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OF THE LATE 380'S BC

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THE ATTIC-CHIAN ALLIANCE (*IG* II² 34) AND THE ‘TROUBLES IN GREECE’
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In the summer of 384 (the first prytany of Diitrephes’ year), a defensive alliance between Athens and Chios was concluded ‘for all time’. We have an epigraphic record of the best part of the Athenian assembly’s corresponding decree, found on the southern slope of the Acropolis (*IG* II² 34, fragments *b–d*, possibly the other two, *a* and *e*, also)¹. Unfortunately, neither the name of the mover of the decree nor the lines immediately following have been preserved.

[Σ]υ[μ]μαχ[ί]α Ἀθηναίων καὶ Χίων. Ἐπὶ Διει/τρ[ρ]έφους [ἄ]ρχοντος, ἐπὶ τῆς Ἱπποθωντίδ/ος π[ρ]ώτης πρυτανείας, ἦι -- 9 -- Σ/[τεφ?]άνου[υ?] ἕξ] Οἴου[υ?] ἐγραμμάτευεν -- 5 --]. *lacuna* /⁵ [.]ο[-- 28 --]. / Ταῦτα μὲν ἠϋχθαι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ Χῖοι, ἐκ κο[ιν]ῶν λόγων [τῶν γεγραμμένων] τοῖς Ἑλλ/ησιν, μέμνην[ται] διαφυλάξειν, καθάπερ / Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τὴν φι[λ]ίαν /¹⁰ καὶ τοὺς ὄρκους καὶ [τὰς οὖσας συνθήκ]ας, / ἃς ὤμοσεν βασιλεὺς[ς] καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ / Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι[ι] Ἑλλ/ηνες, / καὶ ἦκουσιν ἀγαθὰ ἐπαγ[γ]ελλόμενοι τῶ/ι δήμωι τῶι Ἀθηναίων [κ]αὶ ἀπάσῃ τῇ Ἑ/¹⁵λλάδι καὶ βασιλεῖ, ἐψηφίσθαι τῶι δήμωι· ἐπαινέσαι μὲν τ[ὸν] δῆμον τ[ὸν] τῶν Χίων καὶ τοὺς πρέσβεις [τοὺς ἦκον]τας, ὑπάρχειν[δ]ὲ τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τοὺς ὄρκους καὶ τὰς / σ[υνθ]ή[κ]ας [τ]ὰς νῦ[ν] οὐ[σ]ας, συμμάχους δὲ ποι/²⁰εῖσ[θα]ι Χίους ἐπ’ ἐλευθ[ε]ρίαι καὶ αὐτον/ομί[α]ι μὴ παραβαίνοντας τῶν ἐν ταῖς σ[υνθ]ήκαις γεγραμμένων περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης / μηδέν, μηδ’, ἐάν τις ἄλλ[λ]ος παραβαίῃ, π[ε]ιθομένους κατὰ τὸ δυ[να]τόν. Στήσαι δὲ σ/²⁵τήλην ἐν ἀκροπόλει [πρ]όσθεν τοῦ ἀγάλμ/ατος, ἐς δὲ ταύτην ἀνα[γρ]άφειν, ἐάν τις ἴ/ηι ἐπ’ Ἀθηναίους, βοηθεῖν[ν] Χίους παντὶ σθέ/[ν]ει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, [καί, ἐ]άν τις ἴ/ηι [ἐπ’] / [ὲ] Χίους, βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναίους[ς] παντὶ σθέ/[ν]ει /³⁰ [κατὰ τ]ὸ δυνατόν. Ὁμόσα[ι] δ[ὲ] τοῖς [ἦ]κουσι/[ν] Χίοις] μὲν τὴν βουλὴν κ[αὶ] τοὺς [στρατηγ]/[οὺς] καὶ ταξί[α]ρχους, ἐγ Χί[ω]ι δὲ [τὴν] βουλὴν / [καὶ τὰς ἄλλ]ας ἀρχάς Ἐλ[έ]σ[θαι] δὲ πέντε / [ἀνδ]ρας, οἵτινες πλεύ[σαν]τες ἐς Χίον ὄρ/³⁵κώσουσι τῆμ] πόλιν [τὴν Χίων. Ὑπάρχειν δὲ τ]/[ὴν] συμμαχίαν ἐς τὸν ἅπαντα χ[ρ]όνο[ν]. Καλ]/[έσαι δὲ τὴν πρεσβείαν τὴν τῶν Χίων ἐπὶ] / [ξένια ἐς τὸ πρυτανεῖον ἐς αὖριον]. *vacat* / [Οἶδε ἠρέθησαν πρ]έσβεις· Κέφαλος[ς] Κολ]/⁴⁰[λυτεύς, -- ca. 5 -- Ἀ]λωπεκῆθεν, Αἴσιμος[ς] . . / [-- ca. 10 --]ς Φρεάρριος, Δημοκλε[ίδης]/[ς -- ca. 4 --. Οἶδ]ε ἐπρέσβευον Χίων· Βρύων, Ἀπε/[λλ]ῆς?, Θεόκ[ρι]τος, Ἀρχέλας. *vacat*

Stoich. 30 (with irregular features in lines 19, 24, and 34–43 *passim*). Fragments *a–d* (lines 5–43) were united by U. Köhler (the restoration of lines 7–25 reposes in part on a parallel with *IG* II² 35 fr. *a*, see n. 1), fragment *e* (lines 1–4), decorated with a relief², was added by Ad. Wilhelm. — The text reproduced here is that of M. N. Tod (followed also in matters of orthography: the treatment of the ‘impure diphthongs’ *et al.*), whose *apparatus criticus* should be consulted, together with H. Bengtson’s. For line 6 (left unrestored by previous editors) see *infra*, for line 43, *JHS* 119, 1999, 6–8. I have not seen the stele but, thanks to Professor Ch. Habicht’s kind assistance, I have been able to collate its squeeze which belongs to the collection of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton; the traditional reading of the extant letters seems certain.

* The author is grateful to Professor Christian Habicht and a number of other colleagues for valuable comments and suggestions.

¹ U. Köhler, *AM* 2, 1877, 138 ff.; *IG* II² 34; *Syll.*³ 142; M. N. Tod, *GHI* II 118; J. Pouilloux, *Choix d’inscriptions grecques*, Paris 1960, 98–100 no. 26; *St. V.* II² 384; English translation (quoted here with slight modifications [notably in lines 6 and 43]); P. Harding, *From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus*, Cambridge 1985, 44–6 no. 31 – all with bibl. The two fragments of *IG* II² 35, discovered under the Propylaea, obviously belonged to a later inscription (of 378 BC?), which was partly modelled upon *IG* II² 34 (lines 7–25). See S. Accame, *La lega ateniese del secolo IV a. C.*, Roma 1941, 9–13 and 34 f.; J. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance?*, Berkeley 1981, 52; Harding p. 45 f. n. 1.

² H. K. Süsserott, *Griechische Plastik des 4. Jahrhunderts vor Christus*, Frankfurt a. M. 1938, 46 f. (+ T. 3,1): ‘Die Tafel ist oben und links gebrochen . . . Etwa in der Mitte des Fragmentes steht in Vorderansicht eine bis auf den Kopf erhaltene weibliche Figur, in Chiton und Mantel gekleidet . . . (n. 68) Über die Gesamtkomposition ist nichts Genaueres auszusagen.’

'Alliance of the Athe[nians and the Chians. When Dii]/t[r]ephes was archon, [when Hippothont/is] held the first prytany, [in which -- 9 --], son of [S/teph(?)]anu[s(?)] from] Oeu[m(?)] was secretary -- 5 --]. (lacuna) / These [vows were made, and since the Chians, in accordance with] the co/mmon agreements [that have been written by] the Hell/enes, are mindful [that they will maintain], like / the Athenians, the [Peace and the] friendship /⁰ and the oaths and [the treaties that are in existence], / which were sworn by the King and [the Athenians and] / the Lacedaemonians and the other [Hellenes], / and have come professing (their) good intentions [to the] / People of Athens and all He/⁵llas and the King, let it be voted by the Peop/le. Commendation shall be given to [the People] of Chi/os and to the ambassadors [who] have come; there shall continue / in existence the Peace and [the] oaths and the / alliances that are now in existence; the Chians shall be tre/⁰ated as allies on terms of freedom and auton/omy, provided that they do not transgress (any of) the (terms) on the s/telae, (terms) that have been inscribed concerning the Peace, / in any way, and provided that, if anyone else transgresses (them), t/o the best of (their) ability they refuse to obey; there shall be set up a s/⁵tele on the Acropolis in front of the Stat/ue, and on this shall be written: if anyone c/omes against the Athenians, the Chians shall give assistance with all (their) stre/ngth to the best of (their) ability, [and], if anyone comes [again/st the Chi]ans, the Athenians shall give assistance with all (their) strength /⁰ [to the best of] (their) ability. The oath shall be sworn to those [who have com/e from Chios] by the Boule and the [general/s and the] taxiarchs, in Chios [by the Council / and the other] magistrates. There shall be chosen [five / men] to sail [to Chios to ad/⁵minister the oath to the] city [of the Chians. The existence of t/he alliance shall be for all] time. [Invit/ation shall be issued to the embassy] of the Chi[ans] (to come) [for / hospitality to the Prytane]ion on the morrow. (vacat) / [The following were chosen] as ambassadors: Cephalus [of Col/⁰lytus, -- ca. 5 --] from Alopece, Aesimus [.. / -- ca. 10 --], of Phrearhii, Democli[de/s -- ca. 4 --]. The following] were the Chian ambassadors: Bryon, Ape/[lles(?), Theoc]ritus, Archelas. (vacat)'

Modern historians of the fourth century have justly stressed two features of this interesting document: (a) the Athenians insistently claim that it in no way infringes the Peace of 386 ('sworn by the King and [the Athenians and] the Lacedaemonians and the other [Hellenes]') or the interests of the King or any of the Greeks (lines 8–24); (b) thanks to the importance of Chios and the popularity of the programme epitomised in the clause of lines 19–21 ('the Chians shall be treated as allies on terms of freedom and autonomy'), which implies that Athens will renounce her fifth-century hegemonial aspirations, the document and the international activities it reflected paved the way to the formation of the Second Maritime League³.

Surprisingly enough, the immediate politico-military intentions of the treaty have been little discussed. Its epigraphic record leaves them unmentioned, if the implicit message of lines 24–6 (see *infra*) is ignored. We can safely dismiss the notion that the discreet wording of the treaty has been exclusively inspired by Athens' and Chios' plans for armed expansion and/or confederate progress, plans whose realisation was left for a more or less near future. On the one hand, a distinct link with the realities of the moment should be assumed for all Athenian treaties of alliance of the classical epoch, even those concluded 'for all time'. If we are not wrong in assigning the events spoken of in Theopompus' fragment 104 Jac. to the Attic-Chian contacts of 384 (below), the contacts were initiated by a Chios convinced that war was imminent in the east Aegean. On the other hand, regardless of the intensity of their wish to restore the *arche*, the post-386 Athenians were compelled to proceed cautiously and respect the provisions of the Koine Eirene which, as is well known, did not encourage the idea of the rebirth of the Maritime League or any other Confederacy. Not only does the 384 document have the form of a defensive alliance, but it also dates from a time which, owing to the dominance of Artaxerxes II, could hardly allow Athens or Chios, or both together, to take offensive actions on a larger scale.

³ See Tod, *GHI* II 121, line 7; 123, line 24 (cf. 79); *IG* II² 35 (note 1 above).

True, the two cities co-operated in 389/8 against both the Persian and Spartan interests (Diod. 14,94,4) but the renewal of such undertakings seems unimaginable c. 384, after the dissolution of the complex bloc of states, centred on Athens, that opposed Sparta in the Corinthian War. The document's clauses stress the contracting parties' wish to preserve good relations with the King and, rather less emphatically, with Sparta. There is nothing strange about that: Athens – unsupported by other powers, practically speaking – would not have dared to defy the concerted Achaemenid-Lacedaemonian reaction, regardless of the maritime potential she and Chios possessed⁴.

Alternatively, was there an external menace to Athens and/or Chios then and, if so, from which quarters? An affirmative answer to the first part of the question appears *a priori* probable. With regard to the continuity that characterised the Attic-Chian relations of the 380's – the two cities were allied before as well as after 386⁵ – the treaty will have been caused by some novel development influencing the balance of powers in the Aegean of 384; otherwise, a fresh agreement (it can be argued) would not have been necessary. That development cannot be plausibly identified with Antalcidas' Peace itself, some two long years old by the beginning of Diitrephes' archonship. As to the second part of the question, the candidate(s) for the potential aggressor(s) is (are) not easy to name, though the choice cannot have been a wide one. (It looks all the more limited if we accept the traditional picture of the Koine Eirene's aftermath, according to which the late 380's witnessed something that might be termed Achaemenid-Spartan diarchy over the east Mediterranean.) In any event, Chios presented a more likely target of aggression than Athens. The very fact that the treaty came into being on the islanders' initiative (lines 16 ff. *et pass.*) lends some support to this conclusion, which might be put in a less general form, perhaps. At the time of the publication of the *Panegyricus*, a source of danger for the Chians' freedom – possibly, *the* source – was sought among the barbarian garrisons stationed or expected to be stationed along the western coast of Asia Minor⁶. Modern students of the treaty have thus envisaged two (alternative and tentative) identifications of the factor whose menace provoked the Chian initiative of 384: 'Persia' (i.e. a satrap or satraps obeying Artaxerxes)⁷, and Hecatomnus, the Carian dynast with a somewhat independent position vis-à-vis Susa⁸.

Neither of these possibilities seems attractive, however. An invasion of the island on Artaxerxes' command would have contradicted the Koine Eirene's letter and spirit alike. Considering the strategic constants and the effects of a long history of Greek-Persian hostilities, Isocrates' (conditional) warning in the *Panegyrics* (4,163) was useful in a certain theoretic way⁹ – the more so as the problem of the *peraiiai* of great islands such as Chios must have complicated the implementation of the Koine Eirene's terms¹⁰ – but, from Artaxerxes' point of view, his attack upon Chios would have been politically unwise, or hazardous at least, in about 384 BC. The wars against Acoris and Evagoras were still in progress, while Panhellenic ideas and anti-Persian alliances – including the orators' projects of an Attic-Spartan bloc – enjoyed considerable popularity among the patriots in Greece and the West. Even if the Achaemenid were assumed to have planned the invasion for a not immediate future – i.e., for the end of the decade, when he could expect to have less worries in the Aegean – the assumption would remain implausible. It would contradict the circumstance that 'he was interested in Greek disputes only in so far

⁴ On the relative importance of the Chian fleet in the early fourth century, Isocr. 4,139.

⁵ Accame (n. 1) 9 f.

⁶ Isocr. 4,163: 'If the barbarian strengthens his hold on the cities of the coast by stationing in them larger garrisons than he has there now, perhaps those of the islands which lie near the mainland, as, for example, Rhodes and Samos and Chios, might incline to his side . . .' (transl. G. Norlin, LCL).

⁷ R. Seager, in: D. M. Lewis, J. Boardman, S. Hornblower and M. Ostwald eds., *CAH VI*², 1994, 163 f.

⁸ E. Badian, in: W. Eder ed., *Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.*, Stuttgart 1995, 87 with n. 30.

⁹ Cf. e.g. *SEG XXVI* 1282, lines 11 ff. (the Persians and Erythrae c. 387 BC [?]); D. 15,9 (Cyprothemis and Samos c. 366/5 BC).

¹⁰ Hornblower, in: *CAH VI*² 80.

as they affected his position'¹¹; an historian of the aftermath of Antalcidas' Peace, focusing on matters more obvious than secret diplomacy, has found that Artaxerxes' 'intervention in Greek affairs can be detected only once in the sixteen years down to 370'¹². The majority of Athenians must have opted for a similarly prudent policy; note among other things the respect with which the Peace is treated in the official acts of the city's foreign policy during the late 380's–early 370's, particularly in the Charter of the Second Maritime Confederacy¹³. Indeed, some traits of our document – prosopographic (see *infra*, on Cephalus', Bryon's and Theocritus' political options) and diplomatic (see *supra*, on [a]) – would be quite difficult to understand if it is taken to reflect Artaxerxes' anti-Peace purposes. As to Hecatomnus, regardless of what his aims and his status within Artaxerxes' Asia Minor really were¹⁴, he (unlike his sons) was neither strong enough nor – strategically speaking – favourably situated to attack Chios without the help of others¹⁵. To identify his helpers with a group of Chian exiles supported by Sparta would be an implausible solution for more than one reason, though the activity of *lakonizontes* (such as the father of Theopompus the Historian) must have been a factor in the Chian home affairs of the 380's¹⁶.

The prosopographic characteristics of the two lists of ambassadors cited in the inscription – the Athenian (lines 39–42: five men) and the Chian (lines 42–3: four men) – may be revealing here, though not all names are extant. Cephalus Collyteus (*PA* 8277), heading the Athenian team, passed for a pronounced radical and a friend of Thebes; this latter quality well accorded with the accusations that he had received Persian gold in 395¹⁷. The second in order of Cephalus' co-ambassadors, Aesimus (*PA* 311), judging from his role in the restoration of democracy in 404, may have counted among the *boiotiazontes* (and *medizontes*), too. As to the envoys from Chios, two of them (Bryon, the first-named, and [Theoc]ritus, the third-named) came from related families whose party allegiances seem to have corresponded with Cephalus' radical attitudes, his Medism and his Boeotophilia¹⁸. Such a state of affairs does not speak for the hypothesis, implausible in itself, that the treaty was oriented against the Achaemenid expansion, though of course the capability of sudden political turns must be allowed for people of Cephalus' type.

The epigraphic text offers another 'political' indication – apparently contradicting our comments on lines 39–43 – which has remained overlooked by previous research. According to lines 24–6, the stele of the decree was to be set up 'on the Acropolis in front of the Statue'¹⁹. As noted by all the editors and

¹¹ T. T. B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene. General Peace and Local Independence in Ancient Greece*, Oxford 1965, 41. Diodorus (14,110,5) makes us believe that Artaxerxes' motives for imposing the Koine Eirene of 386 upon the Greeks included his wish to prepare an expedition against a revolted Cyprus; Hornblower (n. 9) 66 f. adds justly 'and against Egypt'.

¹² Ryder (n. 11) 41 with n. 5.

¹³ Diod. 15,5,5; *FGrHist* 115 F 103, 7–8; Tod, *GHI* II 123, lines 12–5.

¹⁴ Cf. Isocr. 4,162; Diod. 15,2,3. Hornblower (n. 10) 69.

¹⁵ The idea underlying Isocrates' comment at IV 163 (n. 6 above) was that the danger for Rhodes, Samos and Chios might come from the Persian garrisons situated just opposite those islands, not from far afield as was the case with Chios and Hecatomnus' strongholds.

¹⁶ Cf. the case of Erythrae (?) c. 387 BC (*SEG* XXVI 1282, lines 7–11) and the Spartan practice of 385–380 criticized by Diodorus, 15,19,1.

¹⁷ Paus. 3,9,8.

¹⁸ S. Dušanić, *JHS* 119, 1999, 6–8 (the connections of Bryon and [Theoc]ritus with Isocrates, and Conon behind him, c. 393 BC). And the anti-Macedonism of Bryon's and [Theoc]ritus' descendants during the 340's–320's squares well enough with our hypothesis that Bryon and Theocritus themselves were ready to pursue a policy of loyalty to Artaxerxes in the second half of the 380's. – To the prosopographical evidence examined in the paper from *JHS* just cited, one might add the fragment of the Athenian honorary decree of 388/7 (*IG* II² 23; *stoich.* 28) for one [13 letters]/οδώρου τὸν Χῖον (lines 6–7; the mover's name lost). A restoration [Θεόκριτον Μητρ]οδώρου, which makes no epigraphic difficulties (i.e. with regard to the length of the *lacuna* in line 6 and to the letter-traces in line 7 *init.*), would seem probable in the light of diverse historical indications. If it is accepted, *IG* II² 23 should be attributed to Theocritus the ambassador of 384; as the ambassador's son bore the name of Metrodorus (*JHS* 119, 1999, 6 f. with note 39, on Stob. *Ecl.* I 304), the ambassador's father (otherwise unattested) is likely to have been named Metrodorus, too.

¹⁹ The actual finding-place of the fragments *b–d* (*a* and *e*, too ?) neither supports nor contradicts this provision (Accame [n. 1] 12 f. with n. 1 on p. 13).

commentators of the inscription since Köhler, this means ‘in front of Athena Promachos’, *the* statue of the (open space of the) Acropolis. Now, it may be posited as a general rule that all the Athenian decrees of the fifth-fourth centuries whose texts refer to their original sites in a different way than the usual ἐμ πόλει / ἐν Ἀκροπόλει (in other words, whose originals were situated either outside of the Acropolis or [the case of IG II² 34] in a place on the Acropolis defined with an additional precision) attest to the redactors’ insistence upon something that might be termed topographical symbolism²⁰. The kind of symbolic message attributable to the site of IG II² 34 recalls, rather closely, lines 64–6 of the Charter of the Second Maritime Confederacy, where it is said of the Charter’s decree that it will be inscribed on a marble stele ‘placed beside (the statue of) Zeus Eleutherios’ (in the Agora); the selection of place obviously echoes the topical theme of freedom (freedom from Spartan oppression, principally), crucial for the ideological content of the Charter (cf. lines 10, 20, 93)²¹. In a similar way, the stele recording the treaty of 384 was posted in front of Athena Promachos, as that statue – erected to commemorate Marathon, or the post-480 Persian War, or both²² – had its metaphoric meaning; it connoted, to be exact, the Athenian victories won against the eastern barbarians. And the treaty of 384 was not unique in that respect. The stele bearing the Arthmius decree was also set up beside Athena Promachos; the anti-Persian aspects of that controversial decree and Athena’s statue were in harmony, as Demosthenes explicitly tells us (19,271 f.).

It goes without saying that the provision concerning Athena Promachos of lines 24–6 corresponds with the strategic estimate, just cited from Isocrates, 4,163, that a potential enemy of Chios was to be found among the Persians who controlled the northwest coast of Asia Minor. An analogous conclusion about the Chian-Persian relations of the period will be deduced from fr. 104 of Theopompus (originally in Bk. 12 of his *Philippika*), if it is taken to refer to Bryon’s and Cephalus’ initiative of 384 BC. Though not conclusive, that dating of the fragment’s historical setting seems variously probable; as a whole, the excursus of the *Philippika* 12 dealt with the Persian history of the early fourth century²³ and a reference, in fr. 104, to the Attic-Chian *rapprochement* of 384 could be easily connected with more than one phrase of the immediately preceding fragment (No. 103), which – complex and hard to interpret as it is – summarises the contents of the entire Bk. 12²⁴.

It should be remarked that the dispute between the Athenian democrats and their less radical compatriots concerning the common vows of the Athenians and the Chians, spoken of in fr. 104²⁵, would well accord with the same *rapprochement*. Plato’s *Euthydemus*, in a passage alluding to political problems presented by the tradition about the Attic-Chian kinship (302 b–d), seems to refer to the

²⁰ To cite some random examples: Tod, *GHI* II 154, lines 18 f. (cf. 4 f.); 167, lines 46 f. (cf. 21–4); *IG* II² 204, line 57; Pouilloux (n. 1) 121–4 no. 32, lines 23–6 (cf. 13 ff.). Tod, *GHI* II 110, lines 35 ff., should be added here, though the provision concerns the Apollo-sanctuary at Carpathus, not an Attic locality.

²¹ As realized by Accame (n. 1) 64 f., Cargill (n. 1) 132, and others.

²² The evidence (which, despite the differences of chronological detail, is clear enough for our purpose) can be found listed in e.g. W. Judeich, *Topographie von Athen*, München 1931, 75 with n. 1 and 234 f. (Paus. 1,28,2 etc.). The tradition that Athena Promachos symbolises victory in the Persian Wars was alive as late as Gordian III’s campaign against Sapor I, and probably much longer than that: L. Robert, *Op. min. sel.* V 654–58 (cf. *SEG* XLIII 658).

²³ Cf. *FGrHist* 115 comm. p. 359.

²⁴ Cf. F. Jacoby, fr. 104 comm. (p. 374), who thought of fr. 103, 7 f. (the Koine Eirene and its postcedents). Fr. 103, 9 (Tiribazus’ downfall), is also a possible connection, with regard to Diodorus’ testimony 15, 9, 3 (see below).

²⁵ *FGrHist* 115 F 104 (= *schol.* Aristoph. *Av.* 880): --- εὔχοντο γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι κοινή ἐπὶ τῶν θυσίων ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ Χίοις, ἐπειδὴ ἔπεμπον οἱ Χίοι συμμαχούς εἰς Ἀθήνας ὅτε χρεια πολέμου προσῆν, καθάπερ Θεόπομπος ἐν τῷ *IB* Φιλίππικῶν φησιν οὕτως: »οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τοῦ ταῦτα πράττειν ἀπέειχον, ὥστε τὰς εὐχὰς κοινὰς καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων καὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐποιούντο, καὶ σπένδοντες ἐπὶ ταῖς θυσίαις ταῖς δημοτελέσιν ὁμοίως ἤρχοντο τοῖς θεοῖς Χίοις διδόναι τὰγαθὰ καὶ σφίσι αὐτοῖς«, etc. The phrase ‘οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ . . . ἀπέειχον’ implies, in my opinion, that the fragment omits some lines from the immediately preceding passage of the original. They seem to have referred to a ‘moderate’ proposal (made to the Athenian assembly ?) concerning the vows which accompanied the conclusion of the Attic-Chian treaty of alliance. The proposal – overruled by the Demos – obviously envisaged the normal procedure, i.e. (in the case of an Athenian decision) vows declared by, and undertaken for the sake of, the Athenians alone (cf. e.g. Tod, *GHI* II 144, lines 6 ff.).

topical arguments of the 384 diplomacy precisely²⁶. As the vows connected with the conclusion of treaties of alliance between cities which passed for *sungeneis* were likely to include deities, heroes etc. personifying the *syngeneia* in question²⁷, *IG* II² 34, *FGrHist* 115 F 104 and *Euthyd.* 302 b–d may be combined to corroborate the claim that the lines (now lost) of *IG* II² 34 immediately following the prescript²⁸ were devoted to the same *euchai* whose summary description is found in *FGrHist* 115 F 104. Indeed, Plato implies that the stories of Attic-Chian *sungeneia* provoked political debates in which the Athenian lower classes – Theopompus’ *hoi polloi* cited in fr. 104 – felt obliged to insist upon very close ties with Chios, religious as well as every other²⁹. On the purely epigraphic side of the matter, it is to be noted that line 6 *init.* of *IG* II² 34 has ταῦτα με[---], which may be restored, on the parallel of Tod, *GHI* II 144, line 12 (cf. *IG* II² 30, line 3), Ταῦτα με[ν ἠῶχθαι ---]; in any case, an analogous formula with a different verb – i.e. referring to an action which was not that of the *votorum nuncupatio* – is hard to assume at a place so near the beginning of the main body of the document. The rest of the *lacuna* can be restored to read³⁰ [ἐπειδὴ δὲ Χίιοι, ἐκ κο]ινῶν λόγων [τῶν γεγραμμένων] τοῖς Ἑλλησιν, μέμνην- [ται διαφυλάξει]ν τὴν εἰρήνην κτλ. and mean ‘[. . . and since the Chians, in accordance³¹ with] the common agreements [that have been written by] the Hellenes, are mindful [that they will maintain] . . . the [Peace] etc.’ The two restorations, Ταῦτα με[ν ἠῶχθαι], and [ἐπειδὴ δὲ Χίιοι, ἐκ κο]ινῶν λόγων . . ., corroborate each other in more than one respect, notably in corresponding exactly to the space available, which is all the more significant as the *lacuna* of line 6 is a comparatively short one³².

The three pieces of evidence which are of prime interest for us here (*IG* II² 34, lines 24–6; Isocr. 4, 163; *FGrHist* 115 F 104), despite the difficulties of their interpretation, concur in suggesting that the anti-Persian purpose of its mover was decisive for the passing of the decree; the alternative of a decree reflecting a Greek menace – embodied, for instance, in a force of Chian oligarchs wishing to regain control of the island and/or in the fleet of a Laconophile (Medophile) Samos³³ – could explain neither the history nor the wording of the document. Is it possible, however, to reconcile lines 24–6, as well as Isocrates’ (slightly tendentious) observations at 4,163, with what is known about the Attic-Chian

²⁶ Dušanić (n. 18) 9–13.

²⁷ Cf. *TAM* III fasc. 1, no. 2 (Termessus Maior-Adada, II cent. BC), lines 7 ff. (as restored and commented upon by Ad. Wilhelm, *Neue Beiträge* II, 1912, 9 f. 18 f.; if accepted, R. Heberdey’s restoration from *TAM* would change little in our argument). The importance of the *ktisis* themes in such ceremonies is indirectly shown by *St. V.* III 551 (Rhodes-Hierapytna, (?) 201/200 BC), lines 2 ff.: --- καὶ τοῖς ἀρχαγέταις καὶ τοῖς ἥρωσι ---. In the case of the joint *vota* of Athens and Chios, what might be termed – on the analogy of *TAM* III fasc. 1, no. 2, line 7, and *St. V.* III 551, lines 2 ff. –, the θεοὶ καὶ ἥρωες συγγενεῖοι would include i.a. Ionian Apollo, Neleus, Poseidon, Theseus, and Oinopion (Dušanić [n. 18] 5 with n. 27,7 with n. 44,9 ff.); the first two of these were especially important for the aristocratic cults in the contracting cities, the remaining three for the more popular cults. None of them seems to have been represented in the relief at the top of the stele, though its original ‘Gesamtkomposition’ and meaning are difficult to determine (n. 2 above).

²⁸ Understandably, they provided the standard place for the records of the *euchai*, in Athens and elsewhere. On the epigraphic evidence of the *euchai* that sporadically accompanied the birth of treaties of alliance, see e.g. Ad. Wilhelm (n. 27); J. Vanseveren, *Rev. philol.* 63, 1937, 342 f.; L. J. Bliquez, *ZPE* 35, 1979, 237–40, and J. and L. Robert, *Bull. ép.* 1980, 197. In fourth-century Athens, such vows occurred e.g. in 387/6 (or 386/5) and 362 (Bliquez 237–9, on *IG* II² 30 and Tod, *GHI* II 144) so that, chronologically speaking, it would not be unexpected to find them attested in 384 too. Conversely, there is no good reason to date the *euchai* of fr. 104 as early as the fifth century (with F. Jacoby, R. Meiggs *et al.*); Aristophanes’ scholiast obviously cited them as a (later) parallel for, not the comic poet’s *exemplum* of, the ceremony alluded to in the *Birds* 880. Of course, Aristophanes’ verse shows that cult ties between Athens and Chios, analogous to the common vows referred to in *IG* II² 34, lines 5–6, and *FGrHist* 115 F 104, had existed in the times of the *arche* already.

²⁹ T. J. Quinn, *Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios: 478–404 BC*, Manchester 1981, 38–49; cf. above, n. 27, on Poseidon, Theseus and Oinopion.

³⁰ A similar formula will be found again in Tod, *GHI* II 144 (lines 12 ff.). *IG* II² 35, fr. a line 1, as preserved now, cannot help us restore *IG* II² 34, line 6.

³¹ Liddell–Scott–Jones *s. v.* ἐκ A III 7. Harding’s translation makes the genitive [κο]ινῶν λόγων depend on the μέμνην- [ται], which produces a partly ungrammatical construction in lines 6–8.

³² 21 letters (from E [exclusive] to KO [exclusive]), according to the indications of the *stoichedon* pattern.

³³ *Supra*, text and n. 17. We ignore the exact position of Samos in the Attic-Lacedaemonian relations of the 380’s; in 377, the islanders refused to enter the Second Maritime League (Accame [n. 1] 61 n. 1, 83).

relations with Artaxerxes II c. 384, relations whose peaceful character, according to the indications which have just been analyzed, is hard to doubt seriously? Let us note at once that attempts at a conciliatory treatment of the evidence should not start from the hypothesis that the treaty, non-committant in its explicit provisions, reflects Attic-Chian *secret* contacts of an anti-Achaemenid inspiration. Apart from the choice of ambassadors (Athenian as well as Chian), some of whom had a past as the King's friends, the topographical formula cannot recommend such a line of interpretation. The meaning of the *πρόσθεν τοῦ ἀγάλματος*, if anti-Achaemenid in this concrete case, could not have remained hidden from Artaxerxes' partisans in Athens and abroad.

The simplest way to reconcile these seemingly contradictory parts of IG II² 34 – i.e. lines 24–6 (illuminating the parallel testimonies of Isocrates [4,163] and Theopompus [*FGrHist* 115 F 104]) versus lines 8–24 and 39–43 – would be, in my opinion, to take that the anti-Persian point of the treaty concerned Glos, Artaxerxes' admiral who had revolted against his King³⁴. As a rebel, he was not bound by the terms or the political intentions of the 386 Peace. 'Well supplied with money and soldiers' (Diod. 15,9,3 f.), possessing a large fleet and valuable experience in naval warfare, Glos must have presented, for the Chians, a formidable if short-lived³⁵ threat. Furthermore, it is more or less certain that his lands were mainly located in northcentral Ionia, close to Chios³⁶. He may be described therefore as anticipating, through his activities and the position of his domain, the Anatolian enemies spoken of in Isocrates' geo-strategic passage at 4,163 ff. To develop upon Isocrates' observations on the uncomfortable neighbourhood of the island, the satrap of Artaxerxes in Lydia (i.e. the satrapy 'overlooking' Ionia-Aeolid) responsible for the defeat of Glos' and Tachos' principality was able to continue their efforts to erect, along the coast, military strongholds which seemed potentially anti-Chian and dangerous³⁷. The satrap's undertakings of that order may have lasted long enough to inspire Isocrates' comments on Chios and Lydia at 4,163 ff.³⁸ The students of the mid-eighties will find this assumption of Glos' designs on Chios something more than a pure conjecture: we are well informed about his readiness to help Agesilaus' hegemonial schemes that endangered those Greeks, like the Athenians and the Chians, who were unwilling to follow Sparta's lead³⁹. As his own reward or one of the 'great inducements' (Diod. 15,9,4) promised to Sparta, he may have wished to occupy the rich island of Chios,

³⁴ H. Swoboda, *RE* VII(1910) s.v. 'Glos 2' 1431 f.; S. Ruzicka, *Historia* 48, 1999, 23–43, with bibl.

³⁵ The 'rule' of Glos lasted a year or two; that of his successor in revolt, Tachos, rather less than that.

³⁶ Diod. 15,18,1–3 (*cf.* Hornblower [n. 10] 81): Glos' heir Tachos founded a city (Leuce) on the coast, somewhere between Cyme and Clazomenae. The Tamos who had probably been Glos' father served as Tissaphernes' hyparch of Ionia in 412–411 (Thuc. 8,31,2; Diod. 4,35,3), then became the admiral of Cyrus the Younger (J. Miller, *RE* IV A[1932] s.v. 'Tamos 2' 2149). In view of Tamos' and Glos' familial connections and the parallellism of their careers, the latter can be expected to have held Ionia (or northern Ionia with the southern Aeolid (see e.g. K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* III 1, Berlin – Leipzig 1922, 98 f.); Ruzicka [n. 34] 26) as the former did. And note that Tiribazus, the commander-in-chief of Artaxerxes' navy in the Cyprian War and Glos' father-in-law, served as 'satrap of Lydia and Ionia' for some time before 392 and after 388.

³⁷ Diod. 15,18,1 (transl. C. H. Oldfather, LCL): 'After his (Glos') death Tachos took over his operations. He gathered a force about him and founded on a crag near the sea a city that bears the name of Leuce . . .'

³⁸ This possibility deserves all the more attention if Lydia is assumed (little more than a guess) to have been held by Tithraustes c. 383–380, its satrap during the mid-390's (on him, and the diverse problems presented by the Achaemenid administration of Lydia and Ionia in the 390's and 380's BC, Hornblower [n. 10] 77 f.). *Cf.* below, text and n. 57.

³⁹ Diod. 15,9,4: 'At once, then, he (Glos) sent ambassadors to Acoris, the king of the Egyptians, and concluded an alliance with him against the King. He also wrote the Lacedaemonians and incited them against the King, promising to give them a large sum of money and offering other great inducements. He pledged himself to full co-operation with them (the Lacedaemonians) in Greece and to work with them in restoring the supremacy their fathers had exercised. Even before this the Spartans had made up their minds to recover their supremacy, and at the time were already throwing the cities into confusion and enslaving them, as was clear to all men. Moreover, they were in bad repute because it was generally believed that in the agreement (Antalcidas' Peace) they had made with the King they had betrayed the Greeks of Asia, and so they repented of what they had done and sought a plausible excuse for a war against Artaxerxes. Consequently they were glad to enter the alliance with Glos' (transl. C. H. Oldfather, LCL). *Cf.* below, nn. 40 and 46, as well as text with nn. 53 ff.

a wish whose imperialistic aspect would explain lines 23–24⁴⁰ and 24–6 (Athena Promachos) of the document dealt with here. In the Athenian radicals' propaganda – partly inspired by necessity to neutralise Agesilaus' Panhellenic slogans? – the Attic-Chian alliance was conceivably presented as announcing a new Marathon (Salamis and/or the Eurymedon). The location of the stele 'in front of the Statue' reveals that fact. It need not have contradicted Cephalus' determination to preserve Artaxerxes' good will (and, if possible, obtain financial and/or armed help from his satraps), as Glos' ambition, and the nature of the Attic-Chian counter-measures, will have been widely known *c.* 384. Chares' self-advertisement in 355 BC shows that the label of a 'new Marathon' (a 'sister of Marathon')⁴¹ was employable even for those battles in which the Greeks fought the Persians with the aid of other Persians. In 355, having Artabazus as his ally, Chares defeated the King's troops; *c.* 384, the 'new Miltiadeses' among the Athenians and the Chians had obviously hoped to defeat Glos with the support of Artaxerxes' forces that were naturally expected to intervene against the disloyal dynast and (from one point of view) the violator of the Common Peace.

This attempt at interpreting *IG II² 34* starts from the premise that the Diodorean date for Glos' revolt (15,9,3–5: 385/4 BC), based on a well-informed source⁴² and preferable to the moderns' proposals to put the event as late as *c.* 380/79 BC⁴³, must be essentially correct. (The years postdating Acoris' death *c.* 380 BC seem ruled out anyhow, for we have reasons to believe Diodorus who says that Glos concluded a treaty of alliance with that pharaoh; the introduction of Nectanebos (I) into Theopompus' fragment *FGHist* 115 F 103, 10, stems from Photius' slip.)⁴⁴ It has been already remarked that Diodorus' report 15,9, 3–5 has the advantage of a coherent unity⁴⁵. Its political and chronological sides are clearly concordant, pointing to the aftermath of the Koine Eirene. The fact itself that Glos plotted with the Spartans⁴⁶ against Susa (Diod. 15,9, 4 f.) posits, for the centrifugal activities of his and his heir Tachos, 383–382 BC as a *terminus ante quem*; with the beginning of the Olynthian crisis and, further on, Athenian moves in the Aegean leading to the formation of the anti-Laconian Maritime League, Sparta was in no position any more to engage herself 'in Asia'⁴⁷.

There are other indications in our sources, partly independent from the chronographic framework of the historical narrative preserved in the *Bibliothèque*, which corroborate the Diodorean general picture of events resulting in Glos' revolt. The revolt was (directly) caused by Artaxerxes' decision to arrest Tiribazus, a Spartophile and Glos' father-in-law (Diod. 15,9,3). The downfall of Tiribazus occurred at an uncertain moment during the Cyprian War (in 385/4, according to Diodorus, 15,8), not long after the Persian victory of Citium (Diod. 15,3,4–4,2), while the war itself had begun in 386/5⁴⁸. As the real fighting – which obviously included the naval battle of Citium – lasted no more than two years, and these should be equated with 386/5 and 385/4⁴⁹, the developments which interest us here are best ar-

⁴⁰ Obviously, Sparta was the potential aggressor alluded to in line 24.

⁴¹ *Schol. D.* 14,19; *Plut. Arat.* 16, 3.

⁴² Admittedly, Diodorus reproduces Ephorus here, a (younger) contemporary and neighbour of Glos; something of Ephorus' notorious local patriotism can be sensed behind *Diod.* 15,18,2–4 (Cyme).

⁴³ The first to reject Diodorus' date for Glos' revolt (and to revise the Sicilian's chronology of the Cyprian War, upon which that date depends) was K. J. Beloch ([n. 36] 98 f.; see also *id.*, *Griechische Geschichte*, vol. III 2, Berlin – Leipzig 1923, 226–9; T. T. B. Ryder, *CQ* n.s. 13, 1963, 105 ff. and *Koine Eirene* [n. 11] 52 f.; Ruzicka [n. 34] 27 f. n. 11, and all modern works of reference). Before Beloch's revision, Diodorus was generally followed in this matter, see e.g. W. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, Marburg 1892, 190.

⁴⁴ S. Dušanić, in: P. Roesch ed., *Colloques int. du CNRS 'La Béotie antique'*, Paris 1985, 230 n. 28, 231 n. 42.

⁴⁵ Cl. Vial, in the *Budé Diodorus, Livre XV*, Paris 1977, 14 and 16 n. 1.

⁴⁶ I.e. Agesilaus (*cf.* X. *Ages.* 8, 3 ff.)? Dušanić (n. 44) 230 n. 30; Ruzicka (n. 34) 35 n. 25.

⁴⁷ Actually, the engagement ceased with the disappearance of Glos' and Tachos' 'state'. Diodorus (XV 19) provides an instructive order, as well as a political analysis, of the crucial events.

⁴⁸ *Isocr.* 4,141: the 'six years' pertains to the second phase of the War; *cf.* *Diod.* 15,2,1 (*sub anno* 386/5) and 14,110,5 (above, n. 11).

⁴⁹ *Diod.* 15,9,2, is sustained by *Isocrates'* note 4,141, which implies that Citium was followed by a lengthy period of

ranged thus (a tentative and approximate chronology): *The beginning of operations in the Cyprian War*: the latter half of 386; *Citium*: the warm season of 385; *the Egyptian War*: c. 385–383; *the deposition of Tiribazus*: the winter of 385/4; *Glos' rebellion*: starting in the spring of 384. Some of this last event's preliminaries (notably, Glos' contacts with Agesilaus and Acoris⁵⁰) may have commenced even before the spring⁵¹; there was enough time, consequently, for the Chian democrats to sense the danger and prepare the alliance with Cephalus' Athens along the lines already traced in the late 390's/ early 380's and leading to the formation of the Second League as the most important if not the immediate objective.

All this formed part of a wider network of diplomatic, political and military happenings that originated in the polarizations of the Corinthian War⁵², and may have been interpreted as announcing a new phase of it. The autonomy clause of the King's Peace gave rise to attempts, by a number of Greek cities or Greek statesmen at least, to pursue a policy of independence which Sparta held hostile (Diod. 15,5,1–3; cf. 40, 1–5, of the analogous troubles of 375–374 BC), radically democratic (cf. *ibid.* 40, 1 ff.), and pro-Persian (cf. X. *HG* 5,2,35 [*infra*]); it may be that Sparta suspected the influence of Persian gold and secret embassies in the whole matter⁵³. The Spartans' resistance to that independent line with its 'Barbarophile' implications went together with their intention, spoken of by Diodorus under the year 385/4, of finding 'a plausible excuse for a war against Artaxerxes' as a means to 'restore the supremacy their fathers had exercised' in Greece and make the Greeks forget Sparta's unpatriotic role in the postcedents of the King's Peace (Diod. 15,9,5; *supra*, n. 39). The Spartan alliances, or similar arrangements, with the axis formed by Glos (*ibid.*), Evagoras (Isocr. 4,135, cf. Diod. 15,8,2–4) and Acoris⁵⁴ must be obviously ascribed to the same anti-Mede programme of 385/4.

The programme was still in force, as a propaganda weapon at least, in the summer of 382, when Ismenias' accusers formulated their charges thus: καὶ ὡς βαρβαρίζοι καὶ ὡς ξένος τῷ Πέρσῃ ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ἀγαθῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος γεγενημένος εἶη καὶ ὡς τῶν παρὰ βασιλέως χρημάτων μετειληφῶς εἶη καὶ ὅτι τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ταραχῆς πάσης ἐκεῖνός τε καὶ Ἀνδροκλείδας αἰτιώτατοι εἶεν (X. *HG* 5,2,35). Contrary to the view (popular among the moderns) that the accusation – 'a travesty of justice'⁵⁵ – cited the events of 395–394 only⁵⁶, it evidently had two (complementary) chronological layers: one referring to the Corinthian War, the other to the Theban's recent crimes, as seen through the eyes of Spartans posing as Artaxerxes' enemies (and searching for 'a plausible excuse for a war against Artaxerxes', to quote the philo-Laonian propaganda related by Diodorus). Both the present tense βαρβαρίζοι and the mention of the ἡ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ταραχῇ πᾶσα – the words clearly describing a topical crisis, which must have affected a considerable number of *poleis* – belong to the latter layer. If the Oriental who chose Ismenias, 'to the hurt of Greece', for his guest friend is identified with Tithraustes, which seems the likeliest possibility, the accusers' citing a satrap whose essentially anti-Greek activities connected 395–394 and 385–383 also underlined the importance that the Persian question of the late 380's had in the background of Ismenias' trial⁵⁷. And the core of the entire accusation as summarised by Xenophon need not have been wholly tendentious: to judge by political allusions in the *Meno* (probably published c. 383), Plato, like many conservatives of a Panhellenic persuasion, did not doubt that

inactive warfare. Similarly, Theopompus' fr. 103, 6 Jac. (the paragraphs of that fragment have been set into a rough chronological order) presupposes a date for Citium (cf. Jacoby's comm., p. 373) which is quite close to 386 and the Koine Eirene with its immediate consequences. Cf. G. Shrimpton, *Phoenix* 45, 1991, 1–20.

⁵⁰ *Supra*, n. 39.

⁵¹ Cf. Diod. 15,9,4 (εὐθύς).

⁵² Cf. e.g. n. 18 above.

⁵³ *Infra*, n. 58 (the association, in the *Meno* and the *Republic* 1, of the theme of money with the names of Ismenias, Xerxes, and Polycrates); X. *HG* 5,2,35 (below): the second and third charges.

⁵⁴ Whose collaboration with Agesilaus in 385/4 should be assumed on the basis of several pieces of circumstantial evidence.

⁵⁵ J. B. Bury – R. Meiggs, *A History of Greece*, London 1975⁴, 348.

⁵⁶ Seager (n. 7) 160.

⁵⁷ Dušančić (n. 44) 232. 395–394: X. *HG* 3,5,1. 385–383: Isocr. 4,140. Cf. above, n. 38.

Medism figured prominently among the political vices of Ismenias⁵⁸. Virtually the same charges of a Barbarophilia combined with revolutionary schemes may be taken to have been brought, at the same time approximately, against certain demagogues from Elis, Thessaly and Olynthus, if we rely upon the evidence that is both scarce and incompletely examined⁵⁹.

Modern scholarship tends to neglect the Persian aspects of the ‘troubles in Greece’ mentioned by Xenophon and alluded to by Diodorus. This comes as a corollary to the highly vulnerable, but widely admitted, reconstruction of the course of major events in Greece and the Aegean in the second half of the 380’s BC, reconstruction which, among other things, has implied the rejection of the Diodorean date for Glos’ revolt and obstructed the historical interpretation of *IG II² 34* on certain points. Now, it should be taken that the dioecism of Mantinea (385/4) seriously strengthened, in Athens, the position of the Laconophobe ultrademocrats such as Cephalus of Collytus. They influenced public opinion to adopt the line of collaboration with Ismenias and Artaxerxes which had been dominant in 395: then as usual, the options of home and foreign policies proved interdependent to a high degree. With regard to the violence of Sparta’s interventions in Greek affairs, that re-establishment of good relations with the King, the author of the Common Peace, did not appear unpatriotic to the average Athenian; after 385/4, the Athenians’ consistent acceptance of the Peace reflected something more than military realities – though it would be wrong to look upon the sum of their political decisions of the late 380’s as constituting a logical unity. The Spartan answer to all this, and to the *staseis* related by Diodorus, 15,5,1–3, naturally took the form of alliances with anti-Achaemenid potentates such as Glos, and of help offered to a number of ‘moderate’ *politeuomenoi*, notably Leontiades the Theban, Chabrias of Aixone, and Thrasybulus of Collytus, who, for various reasons, had not been persuaded by the recent pro-Artaxerxes propaganda⁶⁰. On the other hand, the answer included Agesilaus’ decision to reinterpret the Peace’s intentions, or letter at least, in a sense which was to formally justify his imperialist policy.

IG II² 34 faithfully reflects the political divisions typical of the moment. The fruit of recent contacts between the Achaemenid Persians and the Greek radicals to whose number the majority of the Athenian and Chian ambassadors (lines 39–43) belonged, it was directed against Glos (his Persian background explains the propaganda provision of lines 24–6, which served to appease the simple among those Athenians and Chians who remained hostile to the pro-Persian attitudes) and King Agesilaus behind him. If we are right in explaining the historical setting of the events referred to in *FGrHist* 115 F 104, Glos’ menace to Chios – an episode in Agesilaus’ hegemonial plans – was quite serious (ὅτε χρεία πολέμου προσῆν). Nothing came of it, however, and, owing to a variety of factors, the tension of the Lacedaemonian-Persian relations gradually diminished. But the radical Athenians who acted as Medo-philés and enemies of Sparta retained their leading role in the city for many years. This can be seen from their support to the freedom of the Thebans⁶¹, to the Persian cause in the Egyptian War⁶², and, especially, to the formation of the Second Maritime League. The salient features of the Charter of the League are eloquent enough in that respect.

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⁵⁸ *Meno* 90 a (on the identity of Polycrates, the accuser of Socrates, J. S. Morrison, *CQ* 36, 1942, 58, 76–8), cf. *R.* 1,336 a (note that Plato associates Xerxes with Ismenias here: Beloch (n. 36) 105 n. 1).

⁵⁹ Elis: Tertull. *Apol.* 46, 16 (I hope to give a detailed analysis, in a forthcoming book, of Tertullian’s testimony on Hippias the Sophist);(?) some other *poleis* of the Peloponnese: cf. Diod. 15,40,1–5 (of 375–374 BC). Thessaly and Olynthus: Dušanić (n. 44) 232 ff.

⁶⁰ Leontiades: J. Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony, 371–362 BC*, Cambridge Mass. 1980, 16. Chabrias and Thrasybulus: Dušanić (n. 44) 231–4. Eudoxus, the famous friend of Plato’s (who, in turn, was a relative of Chabrias and politically stood close to him: Dušanić (n. 18) 14 f., on 384/3 BC and the *Euthydemus*), carried Agesilaus’ letter for Nectanebos I c. 380 BC: DL 8,8,87.

⁶¹ For Cephalus himself see Din. 1,39 (of 378 BC).

⁶² Diod. 15,19,1–4 (cf. n. 60).