same in both, it may well seem that they do not. The papyrus equates Olympus with Time (col. XII); Zeus with Kronos (col. XV), Mind (col. XVI), and Air (col. XVII); Air (?) with Breath (πνεῦμα), and Breath with Moira and φρόνησις, especially the wisdom of Zeus (col. XVIII, XIX); the mixture of things with Zeus, Aphrodite, Peitho and Harmony (col. XXI); Earth with Meter, Rhea and Hera (col. XXII); Okeanos with Air, and Air with Zeus (col. XXIII)—a breathtaking performance. Metrodorus, on the other hand, equates heroes with the elements (Agamemnon = Aither, Achilles = Sun, Helen = Earth, Paris = Air, and Hector = Moon), but gods with parts of the human body (Demeter = liver, Dionysus =

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152 61 F 4 DK, = Lanata 246-7.
154 The preceding context may have been something like ‘these critics, although they often admit that the signifiers begin right from the word “wrath”.
155 Myth. I 15 (= p. 25.1-18 in the edition of R. Helm, *Fabii Planciadiis Fulgentii v.c. Opera*, Leipzig 1898), = FGH 9 F 4: ‘... habes ergo novem Musarum vel Apollinis ipsius redditam rationem, sicut in libris suis Anaximander Lamsacenus et Zenopanes Eracleopolites exponunt, quod et aliis firmant ut Pisander fisicus et Euximenes in libro Teologumenon’. This text deserves to be more thoroughly investigated. Did Fulgentius or his source once say that Metrodorus was a pupil of Anaxagoras, with ‘Anaximander’ as an error for ‘Anaxagoras’? Fulgentius had a special interest in allegory; he also wrote the *Expositio Vergilianae continentiae* (sic), a dialogue in which the ghost of Vergil interprets the hidden meanings of the *Aeneid* as an allegory of human life.
spleen, Apollo = bile), an utterly bizarre and unparalleled procedure.\textsuperscript{156} As Buffière notes, he must have had difficulty in finding passages in Homer on which to base the equations for Demeter and Dionysus, since they appear so rarely in the poems. But there may be another explanation. What if Metrodorus allegorized other texts also? The passage from Syncellus (quoted above) makes this likely; there ‘Anaxagoreans’ equated Zeus with Air (as in the Derveni papyrus), but Athene with \textit{techne}, and cited in support an Orphic verse—"when the hands are gone, Athene perishes". As Buffière remarked,\textsuperscript{157} without noting that the verse is Orphic, this makes Zeus equivalent to Air and to Nous, but Athene equal to the manual ability that executes the plans of the mind. As he observes, Anaxagoras had said that man was the most intelligent animal because he had hands.\textsuperscript{158} Hence, in Syncellus too, we may see gods equated with parts of the body, Zeus with the Mind and Athena with the Hands—but based on an Orphic text. If this report does refer to Metrodorus, as seems very possible, it also follows that he contrived to equate one god with both a cosmic and a bodily principle—Zeus with Mind. But could he have done so in the case of other gods as well? And in particular, could he have equated Demeter with spleen as well as with the other goddesses named in col. XXII of the Derveni papyrus? There is only one possible parallel in the papyrus, where the Sun is said to resemble the genitals:

\begin{quote}
\textit{έν τοὶς άλιθοὶς όρϑώποις τὴν γένειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους νομίζοντας ἕναν τοῦτον ἔχρησατο, ἀνεύοντος τῶν αἰθίων [οὗ γίνεται, αἰθίωι εἴκάσας τὸν ἥλιον]. ἄνευ [υπὸ τοῦ ἥλιου] τὰ ἀντα τοιαύτα ὄφες ὀφθον [τε] γενε[έθισα].\textsuperscript{159}
\end{quote}

As (Orpheus) saw that people think that they have their origin in genitals and do not come to be without genitals, he made use of this, likening the Sun to a genital organ. For it is impossible for the sort of things that exist to have arisen without the Sun.

But some may feel that, rather than \textit{equate} the Sun with the genitals, the papyrus instead remarks on their similarity in function in order to explain the Orphic poem. Moreover, as we saw, Metrodorus equated Achilles with the Sun; could he have accepted both these equations together? Such multiple identifications are common among the allegorists, and a given set of heroes or gods could be equally compatible with more than one set of allegorical identifications. However, it strains credulity that Metrodorus could have been quite so inconsistent as to equate gods with elements in the Derveni papyrus, but with body-parts elsewhere in his work, while celestial bodies were equated with elements in the papyrus and with heroes elsewhere. Moreover there is no sign of etymology in the admittedly scanty remains of his work.\textsuperscript{160} Nor is this the sole objection to identifying Metrodorus of Lampsacus as the author of the papyrus. Its dialect, as we saw, is Ionic overlaid with Attic. Lampsacus had long been under Athenian control by the time when Metrodorus must have been writing. The mixture of Attic and Ionic is appropriate—but what about the apparently Doric \textit{nin}? Lampsacus was founded from Phocaea, an Ionian town which is on the edge of the Aeolic-speaking area south of Lesbos, and which, like Erythrae, \textit{may} have had an Aeolic substrate in its dialect; conceivably the form \textit{nin} was Aeolic too.\textsuperscript{161} But this is as long a shot as a Metrodorean allegory.

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\textsuperscript{156} For an attempt to imagine how Metrodorus might have extracted these equations from the text of Homer cf. Buffière, \textit{op. cit.} 128-31.

\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Ibid.} 130.

\textsuperscript{158} 59 A 102, = \textit{At. Part. An. IV.}10.687a7.

\textsuperscript{159} Col. XIII 7-11. I have supplied \textit{γενε[έθισα]}, but have no means of knowing whether others have already done so.

\textsuperscript{160} So Baxter, \textit{op. cit.} p. 127.

\textsuperscript{161} We do not know whether Aeolic used \textit{viv} or \textit{μυ} (see R. Janko, \textit{Homer, Hesiod and the Hymns}, Cambridge 1982, 171), but since that dialectal group has strong affiliations with West Greek it might have shared \textit{viv} with Doric. The letters written on leaden sheets from Ampurias, a colony of Massalia which was itself founded from Phocaea, happen not to contain either form.
V. An Airy Hypothesis

If we hesitantly exclude Metrodorus, and also Anaxagoras himself, as well as his other pupil Archelaus of Athens (neither practised allegory, and neither can plausibly be expected to have used Doric *viv* in his writings), we need to look for someone else who accepted, as they did, the equation of Zeus with Mind, but was also an allegorist and might have employed that offending pronoun. Fortunately we know of one candidate who meets these criteria, and whose extensive fragments reveal exactly the same philosophical affiliations as those of the Derveni papyrus. He has been overlooked until now, I think, because of the prevalent view that Metrodorus was the only fifth-century allegorist. I refer to Diogenes of Apollonia. We know from Philodemus, in a passage that has passed almost unnoticed, that Diogenes ventured an allegorical interpretation of poetry at least once:


'Diogenes praises Homer on the ground that he spoke not mythically but in accord with reality about the divine: for he says that (Homer) believes that Air is Zeus, since (Homer) says that Zeus is omniscient.'

This evidence has hardly ever been taken seriously. That Homer is to be praised for his truthful treatment of the gods of mythology, because he equates Air with Zeus, will surprise many familiar with the epics of that poet. This claim had not been made by the earliest Homeric allegorist, Theagenes of Rhegium (*floruit* c. 525), who had probably equated Air with Hera, by the neat anagram HPA = AHP. It will surprise us even more to note why Diogenes held that Homer knew that Zeus was Air, namely that Zeus is said by the poet to be omniscient. This accords fully with Diogenes' doctrine: compare his statements that Air 'knows much' and is omnipotent, which ought to imply omniscience. However, even if Homer's Zeus does know everything (itself a doubtful proposition), we moderns would hesitate to extract from this premiss Diogenes' conclusion. Here, surely, we are fully within the lost world of the Derveni papyrus.

Moreover, Diogenes used etymology as well as allegory in his interpretations. Baxter well observes that he derived τὰ ἄφροδίσια from ἄφρος 'foam', because he held that semen is ἄφρος τοῦ αἷματος. Moreover, he continues, Diogenes' fragment B 4 DK

'justifies his use of ὀηρι as a principle by pointing to the fact that animals live by breathing and die without it: ὀηρι is ψυχή and νόμισμα for them … Zeus is air because he is the cause of life and air enables us to live. (It is easy to see how this could be supported by an etymology of the Ζευς-ζήν variety.) Diels also suggested linking the etymology of

162 There seems to have been only one philosopher in the middle of the fifth century whom we may label with confidence an allegorist, a pupil of Anaxagoras, not a sophist, Metrodorus of Lampsaucus (Pfeiffer, op. cit. p. 35).


166 B 8 DK, = F 7 Laks: Air is μέγα καὶ ἱσχυρὸν καὶ άθετὸν τε καὶ άθάνατον καὶ πολλὰ εἰδός.

167 B 5 DK, = F 9 Laks (cited below).

The Physicist as Hierophant

Ouryanovs at Cratylus 396b8-c3 to Diogenes’ theory that men think with to oére katharo kai xírro... Now since this mixture of allegory and etymology is just what in my view Plato is parodying [in the Cratylus], Diogenes makes a plausible target... All Diogenes’ vices and more can be seen to the fore in the last but certainly not least member of the ‘Anaxagorétei I wish to discuss, the Derveni commentator.'

Baxter’s subsequent discussion leads him to conclude that ‘the Derveni commentary remains a prime candidate as a target of the Cratylus’. The coincidence, remarked above, between the Doric etymology of ἕλιος in the papyrus and that in Cratylus 408e-409a (as deriving, respectively, from ἄλλης ‘gathered together’ and ἄλλης ὁ ‘gather’) seems significant in the context of this recognition of Diogenean elements in that dialogue. Since Baxter knew of the evidence that Diogenes employed allegory as well as etymology, one wonders why he did not follow to the end the path he had so brilliantly discovered and suggest that Diogenes is the author of the Derveni papyrus. That he did not may have been owing to the very misnomer ‘Derveni commentator’. Plato’s Protagoras does not become a ‘commentator’ simply because he analyses a poem of Simonides. The author of the papyrus is not, I believe, such a commentator or rhapsode: he is trying to show not only that his theory is compatible with traditional religious practices and sacred texts, but also that by employing his theory one can give a much better account of both than others could, and simultaneously remove the element of scandal present in Homeric and Orphic poetry. The focus of his treatise is on the philosophico-religious doctrine which it contains, buttressed by the allegorical and etymological interpretation of the Orphic scripture.

A back-reference shows that the work began not with poetic commentary, but with an account of the composition and size of the Sun, which he sees as essential to the current state of things:

τὰ νῦν ἕντα τὸ θεὸς εἰ μὴ ἤθελεν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ἐκόπηκεν ἕλιον. ἐποίησε δὲ τοιοῦτον καί τὸ οὐσίων γνῶμενον οἷος ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου διηγεῖται.

‘If God did not want the things which now exist to exist, he would not have created a Sun.
But he created it to be of such a kind and size as is explained at the start of this account.’

This accords with the fact that Heraclitus’ opinions about the Sun are quoted in col. IV 7-9, including his claim that the Sun is the size of a human foot. Moreover, as Maria Serena Funghi noted, this teleological theory of a beneficent deity arranging the Universe in the best possible way is paralleled in Diogenes:

οὐ γὰρ ἂν, φησίν, οἷον τε ἦν οὕτως διεξάθαι ἄνευ νοῆσιος, ὡστε πάντων μέτρα ἐξειν, χειμονὸς τε καὶ θέρους καὶ νυκτός καὶ ἡμέρας καὶ ωριῶν καὶ ηπείων καὶ κυνηγών καὶ εὐδιων· καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, εἰ τις βουλέται ἐννοεῖσθαι, εὕρισκοι ἂν οὕτω διακείμενα ὡς ἀνυστὸν κάλλιστα.

Another reference to this teleological view appears in col. XXIV 10-12, where the existence of the moon is deemed responsible for mankind’s knowledge of the winds and seasons:

171 However, Baxter (op. cit. p. 124) well compares Empedocles’ verse about the Sun, ἄλλης ὁ μὲν ἄλλης μέγας ὁ ὄραν ἐκ μορφολογίας (31 B 41 DK). This might be the source of either or both passages.
172 So already Obbink in Laks and Most, pp. 40-2.
173 Thus I cannot agree with M.J. Edwards (art. cit. p. 210), when he claims that the author is a critic not a philosopher, although I agree that he aims ‘to give such an account of Orphic poetry as will rob it of the caprice which must awaken incredulity and the horrors which can only inspire disgust’.
174 Col. XXV 9-12.
175 In Laks and Most, p. 35; she also compared the views of Xenophon’s Socrates (Mem. I 4, IV 1).
176 64 B 3 DK, = Simpl. Phys. 152.13ff.
It is well known that Diogenes, alone among the Presocratics, believed in such a teleological model, and indeed that he was the first to advance one. As we shall see, it is significant that Socrates too complains in the *Phaedo* that Anaxagoras failed to give Mind its proper teleological role in his image of the universe.

We already observed in Section I in the case of terms for "(pre)dominate" that the papyrus does not agree with Anaxagoras in saying κατέχειν, but with doxographical sources which use ἐπικρατεῖν. Another important distinction between Anaxagoras and Diogenes is this: Anaxagoras believed that Air/Nous is in animate objects only (τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει, νοῦς δὲ ἐστὶν ἀπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατές καὶ μέμεικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι), whereas Diogenes held that all things participate in Air (ἐν παντὶ ἐνείπαι, καὶ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἐν ὧ τι μὴ μετέχει τοῖτον), but what determines whether things are animate is the warmth of the Air in them, since the ψυχὴ of living beings is Air that is warmer than the ambient Air, but much colder than that in the Sun. In this respect too it is Diogenes’ doctrine, not Anaxagoras’, which appears (thrice) in the Derveni papyrus:

Now Theophrastus reports that, for Diogenes, Air was essential to life, intelligence and perception: Diog. ἐν τῷ ὕππειρε τῷ ἀέρι καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀνάπτει.

This is confirmed by Diogenes’ own words:

The equation between Air, psyche and noesis or τὸ φρονεῖν recalls those in the Derveni papyrus between Zeus, Mind (col. XVI), and Air (col. XVII), and those between Air (?), Breath (πνεύμα), and φρόνησις, especially the wisdom of Zeus, by which everything is ruled (col. XVIII, XIX). The equivalence of mind to Air and God is likewise fundamental to Diogenes:

καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τὴν νόησιν ἐξον εἶναι ὁ ἄτμος καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦτο πάντως καὶ κυβερνᾶσθαι καὶ πάντων κρατεῖν· αὐτῷ (Usener: ἄποι κατ. ἀκοῦσαι, δὲ ἀκοῦσαι) γὰρ μοί.
Diogenes aimed at a high as well as a clear style, as he tells us himself (χρέων εἶναι ... τὴν ἐμπνείαν ἀπάλην καὶ σεμνήν),186 and certainly achieved it here. With the philosopher’s hierophantic hymnody we may compare especially col. XIX 4-7 of the papyrus:

"Μόιραν" δ’ ἐπικλόσει λέγοντες τοῦ Δίος τὴν φρόνησιν ἐπικυρώσας λέγουσιν τὰ ἔόντα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα, ὡσκ χρή γενέθαι τε καὶ εἶναι κα[ί] παύσασθαι.

In short, only someone who believed in the doctrines of Diogenes could have written the Derveni papyrus.

As we saw at the outset, there is a consensus that the treatise offers a version of the opinions of Anaxagoras with signs of the influence of the Atomists, especially Leucippus, and of that of Heraclitus of Ephesus. Such an eclectic combination might be expected to be highly unusual, if not unique. It is exactly paralleled in Diogenes. First, consider Theophrastus’ description of Diogenes’ thought as an amalgam of the beliefs of Anaxagoras and Leucippus:187

καὶ Διογένης δὲ ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης, σχεδὸν νεότατος γεγονός τῶν περὶ ταῦτα χρολακαστῶν, τὰ μὲν πλεῖότα συμπεριφερμένως γέγορφη, τὰ μὲν κατὰ Ἀναξαγόραν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ Λεύκιππον λέγων· τὴν δὲ τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἀέρα καὶ οὕτως φησιν ἀπειρον εἶναι καὶ ἀἰδίον, ἐξ οὗ πυκνομένου καὶ μακροεμνοῦ καὶ μεταβάλλοντος τοῖς πάθει τὴν τῶν ἄλλων γίνεσθαι μορφήν. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν Θεόφραστος ἱστορεῖ περὶ τοῦ Διογένους.

'Diogenes of Apollonia, almost the youngest of those who studied these questions, has written most of his works in an incoherent manner, sometimes following Anaxagoras, sometimes Leucippus; as for the nature of the universe, he too [like Anaxagoras] says that it is air, boundless and eternal, from which derives the form of the other things by the condensation, rarefaction and alteration of its states. This is what Theophrastus records about Diogenes.'

There are other parallels between Diogenes and Leucippus, for instance the view that perception happens by convention and not by nature:188

οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι φύει τὰ αἰσθητά, Λεύκιππος δὲ (καὶ) Δημόκριτος καὶ Διογένης νόμῳ· τούτο δ’ ἐστὶ δόξῃ καὶ πάθει τοῖς ἴμμετροις.

Theophrastus does not mention Heraclitus as part of this amalgam, but his influence on Diogenes is widely accepted by modern scholars,189 especially the analogy between Heraclitus’ Logos or fire and Diogenes’ Air or Zeus;190 in both systems, intelligence is quenched by moisture.191 Again, in Diogenes’ teleological statement quoted above,192 the fact that Mind divides up the ‘measures of all things’, which include summer and winter, night and day (πάντων μέτρα ἔχειν, χειμώνως τε καὶ θέρως καὶ νυκτὸς καὶ ἱμέρας), is indebted to Heraclitus, who insisted that the measures of all natural change

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186 64 B 1, = Diog. Laërt. IX 57.
189 ‘It seems probable that Heraclitus should be added to the list of important influences’ (Kirk, Raven and Schofield, op. cit. p. 437, with their examples at pp. 440-1, 443-5 and 449).
190 For this comparison cf. ibid. pp. 443-5.
191 On this point cf. ibid. p. 449.
192 64 B 3 DK, = Simpl. Phys. 152.13ff.
were preserved by the Logos, and who cited these same natural oppositions and cycles, including day and night, summer and winter, and of the weather (ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὕφρον, χείμαν θέρος κτλ.). Remarkably, the fragment of Heraclitus cited in the papyrus at col. IV 7-9 is concerned precisely with the size, or, one might say, μέτρον, of the Sun, and why the Sun may not exceed it.

Thus the influences on Diogenes are three: Leucippus (the least important), Heraclitus and above all Anaxagoras. These are the same as the affiliations of the Derveni papyrus. What is more, two of these thinkers appear in the discussion of etymology in Plato’s *Cratylus*, which, as we saw, Baxter thinks is a critique of the Derveni papyrus. In that section of the dialogue, three people are mentioned, if we exclude poets like Orpheus (400c): these are Euthyphro (407d), Heraclitus (401d, 402a-c) and Anaxagoras (400a, 409a-b and 413c). The first and last passages refer to Anaxagoras’ doctrine of Nous as that which orders and maintains the nature of everything else. In both passages Socrates equates Nous with ψυχή, this probably goes beyond Anaxagoras’ position, which was unclear on this point, as Aristotle complained. The only certainty is that Anaxagoras said that Nous controlled everything which has ψυχή. Socrates aims here at precisely that same weakness about which, as we saw, he complains in the *Phaedo*, which Diogenes had aimed at too, namely Anaxagoras’ failure to give Mind a clear teleological role in the universe. As for the critique of Heraclitus and his followers for ‘fluxiness’ (401d-402c), this centres on the eymologies of Cronus and Rhea. Now in col. XXIII the author of the Derveni papyrus, claiming that Oceanus is Air, explains away Orpheus’ epithet of it εἰρήν ἰόντος, ‘broadly flowing’. Socrates, citing a different verse of Orpheus about Oceanus, etymologises both Cronus and Rhea as from ἐν, as if in mockery of this particular follower of Heraclitus. If the target of the dialogue were to be after all Euthyphro, we would have to conclude that he had undergone exactly the same amalgam of philosophical influences as we see in the Derveni papyrus and in Diogenes of Apollonia.

Let us turn to compare the dialect of Diogenes’ writings with that of the Derveni text. Diogenes too uses a mixture of Ionic and Attic. Ionic η after ε, τ and ρ survives only once, in ὄξυτηρην (fr. B 5 DK), against Attic ἀ 18x. However, Ionic εὖν(τα) occurs 4x, Attic ἕν(τα) only twice. Ionic (and later Greek) γίνεσθαι and εὖν occur 3x each, Attic γίνεσθαι and ξυν (which is also in older Ionic) once each. The later and Attic form ἔστωτη occurs twice, and Attic -ττ- thrice (never -κτ-). Ionic -οεις in a neuter s-stem occurs once, beside -οις once. The Ionic declension of feminine s-stems in -σιος, -σις is well-preserved (5x), but in the genitive plurals of a-stem nouns only -ων appears (4x), not -εων. A possibly Attic feature is the dative plural -οεις (5x), never -οις. Note also the occurrence of ἔντερθεν, μικρό- (1x) and never μικρο-, ἐξῖν (2x), οὐδομή and πάλ η contracted for πάλη. Since Diogenes’ *ipsissima verba* are transmitted only via Simplicius, we cannot fully rely on these findings, but they are extremely interesting. Although the language is more heavily Atticised than that of the Derveni papyrus (e.g. in -ττ- and ἀ), there is enough evidence to suggest that in the latter criterion the Atticism may be largely owed to the transmission: the same could be true of forms like γίνεσθαι, but transmission alone

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193 Fr. 10, 57, 67, 88, 111 DK.
194 Fr. 30, 31, 90 DK.
195 Fr. 10 DK. For the comparison with this fr. of Diogenes cf. Kirk, Raven and Schofield, *op. cit.* pp. 440-1.
196 Heraclitus 22 B 3 = 22 B 94 (on this see now D. Sider in Laks and Most, pp. 129-31).
197 At 413c Anaxagoras 59 B 12 is closely paraphrased.
198 γίνεσθαι  νομίζει διακομόνον καὶ ἔξοικον; (*Crat.* 400a8-10). In each case, I think κα means ‘i.e.’, as often.
199 De Anima I 2.404b1-6, cf. 405a13-19 (= 59 A 100 DK). Baxter, *op. cit.* pp. 128-9, thinks Plato is fair in his interpretation of Anaxagoras; I gravely doubt it.
200 59 B 12 DK.
201 I have consulted the detailed but not wholly complete *index verborum* of Laks, *op. cit.* pp. 317-27.
202 Contrast οὐδομή in *P. Derveni* col. XXII 6. This difference is not significant: Herodotus uses both forms.
will not explain the dialectal amalgam. The fluctuation between ἐὼν and ὦν is especially striking, and reminiscent of the Derveni author. In dialectal terms, they are practically identical in the precise blend of Attic and Ionic forms which they employ. As for style, one noteworthy feature, which is as we saw ubiquitous in the papyrus, is Diogenes’ use of ὦν τε without the copula in the phrase ὦν τε γενέκταη in fr. 5.203 I find the clear but lofty style of Diogenes very similar indeed to those parts of the papyrus which are not commentary, e.g. col. XX on the mysteries. However, as A. D’Angour points out to me, there are differences too. Diogenes is fond of δοξέω used as an impersonal verb, whereas the papyrus used δοξῶ only as a personal verb (4x). Features found only in the papyrus are asyndeton, ἐνεκέν and a love of ἐκκατος (7x), sometimes even employed pleonastically.

One other problem remains: Diogenes uses no West Greek forms to match the νν of the papyrus. However, μν is not attested in his fragments either, if Diogenes was writing in an Ionic/Attic dialect typical of the scientific writing of his time. Despite a writer’s best efforts to exclude Doric forms, a little word like νν might still betray his origins; and there is evidence that Diogenes of Apollonia came originally from Crete. It has been conjectured, because of his philosophical allegiance, that he came from the Apollonia in the Pontus founded by Miletus,204 and in one report a Diogenes ‘the Phrygian’ appears in a list of ‘atheists’, resulting from a confusion between the Apollonia in Phrygia and that in Pontus.205 However, the only report which links Diogenes ‘the natural scientist’ with a specific town offers the at first sight improbable statement that he was from the Cretan city formerly called Eleutherna:206

‘Ἀπολλωνία: … (κυ’) Κρήτης, ἢ πάλαι Ἐλευθέρνα, Δίνου πατρίς· ἐκ ταύτης ὁ φυσικὸς Διογένης.

As Laks observes, the Ionic dialect of Diogenes cannot be cited in favour of the Milesian colony, since it was the lingua franca of contemporary prose, and the very lack of connection between Crete and the affiliations of the philosophy of that time makes this detail seem more trustworthy.207 It would neatly explain that Doric form ννν. The form of his father’s name, Apollothemis,208 offers little help.

If we accept Diogenes as a more plausible candidate for the authorship of the Derveni papyrus than Metrodorus, which work of his could this be? That we have no record that he wrote a work exactly like this is not, surely, an insuperable obstacle. Diogenes Laërtius209 (or his source) implies that he wrote only one book, when he writes ἄρχη δὲ αὐτῷ τοῦ συγγράμματος ἢδε. But the doxographer was so poorly informed about Diogenes of Apollonia that he interpolated him between two putative pupils of Democritus, namely Protagoras and Anaxarchus, and relates him to Anaxagoras only by saying that he lived in Anaxagoras’ time.210 However, Theophrastus must have read several different works by him, because he compiled a book entitled Τῶν Διογένους συναγωγή ἦν, ‘Digest of the opinions of Diogenes’.211 Furthermore, when Simplicius212 says that he read the Περὶ φύσεως, but no other works,

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203 ὦν τε appears with ἦν in fr. 3, but the past tense requires the presence of the verb.
204 Kirk, Raven and Schofield, op. cit. p. 434. μν was used in Milesian dialect: it is in the lead letter from Berezan of c. 500 B.C. (SEG XXVI 45, = L.H. Jeffery, The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece, ed. 2 by A.W. Johnston, Oxford 1990, no. 60c, transcribed on p. 420).
205 Aelian, V.H. II 31, = 64 A 3 DK, = T 1a Laks (pp. 78-9).
206 Stephanus of Byzantium, Ethnica I p. 105 Meineke, = 64 A 3 DK.
207 So Laks, op. cit. p. 80, who, however, in the end is reluctant to follow this argument to its logical conclusion.
208 Diog. Laërt. IX 57.
209 IX 57.
211 Diog. Laërt. V 43.
212 Phys. 152.1 Diels, = 64 A 5.15 DK
we must believe him; that he read it directly and without an intermediary can be taken as certain. He reports that, in the Περὶ φύσεως, he discovered cross-references to three other works, which were no longer available to him:

The papyrus could not correspond to Diogenes’ On Nature. However, it might represent the Meteorologia, where he discussed the first principle, Air (unfortunately we hear nothing more of the contents of this treatise). However, the best identification in my view would be his work Against the Natural Philosophers (Πρὸς φυσιολόγους or Πρὸς σοφιστάς). If he sought to rebut other thinkers by offering his own interpretation of holy writ, he was of course treading on dangerous ground. Indeed, if his own term was σοφισταὶ and only that, Simplicius may have been mistaken to gloss it with φυσιολόγοι; for I would prefer to translate σοφισταί as ‘experts’, and wonder whether it might have been used broadly enough to include within its range those religious experts of whom the Derveni papyrus is so critical.

Now Anaxagoras and his followers were peculiarly subject to suspicions of undermining the established religion. The story of the ram with only one horn, presented to Pericles as a portent by the seer Lampon, but then dissected by Anaxagoras to prove that the missing horn had in fact been impeded from growing, is well known; so is his trial and exile to Lampscus, whence he was never to return. He was condemned, essentially, for impiety, in a trial brought by the seer Diopethus: the actual wording of the charge was that he did not believe in τὰ θεῖα and taught about the heavenly bodies. (This of course was to be one subtext of the charges against Socrates.) Our information about Diogenes is less substantial, but Demetrius of Phalerum may have said in his Apology of Socrates that he was almost condemned at Athens on an unspecified (but presumably similar) charge. In philosophical terms, Diogenes has been placed after Anaxagoras, Melissus and Leucippus, but before Democritus and Socrates. He, or the Anaxagoreans more generally, may also be mentioned in tones of mockery by

214 Phys., 151.20ff. Diels, = 64 A 4 DK.
216 Plut., Per., 6 (442 B.C.). Anaxagoras’ activity at Athens may date from c. 466 to c. 436, as he was active there for 30 years (Diog. Laërt. II 7, = A 1 DK); D. Sider, op. cit. p. 5, prefers 464-434. M. Schofield (An Essay on Anaxagoras, Cambridge 1980, pp. 33-5) claims that his residence in Athens lasted only a decade and was over by 460. This rests primarily on two arguments: (i) that Anaxagoras’ doctrines influenced Aeschylus’ Supplices of 463 and Eumenides of 458, from which he rightly concludes that Anaxagoras was influential by that date (Stesimbrotus’ attempt, in FGH 107 F 1, to link Anaxagoras with Themistocles points to the same conclusion); and (ii) that Socrates in the Phaedo (97b-99c) first learned of Anaxagoras’ thought in his youth from a book, from which he infers that Anaxagoras was no longer in Athens from c. 460. This latter inference seems both hazardous and unduly sceptical of the other evidence. Schofield is, however, right to hold that the Platonic evidence suggests that the sophists, not Anaxagoras, were the prevailing intellectual force in the Athens of the 430s.
217 Plut., Per., 31, an εἰσαγωγή against τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἦ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρρυθμιστικῶν. The trial is now dated to 438-436: see M. Ostwald, op. cit. p. 194-8.
218 64 A 1 DK, = Diog. Laërt. IX 57: τούτων θείαν ὁ Φαληρεύς Δημήτριος ἐν τῇ Σωκράτους ἀπολογίαν διὰ μέγαν φθόνον μικρὸν κυνδύνευε τῇ Ἀθήναις. However, as Anaxagoras’ name immediately precedes, toûton might refer back to him (so R.D. Hicks, Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Cambridge MA and London 1925, p. 470). If Diogenes was meant, there could be a confusion with the Diogenes who was denounced by Andromachus for profaning the Mysteries in 415, who is presumably different (Andoc. I 12-14)—or is he?
Democritus.\textsuperscript{220} The historical \textit{termini} for Diogenes’ activity are the fall of the meteorite at Aigospotamoi in 467 B.C., which he mentioned,\textsuperscript{221} and the parodies of his doctrines in Aristophanes’ \textit{Clouds} of 423 B.C.\textsuperscript{222} Diogenes was, it seems, one of the most important channels through which Ionian science was married to syncretistic religion and widely popularised (and made unpopular). He wrote in the period 450-425 B.C. On the grounds of its style, philosophical affiliations and use of Ionic dialect with Attic influence, this is precisely the time to which the author of the Derveni treatise belongs as well.

V. Divulging the Mysteries

Diogoras of Melos is another figure whom we ought to discuss, especially given that we are considering a text with traces of Doric in its dialect (the twice-repeated use of \textit{viv}). The most notorious atheist of antiquity is worthy of consideration because of then widespread confusion between not believing in the existence of gods \textit{tout court} and not believing in the gods such as the Greeks believed in. The evidence for Diogoras’ beliefs raises two major questions. First, what did he write? And second, did he believe in strange gods, or in no gods at all?

The unexpectedly extensive evidence for Diogoras’ biography and writings is conveniently collected by M. Winiarczyk.\textsuperscript{223} From this we can draw with confidence the following conclusions as to his life. Diogoras of Melos\textsuperscript{224} was a minor dithyrambic poet who composed for various athletic victors, notably in Mantinea and Argos; his known activity is dated between either 484-1 or 468/7 on the one hand, and 415/4 on the other. Politically, he must have been a radical democrat, being a friend of the Mantinean lawgiver Nicodemus who drafted Mantinea’s democratic constitution in the mid 420s, only to see it overthrown by the Spartans after they defeated the city, then in alliance with Athens and Argos, at the Battle of Mantinea in 418. One source says that Diogoras wrote the laws of Mantinea himself.\textsuperscript{225} Winiarczyk rightly deduces that, after a stay in Athens, Diogoras moved to Mantinea in c. 426, and remained there until the debacle of 418; thereupon he returned to Athens, only to have to flee again in 415/4, this time because of his religious beliefs.\textsuperscript{226}

The story goes that Diogoras was originally pious, not to say superstitious, as his poems attested; but at some point he was the victim of perjury, and, when the perjurer went unpunished by the gods, Diogoras lost his faith.\textsuperscript{227} As a result, he publicly mocked the Eleusinian mysteries. He must have done so before 423, when his views were mentioned in the \textit{Clouds},\textsuperscript{228} as we shall see. But the Athenians must have overlooked this at the time, only to sentence him to death for his opinions during the witch-hunt for the alleged profaners of the Mysteries. For, in the archonship of Charias (415/4),\textsuperscript{229} the

\textsuperscript{220} Democritus fr. B 30 DK: τῶν λογίων ἀνθρώπων ὁλίγοι ἀνατείναντες τὰς χείρας ἐνταύθα, οὐ νῦν ἤρεα καλέομεν οἱ Ἕλληνες, "πάντα, (φασίν), Ζεὺς μυθεῖται καὶ πάνθος οὕτος οἴδε καὶ διδοὶ καὶ ἀφαιρεῖται καὶ βασίλευς οὕτος τῶν πάντων".

\textsuperscript{221} 64 A 12 DK (cf. Anaxagoras 59 A 11, A 12 DK, where the same event is mentioned).

\textsuperscript{222} \textit{Nub.} 227-33 with Dover’s nn. on 230-3, 264-5, 627, and his p. xxxvi; Laks, \textit{op. cit.} xix-xx.


\textsuperscript{224} Tatian, \textit{adv. Graecos} 27, calls him an Athenian, but this is either a confusion or a result of his having spent so much of his life at Athens.

\textsuperscript{225} Aelian, VH II 23 (= T 13 Winiarczyk).

\textsuperscript{226} \textit{Eos} 67 (1979), pp. 206-9.


\textsuperscript{228} There is no reason to think that the relevant passage, l. 830, was not in the first edition of that play.

\textsuperscript{229} The date is from the 11th. century \textit{Life of Zeno} the Eleatic by Al-Mubashir ibnFatik (= T 10 Winiarczyk), who probably relied on Porphyry’s \textit{Φιλόσοφος ἱστορία}; cf. Diod. Sic. XIII 6 (= T 17). Jacoby’s attempt to redate the decree to
Athenians issued a decree putting a high price on his head—one talent if dead, two if alive; Aristophanes parodies the decree in the *Birds* in the spring of 414. Inscribed on a bronze tablet, it was quoted by the fourth-century Attidigrapher Melanthius in his *On the Mysteries at Eleusis*, and by Craterus. Luckily for him, Diagoras escaped to Pellene outside the Athenians’ clutches, where at some later time he died. The comical mention of him as singing the holy Iacchus-song in Aristophanes’ *Frogs* does not indicate whether he was alive or dead in 405, only that he was still notorious for divulging the Eleusinian Mysteries.

How exactly had Diagoras done this, in speech or in writing? The source closest in time to the event, apart from Aristophanes, is Pseudo-Lysias’ *Against Andocides*, a speech given in c. 399 B.C. The prosecutor treats Diagoras as a by-word for impiety, yet thunders that, whereas the Melian had sinned in word by committing impiety regarding other people’s cults and festivals, the accused, the Athenian Andocides, had profaned his own city’s mysteries in deed:

> τοσιδότα δ’ ὁὗτος Διαγόρου τοῦ Μηλίου ἁσβέστερος γεγένητο· ἐκείνος μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ περὶ τὰ ἄλλατρα ιερὰ καὶ ορτᾶς ἤσβηε, οὗτος δὲ ἔργῳ περὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἀυτοῦ πόλει.

He goes on to complain that the Athenians ought to spend more effort in catching the criminals in their midst than in issuing rewards for the capture or killing of those who flee. Clearly the decree against Diagoras was still in force, and his escape remained notorious; I suspect that the passage implies that he was still alive. Since it continues by arguing that Andocides showed the Greeks that he ‘does not believe in gods’ (ὅτι θεοὺς οὐ νομίζει), the speaker clearly assumes, or wishes the jury to accept, that this was Diagoras’ position. But how did Diagoras ‘verbally’ profane the mysteries? What is meant by λόγῳ? Winiarczyk thinks it means that he stood on a soap-box in the *agora*, and even claims that the words prove that Diagoras’ writings were unknown at that time; but this is mere assertion. Let us consider some later authorities.

According to Melanthius, Diagoras ‘used to narrate the mysteries to all, divulging and belittling them, and deterring those who wished to be initiated’. This sounds like the soap-box. Craterus adds only that he had put many people off initiation. But one later source, the Christian apologist Athenagoras of Athens, who is extremely well informed about the seamier side of Greek mythology but especially about Orphic texts, says that he did much more:

> Διαγόρα τι μὲν γὰρ εἰκότως ἐπεκάλουν Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ μόνον τὸν Ὄρφικόν εἰς μέκον κατατιθέντι λόγον καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἑλευσίνι καὶ τὰ τῶν Καβύρων δημιουργοὺς μυστήρια καὶ τό...

The Athenians were within their rights to prosecute Diagoras, who did not merely publicise the Orphic *logos*, publish the mysteries at Eleusis and those of the Cabiri, and chop up the cult-statue of Heracles so that he could cook his turnips, but who actually proclaimed that there is no god at all.239

The context is worth noting. Athenagoras begins by contrasting the judicial treatment of others with that of the Christians. He goes on to rebut three charges against them: atheism (believing in no gods at all), cannibalism and licentiousness; along the way he makes a skilful, learned and devastating attack on polytheism and mythology, citing a number of the most important Orphic fragments, including an entire theogony in which the world is born from an egg hatched by the serpent Heracles/Chronos, Kronos castrates Ouranos, Zeus punishes Kronos, rapes his own mother Rhea, and also commits incest with his daughter Persephone, begetting Dionysus.240 Athenagoras’ cosmology is called by West the Hieronymian theogony, after the source given by Damascius;241 this is, he argues,242 a Hellenistic, Stoicising adaptation of the same Protogonos theogony of which the Derveni papyrus offers an abridged version. In short, Athenagoras used a well-informed Hellenistic source, which knew the same Orphic *logos* as that in the papyrus; and that source claimed that Diagoras divulged not only the Eleusinian rites, but the Samothracian mysteries and an Orphic holy text as well. These activities sound alarmingly similar to the contents of the Derveni papyrus; its discussion of *mystai*, and its allegorical interpretation of the Orphic cosmogony, as well as the text’s interest in the Erinyes, the powers who enforced curses and hence punished perjurers like the one said to have cheated Diagoras, is curiously reminiscent of this report.

Other Hellenistic sources complicate the picture. Only one contributes a significant detail—that Diagoras practised etymology to explain the names of the gods. All agree that he was a complete atheist—Philodemus, Sextus Empiricus,243 and Diogenes of Oenoanda,244 who claims that he attacked all those who believed otherwise. Philodemus quotes Epicurus and Aristoxenus, and we might expect these fourth-century sources to have been well informed too. Epicurus’ report, just reedited with striking results by Obbink, is particularly significant:245

239 The anecdote appears elsewhere, together with an anecdote about Samothrace (when it was pointed out to him how many thank-offerings there were, he said that there would have been many more, had all those who had drowned in shipwrecks been saved). All three stories could derive from his treatise, if it contained autobiographical material.
240 *Pro Chr.* 18.3-6, = *OF* F 57 Kern, 20.3-4 = *OF* F 58, and 32.1 = *OF* F 59.
241 *The Orphic Poems* pp. 136, 178-9, citing Damascius, *De Principiis* 125c (p. 323 Ruelle).
245 Philodemus, *On Piety* I col. 19, lines 518-41 Obbink, = p. 112 Gomperz. My translation is adapted from that of Obbink. The supplements παραγραμμένους and ἔνδοξον are his. This is also the first evidence that Prodicus and Critias practised etymology.
Epicurus criticised those who eliminate the divine from existing things for their total insanity, as in Book 12 (of On Nature) he criticises Prodicus, Diagoras and Critias among others, saying that they rave like lunatics, and he likens them to Bacchant revellers, admonishing them not to trouble or disturb us. For they explain the names of the gods by changing letters, just as Antisthenes, substituting the most common (name for god), ascribes the particular ones to convention and even earlier through some act of deceit.

The reference to Antisthenes, obscure as it is, confirms that the whole passage comes from Epicurus.246 The latter, while anxious to distance himself from those considered outright atheists, was still capable of writing 'impious is not he who does away with the gods of the many, but he who attaches the opinions of the many to the gods'.247

Philodemus248 also cites Aristoxenus, who knew a prose work of Diagoras, but doubted its genuineness; in his Customs of the Mantineans, he claimed that its impiety contrasted too sharply with Diagoras’ poems (which he probably rediscovered during his musical researches at Mantinea) for it to be by the same writer.

They (sc. the Stoics) do not believe in gods in human shape but in Airs and Breezes and Ethers, so that I for one would not hesitate to say that they are more out of line than Diagoras. For Diagoras was jesting, if indeed this (sc. prose work of his) is genuine and not falsely attributed, as Aristoxenus claims in his Customs of the Mantineans. But in his poetry, the only thing which seems to have been written by him in reality, he made no irreligious pronouncement at all but is pious in the way of a poet towards the divine. This is attested especially by his poem addressed to Arianthes of Argos: "it is god, god who wields his highest wisdom for every mortal act". Also, his poem to Nicodorus of Mantinea: "by god and fortune all things come to pass for mortals". His Encomium of the Mantineans contains similar sentiments. But although they (sc. the Stoics) name gods in their writings, in practice they abolished them from reality, being in all seriousness less honest than Philippus and those who abolish the divine outright.

The picture presented by late sources is still more confusing. The Suda is generally held to report that Diagoras advertised his loss of faith in a prose treatise called the Apopyrgizontes logoi, a unique title

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246 Obbink, op. cit. pp. 359-60.
which might mean ‘Fortifying arguments’: Διαγόρας ἔγραψε τοὺς καλομένους Ἀποστραγγίζοντας λόγους, ἀναχωρήσων αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκπαίδεων ἔχοντας τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον δόξης ὁθος ἦν τὸ πρότερον.249

The last clause is of course totally illogical: why say that the work ‘contained his withdrawal and lapse from his opinion about the divine—he had been an atheist before’? With no emendation the entry must mean that Diagoras recanted his views, in which case one would have to doubt the book’s authenticity; but I find it preferable to emend it to ὁθος ὁ τὸ πρότερον. Other sources claim that a different work, the Φρυγίωι Λογοί, was his;250 this is elsewhere anonymous, and the story that it was found with Diagoras after his death does not inspire confidence in its authorship.

It is a relief to turn to the earliest evidence for the beliefs of Diagoras, Aristophanes’ Clouds.251 Strepsiades proudly tells his son that Zeus has been succeeded by Δίνος (Δίνος βασιλεύει τὸν Δί’ ἔξεληλακός); asked for the source of this revelation, he replies that it is Σωκράτης ὁ Μήλιος, which has rightly been taken, ever since the scholia,252 as a reference to Diagoras. Unlike the passage in Pseudo-Lysias, Aristophanes implies that Diagoras, and Socrates, believed not in no gods, but in new gods, and that these new gods were conceived in terms of Anaxagorean physics (‘Δίνος’ is of course a pun on Anaxagoras’ δίνη). But can we rely on Aristophanes’ accuracy in this lampoon? Could we not assume that, for the subtler members of the audience, the point of the joke might lie in the the exaggeration of leaping from ‘new gods’ to ‘no gods’? Aristophanes may have been reflecting, as well as creating, the confusion between these positions in the public mind.

But we should also read the joke as an example of that etymologising of the names of the gods which Diagoras himself practised, as Epicurus attests. The name of Zeus (or rather its accusative form Dia) is derived from the Whirl fundamental to Anaxagoras’ cosmogony. This implies that Diagoras held that belief in the conventional gods arose from Ionian physics, just as Prodicus had derived it from human wonder at the marvels of agriculture and Critias from the need of the weaker to control the stronger through fear of the divine punishment of transgressions. Now we are indeed close to the Derveni papyrus, and closer yet if we observe that Dinos’ expulsion of Zeus from the throne of the universe is a theogony like that which forms a major part of our treatise.

There are few other pointers to Diagoras’ having had philosophical views. A number of sources label Diagoras a ‘philosopher’, or establish his date by synchronising him with a mixed bunch of philosophers (Leucippus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Melissus, Protagoras, Anaxagoras, Socrates and Democritus).253 A scholiast to Frogs 320 says that he introduced new divinities, as did Socrates.254 But that is all—weak evidence indeed to set against the general view in antiquity that Diagoras was a complete atheist, i.e. he denied the existence of any gods. Jacoby added an argumentum e silentio, that Diagoras is not linked, even anecdotally, with Anaxagoras, concluding: ‘as far as our evidence goes, it is quite definite as to his doctrine: Diagoras was a straightforward and complete atheist, who bluntly declared that gods did not exist at all. There is not the least indication that he denied only the existence of the popular gods or impugned only the Homeric conception of divinity, nor is there any trace of alternative, positive religious teaching.’ He adds in a note: ‘I do not expect that anybody will appeal to the Δίνος of Aristophanes as proof for Diagorean gods’. If Diagoras knew of philosophical theories, he rejected or ignored them. But then he adds: ‘we do not know whether he collected previous arguments, or moved on scientific lines of sceptical thought and drew conclusions from the theories of the

251 Lines 828-30, = T 38 Winiarczyk.
252 = T 6 Winiarczyk. One scholiast calls him Aristagoras of Melos, a curious slip.
254 Διαγόρας μελῶν ποιητῆς ὁθος, ὡς καὶ κατὰ διαμόνια εἰσηγήτο, ὅπερ Σωκράτης.
physicists’. Winiarczyk concludes that, apart from his verbal insults to the Mysteries, his books are forgeries and his atheism an invention; following Woodbury, he thinks Diagoras belonged to a club of roisterers and profaners of mysteries like the Κακοδαιμονισταί centred round another dithyrambist, Cinesias.

But where does this leave Athenagoras’ claim that Diagoras revealed the Orphic logos? Isolated and untrustworthy? Perhaps. But consider. In the Clouds, as we saw, Aristophanes caricatured the Socrates of the 420s very exactly as a follower, not of Anaxagoras, but of Diogenes of Apollonia, whose thought comprised or accreted a lot of the religious language of mystery and initiation. At line 830 this character is equated with Diagoras of Melos. Now even Plato does not conceal, in the Phaedo, the fact that Socrates had at some stage been attracted by Anaxagoras’ lectures on Nous, but, upon reading his books, had concluded that his system was insufficiently teleological. Diogenes had modified Anaxagoras’ doctrines to remedy the same weakness. In Plato’s Apology, Socrates distinguishes carefully between total atheism and his belief in the divine, which he supports by referring to his daimonion. He directly rebuts the charge that he is a follower of Anaxagoras, believing that the Sun is a stone and the Moon is made of earth. He repudiates the same accusations which had led to the latter’s downfall, notably those of not believing in the divine and teaching about the heavenly bodies. It seems significant that his reference to Anaxagoras appears only late in his defence, and that neither Diogenes nor Diagoras—the most famous irreligionist of his time, as Pseudo-Lysias proves—is mentioned at all. Is this an attempt to conceal the fact that, although Socrates was never an adherent of Anaxagoras, he had been at some stage been attracted to those of Diogenes of Apollonia, who made room for God in the Anaxagorean universe? Diogenes was certainly a theist, in fact a Pantheist; Diagoras probably was too, but certainly did not believe in the traditional gods. Is it therefore coincidence that the Derveni papyrus professes a belief in daimones which uncannily resembles Socrates’ daimonion?

VI. Last mysteries: Socrates, Plato and religious persecution in Athens

From the above arguments I conclude that the Derveni treatise accords perfectly with the doctrines of Diogenes of Apollonia, Anaxagoras’ eclectic disciple. It must have been written in the 430s or 420s B.C. It was probably not by Metrodorus of Lampsacus, even if he shared the views of Diogenes rather than those of Anaxagoras. It is instead either by an unknown pupil of Diogenes, whose identity we do not, by definition, know; or it is by Diogenes himself; or, most probably (and despite his later notoriety for atheism), it is the book of Diagoras. The text contains traces of Doric dialect, which suit a writer from either Crete (Diogenes) or Melos (Diagoras). In the latter case it is the very same book in which, in the years immediately before 423 B.C., Diagoras divulged the secrets of the Eleusinian and Samothracian Mysteries and published the Orphic logos. In it he presents the basic principle of Diogenean thought, Air, which is also Mind and God; and he argues, against the religious experts of his time, that he could give a better account of the Mysteries and of the Orphic logos than they, explaining the latter’s outrageous stories of incest and parricide by his physicalist allegory; and he promises his hearers a truer insight into the nature of God than they would receive from such hierophants as those at Eleusis. Whether or not his claims deterred many from undergoing initiation, the religious extremists who took over Athens after the mutilation of the Herms recalled his logos and persuaded the Athenians to condemn him to death. Fortunately Diagoras escaped: and now his words have escaped too.

A century later, someone burned a copy of this book on a funeral pyre in Northern Greece. This happened either because its owner valued it (whether because of, or more likely in spite of, its author’s

256 Eos 68 (1980), pp. 73-5. For these see Lysias in Athenaeus 551e-552b.
257 Phaedo 97b-99d, esp. 97b-98b.
258 Apol. 26b-28a, 19b, 26d.
interpretations), or because his mourners did not; it was not introduced into this archaeological context because it was anathema. Instead, we are finally entitled to conclude that it was after all burned because of the sacred text which it contained, at the funeral of someone who had been initiated into a mystery-cult, probably that of Dionysus, i.e. the ‘Orphic/Bacchic’ variety.\textsuperscript{259}

If this reconstruction is along the right lines, Plato achieved the most successful cover-up in intellectual and religious history: Diagoras and Socrates were both followers of Diogenes of Apollonia, and were both condemned by the Athenians for holding Anaxagorean beliefs, although in Socrates’ case his personal associations and annoying ways also played a part, as well as the precedent set by Diagoras’ death-sentence and his escape from Athens (hence the general expectation that Socrates would go into exile after his trial). As for Diagoras, the economic effects of his teachings on those with a stake in the Eleusinian Mysteries and other cults also aroused hostility. That does not of course excuse the Athenians for persecuting those who held Anaxagorean views, but it does reveal just how dangerous such opinions were considered to be. So great was the peril that Plato and others, notably Epicurus, preferred to present Diagoras as an outright atheist, so that they could emphasise the piety of their own approaches, even though these did in their different ways introduce deities other than those in which the city believed.

For Anaxagoras to have been exiled while Pericles was at the height of his power, his rationalism must have posed a tremendous threat to the established purveyors of religious teaching and ritual. Perhaps this was because Anaxagoras and his followers were already presenting themselves as the alternative to the seers, faith-healers, oracle-mongers and Orphico-Pythagorean hierophants. But it is at least equally probable that, in the aftermath of Anaxagoras’ condemnation and ejection from Athens, his followers sought to demonstrate their religious faith, as well as the validity of their physics, by analysing the Homeric poems, the holy scriptures of Orpheus and the traditional stories on which standard religious practice was based; only they could purify them of such elements of scandal as parricide and incest, by demonstrating that such tales were in fact allegorical representations of Anaxagorean physics, to which they added a strong element of teleology. If they thought that such a defence was the best form of attack, they were wrong: there was a truly ferocious reaction in Athens during the last two decades of the century, a reaction which Aristophanes’ comedy seems to endorse and to prefigure. The whole episode represents nothing less than a Greek Reformation and Counter-Reformation.

As one would expect, an identification such as this raises more questions than it answers, and in this case they are huge indeed, affecting not only the late fifth century but even the origins of Stoic thought about the universe and the divine, to which I think Diogenes’ thought will be shown to have contributed (perhaps via Xenocrates) an unexpectedly large share. There is a direct line from Diogenes to Stoic theology as it is presented by Philodemus in \textit{De Pietate} Part II, especially in his long discussion of the thought of Chrysippus in particular (where Heraclitus is adduced).\textsuperscript{260} Summing up, he criticises the Stoics for not believing in the gods as anthropomorphic beings, but as ‘airs, breezes and ethers’, and impertinently asks how this differs from the outright atheism of people like Diagoras, who held that there were no gods at all.\textsuperscript{261}

Moreover, the extreme syncretism of Diogenes’ views finds far more numerous echoes in Euripidean tragedy than have been generally recognised.\textsuperscript{262} Less obvious, but no less real, is the need to reconsider Sophocles’ \textit{Antigone} and \textit{Oedipus the King} in this light; these plays raise real questions about

\textsuperscript{259} I am now certain that these were identical: for discussion see W. Burkert, \textit{Greek Religion}, Cambridge MA 1985, pp. 286-301; id., \textit{Ancient Mystery Cults}, Cambridge MA 1987, esp. pp. 5, 87.

\textsuperscript{260} \textit{PHerc}. 1428 cols. 4.12-8.13, = pp. 77-82 Gomperz, = pp. 118-20 Schober, cited above.

\textsuperscript{261} \textit{Ibid}. cols. 11.1-9, = p. 85 Gomperz, = p. 122 Schober, cited above.

\textsuperscript{262} Thus e.g. Anne Michelini, \textit{Euripides and the Tragic Tradition}, Madison 1987, p. 118, does not take the parallels with Diogenes seriously, deeming him an obscure figure whose views were already old-fashioned. See however Ostwald, \textit{op. cit.} 279-90.
reason, true faith and the place of established religion in the state, in duels between rationalist leaders and traditional religious experts which the former do not win. The analogies between the Creon of the Antigone, Oedipus and Pericles are obvious, yet have often been denied, because many of us do not want our Sophocles to have been a die-hard religious conservative; yet I believe that he was sympathetic to those who held such views. There is much rethinking to be done.263

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