Slobodan Dušanić

The Attic-Chian Alliance (IG II² 34) and the ‘Troubles in Greece’ of the Late 380’s BC


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The Attic-Chian Alliance (IG II² 34) and the ‘Troubles in Greece’ of the Late 380’s BC*

In the summer of 384 (the first prytany of Diitrephes’ year), a defensive alliance between Athens and Chios was concluded ‘for all time’. We have an epigraphic record of the best part of the Athenian assembly’s corresponding decree, found on the southern slope of the Acropolis (IG II² 34, fragments b–d, possibly the other two, a and e, also). Unfortunately, neither the name of the mover of the decree nor the lines immediately following have been preserved.

[Σ]υμμαχεῖται τὰ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Χίοι. Ἐπὶ Διηστῆρος ἔπει πρὸς τὴν Ἀθηναίαν καὶ τὸν Χίον, ἐπὶ Διηστῆρα, ἐπὶ πρὸς τὴν Ἀθηναίαν καὶ τὸν Χίον, ἐπὶ Διηστῆρα.

1 U. Köhler, AM 2, 1877, 138 ff.; IG II² 34; Syll. 3 142; M. N. Tod, GHI II 118; J. Pouilloux, Choix d’inscriptions grecques, Paris 1960, 98–100 no. 26; St.V. II² 384; English translation (quoted here with slight modifications [notably in lines 6 and 43]): P. Harding, From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus, Cambridge 1985, 44–6 no. 31 – all with bibl. The two fragments of IG II² 35, discovered under the Propilea, obviously belonged to a later inscription (of 378 BC?), which was partly modelled upon IG II² 34 (lines 7–25). See S. Accame, La lega ateniese del secolo IV a.C., Roma 1941, 9–15 and 34 f.; J. Cargill, The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance?, Berkeley 1981, 52; Harding p. 45 f. n. 1.

‘Alliance of the Athenians and the Chians. When Diophanes was archon, [when Hippothontis] held the first pritany, [in which -- 9 --], son of [Stephanus from Oeum was secretary -- 5 --]. (lacuna) / These [vows were made, and since the Chians, in accordance with] the common agreements [that have been written by] the Hellenes, are mindful [that they will maintain], like / the Athenians, the [Peace and the] friendship and the oaths and [the treaties that are in existence], / which were sworn by the King and [the Athenians and] / the Lacedaemonians and the other [Hellenes], / and have come professing (their) good intentions [to the] / People of Athens and all Hellas and the King, let it be voted by the People. Commendation shall be given to [the People] of Chios and to the ambassadors [who] have come; there shall continue / in existence the Peace and [the] oaths and the / alliances that are now in existence; the Chians shall be treated as allies on terms of freedom and autonomy, provided that they do not transgress (any of) the (terms) on the stelae, (terms) that have been inscribed concerning the Peace, / in any way, and provided that, if anyone else transgresses (them), to the best of (their) ability they refuse to obey; there shall be set up a stele on the Acropolis in front of the Statue, and on this shall be written: if anyone comes against the Athenians, the Chians shall give assistance with all (their) strength to the best of (their) ability, [and], if anyone comes against the Chians, the Athenians shall give assistance with all (their) strength to (the best of) (their) ability. The oath shall be sworn to those who have come from Chios by the Boule and the [general/s and the] taxarchs, in Chios [by the Council / and the other] magistrates. There shall be chosen five men to sail to Chios to administer the oath to the city [of the Chians. The existence of the alliance shall be for all] time. [Invitation shall be issued to the embassy] of the Chians (to come) [for / hospitality to the Prytaneion on the morrow. (vacat) / [The following were chosen] as ambassadors: Cephalus [of Collytus, -- ca. 5 --] from Alopece, Aesimus [-- ca. 10 --] of Phrearrhii, Democles -- ca. 4 --. The following were the Chian ambassadors: Bryon, Apeles (?), Theocritus, Archelas. (vacat)’

Modern historians of the fourth century have justly stressed two features of this interesting document: (a) the Athenians insistently claim that it in no way infringes the Peace of 386 (‘sworn by the King and [the Athenians and] the Lacedaemonians and the other [Hellenes’]) or the interests of the King or any of the Greeks (lines 8–24); (b) thanks to the importance of Chios and the popularity of the programme epitomised in the clause of lines 19–21 (‘the Chians shall be treated as allies on terms of freedom and autonomy’), which implies that Athens will renounce her fifth-century hegemonial aspirations, the document and the international activities it reflected paved the way to the formation of the Second Maritime League.

Surprisingly enough, the immediate politico-military intentions of the treaty have been little discussed. Its epigraphic record leaves them unmentioned, if the implicit message of lines 24–6 (see infra) is ignored. We can safely dismiss the notion that the discreet wording of the treaty has been exclusively inspired by Athens’ and Chios’ plans for armed expansion and/or confederate progress, plans whose realisation was left for a more or less near future. On the one hand, a distinct link with the realities of the moment should be assumed for all Athenian treaties of alliance of the classical epoch, even those concluded ‘for all time’. If we are not wrong in assigning the events spoken of in Theopompos’ fragment 104 Jac. to the Attic-Chian contacts of 384 (below), the contacts were initiated by a Chios convinced that war was imminent in the east Aegean. On the other hand, regardless of the intensity of their wish to restore the arche, the post-386 Athenians were compelled to proceed cautiously and respect the provisions of the Koine Eirene which, as is well known, did not encourage the idea of the rebirth of the Maritime League or any other Confederacy. Not only does the 384 document have the form of a defensive alliance, but it also dates from a time which, owing to the dominance of Artaxerxes II, could hardly allow Athens or Chios, or both together, to take offensive actions on a larger scale.

3 See Tod, GHI II 121, line 7; 123, line 24 (cf. 79); IG II² 35 (note 1 above).
True, the two cities co-operated in 389/8 against both the Persian and Spartan interests (Diod. 14,94,4) but the renewal of such undertakings seems unimaginable c. 384, after the dissolution of the complex bloc of states, centred on Athens, that opposed Sparta in the Corinthian War. The document’s clauses stress the contracting parties’ wish to preserve good relations with the King and, rather less emphatically, with Sparta. There is nothing strange about that: Athens – unsupported by other powers, practically speaking – would not have dared to defy the concerted Achaemenid-Lacedaemonian reaction, regardless of the maritime potential she and Chios possessed.4

Alternatively, was there an external menace to Athens and/or Chios then and, if so, from which quarters? An affirmative answer to the first part of the question appears a priori probable. With regard to the continuity that characterised the Attic-Chian relations of the 380’s – the two cities were allied before as well as after 3865 – the treaty will have been caused by some novel development influencing the balance of powers in the Aegean of 384; otherwise, a fresh agreement (it can be argued) would not have been necessary. That development cannot be plausibly identified with Antalcidas’ Peace itself, some two long years old by the beginning of Dithyrambos’ archonship. As to the second part of the question, the candidate(s) for the potential aggressor(s) is (are) not easy to name, though the choice cannot have been a wide one. (It looks all the more limited if we accept the traditional picture of the Koine Eirene’s aftermath, according to which the late 380’s witnessed something that might be termed Achaemenid-Spartan diarchy over the east Mediterranean.) In any event, Chios presented a more likely target of aggression than Athens. The very fact that the treaty came into being on the islanders’ initiative (lines 16 ff. et pass.) lends some support to this conclusion, which might be put in a less general form, perhaps. At the time of the publication of the Panegyrics, a source of danger for the Chians’ freedom – possibly, the source – was sought among the barbarian garrisons stationed or expected to be stationed along the western coast of Asia Minor.6 Modern students of the treaty have thus envisaged two (alternative and tentative) identifications of the factor whose menace provoked the Chian initiative of 384: ‘Persia’ (i.e. a satrap or satraps obeying Artaxerxes)7, and Hecatomnus, the Carian dynast with a somewhat independent position vis-à-vis Susa8.

Neither of these possibilities seems attractive, however. An invasion of the island on Artaxerxes’ command would have contradicted the Koine Eirene’s letter and spirit alike. Considering the strategic constants and the effects of a long history of Greek-Persian hostilities, Isocrates’ (conditional) warning in the Panegyrics (4,163) was useful in a certain theoretic way – the more so as the problem of the peraiai of great islands such as Chios must have complicated the implementation of the Koine Eirene’s terms10 – but, from Artaxerxes’ point of view, his attack upon Chios would have been politically unwise, or hazardous at least, in about 384 BC. The wars against Acoris and Evagoras were still in progress, while Panhellenic ideas and anti-Persian alliances – including the orators’ projects of an Attic-Spartan bloc – enjoyed considerable popularity among the patriots in Greece and the West. Even if the Achaemenid were assumed to have planned the invasion for a not immediate future – i.e., for the end of the decade, when he could expect to have less worries in the Aegean – the assumption would remain implausible. It would contradict the circumstance that ‘he was interested in Greek disputes only in so far

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4 On the relative importance of the Chian fleet in the early fourth century, Isocr. 4,139.
5 Accame (n. 1) 9 f.
6 Isocr. 4,163: ‘If the barbarian strengthens his hold on the cities of the coast by stationing in them larger garrisons than he has there now, perhaps those of the islands which lie near the mainland, as, for example, Rhodes and Samos and Chios, might incline to his side . . .’ (transl. G. Norlin, LCL).
9 Cf. e.g. SEG XXVI 1282, lines 11 ff. (the Persians and Erythrae c. 387 BC [?]); D. 15,9 (Cyprothemis and Samos c. 366/5 BC).
10 Hornblower, in: CAH VI 2 80.
as they affected his position; an historian of the aftermath of Antalcidas’ Peace, focusing on matters more obvious than secret diplomacy, has found that Artaxerxes’ ‘intervention in Greek affairs can be detected only once in the sixteen years down to 370’. The majority of Athenians must have opted for a similarly prudent policy; note among other things the respect with which the Peace is treated in the official acts of the city’s foreign policy during the late 380’s—early 370’s, particularly in the Charter of the Second Maritime Confederacy. Indeed, some traits of our document – prosopographic (see infra, on Cephalus’, Bryon’s and Theocritus’ political options) and diplomatic (see supra, on [a]) – would be quite difficult to understand if it is taken to reflect Artaxerxes’ anti-Peace purposes. As to Hecatomnus, regardless of what his aims and his status within Artaxerxes’ Asia Minor really were, he (unlike his sons) was neither strong enough nor – strategically speaking – favourably situated to attack Chios without the help of others. To identify his helpers with a group of Chian exiles supported by Sparta would be an implausible solution for more than one reason, though the activity of lakonizontes (such as the father of Theopompos the Historian) must have been a factor in the Chian home affairs of the 380’s.

The prosopographic characteristics of the two lists of ambassadors cited in the inscription – the Athenian (lines 39–42: five men) and the Chian (lines 42–3: four men) – may be revealing here, though not all names are extant. Cephalus Collyteus (PA 8277), heading the Athenian team, passed for a pronounced radical and a friend of Thebes; this latter quality well accorded with the accusations that he had received Persian gold in 395. The second in order of Cephalus’ co-ambassadors, Aesimus (PA 311), judging from his role in the restoration of democracy in 404, may have counted among the boiotiazontes (and medizontes), too. As to the envoys from Chios, two of them (Bryon, the first-named, and [Theoc]ritus, the third-named) came from related families whose party allegiances seem to have corresponded with Cephalus’ radical attitudes, his Medism and his Boeotophilia. Such a state of affairs does not speak for the hypothesis, implausible in itself, that the treaty was oriented against the Achaemenid expansion, though of course the capability of sudden political turns must be allowed for people of Cephalus’ type.

The epigraphic text offers another ‘political’ indication – apparently contradicting our comments on lines 39–43 – which has remained overlooked by previous research. According to lines 24–6, the stele of the decree was to be set up ‘on the Acropolis in front of the Statue’. As noted by all the editors and

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11 T. T. B. Ryder, Koiné Eirene. General Peace and Local Independence in Ancient Greece, Oxford 1965, 41. Diodorus (14,110,5) makes us believe that Artaxerxes’ motives for imposing the Koiné Eirene of 386 upon the Greeks included his wish to prepare an expedition against a revolted Cyprus; Hornblower (n. 9) 66 f. adds justly ‘and against Egypt’.
12 Ryder (n. 11) 41 with n. 5.
13 Diod. 15,5,5; FGrHist 115 F 103, 7–8; Tod, GHI II 123, lines 12–5.
14 Cf. Isocr. 4,162; Diod. 15,2,3. Hornblower (n. 10) 69.
15 The idea underlying Isocrates’ comment at IV 163 (n. 6 above) was that the danger for Rhodes, Samos and Chios might come from the Persian garrisons situated just opposite those islands, not from far afield as was the case with Chios and Hecatomnus’ strongholds.
16 Cf. the case of Erythrae (?) c. 387 BC (SEG XXVI 1282, lines 7–11) and the Spartan practice of 385–380 criticized by Diodorus, 15,19,1.
17 Paus. 3,9,8.
18 S. Dušanić, JHS 119, 1999, 6–8 (the connections of Bryon and [Theoc]ritus with Isocrates, and Conon behind him, c. 393 BC). And the anti-Macedonism of Bryon’s and [Theoc]ritus’ descendants during the 340’s–320’s squares well enough with our hypothesis that Bryon and Theocritus themselves were ready to pursue a policy of loyalty to Artaxerxes in the second half of the 380’s. – To the prosopographical evidence examined in the paper from JHS just cited, one might add the fragment of the Athenian honorary decree of 388/7 (IG I² 23; stoich. 28) for one [13 letters]/oðápoú τον Χιον (lines 6–7; the mover’s name lost). A restoration [θεόκρητος Μνημπ]oðápoú, which makes no epigraphic difficulties (i.e. with regard to the length of the lacunae in line 6 and to the letter-traces in line 7 init.), would seem probable in the light of diverse historical indications. If it is accepted, IG I² 23 should be attributed to Theocritus the ambassador of 384; as the ambassador’s son bore the name of Metrodorus (JHS 119, 1999, 6 f. with note 39, on Stob. Ecl. I 304), the ambassador’s father (otherwise untested) is likely to have been named Metrodorus, too.
19 The actual finding-place of the fragments b–d (a and e, too?) neither supports nor contradicts this provision (Accame [n. 1] 12 f. with n. 1 on p. 13).
commentators of the inscription since Köhler, this means ‘in front of Athena Promachos’, the statue of the (open space of the) Acropolis. Now, it may be posited as a general rule that all the Athenian decrees of the fifth-fourth centuries whose texts refer to their original sites in a different way than the usual ἐν Ἀκρόπολι / ἐν Ἀκρόπολει (in other words, whose originals were situated either outside of the Acropolis or [the case of IG II² 34] in a place on the Acropolis defined with an additional precision) attest to the redactors’ insistence upon something that might be termed topographical symbolism. The kind of symbolic message attributable to the site of IG II² 34 recalls, rather closely, lines 64–6 of the Charter of the Second Maritime Confederacy, where it is said of the Charter’s decree that it will be inscribed on a marble stele ‘placed beside (the statue of) Zeus Eleutherios’ (in the Agora); the selection of place obviously echoes the topical theme of freedom (freedom from Spartan oppression, principally), crucial for the ideological content of the Charter (cf. lines 10, 20, 93)21. In a similar way, the stele recording the treaty of 384 was posted in front of Athena Promachos, as that statue – erected to commemorate Marathon, or the post-480 Persian War, or both22 – had its metaphoric meaning; it connoted, to be exact, the Athenian victories won against the eastern barbarians. And the treaty of 384 was not unique in that respect. The stele bearing the Arthmius decree was also set up beside Athena Promachos; the anti-Persian aspects of that controversial decree and Athena’s statue were in harmony, as Demosthenes explicitly tells us (19.271 f.).

It goes without saying that the provision concerning Athena Promachos of lines 24–6 corresponds with the strategic estimate, just cited from Isocrates, 4,163, that a potential enemy of Chios was to be found among the Persians who controlled the northwest coast of Asia Minor. An analogous conclusion about the Chian-Persian relations of the period will be deduced from fr. 104 of Theopompos (originally in Bk. 12 of his Philippika), if it is taken to refer to Bryon’s and Cephalus’ initiative of 384 BC. Though not conclusive, that dating of the fragment’s historical setting seems variously probable; as a whole, the excursus of the Philippika 12 dealt with the Persian history of the early fourth century23 and a reference, in fr. 104, to the Attic-Chian rapprochement of 384 could be easily connected with more than one phrase of the immediately preceding fragment (No. 103), which – complex and hard to interpret as it is – summarises the contents of the entire Bk. 1224.

It should be remarked that the dispute between the Athenian democrats and their less radical compatriots concerning the common vows of the Athenians and the Chians, spoken of in fr. 10425, would well accord with the same rapprochement. Plato’s Euthydemos, in a passage alluding to political problems presented by the tradition about the Attic-Chian kinship (302 b–d), seems to refer to the

20 To cite some random examples: Tod, GHI II 154, lines 18 f. (cf. 4 f.); 167, lines 46 f. (cf. 21–4); IG II² 204, line 57; Pouilloux (n. 1) 121–4 no. 32, lines 23–6 (cf. 13 ff.). Tod, GHI II 110, lines 35 ff., should be added here, though the provision concerns the Apollo-sanctuary at Carpathus, not an Attic locality.
21 As realized by Accame (n. 1) 64 f., Cargill (n. 1) 132, and others.
22 The evidence (which, despite the differences of chronological detail, is clear enough for our purpose) can be found listed in e.g. W. Judeich, Topographie von Athen, München 1931, 75 with n. 1 and 234 f. (Paus. 1,28,2 etc.). The tradition that Athena Promachos symbolises victory in the Persian Wars was alive as late as Gordian III’s campaign against Sapor I, and probably much longer than that: L. Robert, Op. min. sel. V 654–58 (cf. SEG XLIII 658).
23 Cf. FGrHist 115 comm. p. 359.
24 Cf. F. Jacoby, fr. 104 comm. (p. 374), who thought of fr. 103, 7 f. (the Koine Eirene and its postcedents). Fr. 103, 9 (Tiribazus’ downfall), is also a possible connection, with regard to Diodorus’ testimony 15, 9, 3 (see below).
25 FGrHist 115 F 104 (s. schol. Aristoph. Av. 880): — εὐφυότατο γὰρ Ἀθηναίοι κοινῆ ἐπὶ τῶν θυσιῶν ἔστωσι τε καὶ Χίους, ἐπεὶδὴ ἔπεμψαν οἱ Χίοι συμμάχους εἰς Ἀθήνας ὅτι χρείαν πολέμου προσήν, καθάπερ Θεόπομπος ἐν τοῖς ΙΒ Φιλοππικικοῖς φησὶν οὕτως: οἵ δὲ πολλοὶ τοῦ τότε πράττειν ἀκέχον, ὡστε τὰς εὔρικας κοινής καὶ περὶ ἐκέκτιν καὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐπισκύνοντο, καὶ πεπένθοντο ἐπὶ τὰς θυσίας ταῖς δημοτέλεσιν ὁμοίως πήχος τοῖς θείοις Χίοις διόλον τάξει, καὶ σφίστιν αὐτοῦς, etc. The phrase ‘οἵ δὲ πολλοὶ . . . ἄσχημοι’ implies, in my opinion, that the fragment omits some lines from the immediately preceding passage of the original. They seem to have referred to a ‘moderate’ proposal (made to the Athenian assembly ?) concerning the vows which accompanied the conclusion of the Attic-Chian treaty of alliance. The proposal – overruled by the Demos – obviously envisaged the normal procedure, i.e. (in the case of an Athenian decision) vows declared by, and undertaken for the sake of, the Athenians alone (cf. e.g. Tod, GHI II 144, lines 6 ff.).
topical arguments of the 384 diplomacy precisely. As the vows connected with the conclusion of treaties of alliance between cities which passed for sungeneis were likely to include deities, heroes etc. personifying the syngeneia in question, *IG* II² 34, *FGrHist* 115 F 104 and *Euthyd*. 302 b–d may be combined to corroborate the claim that the lines (now lost) of *IG* II² 34 immediately following the prescript were devoted to the same euchai whose summary description is found in *FGrHist* 115 F 104. Indeed, Plato implies that the stories of Attic-Chian sungeneia provoked political debates in which the Athenian lower classes – Theopompus' *hoi polloi* cited in fr. 104 – felt obliged to insist upon very close ties with Chios, religious as well as every other. On the purely epigraphic side of the matter, it is to be noted that line 6 *init.* of *IG* II² 34 has ταύτη με[ [...] which may be restored, on the parallel of Tod, *GHI* II 144, line 12 (cf. *IG* II² 30, line 3), Τεύτον μην ἕχῃται [...] in any case, an analogous formula with a different verb – i.e. referring to an action which was not that of the votorum nuncupatio – is hard to assume at a place so near the beginning of the main body of the document. The rest of the lacuna can be restored to read thirty [ἐπειθὴ δὲ Χίοι, ἐκ κοι/γινόν λόγων ἵνα γεχραμμένην τοῖς Ἑλλην[τοί διοφύλαξεν] τὴν εἰρήνην κτλ. and mean ‘[...] and since the Chians, in accordance with the common agreements [that have been written by] the Hellenes, are mindful [that they will maintain] . . . the [Peace] etc.’ The two restorations, Τεύτος μὴν ἕχῃται, and [ἐπειθὴ δὲ Χίοι, ἐκ κοι/γινόν λόγων . . ., corroborate each other in more than one respect, notably in corresponding exactly to the space available, which is all the more significant as the lacuna of line 6 is a comparatively short one.

The three pieces of evidence which are of prime interest for us here (*IG* II² 34, lines 24–6; *Isocr.* 4, 163; *FGrHist* 115 F 104), despite the difficulties of their interpretation, concur in suggesting that the anti-Persian purpose of its mover was decisive for the passing of the decree; the alternative of a decree reflecting a Greek menace – embodied, for instance, in a force of Chian oligarchs wishing to regain the anti-Persian purpose of its mover was decisive for the passing of the decree; the alternative of a decree reflecting a Greek menace – embodied, for instance, in a force of Chian oligarchs wishing to regain control of the island and/or in the fleet of a Laconophile (Medophile) Samos – could explain neither the history nor the wording of the document. Is it possible, however, to reconcile lines 24–6, as well as Isocrates’ (slightly tendentious) observations at 4,163, with what is known about the Attic-Chian

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26 Dušanić (n. 18) 9–13.
27 Cf. *TAM* III fasc. 1, no. 2 (Termessus Maior-Adada, II cent. BC), lines 7 ff. (as restored and commented upon by Ad. Wilhelm, *Neue Beiträge* II, 1912, 9 f. 18 ff.; if accepted, R. Heberdey’s restoration from *TAM* would change little in our argument). The importance of the *kitis* themes in such ceremonies is indirectly shown by *St.V.* III 551 (Rhodes-Hiera-putyina, (?) 201/200 BC), lines 2 ff. – καὶ τοῖς ἄργαγγέσις καὶ τοῖς ἡμοῖσι –. In the case of the joint *vota* of Athens and Chios, what might be termed – on the analogy of *TAM* II² 34, no. 1, line 7, and *St.V.* III 551, lines 2 ff. –, the θεοὶ καὶ ἡμῶν συγγενεοί would include i.a. Ionian Apollo, Neleus, Poseidon, Theseus, and Oinopion (Dušanić [n. 18] 5 with n. 27, 7 with n. 44, 9 ff.); the first two of these were especially important for the aristocratic cults in the contracting cities, the remaining three for the more popular cults. None of them seems to have been represented in the relief at the top of the stele, whose summary description is found in *IG* II² 30, line 3, *TaŒta μη[---]

28 Understandably, they provided the standard place for the records of the euchai, in Athens and elsewhere. On the epigraphic evidence of the euchai that sporadically accompanied the birth of treaties of alliance, see e.g. Ad. Wilhelm (n. 27); J. Vanseveren, *Rev. philol.* 63, 1937, 342 f.; L. J. Bliquez, *ZPE* 35, 1979, 237–40, and J. and L. Robert, *Bull. ép.* 1980, 197. In fourth-century Athens, such vows occurred e.g. in 38/76 (or 38/65) and 362 (Bliquez 237–9, on *IG* II² 30 and Tod, *GHI* II 144) so that, chronologically speaking, it would not be unexpected to find them attested in 384 too. Conversely, there is no good reason to date the euchai of fr. 104 as early as the fifth century (with F. Jacoby, R. Meiggs et al.); Aristophanes’ scholar obviously cited them as a (later) parallel for, not the comic poet’s *exemplum* of, the ceremony alluded to in the *Birds* 880. Of course, Aristophanes’ verse shows that cult ties between Athens and Chios, analogous to the common vows referred to in *IG* II² 34, lines 5–6, and *FGrHist* 115 F 104, had existed in the times of the archel already.


30 A similar formula will be found again in Tod, *GHI* II 144 (lines 12 ff.). *IG* II² 35, fr. a line 1, as preserved now, cannot help us restore *IG* II² 34, line 6.


32 21 letters (from E [exclusive] to KO [exclusive]), according to the indications of the *stoichedon* pattern.

33 *Supra*, text and n. 17. We ignore the exact position of Samos in the Attic-Lacedaemonian relations of the 380’s; in 377, the islanders refused to enter the Second Maritime League (Accame [n. 1] 61 n. 1, 83).
relations with Artaxerxes II c. 384, relations whose peaceful character, according to the indications which have just been analyzed, is hard to doubt seriously? Let us note at once that attempts at a conciliatory treatment of the evidence should not start from the hypothesis that the treaty, non-committant in its explicit provisions, reflects Attic-Chian secret contacts of an anti-Achaemenid inspiration. Apart from the choice of ambassadors (Athenian as well as Chian), some of whom had a past as the King’s friends, the topographical formula cannot recommend such a line of interpretation. The meaning of the πρὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄγάλλημας, if anti-Achaemenid in this concrete case, could not have remained hidden from Artaxerxes’ partisans in Athens and abroad.

The simplest way to reconcile these seemingly contradictory parts of IG II² 34 – i.e. lines 24–6 (illuminating the parallel testimonies of Isocrates [4,163] and Theopompus [FGrHist 115 F 104]) versus lines 8–24 and 39–43 – would be, in my opinion, to take that the anti-Persian point of the treaty concerned Glos, Artaxerxes’ admiral who had revolted against his King34. As a rebel, he was not bound by the terms or the political intentions of the 386 Peace. ‘Well supplied with money and soldiers’ (Diod. 15,9,3 f.), possessing a large fleet and valuable experience in naval warfare, Glos must have presented, for the Chians, a formidable if short-lived35 threat. Furthermore, it is more or less certain that his lands were mainly located in northcentral Ionia, close to Chios36. He may be described therefore as anticipating, through his activities and the position of his domain, the Anatolian enemies spoken of in Isocrates’ geo-strategic passage at 4,163 ff. To develop upon Isocrates’ observations on the uncomfortable neighbourhood of the island, the satrap of Artaxerxes in Lydia (i.e. the satrapy ‘overlooking’ Ionia-Aeolid) responsible for the defeat of Glos’ and Tachos’ principality was able to continue their efforts to erect, along the coast, military strongholds which seemed potentially anti-Chian and dangerous37. The satrap’s undertakings of that order may have lasted long enough to inspire Isocrates’ comments on Chios and Lydia at 4,163 ff.38 The students of the mid-eighties will find this assumption of Glos’ designs on Chios something more than a pure conjecture: we are well informed about his readiness to help Agesilaus’ hegemonial schemes that endangered those Greeks, like the Athenians and the Chians, who were unwilling to follow Sparta’s lead39. As his own reward or one of the ‘great inducements’ (Diod. 15,9,4) promised to Sparta, he may have wished to occupy the rich island of Chios,
a wish whose imperialistic aspect would explain lines 23–24 and 24–6 (Athena Promachos) of the document dealt with here. In the Athenian radicals’ propaganda – partly inspired by necessity to neutralise Agesilaus’ Panhellenic slogans? – the Attic-Chian alliance was conceivably presented as announcing a new Marathon (Salamis and/or the Eurymedon). The location of the stele ‘in front of the Statue’ reveals that fact. It need not have contradicted Cephalus’ determination to preserve Artaxerxes’ good will (and, if possible, obtain financial and/or armed help from his satraps), as Glos’ ambition, and the nature of the Attic-Chian counter-measures, will have been widely known.

This attempt at interpreting IG II F 34 starts from the premise that the Diodorean date for Glos’ revolt (15.9.3–5: 385/4 BC), based on a well-informed source and preferable to the moderns’ proposals to put the event as late as c. 380/79 BC, must be essentially correct. (The years postdating Acoris’ death c. 380 BC seem ruled out anyhow, for we have reasons to believe Diodorus who says that Glos concluded a treaty of alliance with that pharaoh; the introduction of Nectanebos (I) into Theopompus’ fragment FGHist 115 F 103, 10, stems from Photius’ slip.) It has been already remarked that Diodorus’ report 15.9, 3–5 has the advantage of a coherent unity. Its political and chronological sides are clearly concordant, pointing to the aftermath of the Koine Eirene. The fact itself that Glos plotted with the Spartans against Susa (Diod. 15.9.4 f.) posits, for the centrifugal activities of his and his heir Tachos, 383–382 BC as a terminus ante quem; with the beginning of the Olynthian crisis and, further on, Athenian moves in the Aegean leading to the formation of the anti-Laconian Maritime League, Sparta was in no position any more to engage herself ‘in Asia’.

There are other indications in our sources, partly independent from the chronographic framework of the historical narrative preserved in the Bibliothèque, which corroborate the Diodorean general picture of events resulting in Glos’ revolt. The revolt was (directly) caused by Artaxerxes’ decision to arrest Tiribazus, a Spartophile and Glos’ father-in-law (Diod. 15.9.3). The downfall of Tiribazus occurred at an uncertain moment during the Cyprian War (in 385/4, according to Diodorus, 15.8), not long after the Persian victory of Citium (Diod. 15.8.4–4.2), while the war itself had begun in 386/5. As the real fighting – which obviously included the naval battle of Citium – lasted no more than two years, and these should be equated with 386/5 and 385/4, the developments which interest us here are best ar-

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40 Obviously, Sparta was the potential aggressor alluded to in line 24.

41 Schol. D. 14.19; Plut. Arat. 16.3.

42 Admittedly, Diodorus reproduces Euphorus here, a (younger) contemporary and neighbour of Glos; something of Euphorus’ notorious local patriotism can be sensed behind Diod. 15.18.2–4 (Cyme).

43 The first to reject Diodorus’ date for Glos’ revolt (and to revise the Sicilian’s chronology of the Cyprian War, upon which that date depends) was K. J. Beloch (in. 36) 98 f.; see also id., Griechische Geschichte, vol. III 2, Berlin – Leipzig 1923, 226–9; T. T. B. Ryder, CQ n.s. 13, 1963, 105 ff. and Koine Eirene [n. 11] 52 f.; Ruzicka [n. 34] 27 f. n. 11, and all modern works of reference). Before Beloch’s revision, Diodorus was generally followed in this matter, see e.g. W. Judeich, Kleinasiatische Studien, Marburg 1892, 190.


46 I.e. Agesilaus (cf. X. Ages. 8, 3 f.)? Dušanić (n. 44) 230 n. 30; Ruzicka (n. 34) 35 n. 25.

47 Actually, the engagement ceased with the disappearance of Glos’ and Tachos’ ‘state’. Diodorus (XV 19) provides an instructive order, as well as a political analysis, of the crucial events.

48 Isocr. 4,141: the ‘six years’ pertains to the second phase of the War; cf. Diod. 15.2,1 (sub anno 386/5) and 14,110,5 (above, n. 11).

49 Diod. 15.9.2, is sustained by Isocrates’ note 4,141, which implies that Citium was followed by a lengthy period of
ranged thus (a tentative and approximate chronology): The beginning of operations in the Cyprian War: the latter half of 386; Citium: the warm season of 385; the Egyptian War: c. 385–383; the deposition of Tiribazus: the winter of 385/4; Glos’ rebellion: starting in the spring of 384. Some of this last event’s preliminaries (notably, Glos’ contacts with Agesilaus and Acoris) may have commenced even before the spring; there was enough time, consequently, for the Chian democrats to sense the danger and prepare the alliance with Cephalus’ Athens along the lines already traced in the late 390’s/early 380’s and leading to the formation of the Second League as the most important if not the immediate objective.

All this formed part of a wider network of diplomatic, political and military happenings that originated in the polarizations of the Corinthian War, and may have been interpreted as announcing a new phase of it. The autonomy clause of the King’s Peace gave rise to attempts, by a number of Greek cities or Greek statesmen at least, to pursue a policy of independence which Sparta held hostile (Diod. 15.5.1–3; cf. 40.1–5, of the analogous troubles of 375–374 BC), radically democratic (cf. ibid. 40.1, 1 ff.), and pro-Persian (cf. X. HG 5.2,35 [infra]); it may be that Sparta suspected the influence of Persian gold and secret embassies in the whole matter. The Spartans’ resistance to that independent line with its ‘Barbarophile’ implications went together with their intention, spoken of by Diodorus under the year 385/4, of finding ‘a plausible excuse for a war against Artaxerxes’ as a means to ‘restore the supremacy their fathers had exercised’ in Greece and make the Greeks forget Sparta’s unpatriotic role in the post-ecedents of the King’s Peace (Diod. 15.9.5; supra, n. 39). The Spartan alliances, or similar arrangements, with the axis formed by Glos (ibid.), Evagoras (Isocr. 4.135, cf. Diod. 15.8.2–4) and Acoris must be obviously ascribed to the same anti-Mede programme of 385/4.

The programme was still in force, as a propaganda weapon at least, in the summer of 382, when Ismenias’ accusers formulated their charges thus: καὶ ὃς βαρβαρίζοι καὶ ὃς ξένος τῷ Πέρσῃ ἐπ᾿ οὐδὲν ἀγαθῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος γεγενεμένοις εἶη καὶ ὃς τὸν παρὰ βασιλέως χρυσεῖς μετεληφώς εἶη καὶ ὃς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ταραχῇ πάσῃς ἐκείνῃς τε καὶ Ἀνδροκλείδας αἰτιώτατοι εἶν (X. HG 5.2.35). Contrary to the view (popular among the moderns) that the accusation – ‘a travesty of justice’ – cited the events of 395–394 only, it evidently had two (complementary) chronological layers: one referring to the Corinthian War, the other to the Theban’s recent crimes, as seen through the eyes of Spartans posing as Artaxerxes’ enemies (and searching for ‘a plausible excuse for a war against Artaxerxes’, to quote the philo-Laconian propaganda related by Diodorus). Both the present tense βαρβαρίζοι and the mention of the ἡ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ταραχῇ πάσα – the words clearly describing a topical crisis, which must have affected a considerable number of poleis – belong to the latter layer. If the Oriental who chose Ismenias, ‘to the hurt of Greece’, for his guest friend is identified with Tithraustes, which seems the likeliest possibility, the accusers’ citing a satrap whose essentially anti-Greek activities connected 395–394 and 385–383 also underlined the importance that the Persian question of the late 380’s had in the background of Ismenias’ trial. And the core of the entire accusation as summarised by Xenophon need not have been wholly tendentious: to judge by political allusions in the Meno (probably published c. 383), Plato, like many conservatives of a Panhellenic persuasion, did not doubt that
Medism figured prominently among the political vices of Ismenias\textsuperscript{58}. Virtually the same charges of a Barbarophilia combined with revolutionary schemes may be taken to have been brought, at the same time approximately, against certain demagogues from Elis, Thessaly and Olynthus, if we rely upon the evidence that is both scarce and incompletely examined\textsuperscript{59}.

Modern scholarship tends to neglect the Persian aspects of the ‘troubles in Greece’ mentioned by Xenophon and alluded to by Diodorus. This comes as a corollary to the highly vulnerable, but widely admitted, reconstruction of the course of major events in Greece and the Aegean in the second half of the 380’s BC, reconstruction which, among other things, has implied the rejection of the Diodorean date for Glos’ revolt and obstructed the historical interpretation of \textit{IG II} II\textsuperscript{34} on certain points. Now, it should be taken that the dioecism of Mantinea (385/4) seriously strengthened, in Athens, the position of the Laconophobe ultrademocrats such as Cephalus of Collytus. They influenced public opinion to adopt the line of collaboration with Ismenias and Artaxerxes which had been dominant in 395: then as usual, the options of home and foreign policies proved interdependent to a high degree. With regard to the violence of Sparta’s interventions in Greek affairs, that re-establishment of good relations with the King, the author of the Common Peace, did not appear unpatriotic to the average Athenian; after 385/4, the Athenians’ consistent acceptance of the Peace reflected something more than military realities – though it would be wrong to look upon the sum of their political decisions of the late 380’s as constituting a logical unity. The Spartan answer to all this, and to the \textit{staseis} related by Diodorus, 15.5.1–3, naturally took the form of alliances with anti-Achaemenid potentates such as Glos, and of help offered to a number of ‘moderate’ \textit{politeuomenoi}, notably Leontiades the Theban, Chabrias of Aixone, and Thrasybulus of Collytus, who, for various reasons, had not been persuaded by the recent pro-Artaxerxes propaganda\textsuperscript{60}. On the other hand, the answer included Agesilaus’ decision to reinterpret the Peace’s intentions, or letter at least, in a sense which was to formally justify his imperialist policy.

\textit{IG II} II\textsuperscript{34} faithfully reflects the political divisions typical of the moment. The fruit of recent contacts between the Achaemenid Persians and the Greek radicals to whose number the majority of the Athenian and Chian ambassadors (lines 39–43) belonged, it was directed against Glos (his Persian background explains the propaganda provision of lines 24–6, which served to appease the simple among those Athenians and Chians who remained hostile to the pro-Persian attitudes) and King Agesilaus behind him. If we are right in explaining the historical setting of the events referred to in \textit{FGrHist} 115 F 104, Glos’ menace to Chios – an episode in Agesilaus’ hegemonial plans – was quite serious (δότε χρέια πολέμου προστήγων). Nothing came of it, however, and, owing to a variety of factors, the tension of the Lacedaemonian-Persian relations gradually diminished. But the radical Athenians who acted as Medophiles and enemies of Sparta retained their leading role in the city for many years. This can be seen from their support to the freedom of the Thebans\textsuperscript{61}, to the Persian cause in the Egyptian War\textsuperscript{62}, and, especially, to the formation of the Second Maritime League. The salient features of the Charter of the League are eloquent enough in that respect.

\textsuperscript{58} Meno 90 a (on the identity of Polycrates, the accuser of Socrates, J. S. Morrison, \textit{CQ} 36, 1942, 58, 76–8), cf. R. 1,336 a (note that Plato associates Xerxes with Ismenias here: Beloch (n. 36) 105 n. 1).

\textsuperscript{59} Elis: Tertull. \textit{Apol.} 46, 16 (I hope to give a detailed analysis, in a forthcoming book, of Tertullian’s testimony on Hippias the Sophist); (?) some other \textit{poleis} of the Peloponnese: cf. Diod. 15,40,1–5 (of 375–374 BC). Thessaly and Olynthus: Dušanić (n. 44) 232 ff.


\textsuperscript{61} For Cephalus himself see Din. 1,39 (of 378 BC).

\textsuperscript{62} Diod. 15,19,1–4 (cf. n. 60).