LARA O’SULLIVAN

ASANDER, ATHENS AND IG II² 450: A NEW INTERPRETATION


© Dr. Rudolf Habelt GmbH, Bonn
The Athenian government of Demetrius of Phalerum (317–307) is notable for the few assembly decrees committed to stone under its auspices: only two resolutions of that body can be assigned with certainty to Demetrius’ ten years, and of one of these (IG ii² 453), little more than the prescript remains. The second, IG ii² 450, is fortunately better preserved, and it has received much scholarly attention not only because it affords a rare insight into the functioning of the Phalerean assembly, but also because it documents interaction between Athens (then under the sway of the Macedonian, Cassander) and another key Macedonian figure in the age of the Successors, namely Asander, satrap of Caria. This inscription records honours voted by the Athenians for Asander in 314/3 B.C. From the clauses detailing the motivation for the bestowal of honours, we learn that Asander at some time came in person to Athens and furnished ships and men to the Athenians:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{παρασαγενόμενος εἰς τῆμ} \\
\text{πόλιν τὰς τε νεκῦς τῶς ἰδία} \\
\text{καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας παρ-} \\
\text{[έχεται] Ἄθ[ήνα]ϊο[ι]ς εἰς τὰς χ-} \\
\text{[πείας - - - - - - - - - - - ]}
\end{align*}
\]

The broad backdrop for Asander’s contact with the Athenians is beyond dispute. Some two years before the promulgation of the decree, hostilities had erupted among the Diadochoi, with a coalition of satraps – Cassander and Asander among them – attempting to impose restrictions upon the expanding power of Antigonus Monophthalmus. In the context of a united campaign against Antigonus, co-operation between the Carian satrap and a Cassandran city in Greece is unsurprising. The specific circumstances of Asander’s donations to Athens, however, are quite problematic, and it is to determining the precise timing of, and reason for, his contact with Athens that this paper is devoted.

Superficially, the context should be easily resolved. The prescript provides a firm date for the decree – Gamelion 11 in the archonship of Nicodorus, or late January–early February 313 on the Julian calendar – so it should simply be a matter of matching this date against the known dispositions of our players. But the attempt to reconcile Asander’s contribution of ships to Athens with his condition in Gamelion 313 immediately encounters difficulties. As is clear from Diodorus’ narrative, Asander was at that time facing a military crisis. In the closing months of 314, the Carian cities of Asander’s satrapy had been under assault by Antigonid forces, and Cassander had supplied Asander with reinforcements to meet that pressure. By the end of the 314 campaign season, these Cassandran auxiliaries had been decisively defeated by Antigonus’ generals, leaving Asander in a vulnerable position. Antigonus himself, who

---

1 Other decrees which may belong to this period are listed by S. V. Tracy, Athenian Democracy in Transition, Berkeley 1995, 36 n. 2.
2 The honorand of IG ii² 450 may be identified as Asander, satrap of Caria, from his father, specified at ll. 11–12 as Agathon (perhaps the same Agathon as mentioned at Babylon in 330 – Diod. 17.64.5, Curt. 5.1.43). The Carian satrap had a brother, Agathon: Diod. 19.75.2.
3 ll. 18 ff. The text is as given by M. J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens vol. 1, Brussels 1981, 111 (his D42).
4 Diod. 19.57.
5 Diod. 19.68.2–7.
6 Cassander’s forces learned upon their arrival that the Antigonid, Polemaeus, had assumed winter quarters. Asander and Cassander’s general, Prepelaus, sent out a subordinate, Eupolemus, to ambush the retiring enemy. Polemaeus received intelligence of this move, however, and executed a surprise ambush of Eupolemus’ camp in which Eupolemus and his forces (some eight thousand foot soldiers and two hundred cavalry) were seized.
was stationed beyond the Taurus mountains in late 314, had desired to press the advantage gained by his generals by leading his main army into Caria, and had been hampered from doing so only by the onset of winter.\(^7\) With resources superior to those of Asander, Antigonus remained poised throughout that winter to invade Caria as soon as the weather changed. With Asander in such dire straits in Gamelion 313, his capacity to contribute resources to Athens has been seriously doubted.

This inclination to discredit any donation to Athens in Gamelion has been fuelled by the existence of an apparently more attractive context for Asander’s gifts. Cassander’s dispatch of troops into Caria late in the campaigning season of 314 was not the only initiative against Monophthalmus orchestrated at that point. While the Macedonian troops embarked for Caria, twenty ships were sent out from Athens at Cassander’s behest to recover Lemnos, an island which had recently fallen under Antigonid sway.\(^8\) Diodorus’ interweaving at 19.68.2 of the narratives of both theatres, Lemnos and Caria, and the simultaneous launch of Cassander’s two forces, have prompted scholars to view the assault on Lemnos as in some way connected with the aid given Asander in Caria,\(^9\) and many have been tempted, as a result, to associate Asander’s provisioning of Athens with this invasion of Lemnos. The problem with this, of course, is the gap required between Asander’s visit to Athens and the recognition of his services by the Athenians. The mission to Lemnos (itself disastrous) clearly took place late in the sailing season of 314 (a fact which may be established from the concurrence of the Cassandran intervention on Caria, for which all the temporal indications in Diodorus point to early winter\(^10\)), yet the decree for Asander was passed some months later, in early 313.

Some have been willing to countenance such a dissociation of the promulgation of the decree from Asander’s actual presence in Athens, a dissociation apparently made tenable by the fragmented and corroded nature of the stele.\(^11\) For one, the decree survives in two non-continuous fragments of the one stele. The first portion (breaking off at l. 22) records Asander’s visit to Athens and donation of resources; the second portion, which is not part of the original decree but is rather an amendment or even a second resolution,\(^12\) resumes with additional reasons for honours, and a list of honours bestowed. The final lines of the first decree and the opening of the appended material have been lost, and the lacuna may be considerable (although with what remains of the stone standing at a little over two metres high,\(^7\) So Diod. 19.69.1–2.

\(^8\) Diod. 19.68.2.

\(^9\) Osborne, *Naturalization* vol. 2 (n. 3) 114.

\(^10\) See esp. Diod. 19.68.5, 69.2.

\(^11\) W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, London 1911, 49 n. 4 was one of those to displace the visit documented in the Gamelion decree to a point prior to the launch of the Lemnian fleet; he supposed that Asander crossed to mainland Greece to co-ordinate the Macedonian expedition to Caria. By contrast R. A. Billows, *Antigonus the One-eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, New York 1990, 119 n. 48 contests the existence of any crossing to Macedon in late 314; he plausibly argues that any impression given by Diodorus 19.68.5, 7 that Asander accompanied Cassander’s troops from Macedon is due to Diodorus’ source abbreviation, and that Asander merely assumed authority over the Macedonians once they reached him in Caria.

Unlike Ferguson, C. Habicht, *Athen: Die Geschichte der Stadt in hellenistischer Zeit*, Munich 1995, 72 maintains that Asander’s benefactions to Athens belong, like the decree, to Gamelion 313, but he still retains a Lemnian connection: the donations are ‘offenbar als Dank für die Unterstützung athenscher Operationen [on Lemnos]’. (J. G. Droysen, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* vol. 2, 2nd ed. Basel 1952, 225 n. 93 came up with a similar explanation (that the Carian was reinforcing the Athenian navy depleted by the losses at Lemnos) but curiously still located Asander’s visit to Athens in autumn 314.) In the light of Asander’s straitened circumstances in early 313, however, he could scarcely afford munificence unless some benefit accrued in return, so Habicht’s solution can provide only a partial answer.

\(^12\) See Osborne, *Naturalization* vol. 1 (n. 3) 111; cf. vol. 2, 115. The second fragment is known not to be a continuation of the initial decree because of the pattern to which honorary decrees conform. The honorand’s benefactions are always listed in entirety, with the resulting honours and provisions for payments specified afterwards. Missing from the honours listed on the second fragment is a grant of citizenship, a grant which is the customary prerequisite for the other honours preserved. Citizenship must therefore have been awarded in the missing portion, establishing that the first set of motivation clauses had concluded.
it is already one of the largest steleai known).\textsuperscript{13} Importantly, the notice of further benefactions by Asander may have been lost from the motivation clauses of the original decree. This is of particular concern here because Athenian honorary decrees conventionally list a benefactor’s services in chronological order; if the motivation clauses of the original decree continued beyond line 21, Asander’s visit to Athens and donation of ships might not have been the immediate incentive for the decree.

More problematic still has been the loss, in lines 20–21, of much of the verb by which Asander’s provision of forces was recorded, a verb whose tense may help to determine the temporal reference of the preceding παραγένομενος. In previous publications of the stele, the first letter in line 22 detected at all was the alpha of ‘Αθηναίοις; thus earlier editors, influenced by the supposed association between Asander’s aid and the disaster at Lemnos, could favour the restoration of an aorist, παρέχετο. This restoration would allow an interval of time, and possibly other benefactions, between Asander’s visit of line 18 and the promulgation of the decree in Gamelion.

More recently, however, Osborne has identified in line 22 traces consistent with a terminal iota, which determines the tense as the present παρέχεται.\textsuperscript{14} This restoration does require a crowding of letters in the early portion of the line, but this is not a serious objection since there are irregularities in the stoichenon pattern elsewhere on the stone.\textsuperscript{15} A reasonably certain fixing of a present tense effectively removes the other identified problem, that of lost motivational clauses – again because of the formulaic nature of Attic honorary decrees in which an honorand’s past services are often rendered in a past tense, with a transition to the present tense once the immediate grounds for recognition are reached.\textsuperscript{16}

The restoration of the present form παρέχεται in line 20–21 strongly suggests that Asander’s provision of ships and men was the direct motivation for the decree, and indeed – from the very nature of Asander’s contribution, his status as a prominent ally of Cassander, and the fact that he came to Athens in person – such immediate official acknowledgement is perhaps to be expected.

Asander’s presence in Athens, then, ought be correlated with the promulgation of \textit{IG ii²} 450 in Gamelion 313. The corollary is, of course, that the ships and men furnished by Asander cannot have been intended for the Athenian attempt on Lemnos. So the original problem remains.\textsuperscript{17} Why did Asan-

\textsuperscript{13} Of comparable height are \textit{IG ii²} 448, standing 2.34 m; and \textit{IG ii²} 646 for Herodorus, also a little over two metres. The largest stele for an individual, at 2.85 m. even in its incomplete state, bears a naturalization decree for Arybbas of Molossia (\textit{IG ii²} 226 + Addendum p. 659 + O. Walter, \textit{Jahreshefte} 32 (1940) 1ff). The calculation of the height of \textit{IG ii²} 450 comes from O. Palagia, ‘The Enemy Within: a Macedonian in Piraeus’ in O. Palagia and W. Coulson (edd.), \textit{Regional Schools in Hellenistic Sculpture}, Oxford (forthcoming), and includes the relief which Palagia tentatively identifies as belonging to this inscription.

\textsuperscript{14} For the aorist, see notably Dittenberger, who published the decree for Asander as \textit{SlgI} 320, (see especially his n. 5). He was influenced by the views of Droysen, on which see above, n. 11. Osborne \textit{Naturalization} vol. 1 (n. 3) 110–111 was not the first to opt for the present; A. Wilhelm, ‘An Athenian Decree’, \textit{ABSA} 7, 1900/1901, 156–162, 160 did so at the turn of the century.

\textsuperscript{15} For example, at l. 16 an iota shares a space with the preceding alpha. Violations of the strict pattern occur also at ll. 2 and 5. By contrast, παρέχεται fills the stoichenon pattern very neatly.

\textsuperscript{16} It is unfortunate that the sequence of former and current benefactions in \textit{IG ii²} 450 is not as explicitly demarcated as in some other honorific decrees, for example \textit{IG ii²} 448 l. 9, in which earlier deeds are prefaced with πρῶτος, and present ones by κυρίων. It must be noted that \textit{IG ii²} 450 does not conform to the standard pattern for citizenship decrees in all aspects, as W. von Hartel, \textit{Studien über attisches Staatsrecht und Urkundenwesen}, Wien 1878, 40, 54 observed. (See further below, n. 41). In violation of the traditional order, the laudation of Asander – δεδομένη τῷ δήμῳ – precedes the motivational clauses, which are not introduced by ἐξετάζει. Nonetheless, the motivational clauses seem to adhere to the normal pattern. Lines 14ff acknowledge Asander’s general disposition towards the Athenians before moving on, at line 18, to his current benefaction.

\textsuperscript{17} A more radical solution emerged from the different chronological scheme of the Diadochian period worked out in detail by M. R. Errington, ‘Diodorus Siculus and the Chronology of the Early Diadochoi, 320–311 B.C.’, \textit{Hermes} 105, 1977, 478–504, and largely adopted by Billows, \textit{Antigonus} (n. 11), a scheme which generally locates events of the early Diadochian period a year later than was traditionally thought to be the case. Both accepted that the decree refers to a visit to Athens in Gamelion, 313, and in fact used this to support their rival dating of the Lemnos campaign to autumn 313 rather than 314 (Errington, ‘Chronology’, 498 n. 63; Billows, \textit{Antigonus}, 116 n. 43). On their analysis, Asander was yet to face a direct threat
under, himself in perilous circumstances in Caria, divert resources to a city whose capacity to render
Asander reciprocal aid had been impaired by a recent naval loss? We must find a context which fulfills
two requirements: we must find a theatre for which the Athenians would have been anxious for additional
resources, and a theatre of great strategic value for Asander in the looming clash with Monophasmalus which had some specifically Athenian connection. Neither Diodorus nor the Attic inscriptions are of any help; some poorly preserved decrees from Samos, by contrast, may yield an answer, as there is some evidence of an Athenian attack on Samos during the years of the Phalerean regime. Under the control of Athenian cleruchs for almost half a century, Samos had thrown off the Athenian yoke in the late 320s after Alexander’s promulgation of the ‘exiles’ decree’;18 early in the era of the Successors, the island had fallen under Antigonid sway.19 Situated as it was in a vital position off the Carian coast, this Antigonid base on Samos must have been of great concern to Asander and his allies in 314/3, and it may be just possible that, by his donation of ships and men in 313, Asander wished to encourage Athens to make an attempt on her erstwhile territory.

Two decrees are pertinent here, numbers 18 and 19 in Habicht’s magisterial publication of Samian inscriptions;20 for convenience, the texts (with some restorations volunteered by Habicht) are reproduced here.

MDAI(A) 1957, pp. 182–183 no. 18

[Ell]do Głe v tē boulē kai tōi dēmōi. ‘Eçēn[1]-
[ko]s A[-] eipiemen ephe-
[ō]h KA[-]Σ Πριμη-
[ūc] χρήσμω[olc [ō]v [dietelēi] tōi dēmō-
[1 tōi] Samiōw kai νη[ν tēς] eis[βολ[ēi] eis τ-
[ην] v] ἢσον γενομέν[ης p]αρε[γ]ένετο Ε-
[−]ΤΟ[−]

MDAI(A) 1957, pp. 183–186 no. 19

[Ell]do Głe v tē boulē kai tōi dēmōi, Oúliádaθs Σημακλέους e[ἵππεν]’
[epiθīθ -] eυργέτηκε τὸν dēμον [tōn]
[Σαμιῶν, ἐν ἀπαντὶ καιρῶι εὗνος] ἄν και πρόθυμος, Σαμιῶν v2
[δῆ ... c.16 ... καὶ νῦν τῆς] ἐμβολῆς γινομένης eis tēn
[νήσον ἢμῶν ἀποσταλείς ὑπὸ Ἀντιγονῶν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τοῦ v2

from Monophasmalus in early 313, and could easily afford to support Cassander’s Athenian cities. This cannot, however, be the answer; their chronological scheme has been fatally undermined by A. B. Bosworth, ‘Philip III Arrhidaeus and the Chronology of the Successors’, *Chiron* 22, 1992, 55–81 (dealing chiefly with the years 317–316) and P. V. Wheatley, ‘The Chronology of the Third Diadoch War, 315–311 B.C.’, *Phoenix* 1997 (forthcoming). The traditional dating of the Lemnian expedition must stand, and with it the recognition that the year which saw Asander come under pressure from Antigonus in Caria was indeed the time at which he made contributions to the Athenians.

18 Alexander’s order for the repatriation of Samian exiles was re-affirmed by Perdiccas in 322, bringing to an end the Athenians’ tenure of the island which began in 366/5 (Diod. 18.18.9). Perdiccas’ decision was reversed in 318 (Diod. 18.56.7); with their harbour under enemy control, however, the Athenians could not reclaim the island at this point (see below, n. 25).

19 There is ample evidence of Samos’ connection with Antigonus, for example inscriptions honouring Antigonus officers. See especially C. Habicht, ‘Samische Volksbeschlüsse der hellenistischen Zeit’, *AM* 72, 1957, 152–274; his decrees 3, 4 and 5 may all belong before 312. Most of the evidence for Antigonus’ connections with the island, however, cannot be dated more precisely than the closing two decades of the fourth century. G. Shipley, *A History of Samos 800–188 B.C.*, Oxford 1987, 171 dates Antigonus’ hold of Samos to the late 320s on the basis of his position as general of Asia granted at the conference of Triparadeisis. Whilst not isolating an exact date, Billows, *Antigonus* (n. 11) 118 n. 45 deems it highly likely that Samos figured among those islands who had already entered an alliance with Antigonus before 315, when Antigonus sent Dioscorides to win over recalcitrant islands.

Both refer to an attack on the island, and an equation of these attacks as one and the same has been determined by the linguistic and ornamental parallels in the decrees. Number 18 honours a native of Priene who rendered the Samians assistance when an attack occurred (lines 5–6: τῆς εἰς[θ]βολῆς εἰς τὴν νήσον γενομένος γινομένος τῶν πολιτῶν διατελεῖ ). In number 19 there is a similar reference to an enemy foray (τῆς εἴμβολης γινομένης τῆς [νήσου], but the identity of the honorand who had helped the Samians in the ensuing siege (mentioned at lines 6–7 καὶ συνεπολίδρει . . . χόραν κοιμήσατο) is lost. The Athenians feature in number 19 at line 8, where the retreat of the enemy might be expected to have been recorded; in consequence it has generally been accepted that the Athenians were the perpetrators of the invasion treated in this decree, and, by implication, in the decree number 18.

Fixing temporal limits for this attack has proved difficult. The decrees have been assigned to the period 321–306 on stylistic grounds; in particular, Habicht notes the similarity of his decree 19 to a decree belonging to 314–306 honouring a subordinate of Demetrius Poliorcetes. Beyond this, the inscriptions themselves offer little else to determine the date. It is clear that they do not relate to the Athenian conflict with Samos which is attested around late 324–early 323. The attack documented—which unquestionably included an unsuccessful siege—is inconsistent with the known events of that year, when the ousted Samians had seized the opportunity presented by Alexander’s edict to reclaim their island, and the Athenian general on Samos had responded by rounding up the Samians and shipping them to an Athenian prison. That could scarcely be termed an Athenian invasion.

Many scholars have instead nominated the third Diadochan war a plausible backdrop of the decrees 18 and 19. Samos is generally agreed to have been in Antigonus’ hands well before 314, and may indeed. From 318–315, Athenian hostilities against Samos are few and far between. At the outbreak in 319/18 of hostilities between Antipater’s nominated successor, Polyperchon, and his son, Cassander, there was admittedly a pretext for an Athenian attack: Polyperchon had reversed Perdiccas’ earlier decision and awarded Samos to Athens, thereby courting the Athenian democrats exiled by Antipater as an alternative to the pro-Cassandran oligarchs (Diod. 18.56.7). However the occupation of the Piraeus by Cassander’s subordinate, Nicanor, would have prevented any mobilisation of Athenian forces to reclaim Samos at this point. Cassander would hardly have acceded to the restoration of Samos to Athens in 318 given the ties which probably already existed between the island and Cassander’s key ally against Polyperchon, namely Antigonus. (For Cassander’s debt to Antigonus in 318/7, Diod. 18.54.3, 55.2, 68.1). For the same reason – the alliance between Cassander and Antigonus – we may exclude too any attempt at a direct Athenian invasion of Samos.

21 Habicht, ‘Samische Volksbeschlüsse’ (n. 19) 185.
23 No proper names are sufficiently preserved to be of use – see the military commander(s) mentioned in lines 5–6 of decree 19. Of one name we have only the last four letters of the genitive form – hardly a useful tool for identification. It is further possible that this general was a subordinate of another leader once named in line 6 (τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τοῦ), assuming that another name rather than an ethnic followed. (Indeed, even a restoration such as Ἀντίγονου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τοῦ [Βοσσιλέως might be entertained.) Not only are the names lost to us, but it is very unclear how these generals fit into the story: were they implicated in the attack, or did they assist the Samians? Habicht offered two possible avenues of restoration, which would allow either scenario. According to the first, line 5 would contain an identification of the perpetrators of the attack: τῆς ἐμβολῆς γινομένης εἰς τὸν [νήσου ἡμῶν ύπὸ Ἀθηναίων . . . Alternatively (the version favoured by Habicht himself, and the one printed above), line 5 might specify the general, himself in the employ of a superior commander such as Antigonus, at whose behest the honorand of the decree was sent to Samos.

24 This is not the place to delve into the complex arguments about the exact timing of this attack; suffice it to say that this altercation was a fairly immediate result of Alexander’s exiles’ proclamation. See the differing views of Habicht, ‘Samische Volksbeschlüsse’ (n. 19) decrees 1 and 2 with commentary; R. M. Errington, ‘Samos and the Lamian War’, Chiron 5, 1975, 51–57; E. Badian, ‘A Comma in the History of Samos’, ZPE 23, 1976, 289–94.
25 After the death of Alexander the Great, the opportunities for Athens to have launched an attempt on Samos are few and far between. From 318–315, Athenian hostilities against Samos are unlikely (cf. H. Hauben, ‘An Athenian Naval Victory in 321 B.C.’, ZPE 13, 1974, 61–64, 62 n. 7). At the outbreak in 319/18 of hostilities between Antipater’s nominated successor, Polyperchon, and his son, Cassander, there was admittedly a pretext for an Athenian attack: Polyperchon had reversed Perdiccas’ earlier decision and awarded Samos to Athens, thereby courting the Athenian democrats exiled by Antipater as an alternative to the pro-Cassandran oligarchs (Diod. 18.56.7). However the occupation of the Piraeus by Cassander’s subordinate, Nicanor, would have prevented any mobilisation of Athenian forces to reclaim Samos at this point. Cassander would hardly have acceded to the restoration of Samos to Athens in 318 given the ties which probably already existed between the island and Cassander’s key ally against Polyperchon, namely Antigonus. (For Cassander’s debt to Antigonus in 318/7, Diod. 18.54.3, 55.2, 68.1). For the same reason – the alliance between Cassander and Antigonus – we may exclude too any attempt at a direct Athenian invasion of Samos.
have given his cause military support; 26 as such, it would have been a useful target for his enemies. There is little agreement, by contrast, on the precise timing of the attack and the identification of the individual Athenian and Macedonian commanders involved. The solutions have been largely arbitrary, a matter of grasping at any passing reference to Antigonids or Athenians in the vicinity of Asia Minor. 27 One assumption to have gained general currency, however, is that the attempt is best located before the end of 314: Athens cannot have launched a fleet against Samos in 313, so the argument goes, since the greater part of the Athenian flotilla was lost off Lemnos. 28 This claim is predicated on the belief that Asander provided ships to Athens before Lemnos; locating Asander’s contribution after Lemnos in Gamelion, presents a rather different picture of Athens’ military capability over the winter of 314/3. Had Asander compensated in Gamelion for Athenian losses at Lemnos, no strategic considerations from an Athenian viewpoint preclude the possibility that the assault on Samos occurred in early 313.

If the two Samian inscriptions might document an Athenian attack in 313, we may have a fitting context for Asander’s presence in Athens in Gamelion of that year: IG ii2 450 may in fact allude to the preparation for that assault, revealing that Asander collaborated with the Athenians in an expedition to Samos by diverting some of his own resources for that purpose. An appeal to Athens by Asander, offering support for a renewal of Athenian hopes on Samos, is entirely credible within the context of the military imperatives of the winter in question, and in fact makes more strategic sense than the coupling of Asander’s provisions with Lemnos. For the Carian satrap, the attempt on Lemnos would have been of only tangential benefit; 29 yet Samos would have been of great strategic value, as a survey of the military dispositions over the 314/3 winter reveals. Asander would have been manoeuvring to face an Antigonid onslaught in 313, an onslaught which he could have expected to comprise land and naval invasions. Sympathetic Athenian control of Samos would have hampered an Antigonid fleet’s access to the Carian coastline, thereby creating difficulties for the co-ordination of Antigonus’ land and sea forces. Moreover, control of Samos was vital to the defence of the important base at Miletus, as the experience of Alexander the Great (who had employed Samos as a base for his siege of Miletus) readily showed. 30 Such was the importance of Samos that Asander could well have ventured upon a winter crossing to Athens at a critical time to bargain for intervention there. Athens was, after all, the natural ally for a potentate worried by hostile forces on that island. In the past year, Athens had seen her traditional influence on Delos, Imbros and Lemnos usurped by Antigonus; 31 she had fought to reverse that process

---

26 Above, n. 19. See Diod. 19.62.7 for the Samian commander, Themison, assisting Antigonus (on whom, see Billows, Antigonus (n. 11) 437 no. 112). Samians were serving Antigonus’ interests in Caria after 306: cf. Habicht, ‘Samische Volks- beschlüsse’ (n. 19) 188–90.


28 Hauben, Vlootbevelhebberschap (n. 27) 104.

29 While the initiative against Lemnos may have served to distract the Antigonid general, Dioscourides, from intercepting Cassander’s Caria-bound contingent (so Billows, Antigonus (n. 11) 119), any more direct coincidence with Asander’s interests is hard to isolate. If Cassander’s forces were departing from Macedon itself, and even being escorted by Macedonian vessels from Pydna as Hauben ‘Ships of the Pydnaeans’ (n. 27) has suggested, Lemnos would hardly have been of great strategic value to Asander; more southerly islands would have served better to safeguard the communications route between Macedon and Caria. The recovery of Lemnos, which afforded a key point of control over the Hellespont, was primarily in Cassander’s interests, not Asander’s. The association of Caria and Lemnos in Diodorus’ narrative is thus a reflection of Cassander’s concerns only: the controller of Macedon was keen to hinder the progress of Antigonid forces towards Europe, and he sent forces to Caria and Lemnos accordingly.

30 Arr. 1.19. The island had similarly featured in the engagements for Miletus in 413–411.

31 The last witness to Athens’ control on Delos is IG xi.(2).138 (summer 314), in which the Athenian archon appears; non-Athenian archons appear in records after this. Delos subsequently became the focus of a Cycladic League instituted by
on Lemnos and failed. Now the Carian offered the chance to salvage some pride on Athens’ most prized possession, Samos, a possession for which she had once perhaps been willing to contemplate open conflict with Alexander the Great himself.\(^{32}\)

There is no explicit mention in Diodorus of conflict on Samos in 313, but this is not an insurmountable obstacle. Having abandoned the Carian narrative at 19.69 to devote his attention to events in Sicily, Rome, Thrace and the Peloponnesse, Diodorus does not resume his account of affairs in Asia Minor until 19.75, and it is quite possible that his Carian narrative does not pick up exactly where it left off. An inconsequential dispute on Samos at the opening of the 313 season may have been omitted. Indeed, while direct testimony of an attack on Samos by forces allied to Asander may be lacking, it is possible to seek some indirect corroboration. Diodorus reveals that Antigonus, preparing his invasion of Caria over the winter of 314/3, had summoned his navy (under Medius) from Phoenicia.\(^ {33}\) Although placed in a chapter dealing with Antigonus’ movements late in 314, this summons of the fleet should belong to the beginning of the 313 season: Antigonus had already sent his army into winter quarters, then at some time later (μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο) had called up the navy.\(^ {34}\) It is quite possible that the diversion of Medius from Phoenicia is to be associated with allied activity around Samos, particularly when it is noted that Medius’ first attested involvement in 313 is at the siege of Miletus.\(^ {35}\) That city is the first recorded target of the Antigonid invasion, and it may well have fallen early in 313 (the Milesian *stephanephoroi* list records the Antigonid liberation of the city under the Milesian year 313/2, which ran from March 313 to February 312, and a date close to March 313 is thus tenable for the capitulation of Miletus itself).\(^ {36}\) An ineffectual Athenian initiative against Samos may have taken place as soon as weather conditions permitted, immediately before the Antigonid move on Miletus, only to be repelled by pro-Antigonid forces.\(^ {37}\) It may be at this point, after the failure of the Athenian assault on Samos, that Diodorus’ account of the Carian campaign resumes, with Asander ‘hard pressed by the war’. If we rely solely on Diodorus’ narrative, we must assume Asander’s crisis to have been the result of the failure of the Cassandran generals late in 314; incorporating the inscriptive material, however, it appears that Asander’s situation had deteriorated still further with the collapse of an attempt on Samos early in the

---


\(^{33}\) Diod. 19.69.3.

\(^{34}\) Diod. 19.69.2–3. The sequence of events reconstructed here differs from that of Hauben, ‘The Ships of the Pydnaeans’ (n. 27) 47–8, who maintains that Medius was called out in late 314, not early 313. But Diodorus claims that from the onset of winter 314 Antigonus had made one attempt to cross the Taurus but was thwarted by heavy snow (confirming that winter conditions had already set in), after which he turned back into Cilicia and crossed the Taurus by another path; the army was then divided into winter quarters. This must take us well into winter, 314/3, before Antigonus summoned Medius. If Diodorus misplaced the call to Medius (which we have no compelling reason to believe), and Hauben is correct that Medius wintered near Ephesus, then an attempt on Samos by Athens and Asander might be read as a response to these fleet movements which hinted at an Antigonid naval offensive on the Carian coast for early 313.

\(^{35}\) Diod. 19.75.4.

\(^{36}\) Diod. 19.75.3; Milesian *stephanephoroi* list no. 123 = Ditt. *Syll.* 322. Billows, *Antigonus* (n. 11) 122 n. 52 adduces the list as evidence that Miletus fell in 312; this scheme requires that Diodorus has significantly confused the order of operations throughout 313–2. Diodorus does introduce the archons of 313/2 too early at 19.78.1, which might suggest that the activity of 19.75.1 took place in late 313–early 312. But the introduction of archons at the start of the campaign season, when the archon year really began in the middle of the season, is a commonplace error in Diodorus; we need not have recourse to a full scale rearrangement of Diodorus’ narrative as Billows’ chronology compels him to make.

\(^{37}\) Diodorus names Medius and Docimus as the Antigonid generals involved in the taking of Miletus. Neither name may be restored satisfactorily to the Samian inscription no. 19 line 5 (see above, n. 23). Other Antigonid commanders may have participated in the repulse of the Athenians from Samos itself; alternatively, it may be that the name and ethnic of an invading Athenian commander is to be restored.
following season. In dire straits, Asander submitted to Antigonus, but breached his pledge shortly after: so Diodorus. Antigonus immediately renewed his assault on Caria, sending Medius and Docimus against Miletus from their secure base on Samos. The whole satrapy of Caria was soon added to Antigonus’ expanding empire.

Postscript: The Second Fragment of IG II² 450

The riddles posed by IG ii² 450 do not end with Asander’s presence in Athens at a difficult time; the second fragment of the stele, an amendment or subsequent decree, also presents problems. The poorly preserved opening lines further catalogue Asander’s benefactions. Extraordinary honours follow: he is awarded sētisēs at the Prytaneum, one of Athens’ highest honours ranking above all other forms of state entertainment, in addition to the right to erect the most prestigious form of statue, a statue on horseback. It is the relationship of this material – both the benefaction and the honours – to the activities documented in the first portion of the stone which is intriguing, and it is to finding a context for the second fragment that this postscript is dedicated.

The absence of provisions for the publication of the resolution recorded in the second fragment does suggest initially that the portion is an amendment, on the understanding that such specifications were contained in the (now missing) final lines of the draft motion presented in the upper fragment. This conclusion is not unproblematic, however, because of the debate that surrounds the mechanisms for the publication of decrees of the Phalerean period. On the basis of various anomalies in IG ii² 450, Hartel argued that this inscription was an unofficial copy, erected at Asander’s expense to stand by his statue in the agora. If that were the case, the publication details may well have been omitted, and the two fragments could indeed come from two distinct decrees. Others have thought that there were changes in the arrangements for publication of all Phalerean decrees. It must be noted that the second fragment makes no mention of any provisions for the payment for the statue awarded in this fragment, and it has been inferred that Asander was to pay for this himself. This in turn has prompted the suggestion that the erection of even the official copies of documents was attended to no longer by public officials, but by individuals; in those circumstances, it is possible that the customary instructions to the prytany secretary about the publication of decrees were not part of the decree for Asander at all. While the sample of

38 Diod. 19.75.1–2. The timing of Asander’s brief rapprochement with Antigonus, like that of the summons of Medius (above, n. 34) is a little ambiguous, but as the sections in Diodorus recording the capture of Cassander’s troops in 314 (19.68.5ff) and the brief capitulation of Asander (19.75) are well separated, the narrative of 19.75 may well be at some temporal remove from 19.68.

39 The association of the fragments is virtually assured: the dimensions of the two pieces (width, 0.52m.; thickness, 0.15m.) correspond precisely. On the relationship of the first fragment to the second, see above, n.12.


41 Hartel, Studien (n. 16) 40, 54. Hartel was influenced not only by the absence of the secretary (discussed below), but by the omission of the characteristic formula, ἔδοξεν τῷ θεῷ ἡεράλδη καὶ τῷ δῆμῳ.

42 A. Wilhelm, ‘Athenian Decree’ (n. 14) 158; followed by J. R. Ellis ‘IG ii² 450 (b), ll. 7–8: An Emendation’, ABSA 63, 1968, 229.

43 Tracy, Athenian Democracy (n. 1) 37. The absence from the preamble of the first fragment of IG ii² 450 of the secretary is pertinent here; his omission increases doubts that he was mentioned in provisions for the publication of the decree at all, and hints that Asander was indeed personally responsible for the inscription of his honours. This idea has been dismissed by Osborne, Naturalization vol. 2 (n. 3) 115, who notes that no secretary appears in the other firmly dated decree from the Phalerean years, IG ii² 453. But the parallel afforded by this inscription proves little. Only its prescript remains, so that nothing is known of the provisions for the publication of the resolution once contained on it; it too may have been an honorary decree for the publication of which the honoree had paid. Some light might be shed on this issue by IG ii² 585 and 418, decrees which may be Phalerean (for 418, see Habicht, Athen (n. 11) 74 n. 81, although his dating is by no means unanimously accepted – see M. B. Walbank, ‘Athens, Carthage and Tyre (IG ii² 342)’, ZPE 59, 1985, 107–111; a 314/3 date for 585 will, according to Tracy, Athenian Democracy (n. 1) 36 n. 2, be argued for in a forthcoming calendrical study by J.
Phalerean decrees is hopelessly small, the procedural aspects of such resolutions must remain ambiguous. What must be stated, however, is that our knowledge of Phalerean decrees is too poor for the absence of provisional clauses at the end of the second fragment of IG ii² 450 to establish conclusively that the fragment is an amendment and not a second decree, passed after the first resolution of the eleventh of Gamelion. Other factors must determine the context of the second fragment.

Asander’s benefaction recorded in the opening lines (II. 23–5) similarly offers little help for establishing the chronological relationship of the two portions of the stele. Following Wilhelm’s restoration

\[
\begin{align*}
&\alpha]\varsigma \mid \epsilon\varsigma \mid \zeta \mid \tau[\theta\nu \iota \delta \iota \iota \nu \alpha \nu \iota \pi]\mid
&[\varepsilon \sigma \tau \tau \iota \lambda \alpha \nu] \mid \tau \varepsilon \lambda \varepsilon \varsigma \mid \tau \iota \omega \iota \zeta \mid \alpha \nu \tau]\mid
&[\omega \nu]
\end{align*}
\]

Osborne suggests that the lines might refer to Asander’s ransoming of captured Athenians.⁴⁴ Ransoming of captives might have taken place at any time: the immediate aftermath of Lemnos or the peace talks with Antigonus are possible contexts, but there are instances of ransomings unrelated to peace talks which should warn against assuming a link between Asander’s liberation of the Athenians and those contacts with Antigonus recorded by Diodorus.⁴⁵

Of greater help may be the honours lavished upon Asander, in particular the grant of sitēsis.⁴⁶ Dow maintained that an award of sitēsis, as distinct from the alternative form of hospitality, xenia, was made to foreigners only in the expectation that the recipients would exercise their dining rights, and thus that sitēsis implied the residence of recipients in Athens.⁴⁷ This analysis of the import of sitēsis has not gone unchallenged. Osborne has countered that sitēsis, like citizenship, could be a purely honorific grant.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Osborne, Naturalization vol. 2 (n. 3) 114. In Naturalization vol. 1, 111 Osborne, with minor alterations to the precise wording, concurs with the sense of this reading.

⁴⁵ Athenians could conceivably have been taken at Lemnos in late 314 or on Samos in early 313, permitting Asander’s intervention on their behalf to fall before or after his Gamelion visit to mainland Greece. It is tempting to link Asander’s ransoming of Athenians with his (admittedly conjectured, but highly likely) ransoming of the Cassandran officer, Eupolemus, who was among those in charge of Cassander’s Carian venture in late 314; he was taken by Polemaeus, but reappears in Greece in the next campaign season (on which, R. A. Billows, ‘Anatolian Dynasts: the Case of the Macedonian Eupolemus in Karia’, Classical Antiquity 8, 1989, 173–206, 176, Antigonus (n. 11) 120). Ransoming as part of peace talks features in the negotiations at Ecregma (Diod. 19.64.8); for ransoming unrelated to wider negotiations, see Diod. 19.73.10, 20.84.6.

⁴⁶ Eligibility for sitēsis was prescribed by law, and although we rely for the criteria on a paraphrase in a third century inscription (IG ii² 832 + Addendum p. 668), there is reason to believe that the formalisation of sitēsis requirements goes back to c. 330 (M. J. Osborne, ‘Entertainment at the Prytaneion at Athens’, ZPE 41, 1981, 153–70). The regulations provided sitēsis for οἱ τὴν ἱδίου οἰσίαν εἰς τὴν κοινὴν σπαραγμὸν θείες, and Osborne, Naturalization vol. 2 (n. 3) 115 has identified this as the most likely category under which Asander qualified for the honour. From the echoes of this classification in the description of Asander’s provision of ships in the upper fragment of IG ii² 450, it may be that the grant of sitēsis was a response to Asander’s donation of forces. On this understanding, the amendment ought be dated to Gamelion 11, at the time of Asander’s organisation of the Samos expedition. On the other hand, it is possible that sitēsis was granted in recognition of Asander’s ransoming of Athenians, since this ransoming was also done at Asander’s personal expense. If this is the case, and if the ransoming did occur as part of the treaty between Asander and Antigonus, then the amendment containing the sitēsis provision may have been passed later than Gamelion.

⁴⁷ Dow, ‘Honours for Aristonikos’ (n. 40) 89–90.

⁴⁸ Osborne, Naturalization vol. 2 (n. 3) 215. Matters are complicated by the fact that Asander is the first foreigner known to have received sitēsis, and indeed there appears to have been a change in the forms of honours given in or shortly after the Lycurgan period. The practice of inviting honorands to dine once on the evening of the decreeing of their honours in the assembly, a practice well attested in the early–mid fourth century, apparently falls from use by the close of the century. See Osborne, ‘Entertainment’ (n. 46) 57.
His ‘clearest proof’ for the view that *sitesis* did not imply residence in Attica is, indeed, this award to Asander – a ‘proof’ based on the assumption that the second fragment belongs, like the main decree, to Gamelion 313, after which Asander returned to Caria and made his fateful pact with Antigonus.\(^49\) If the fragment was not passed in Gamelion, however, Osborne’s case becomes rather tenuous. Of the other four surviving grants of *sitesis* to foreigners gathered by Osborne, two (*IG ii²* 385b and 646) were to individuals in the entourage of Demetrius Poliorcetes, men who may have resided in Athens for a considerable time and whose continued presence may well have been expected when the decrees were promulgated. The third such decree (*IG ii²* 467) honours a Karystian whose subsequent residence is unknown, and the last (*IG ii²* 832 + Addendum p. 668) is a reaffirmation of his privileges for his grandson, whom Osborne believes to have sought refuge in Athens.\(^50\) There is no compelling evidence, therefore, that *sitesis* was ever granted to those whose residence, at least for the foreseeable future, was to be beyond Attica.

In such circumstances, the granting of *sitesis* to Asander makes little sense in Gamelion, when it was known that Asander was returning to Caria to face the anticipated Antigonal onslaught. Rather, this award might indicate that the second fragment of *IG ii²* 450 was passed somewhat later than the first, at a point when there was some possibility that Asander might reside, even temporarily, in Athens. This possibility gives rise to a hypothesis – and it must remain a hypothesis only – that Asander returned to Athens seeking refuge after losing Caria, and that it is this return which prompted the decree engraved below the first enactment of Gamelion. Diodorus traces Asander’s activities up to his breach of faith from Antigonus which, in the scheme formulated above, should be dated early in the campaign season of 313, just after the Athenians’ failure at Samos. From this point on, Asander disappears entirely from all our historical records. Nowhere is he mentioned in the Antigonal campaign against Caria which followed the collapse of Asander’s pact. This may be due to abbreviation in Diodorus’ account, but the ease with which the Antigonal armies swept through Caria does hint that they encountered little opposition. It may be that the Carian satrap, finally acknowledging that his situation was hopeless,\(^51\) fled rather than oppose the imminent invasion. Athens, a city indebted to Asander, would have been an ideal place of refuge – particularly if Asander had in his entourage Athenians whose ransom he had secured. Faced with a resident, dispossessed Macedonian satrap (who may well have escaped with some of the financial resources of his province, as Harpalus had done nearly a decade earlier), the Athenians voted extraordinary honours to Asander – not only *sitesis*, but also an equestrian statue. None of our fragmentary sources for the Phalerean period alludes to Asander’s presence in Athens after 313, and he may not have lived much longer.\(^52\)

---

\(^{49}\) Osborne, *Naturalization* vol. 2 (n. 3) 115.

\(^{50}\) Osborne, *Naturalization* vol. 2 (n. 3) 179.

\(^{51}\) For Asander’s vain appeal to Ptolemy and Seleucus, see Diod. 19.75.2.

\(^{52}\) I wish to thank Professor A. B. Bosworth for his encouragement in the writing of this paper. The faults remain, of course, my own.