



Diese Vorabversion steht unter einer [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) Lizenz

UNUM ANTIQUM PROBLEMA: DENYS THE CARTHUSIAN AND JOHN CAPREOLUS ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THE SOUL'S ESSENCE IS DISTINCT FROM ITS POTENCIES. A LATE-MEDIEVAL STARTING POINT*

THOMAS JESCHKE

In medieval philosophy, one observes a growing interest in philosophical psychology in the recent years. Apart from the present volume, Paul Bakker's project "Form of the Body or Ghost in the Machine: The Study of Soul, Mind and Body (1250-1700)" is indicative of this trend. Bakker's project sketches developments in the relationship between soul and body, roughly from the introduction of Aristotle's works into the university curriculum to its disappearance. Other examples are Dominik Perler's projects "Transformations of the Mind: Philosophical Psychology between 1500 and 1750" and his "Mapping Body and Soul" (TOPOI, Berlin). Perler's recent publications focus on several issues of the topic, but mostly on the complex of emotions and of the inner structure of the soul itself.

In general, this increased focus splits into the following different research fields: (1) the investigation of the reception of Aristotle's *De anima*,¹ (2) methodological

* I would like to thank Monica Brînzei, Guy Guldentops, Thomas M. Osborne, and Chris Schabel for commenting on an earlier draft of this paper. I also thank the participants of the Nijmegen colloquium for their helpful comments. I presented part of the reworked paper at the DWMC Research Day at the Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, on 2 June 2014. I am grateful for all the participants' comments. My acknowledgments also go to Lee Klein, who helped me with the English. While reworking this paper I also enjoyed the support of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and of the KU Leuven.

¹ Cf., e.g., S. SALATOWSKY, *De Anima: Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, Amsterdam 2006; *Mind, Cognition and Representation. The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's De anima*, ed. P.J.J.M. BAKKER and J.M.M.H. THIJSEN, Aldershot 2007; *Transformations of the Soul: Aristotelian Psychology 1250-1650. Special Issue = Vivarium* 46.3 (2008), ed. D. PERLER, Leiden 2008.

investigations,² (3) the mind-body problem,³ (4) the plurality of forms,⁴ and (5) the change from a metaphysical to a more ‘physical’ perspective (in the sense of modern natural science).⁵ These topics are pursued with varying intensity. For instance, many scholars are curious about the relationship between the agent and possible intellect and their statuses respectively, about how the immaterial soul relates to its material body, and so forth. But until recently they have mostly been unattracted by the question of how many souls we have and, if one, how this soul is structured within itself. This has now changed.⁶

Irrespective of the projects mentioned above, several interesting articles and even monographs have appeared in the last decade or so. The soul’s relation to its potencies or faculties – in my opinion – is actually the most fundamental problem concerning the inner structure of the soul. Understanding how the soul’s essence is related to its powers makes it easier to approach the corresponding questions mentioned earlier. Dominik Perler has recently begun to investigate exactly into this notion of philosophical psychology, studying Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Francisco Suárez, and

² Cf., e.g., J. ZUPKO, “What is the Science of the Soul? A Case Study in the Evolution of Late Medieval Natural Philosophy”, in *Synthese* 110 (1997), 297-334; *Psychology and the Other Disciplines. A Case of Cross-Disciplinary Interaction (1250-1750)*, ed. P.J.J.M. BAKKER, S.W. DE BOER, and C. LEIJENHORST (History of Science and Medicine Library 33), Leiden-Boston 2012; S.W. DE BOER, *The Science of the Soul. The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle’s De anima, c. 1260 - c. 1360* (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Series 1 146), Leuven 2013.

³ Cf., e.g., *Psyche and Soma. Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment*, ed. J.P. WRIGHT and P. POTTER, Oxford 2000; *Corpo e anima, sensi interni e intelletto dai secoli XIII-XIV ai post-cartesiani e spinoziani*, ed. G. FEDERICI VESCOVINI, V. SORGE, and C. VINTI, Turnhout 2005; *Forming the Mind. Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment*, ed. H. LAGERLUND, Dordrecht 2007; R. PASNAU, “Mind and Hylomorphism”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. J. MARENBOON, Oxford 2012, 486-504; IDEM, “The Mind-Soul Problem”, in *Mind, Perception, and Cognition*, ed. J.M.M.H. THIJSEN, Aldershot 2008; IDEM, *Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671*, Oxford 2011.

⁴ Cf., e.g., W.O. DUBA, “The Souls After Vienne: Franciscan Theologians’ Views on the Plurality of Forms and the Plurality of Souls, ca. 1315-1330”, in *Psychology and the Other Disciplines*, ed. BAKKER, DE BOER, and LEIJENHORST, 171-249; B.F. CONOLLY, “The Form of Corporeity and Potential and Aptitudinal Being in Dietrich von Freiberg’s Defense of the Doctrine of the Unity of Substantial Form”, in *Later Medieval Metaphysics. Ontology, Language, and Logic*, ed. C. BOLYARD and R. KEELE, New York 2013, 47-83; T. SCHNEIDER, *Die Einheit des Menschen. Die anthropologische Formel ‘anima forma corporis’ im sogenannten Korrektorienstreit und bei Petrus Johannes Olivi. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte des Konzils von Vienne* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, N. F. 8), Münster 1973; still fundamental: R. ZAVALLONI, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes. Textes inédits et étude critique* (Philosophes médiévaux 2), Louvain 1951.

⁵ Cf., e.g., C.U.M. SMITH, E. FRIXIONE, S. FINGER, and W. CLOWER, *The Animal Spirit Doctrine and the Origins of Neurophysiology*, Oxford 2012; D. DES CHENE, *Physiologia*, Ithaca, NY, 1996; M. HAGNER, *Homo Cerebralis. Der Wandel vom Seelenorgan zum Gehirn*, Frankfurt/M. 2000.

⁶ Apart from the studies that I mentioned earlier and that I will mention later, cf. also J. BIARD, “Diversité des fonctions et unité de l’âme dans la psychologie péripatéticienne (XIV^e-XVI^e siècle)”, in *Transformations of the Soul*, ed. PERLER, 342-67.

René Descartes (who denies any faculties).⁷ Perler's reading of these positions is – as always – very illuminating and clear, but he admittedly does not want to give a history of the sources, but prefers “to draw a picture of the intellectual landscape in which Descartes and other early modern authors developed their own theories.”⁸

I would like to mention two other investigations into the problem that present differing narratives. The first account is that of Peter King. In an article entitled “The Inner Cathedral: Mental Architecture in High Scholasticism,”⁹ King presents Aquinas' real distinction thesis as the mainstream view, which every thinker after Aquinas adhered to – except Ockham and “a few die hard Ockhamists and a few materialists.”¹⁰ As defending Aquinas' view he names Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Durand of St-Pourçain, Giles of Rome, and Godfrey of Fontaines. This is roughly true, but not very subtle, as we shall see. Then, King discusses Scotus' positing a formal distinction. King presents it as very close to Aquinas' real distinction, since – according to King – the *formal* distinctions have to be based on some *real* distinctions.¹¹ With respect to Ockham, King states that he did not endorse Aquinas' ‘mainstream’ view. King mentions some followers of Ockham in Oxford, but generally holds that Ockham's position was not very widespread. He lists the “arch-nominalist Jean Buridan” as well as the Renaissance philosopher Giacomo Zabarella among Aquinas' followers, but this is historically incorrect: Buridan, as Sander de Boer has recently shown, follows Ockham, and Zabarella intends to hold a middle position between Aquinas and Ockham, as we shall see.¹² So, neither of them (unqualifiedly) follows Aquinas.

The second account I would like to mention is precisely the one of Sander de Boer in his book *The Science of the Soul. The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's De anima, c. 1260-c. 1360*. To be sure, de Boer's discussion of the sources is meticulous and his

⁷ D. PERLER, “What Are Faculties of the Soul? Descartes and His Scholastic Background”, in *Continuity and Innovation in Medieval and Modern Philosophy. Knowledge, Mind, and Language*, ed. J. MARENBNON, Oxford 2013, 9-38; IDEM, “Ockham über die Seele und ihre Teile”, *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 77.2 (2010), 313-50; IDEM, “How Many Souls Do I Have? Late Aristotelian Debates on the Plurality of Faculties”, in *Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle's De anima*, ed. J.-M. COUNET and R.L. FRIEDMAN, Leuven 2013, 277-96; *The Faculties: A History*, ed. D. PERLER, Oxford-New York 2015; *Partitioning the Soul. Debates from Plato to Leibniz*, ed. K. CORCILIOUS and D. PERLER, Berlin-Boston 2014.

⁸ PERLER, “What Are Faculties of the Soul?”, 34.

⁹ P. KING, “The Inner Cathedral: Mental Architecture in High Scholasticism”, in *Transformations of the Soul*, ed. PERLER, 253-74. The metaphor reminds one very much of E. PANOFSKY, *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism*, Latrobe 1951.

¹⁰ KING, “Inner Cathedral”, 272.

¹¹ KING, “Inner Cathedral”, 268.

¹² Cf. below, 37.

judgment strong and precise. Moreover, he sharply argues against King's tendentious narration, making perfectly clear that Buridan, Nicole Oresme, Anonymous Patar, and Pierre d'Ailly are on Ockham's side.¹³ But it seems to me that he lapses into the other extreme when he maintains that Ockham's view became the mainstream view. While King both selects sources randomly and (mis)interprets them tendentiously, or better, reads them superficially, De Boer merely has a problem with selecting his sources, deriving from a curious methodology. The author mainly refers to several commentaries of anonymous arts masters for the period ca. 1260 to ca. 1280, the commentaries of Radulphus Brito and Jean de Jandun for the period of the late 1290s and early 1320s, and those by Buridan, Oresme, and another anonymous author (edited by Benoît Patar and falsely identified as Buridan) for the middle of the fourteenth century. He sometimes deviates from this principle, however, for instance when it comes to such 'important figures' as Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham. In all cases, his main criterion is solely that the texts be available in modern or renaissance editions. Recalling how much material of this time is still only in manuscript, one can easily imagine how representative such a selection of material could ever be.

Each of the three narratives (Perler's, King's, and de Boer's) employs an interesting and feasible methodology. Yet I think that, given their different starting points or perspectives, all three reveal only certain characteristics of the period they describe. Hence, I would like to suggest an approach here that should correct these narratives, focusing on a medieval, or better, two fifteenth-century readings of the thirteenth/fourteenth-century problem. My approach intends to avoid our modern prejudices, our modern interests, and to use medieval texts as hermeneutical instruments to understand older texts or earlier debates. Clearly, this is not an exclusive alternative to the above narratives, but another view on the problem, which should correct or add details rather than replace a perspective.

In the following, I will present two accounts of the question of the inner structure of the soul, those of Denys the Carthusian (d. 1471) and John Capreolus (d. 1444), both of them commonly known for their encyclopedic treatment of issues. Denys the Carthusian calls the question whether the potencies of the soul are distinct from each other and with

¹³ DE BOER, *The Science of the Soul*, 248-51. See my review in *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 76 (2014), 354-57.

regard to the essence of the soul “unum antiquum problema.”¹⁴ He therefore testifies to a long-standing medieval focus on the problem, although he does not mention any position earlier than that of William of Auxerre.¹⁵ Moreover, his statement and treatment attest to a genuine interest in the debate, while we know of other authors who found the problem irrelevant or a ‘pain’.¹⁶ Before turning to Denys and Capreolus, I will firstly give a brief outline of the historical background from Augustine to Aquinas. I mostly follow Pius Künzle’s¹⁷ description in my summary (§I). After having, second, presented the central accounts of Denys and Capreolus (§§II-III), I will then look briefly at some authors contemporary to Denys and Capreolus (§IV), in order to sketch similarities and dissimilarities. In the end, I will make some remarks on how their accounts diverge from King’s and de Boer’s modern accounts of the question (§V).

I. The Historical Context: From Augustine to Thomas Aquinas

The question whether the soul and its potencies are identical is mostly linked to the interpretation of two Augustinian trinitarian analogies. Augustine thinks that the triune structure in the soul is analogous to the trinity of persons in God. He uses the distinctions of “*mens, notitia, amor*” and “*memoria, intelligentia, voluntas*.” Whereas Augustine most likely does not speak of potencies in the first case, it is clear that in the second case the

¹⁴ Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 3, q. 13 (Opera Omnia XIX, Tournai 1902, 278).

¹⁵ Even Lottin still thought of William of Auxerre as a starting point in this context (besides Augustine, Alcher of Clairvaux, and Peter Lombard); cf. O. LOTTIN, “L’identité de l’âme et de ses facultés avant s. Thomas”, in *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, 2nd ed., vol. I, Gembloux 1957, 483-502, at 484.

¹⁶ Pierre d’Ailly calls it a “problema neutrum,” while Melanchthon finds the whole debate a “foolish battle.” Cf. PETRUS DE ALLIACO, *Tractatus de anima*, c. 1, pars 5, in O. PLUTA, *Die philosophische Psychologie des Peter von Ailly. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie des späten Mittelalters* (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 6), Amsterdam 1987, 10; PHILIPPUS MELANCHTHON, *Liber de anima (Opera quae supersunt omnia XIII)*, ed. C.G. BRETSCHNEIDER and H.E. BINDSEIL, Halle 1846, 20); K. PARK, “The Organic Soul”, in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. C.B. SCHMITT, Q. SKINNER, E. KEBLER, and J. KRAYE, Cambridge-New York 1988, 464-84, at 479.

¹⁷ P. KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen. Problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen von Augustin bis und mit Thomas von Aquin* (Studia Friburgensia. Neue Folge 12), Freiburg/Schweiz 1956. A more recent and refined account (at least for the first half of the 13th century) is in M. BIENIAK, *The Soul-body Problem at Paris, ca. 1200-1250. Hugh of St-Cher and His Contemporaries* (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Series 1 42) Leuven 2010, esp. part two, 91-169; see also EADEM, “The Powers of the Soul in the Anthropology of Hugh of St.-Cher”, in *Psychology and the Other Disciplines*, ed. BAKKER, DE BOER, and LEIJENHORST, 157-70. For another description of the period before Thomas see LOTTIN, “L’identité de l’âme”. For mostly Franciscan authors of the period 1310-1330 see C. PIANA, “La controversia della distinzione fra anima e potenze ai primordi della Scuola scotista (1310-1330)”, in *Miscellanea del Centro di Studi Medioevali*, Milan 1956, 65-168.

distinction refers to three different potencies. Since Augustine is not concerned with making ontological statements here, his remarks are not always consistent and, therefore, his view allows for interpretation.¹⁸ Nevertheless, Augustine was commonly considered throughout the Middle Ages to be defending the identity thesis, in which the soul is identified with its potencies and vice versa. This attribution to Augustine is due to the later merging of Isidore of Seville's position, which clearly claims this identity, with Augustinian texts. Evidence of this amalgamation is found in the Carolingian Renaissance, namely in Alcuin's *De ratione animae liber ad Eulalam virginem*, but also later, e.g., in Bernard of Clairvaux's works or in the *De spiritu et anima*.¹⁹ The latter work²⁰ was a handbook of psychology that was falsely attributed to Augustine and explicitly defended the identity thesis.²¹ Concerning the twelfth century, one can generally say that – apart from William of Champeaux, John of Salisbury, and Gandalf of Bologne, who assume a real distinction between the soul and its potencies – most authors explicitly or implicitly favor the identity thesis. Only Master Odo is inclined to an intermediate position, which later becomes the principal position of the Franciscans. He distinguishes the soul and its potencies according to their essence, but identifies them according to their substance.²²

A new perspective of the problem arose from the recovery of the complete Aristotelian corpus along with its Arabic commentaries. Aristotle's description of the soul suggests that he saw the potencies of the soul as distinct from the soul itself.²³ His Arabic

¹⁸ Cf. KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 7-29. It is rather morals that Augustine is interested in; cf. R.A. MARKUS, "Augustine. Man: Body and Soul", in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, ed. A.H. ARMSTRONG, Cambridge 1967, 354-61, at 359. Roland Teske, however, states that memory, understanding, and will in Augustine are identical with the soul and only differ according to their diverse activities; cf. R. TESKE, "Augustine's Philosophy of Memory", in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. E. STUMP and N. KRETZMANN, Cambridge 2001, 148-58, 148.

¹⁹ Cf. KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 39 and 63.

²⁰ Traditionally, it has long been attributed to Alcher of Clairvaux. Yet Gaetano Raciti gave evidence that this is definitely ("certamente") not the case; cf. G. RACITI, "L'autore del *De spiritu et anima*", in *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* 53 (1961), 385-401. See also *Three Treatises on Man. A Cistercian Anthropology*, ed. B. MCGINN (Cistercian Fathers Series 24), Kalamazoo 1977, 64-67. McGinn opposes Raciti's proposal to look for an author of this text within the Victorinian context. Years before, Leo Norpoth had already doubted the authorship of Alcher and argued for an "Anonymus Cisterciensis" as author of that work, which was written between 1162 and 1190; cf. L. NORPOTH, *Der pseudo-augustinische Traktat: De spiritu et anima*, dissertation, Munich 1924, printed Köln-Bochum 1971, esp. 72.

²¹ Cf. KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 67. The author of this text, despite using many citations from Augustine, never proves the thesis itself based on Augustinian texts (*ibid.*, 71).

²² Cf. KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 43-96.

²³ Cf. *De anima* II, c. 2, 413b13-414a4, where he seems to suggest that the thinking faculty is another genus with respect to the other faculties (b24-25); E.H. WÉBER, *La personne humaine au XIII^e siècle. L'avènement chez les maîtres parisiens de l'acception modern de l'homme* (Bibliothèque thomiste 46), Paris 1991, 202.

commentators reinforced that view. Avicenna, for instance, opts for a real distinction between them, describing the soul as a substance by itself that possesses its powers (*virtutes*) and is apt with respect to its actions, which operate in different ways.²⁴ These powers flow from the essence of the soul.²⁵ For the powers to differ from each other, the operations that they cause have to differ accordingly.²⁶ Averroes also favors a real distinction between the soul and its potencies, for he classifies the powers as active and passive.²⁷

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the opinions of William of Auvergne (d. 1249) and William of Auxerre (d. 1231) exemplify the two extreme positions. The former stresses the simplicity of the soul, which as a spiritual substance cannot be subdivided into particular potencies.²⁸ The latter holds strongly to the real distinction between them, because only in God is there a pure identity of His being and His operations.²⁹ These positions form the *extrema* within which later thinkers had to situate themselves.

In the following, I will present accounts of two different encyclopedic thinkers, Denys the Carthusian and John Capreolus.³⁰ Although the writings that I will employ, i.e., Denys'

For other examples see KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 97-98.

²⁴ AVICENNA, *Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus*, pars V, c. 1 (ed. S. VAN RIET, Louvain-Leiden 1968, 80.58-63): "Nihil autem horum est anima humana, sed anima est id quod habet has virtutes et est, sicut postea declarabimus, substantia solitaria, idest per se, quae habet aptitudinem ad actiones, quarum quaedam sunt quae non perficiuntur nisi per instrumenta et per usum eorum ullo modo, quaedam vero sunt quibus non sunt necessaria instrumenta aliquo modo." See also KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 99-101; WÉBER, *La personne humaine*, 202.

²⁵ Cf. the exposition of one of the several opinions that Avicenna, at the end of his *De anima*, presents and after discussing the others finally adopts, AVICENNA, *Liber de anima*, pars V, c. 7 (ed. VAN RIET, 155.39-41): "... quod anima est una essentia ex qua emanant istae virtutes, quarum unaquaqueque habet propriam actionem, et quod ipsa nihil facit nisi mediantibus virtutibus," and the answer (ed. VAN RIET, 157.83-158.90): "Nulla autem harum vera est nisi ultima earum quas praediximus [...]. Dicemus igitur ex praemissis manifestum esse actiones diversas ex diversis virtutibus esse, et quod omnis virtus ex hoc quod est virtus, non est sic nisi ob hoc quod ex ea provenit actio quam principalem habet..."

²⁶ See the chapter *de declarando quod diversitas actionum animae est ex diversitate suarum virium*, in AVICENNA, *Liber de anima*, pars I, c. 4 (ed. S. VAN RIET, Louvain-Leiden 1972, 67-79). See also D.N. HASSE, "The soul's faculties", in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. R. PASNAU, Cambridge 2010, 305-19, at 307-10.

²⁷ Cf. AVERROES, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*, II comm. 51-52 (ed. F.S. CRAWFORD [Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem 6.1], Cambridge, Mass. 1953, 208-11, esp. 211.44-48).

²⁸ Cf. KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 103-06 and 110-16; WÉBER, *La personne humaine*, 199-200.

²⁹ Cf. KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 104, n. 28; WÉBER, *La personne humaine*, 201.

³⁰ For a brief introduction to both of them and more literature, cf. K. EMERY, "Denys the Carthusian", and K. WHITE, "John Capreolus", in *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. J.J.E. GRACIA and T.B. NOONE (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy 24), Malden, MA, 2003, 243-44 and 349-50 respectively, as well as my "John Capreolus", in *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500*, ed. H. LAGERLUND, Dordrecht 2011, vol. 1, 606-08. On Denys see also the section titled "Denys the Carthusian and his Books" in K. EMERY, *Introduction to Dionysii Cartusienensis Opera selecta*.

Sentences commentary and Capreolus' *Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis*, imitate the form, content, and style of *Sentences* commentaries, neither is connected to any public or university teaching. Both are 'homeworks', so to speak, and originated in a private study. In reference to Denys' work, Kent Emery Jr. speaks of a "storehouse" or "book of invention,"³¹ which matches what I have called an encyclopedic treatment. The same is true for Capreolus' work, which additionally fosters the idea of defending Aquinas against all critics. Both authors try to give a panorama of positions relevant for a specific topic, and in this they resemble modern scholarship. As I said, I will use them to present an account of the problem that is an alternative to the modern ones described above.

In 1409, John Capreolus completed the first book of his *Defensiones*,³² while Denys' account was finish around 1464. Yet I will invert the historical order, since I believe, on the one hand, that Denys' treatment is more 'systematic' in the sense that it makes it easier for the reader to grasp the problem and its discussion, and, on the other, that Capreolus' account reveals quite well the difference between the 'schools', namely Thomists and Scotists, which we will consider afterwards. Furthermore, Denys' narrative covers the period of the late thirteenth century, while Capreolus mostly discusses authors from the beginning of the fourteenth century. I shall make use of both accounts to identify the question and the problems in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century.

II. Account Number One: Denys the Carthusian

(1) The General Issue

Denys systematically divides his *In primum librum Sententiarum*, distinction 3, question

I: Prolegomena, 2 vols. (CCCM 121), Turnhout 1991, vol. I, 15-38. A more extensive introduction into Denys' biography and world of thought can be found in D. WASSERMANN, *Dionysius der Kartäuser. Einführung in Werk und Gedankenwelt* (Analecta Cartusiana 133), Salzburg 1996.

³¹ Cf. EMERY, "Introduction", 25. See also EMERY, "Denys the Carthusian and Scholastic Theology", in *Ad litteram. Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval Readers*, ed. N.D. JORDAN and K. EMERY, Jr. (Notre Dame Conferences in Medieval Studies 3), Notre Dame-London 1992, 327-59, at 331.

³² Cf. JOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis*, Explicit (Venice 1483, without foliation): "Liber primus defensionum theologiae divi doctoris Thomae de aquino in primo sententiarum editus per eximium veritatis scholae professorem fratrem Johannem Capreoli tholosanum ordinis praedicatorum anno domini millesimo quadringentesimo nono quo legit sententias Parisius feliciter explicit. Impressus Venetiis per Octavianum Scotum Modoetiensem anno salutifere incarnationis m.cccc.lxxxiii."

13, into two parts. First, he discusses the general problem, namely whether the soul's vegetative, sensitive, and intellective faculties are one and the same with the soul. Second, he refers to the more specific question, namely whether the soul is identical with the agent or possible intellect, or *memoria*, i.e., the powers of the intellective faculty. In the first part, Denys presents – apart from the Dominican Thomas Aquinas' position – the opinions of Peter of Tarantaise, Giles of Rome, William of Auxerre, and Albert the Great, who all speak in favor of the real distinction between the soul and its potencies, which Thomas also held. William of Auvergne and Richard of Mediavilla oppose this view. Finally, Bonaventure is introduced as another supporter of the real distinction.

Let us look more closely at some arguments. Thomas' first argument for the real distinction between the soul and its potencies is taken from the first book of his *Sentences* commentary. It stresses the difference between created beings and God. The immediate principle of operation belongs to the genus of substance in God alone, for He does not act by a middle power, but immediately by His substance. Thus, His operating is substantial. According to Thomas, in all other beings the immediate principle of an operation is an accident, i.e., the substance acts by means of active and passive qualities. In the case of the human soul, there are potencies that flow from the essence of the soul and that are thought to perfect the soul itself.³³ Despite arguing for the real distinction between them and the soul, Thomas nevertheless accepts them as belonging to the integrity of the soul, insofar as they build a *totum potestativum* together with the soul. This latter concept goes back to Boethius' *De divisione*, and it enables Thomas to assume a differentiation within the soul without sacrificing its unity entirely.³⁴ Thomas defines these potencies of the soul as proper *accidentia*, which means that they are caused by the specific and not the individual principles of the human being.³⁵

Denys refers to two other arguments from the *Summa theologiae*. The first is based on

³³ The Avicennian notion of *fluxus* is one of the two axes that, according to Wéber, characterize Aquinas' approach to the question. The other one is the Dionysian perspective of the emanation of the soul's powers with respect to the objects of their operations. Cf. WÉBER, *La personne humaine*, 225. The view that powers are responsible for the operations and not the substance as such bears witness to the theme of participation.

³⁴ Cf. BOETHIUS, *De divisione liber* (ed. J. MAGEE [Philosophia antiqua 77], Leiden-Boston-Köln 1998, 38.17-40.32); KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 31-33. Albert, e.g., uses this concept to explain how the soul's inferior grade is potentially contained in the higher one; cf. KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 145; WÉBER, *La personne humaine*, 131-32.

³⁵ Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 13 (ed. cit. above n. 14, 278aB-D); THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2, co. (ed. P. MANDONNET, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, vol. I, Paris 1929, 116).

the premise that act and potency have to refer to the same genus. Since the operation of the soul does not belong to the genus of the substance, even potency does not belong to the genus of substance. The second argument is grounded on the claim that the soul is the substantial act of the body. If the soul's essence were the immediate principle of the operation, every animate being would have *actualiter* all life functions (*opera vitae*) at any given time, which is obviously not the case.³⁶ This distinction between a substantial act and an operation is exactly the distinction between a first and a second act. The first act denotes a thing's perfection in a substantial way, i.e., its being a composite of matter and form. The second act refers to its accidental perfection.

As an early supporter of Thomas' thesis, Denys mentions the Dominican Peter of Tarentaise (d. 1276), the later Pope Innocent V. Peter mentions that there are only three levels of identity, namely (1) essential identity, (2) substantial identity, and (3) the identity of a subject. Only in the second case, i.e., with respect to the substance, can the potencies of the soul be seen as identical with it. Peter in this case also uses the notion of the *totum potestativum* and makes clear that the identity is based on a causal, not an essential, predication. The potencies of the soul do not share an essential identity, but they are causes for the soul to be something complete that contains power. Peter rejects Thomas' claim that the accidents flow from the soul's principles, but are co-natural with it.³⁷ The Augustinian Giles of Rome, the third supporter of the real distinction thesis, adds the notion that the potencies as accidents of the soul belong to the category of quality.³⁸

Against this apparent agreement, which even Denys describes as merely a verbal one,³⁹ Denys places the counter-position of William of Auvergne, which has already been mentioned above. Denys cites none of William's arguments, but concentrates his critique on William's dictum that it would be horrible to think of the soul as an aggregate of its potencies. Thereby, Denys makes clear that William's position marks only a turning point in the systematic development of his own account: until then, the Carthusian laid emphasis on the distinction between soul and potencies, but from now on he has to make

³⁶ Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 13 (ed. cit. above n. 14, 278aD-bB); THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 77, a. 1, co. (ed. P. CARAMELLO, Torino-Rome 1952, 369-70).

³⁷ Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 13 (ed. cit. above n. 14, 278bB-279aB); PETRUS DE TARANTASIA, *In primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 3, q. 5, a. 2 (ed. Toulouse 1652; reprint Ridgewood, NJ, 1964, p. 37a-b).

³⁸ Despite what was commonly assumed, he considers quality the first of the nine accidental categories.

³⁹ Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 13 (ed. cit. above n. 14, 279aD): "Ista tamen concordantia verbalis est potius quam realis..."

clear to what extent soul and potencies are bound together, in order not to be accused of interpreting the soul as an *acervus aggregatus* of its potencies.⁴⁰ Therefore, he immediately refers to William of Auvergne's counter-position, which is found in a text from William of Auxerre's *Summa aurea*. William of Auxerre argues against a kind of middle position that posits an identity of the soul *in essentia*, and he assumes a certain distinction between the potencies as far as acts are concerned. William of Auxerre lays emphasis on the difference between divine and created being, as Thomas would later, but with a slightly different accentuation. It is only in God that, because of His absolute simplicity, being (*esse*) and being able to (*posse*) coincide. But if the human soul were not distinct from its potencies, we would have to admit the same identity of being and being able to as is commonly reserved for God.⁴¹

Hereafter, Denys refers to the Dominican Albert, who is known as the first theologian who uses the Boethian concept of *totum potestativum* or *potentiale* as a key term to reconcile the unity of the soul with the diversity of its potencies.⁴² In Denys' account,

⁴⁰ Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 13 (ed. cit. above n. 14, 279bA). See for William, e.g., *De anima*, c. 3, pars 2 (Opera omnia II, ed. Paris 1674; reprint Frankfurt/Main 1963, p. 88a): "Quod si ex illis est solum totaliter composita, nihil igitur aliud est ipsa anima humana quam acervus sive aggregatio ipsarum, cum nec ipsae secundum hoc unitate vel coniunctione subiecti unitae ad invicem sint, eo quod nullum ei subiectum subdit, postquam nihil aliud veniet in compositionem animae humanae et ad invicem nullo modorum unitae vel coniunctae sint." Cf. M. BAUMGARTEN, *Die Erkenntnislehre des Wilhelm von Auvergne* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Texte und Untersuchungen 2.1), Münster 1893, 15-18; LOTTIN, "L'identité de l'âme", 487; KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 110-14; WÉBER, *La personne humaine*, 76-84. A recent and more general account of William's treatise *De anima* can be found in the introduction to WILLIAM OF AUVERGNE, *The Soul*, trans. R.J. TESKE (Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 37), Milwaukee 2000, 15-40; on p. 106, there is also a translation of the above-mentioned section. On William in general, cf. R.J. TESKE, *Studies in the Philosophy of William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris (1228-1249)* (Marquette Studies in Philosophy 51), Milwaukee, 2006, and *Autour de Guillaume d'Auvergne († 1249)*, ed. F. MORENZONI and J.Y. TILLIETTE (Bibliothèque d'histoire culturelle du moyen âge 2), Turnhout 2005. See also E.A. MOODY, "William of Auvergne and His Treatise *De anima*", in IDEM, *Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic. Collected Papers 1933-1969*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1975, 1-109; R.J. TESKE, "William of Auvergne's Rejection of the Agent Intellect", in *Greek and Medieval Studies in Honor of Leo Sweeney, S. J.*, ed. W.J. CARROL and J.J. FURLONG, New York 1994, 211-35.

⁴¹ Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 13 (ed. cit. above n. 14, 279bB); GUILLELMUS ALTISSIODORENSIS, *Summa aurea* II, tr. 9, c. 1, q. 6 (ed. J. RIBAILLIER [Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 17], Paris-Grottaferrata 1982, vol. II.1, 243.69-244.101); LOTTIN, "L'identité de l'âme", 484-85; KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 103-05; WÉBER, *La personne humaine*, 201-02.

⁴² For the *totum potestativum* in Albert, cf. N. WINKLER, "Zur Neubegründung einer intellekttheoretischen Tradition bei Albertus Magnus", in *Topik und Tradition. Prozesse der Neuordnung von Wissensüberlieferungen des 13. bis 17. Jahrhunderts*, ed. T. FRANK, U. KOCHER, and U. TARNOW (Berliner Mittelalter- und Frühneuzeitforschung 1), Göttingen 2007, 147-73, at 159-71. For Albert and his Arabic sources, cf. D.N. HASSE, "The Early Albertus Magnus and his Arabic Sources on the Theory of the Soul", in *Transformations of the Soul*, ed. PERLER, 232-52; KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 144-58; WÉBER, *La personne humaine*, 205-20. For Albert's use of the concept of 'flowing', see T. BONIN, "The Emanative Psychology of Albertus Magnus", in *Topoi* 19.1 (2000), 45-57. For "potestativum" as a socio-political concept, see F.L. CHEYETTE, *Ermengard of Narbonne and the World of the Troubadours*.

Albert emphasizes exactly this notion when he begins by stating that a lower faculty of the soul is not destroyed but virtually contained in the succeeding higher one; in fact, it is perfected by the higher one, in order to act upon a wider range of objects than before. Albert refers to Aristotle's saying that the vegetative faculty is contained in the sensible, and the sensible in the rational one. In this perspective, the soul as such, i.e., as the perfection of the body as a whole and of its parts, has to have a certain *universale posse* in itself, which denotes the entire function of all its potencies, according to which the body can be called animal being. There are three possibilities to consider the soul with reference to its perfecting relation to the body, which all show its character as a *totum potestativum*. (1) In comparison with the body as its *materia*, we call it the essence of the body. (2) In relation to the body as an organic being, the soul is called *vita*, for it is the primary perfection of a living animal. (Here, the soul acts upon the organic body according to its *universale posse*.) (3) As being separable from the body, the soul is, finally, called *mens*.⁴³ Albert, therefore, argues for a distinction between the potencies of the soul, but the notion of the *totum potestativum* prevents the soul from being considered a cluster of potencies.

A position that also underlines the unity of the soul with its potencies is that of the Franciscan Richard of Mediavilla (d. after 1303). Denys presents his view as deviating from Thomas Aquinas' position. Richard does not think that the potencies of the soul are accidents, for they do not add some absolute entity to the soul, but merely a relation to its acts or objects.⁴⁴ One of his arguments is important to understand Thomas' own position.

Conjunctions of Religion and Power in the Medieval Past, Ithaca-London 2004, esp. 131-34.

⁴³ Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 13 (ed. cit. above n. 14, 280aA-D); HASSE, "The Early Albertus Magnus", 243-44; WINKLER, "Zur Neubegründung"; LOTTIN, "L'identité de l'âme", 497-501; KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 144.

⁴⁴ Henry of Ghent also uses the notion of relation or *respectus* to describe the rapport between the soul's essence and its powers: the powers are the soul, but differ according to their respects; cf. HENRICUS DE GANDAVO, *Quodlibet III*, q. 14 (*Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo doctoris solemnitis*, ed. I. BADIUS ASCENSIVS, Paris 1518: reprint Louvain 1961, ff. 66rN-71rF, esp. f. 70rB): "Oportet igitur ad determinationem potentiae in ea eam aliquo determinari, ut determinate ad actum determinatum habeat respectum et per hoc rationem potentiae," and (f. 71rF): "Dicendum igitur quod, licet potentiae activae non sunt in anima per determinationem alicuius informantis eas, sunt tamen in anima per naturalem determinationem ad subiectum et materiam, circa quam habent operari, sicut caliditas separata, si esset calefactiva in se, non esset nisi qualitas per essentiam et non esset potentia quaedam nisi ex naturali determinatione et respectu ad actum calidi, ita quod iret in actum quandoque approximaretur calefactibili et cessaret ab actu absente calefactibili. Similiter in proposito dicendum quod voluntas est potentia naturalis in anima et non est nisi substantia animae; sed ex naturali determinatione et respectu ad actum volendi bonum ut bonum, sive simpliciter sive apparens, quod necesse habet velle naturaliter; cum enim presentetur in cognitione, licet non de necessitate velit hoc bonum vel illud et cum bonum ut obiectum et materia ei non presentetur, velle secundum actum omnino non potest. Similiter intellectus agens potentia naturalis est

Richard argues that a substance can receive accidents and act upon other things immediately, i.e., without any further mediating accidents, for otherwise there would be an infinite regress.⁴⁵ This notion, however, implies that Richard does not distinguish between two different kinds of accidents in the way that Thomas did. For Thomas, the accidental character of the soul's potencies is different from the character of the other accidents that belong to the substance of the soul, for example their acts. They are "proper accidents," which means that they are caused by principles that belong to the soul according to its specific nature. They enter the definition of the soul, for they form a necessary unity with the soul, whereas all other accidents are only accidentally united to the substance of the soul.⁴⁶ Since the accidents have such an outstanding character, it is rather easy to see how these accidents can exercise a mediating function without the necessity of being mediated by themselves.⁴⁷ Richard seems to have in mind only one kind of accidents, namely not the "proper" ones, and therefore he would not see how the soul's potencies could play a primary role among the other accidents. In short, Richard holds that there is a certain real distinction, though not because of the accidental character of the potencies, but because of the different notion of relation that they confer to the soul.

After having expounded Richard's defence of a kind of real distinction, Denys finally presents Bonaventure's (d. 1274) position. This Franciscan master shares with his confrère Richard of Mediavilla a similar approach to the question, for he, too, argues against the accidental character of the potencies and, nevertheless, also stresses a real

in anima et non est nisi substantia animae, sed ex naturali determinatione et respectu ad actum abstrahendi species intelligibiles a phantasmate, cum ei proponuntur, ita quod non potest illas non abstrahere, sicut lux non potest non abstrahere species colorum a pariete super quem lucet. Est autem agens in anima quodammodo sicut lux in diaphano, ut vult Philosophus. Cum autem species phantasmatum ei non proponuntur absque actione, necesse est eum manere, et sic in anima determinantur aliter potentiae activae, aliter vero passivae. Activae naturaliter et naturali respectu, quia sunt ad unum tantum et ad unam rationem agendi specie circa bonum. Passivae vero non nisi per alicuius determinationem, quia sunt ad plura per indeterminationem. Sed aliter intellectivae, aliter vero sensitivae, quia illae sunt in anima secundum se per indeterminationem specierum intelligibilium ad intelligendum verum secundum diversos modos intelligendi differentes specie. Ista vero sunt in composito per indeterminationem dispositionis organorum ad sentiendum diversa sensibilia differentia genere secundum diversas operationes sentiendi genere differentes, secundum quod expositum est."

⁴⁵ Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 13 (ed. cit. above n. 14, 280aD-bB); RICARDUS DE MEDIAVILLA, *In primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 3, q. 1 (ed. Brescia 1591; reprint Frankfurt/Main 1963, 53a).

⁴⁶ See above, n. 35. KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 174-75 and 186-88.

⁴⁷ Thomas discusses the argument that no accident is subject to another accident, and therefore no accident can be mediated by another. In his answers he states that certainly no accident can produce or underlie another, but the subject can underlie another accident by virtue of a primary accident. So it is not the accident that produces but merely the subject, including the first accident, that is, the mediating agent in that operation. Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 3, ad 2 (ed. MANDONNET cit. above n. 35, 118).

distinction between them. Bonaventure is known for arguing in favour of this real distinction, together with a co-substantiality of the soul and its potencies,⁴⁸ and Denys mentions exactly this notion. Bonaventure distinguishes between two ways of referring to a natural potency: first, insofar as it is located in a subject; second, insofar as it comes out of a subject (*egrediens a subiecto*). The second way leads, once again, to two possibilities: either to a substance with its accidents, or to a potency that naturally and immediately comes out of the substance, which does not belong to another genus, but is reduced to the same genus as the substance, yet as a kind of substantial difference. The latter description is in some way applied to the soul's potencies *memoria*, *intelligentia*, and *voluntas*, for they are presented as co-substantial with the soul. This co-substantiality implies that they neither are completely identical according to the essence nor differ according to the genus, but belong to the same genus "reductively" (*in eodem sunt genere reductive*), which means that they can be reduced to the same genus.⁴⁹

Bonaventure also faces a possible counter-argument, which in some sense was already implied in Richard's argumentation and which is clearly addressed by Thomas Aquinas. This different view assumes that the soul, as being immediately its own principle of being, is also its own direct principle of operating, and therefore needs no further mediating principle. Bonaventure's answer is close to Thomas'. Such an identity, he says, is only imaginable with regard to the remote principle. With respect to the immediate principle, an actual identity would import an identity in reality, being and operating, and would furthermore lead to an enduring operation as long as there is actual being. Thus, the form is indeed the immediate principle of being, yet the potency serves as an immediate principle for operating.⁵⁰ In this (systematic, yet unhistorical) sense, Bonaventure's answer can be taken as defending Thomas against Richard of Mediavilla.

⁴⁸ Cf. KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, 127-37; WÉBER, *La personne humaine*, 202-05. The notion of "co-substantiality" testifies quite exactly to the context of this philosophical discussion, namely its theological context. The exemplar, of which the soul is said to be an image, that is, the divine Trinity, combines the distinction of three persons with the unity of the divine substance, which brings about the persons' co-substantiality. Nicholas of Orbellis starts from this theological notion in order to state a difference in the analogy. The image in the soul has to be conferred not only on the primary acts, but also to the secondary acts, for the first ones lack a certain distinction, whereas the second lack a certain co-substantiality. Cf. NICOLAUS DE ORBELLIS, *Compendium super I Sententiarum*, d. 3, tertia pars, q. 2, a. 2 (ed. Hagenau 1503, f. 23vb). The same is true for William of Vorillon, cf. *In primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 3, tertia pars, q. 1, a. 2 (ed. Basel 1510, f. 18rb).

⁴⁹ Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 13 (ed. cit. above n. 14, 281aA-bC); BONAVENTURA, *In primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 3, secunda pars, a. 1, q. 3, co. (Opera Omnia I, Quaracchi 1882, 85-86).

⁵⁰ Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 13 (ed. cit. above n. 14, 281bC-282aB); BONAVENTURA, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, secunda pars, a. 1, q. 3, co. (ed. cit. above n. 49, 86-87).

Denys closes the first part of his account by stating that it is more reasonable to hold the position of a real distinction, for some did hold that position, although others, e.g. the Franciscan Scotus, did argue in favor of the opposite. Whereas Denys here just mentions Scotus, the latter plays a key role in Capreolus' account.

(2) The Specific Issue

As mentioned above, Denys is interested not only in the wider problem, namely to what extent the soul is identical with its potencies in general, but also whether there is an identity in the intellective part of the soul. Here, he looks at the relation between agent and passive intellect as well as at *memoria*. While agent and passive intellect function in actual knowledge, *memoria* functions as a prerequisite, since it maintains the *species* by which the intellect knows something.⁵¹

In his *Sentences* commentary, Thomas Aquinas assumes that there are three higher potencies in the soul, namely the Augustinian triad of *memoria*, *intelligentia*, and *voluntas*. These potencies differ from one another, as they stand for different properties that follow the soul's essence.⁵² In his *Summa theologiae*, however, he argues that, on the one hand, *memoria* and intellect are two potencies with reference to their different duties (*officia*), but, on the other, they are only one concerning their essence. He hence identifies *memoria* with the intellect and the reason for this is his interpretation of an Aristotelian dictum. In book III, chapter 4 of the *De anima*, Aristotle defines not the entire soul but solely the intellect as the place of the *species*.⁵³ In accordance with this, Thomas abandons the idea of a proper place for the species and, consequently, accepts only two potencies of the intellect, an active and a passive one. The latter, i.e., the *intellectus possibilis*, is now responsible not only for receiving the *species* but also for conserving them.⁵⁴

Denys clarifies this point by alluding once again to Peter of Tarentaise. Peter refers to the different kinds of diversity between the acts of *conservare*, *intuere*, and *volere*, which

⁵¹ Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 1 (ed. MANDONNET cit. above n. 35, 111-14). Yet *memoria* has no temporal implication, as Thomas makes clear answering an objection that claims that *memoria* belongs to the past; cf. ad 2 (ed. MANDONNET, 113).

⁵² Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 13 (ed. cit. above n. 14, 282aC); THOMAS DE AQUINO, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 1, co. (ed. MANDONNET cit. above n. 35, 112-13).

⁵³ See ARISTOTELES, *De anima* III, c. 4, 429a27-29.

⁵⁴ Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 13 (ed. cit. above n. 14, 282aC-D); THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 79, a. 7 (ed. CARMELLO, cit. above n. 36, 388).

explicitly correspond to *memoria*, *intelligentia*, and *voluntas*. The acts of *conservare* and *intuere* differ, according to Peter's *apologia Thomae*, less from each other than the act of *volere* does from *conservare* and *intuere*, because *conservare* and *intuere* belong to the power of knowledge, whereas *volere* belongs to the will. Adopting the principle according to which any diversity in acts suggests diversity in potencies, but given the fact that *actus conservandi* and *intuendi* are so closely conjoined, Peter concludes that they are identical according to their essence and different according to their duties.⁵⁵ Finally, Denys adds a last paragraph from Aquinas' *Summa*, in which Thomas interprets Augustine's triad *memoria*, *intelligentia*, *voluntas* as referring to the habitual maintenance, the intellect's act and the will's act.⁵⁶

Thereafter, Denys mentions the Dominican Durand of Saint-Pourçain (d. 1334), who, in his *Sentences* commentary, argues against the identification of *memoria* with agent intellect. This seems to be a surprising move by Durand, for two questions later he asks whether such an agent intellect is to be posited in the soul and denies it completely.⁵⁷ Indeed, even in the question from which Denys cites, Durand doubts that the agent intellect is to be considered a potency of the soul.⁵⁸ Yet Denys is not concerned with Durand's doubts on the agent intellect and uses only his first part to reject the opinion that identifies *memoria* with agent intellect. The argument for the identity is based on the view that *memoria* and agent intellect have identical functions, namely containing and causing.

⁵⁵ Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 13 (ed. cit. above n. 14, 282aD-bB); PETRUS DE TARANTASIA, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 5, a. 1, ad 3 (ed. cit. above n. 37, p. 36a).

⁵⁶ Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 13 (ed. cit. above n. 14, 282bB-C); THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 79, a. 7, ad 1 (ed. CARMELLO, cit. above n. 36, 388).

⁵⁷ Cf. DURANDUS DE SANCTO PORCIANO, *In primum librum Sententiarum* (versio C), d. 3, secunda pars, q. 5 (ed. Venice 1571; reprint Ridgewood, NJ, 1964, ff. 27ra-28ra). See also my "Die Ablehnung des tätigen Intellekts bei Durandus. Panorama einer Debatte", in *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet*, ed. A. BECCARISI, R. IMBACH, and P. PORRO (Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi. Beihefte 4), Hamburg 2008, 273-91; S.-T. BONINO, "Quelques réactions thomiste à la critique de l'intellect agent par Durand de Saint-Pourçain", in *Saint Thomas au XIV^e siècle. Actes du colloque organisé par l'Institut Saint-Thomas-d'Aquin les 7 et 8 juin 1996 à l'institut catholique de Toulouse [= Revue Thomiste 97 (1997)]*, 99-128. For Durand's theory of cognition in general, cf. J.-L. SOLERE, "Sine qua non Causality and the Context of Durand's Early Theory of Cognition", and P. HARTMAN, "Causation and Cognition: Durand of St.-Pourçain and Godfrey of Fontaines on the Cause of a Cognitive Act", in *Durand and His Sentences Commentary. Historical, Philosophical, and Theological Issues*, ed. A. SPEER, F. RETUCCI, T. JESCHKE, and G. GULDENTOPS (Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales. Bibliotheca 9), Leuven-Paris-Walpole, MA, 2014, 185-227 and 229-56 respectively, as well as J.-L. SOLERE, "Durand of Saint-Pourçain's Cognition Theory: Its Fundamental Principles", in *Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle's De anima*, ed. COUNET and FRIEDMAN, 185-248.

⁵⁸ DURANDUS DE SANCTO PORCIANO, *In I Sent.* (version C), d. 3, secunda pars, q. 3, §9 (ed. cit. above n. 57, f. 26ra): "Secundum etiam motivum non valet, quia nondum est certum quod intellectus agens inter partes animae teneat supremum locum vel aliquem locum."

Memory contains the *species* and produces intelligence. The agent intellect contains – at least *virtualiter* – the intelligible forms and also causes the intelligence, for it causes the universality in the things by abstracting from the phantasms. Durand, however, rejects this opinion for the simple reason that containing and causing are not attributed univocally to memory and agent intellect. The containing of the agent intellect is virtual, yet effective, while the maintenance of the memory is formal and subjective.⁵⁹

From the entire question, one can easily see that the Carthusian is primarily interested in presenting and sharpening a position about which he does not seem to be zealous, but which he considers worth discussing. He leaves out nearly all supporters of the counter-view, especially Scotus and his followers, and therefore does not create a debate in the proper sense. We also know that Denys the Carthusian is not a Thomist in the strict sense of the word, but often adopts an Albertist view, as has been shown several times and most recently by Alessandro Palazzo.⁶⁰ In this case, however, it is Bonaventure who has the last word. Though Bonaventure, strictly speaking, adopts neither Thomas' nor Albert's view, he argues for the real distinction between the soul and its potencies.

III. Account Number Two: John Capreolus

Turning now to John Capreolus' *Defensiones*, we will see that almost all topics dealt with by Denys are to be found already therein, but in a more extensive treatment. With regard to the period, as said above, we are moving with Capreolus to the first decades of the fourteenth century.⁶¹ As is well known, Capreolus adopts a threefold division for his commentary. First, he presents several conclusions: in the present case, five conclusions exclusively drawn from Thomas Aquinas' works. Second, he reports several objections against the aforementioned conclusions: here there are only four objections, since the fourth conclusion is not contradicted explicitly but implicitly together with the third one. In this context, Capreolus refers to texts from Peter Auriol, William of Ockham, Adam

⁵⁹ Cf. DIONYSIUS CARTUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 13 (ed. cit. above n. 14, 282bB-C); DURANDUS DE SANCTO PORCIANO, *In I Sent.* (versio C), d. 3, secunda pars, q. 3, §§5 and 7 (ed. cit. above n. 57, ff. 25vb-26ra).

⁶⁰ See A. PALAZZO, "Ulrich of Strasbourg and Denys the Carthusian: Textual Analysis and Doctrinal Comments", and "Ulrich of Strasbourg and Denys the Carthusian (II): Doctrinal Influence and Implicit Quotations", in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 46 (2004), 61-113, and 48 (2006), 163-208.

⁶¹ Cf. JOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2 (ed. C. PABAN and T. PÈGUES, 7 vols., Tours 1900-08; reprint Frankfurt/Main 1967, vol. I, 189-220).

Wodeham, and John Duns Scotus. Third, he argues against these objections by using Aquinas' texts or answering them *ad mentem Thomae*.

The first three conclusions get at the heart of what we are concerned with here. The very first says that the soul's potencies are not identical with the soul's essence. The second concentrates immediately on the higher faculties and states that will and intellect are really distinct. The third refers to the relation of the memory and assumes that the intellectual memory is not a potency distinct from the intellect. Quite easily, one can see that these are exactly the topics Denys would be interested in. Capreolus, however, adds two more conclusions in this context, referring to the soul as an image of the Trinity. The fourth conclusion asserts that the *mens* is identical neither with the soul as a whole nor with *memoria*, *intelligentia*, or *voluntas*. The fifth, finally, holds that the parts of the image are distinct from their subject. In the following, I will only deal with the first conclusion, which is a good example of Capreolus' methodology.

Capreolus' description of Thomas' arguments for the first conclusion is strikingly similar to Denys' account. John lays emphasis on the arguments from *Summa theologiae* I, question 77, article 1, however, namely on the distinction between God's operation, which belongs to the substantial genus, and the operation of the soul, which does not belong to it, and the distinction between first and second act.⁶² Against Thomas' arguments, Capreolus poses some of Scotus' objections, which merely clarify Thomas' position and shall not concern us here. Let us look instead at the more important objections of Scotus to which Capreolus refers in the second part.

Duns Scotus (d. 1308), in his *quaestiones* on book II of the *Sentences*, refers to some of the classical arguments, especially those of Thomas.⁶³ Capreolus' "Scotus" and the

⁶² See above, 10. Cf. JOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Defensiones* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2 (ed. PABAN et PÈGUES cit. above n. 61, 189 and 191); THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 77, a. 1, co. (ed. CARMELLO, cit. above n. 36, 369-70).

⁶³ In his *Ordinatio*, distinction 16 and others are not treated; cf. JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio* II, dd. 4-44 (Opera Omnia VIII, Vatican City 2001, 269, n. 94). It is found, moreover, in two volumes of the Vives edition, namely JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Quaestiones in II librum Sententiarum*, d. 16, q. un. (*Joannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* XIII, Paris 1893, 39-40); *Reportata Parisiensia* II, d. 16, q. un. (*Joannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* XXIII, Paris 1894, 73-74). Volume XIII seems to supplement the text of distinctions 14-26 with Parisian material, reflecting probably *Reportatio* IIB. Volume XXIII, however, directly goes back to Scotus and seems to be *Reportatio* IIA. Looking at an authoritative text of Scotus like the *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, one can assume that the report of Scotus' idea in both volumes of Vives is quite adequate; cf. *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* IV, q. 2, §143 (Opera philosophica III, ed. G. ETZKORN ET AL., St. Bonaventure, NY, 1997, 354-55); IX, q. 5, §§12-18 (Opera philosophica IV, ed. G. ETZKORN ET AL., St. Bonaventure, NY, 1997, 562-65). See also VITALIS DE FURNO, *De rerum principio*, q. 2, a. 3 (*Joannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* IV, Paris 1891, 468-82); cf. R. CROSS, "Philosophy of Mind", in

'real' Scotus both declare that the soul is a principle that acts through its essence. For Scotus, a scarcity of principles brings about a nobility of nature. The nobility that we have to assume in God, namely that He is the immediate principle of His actions, has to be accordingly ascribed to the soul, for there is no reason not to suppose such nobility in the soul if it is possible to ascribe such scarcity of principles to the soul as well. Scotus, then, shows in five arguments in what way the assumption that the soul operates immediately by its essence renders the soul more noble. (a) At first, he refers to the fact that acting *per essentiam* would let the soul immediately reach its goal. (b) Furthermore, if the intellect were accidental to the soul, man's beatitude would never be his soul's perfection, but merely something accidental to him. Scotus is not concerned with the perfection of parts of the soul, e.g., the will or the intellect, with reference to final beatitude, but in the soul as a whole.⁶⁴ (c) Moreover, there exist inferior primary acts in the soul that can function as immediate principles of an action; because of that, the soul can do all the more. (d) In addition, substances have to be generated by equally noble substances. Accidental forms, being of inferior nobility, cannot act as immediate principles of generation. (e) Finally, in substantial generation there is no instrument to be used, but prime matter is immediately acted upon. Therefore, substances possess a certain ability to act without mediating accidents. Capreolus summarizes the last three arguments as one large argument, since they all accentuate how a substance is an immediate principle of operation and that accidents always presuppose substantial forms and therefore cannot act immediately. Capreolus follows Scotus quite verbatim and therefore reproduces Scotus' arguments adequately. Yet one section that Capreolus does not immediately refer to is Scotus' summary, which makes clear that he does not approve of the principle that every real diversity in effect induces a real diversity in cause. Scotus agrees that the potencies of the soul have a certain distinction and bring about a certain *respectus*, but not insofar as they function as a principle of action.⁶⁵

The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. T. WILLIAMS, Cambridge 2003, 263-84, at 268-71. For a recent and detailed account of Scotus' view, cf. J.H.L. VANDEN BERCKEN, "John Duns Scotus in Two Minds About the Powers of the Soul", in *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 82.2 (2015), 199-240.

⁶⁴ See also W. DETTLOFF, "Heilswahrheit und Weltweisheit. Zur Stellung der Philosophie bei den Franziskanertheologen der Hochscholastik", in *Wahrheit und Verkündigung. Michael Schmaus zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. L. SCHEFFCZYK, W. DETTLOFF, und R. HEINZMANN, vol. I, Munich-Paderborn-Vienna 1967, 619-34, at 622.

⁶⁵ Cf. JOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Defensiones* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2 (ed. PABAN et PÈGUES cit. above n. 61, 198); JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Reportata Parisiensia* II, d. 16, q. un. (*Joannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* XXIII,

In his *solutiones*, Capreolus opposes Scotus' arguments point by point. He strongly disapproves of Scotus' attribution of such nobility to the soul. For Capreolus as well as Thomas, this nobility is exactly the difference between God's divine and uncreated being and the being of His creatures. In this perspective, Capreolus likewise answers the argument from the beatific point of view. It is man's condition that is perfected by means of his accidental potencies, which cause the soul to be subject to the actually but accidentally perfecting acts in beatitude, namely the vision of God.⁶⁶

Capreolus, at this point, adds more quotations from Thomas in order to show in what way accidents can mediate the inherence of other accidents in a subject. In the third long argument about the immediate principle of action, Capreolus points, for example, to a different understanding of *principium operationis*. If it is understood as a means by which an agent acts (*quo agens agit*), it is an immediate principle, although it is not perfection *simpliciter*. This kind of principle is attributed to any accident in any operation. If it is understood, however, as something that is the condition of the agent's acting (*quod agens agit*), it is nobler than any immediate principle. This kind of principle is attributed to the substantial form "*anima*." This distinction is also used to answer argument (d) above, namely that substances have to be generated by substances for an equality of nobility. The generation of substance by substance is only granted in the second sense of the distinction, i.e., insofar as substance is understood as the immediate *principium quod*, not *quo*. Capreolus specifies, moreover, that the instrument is called *principium quo*, the substance *principium quod*, and hence the accident is – strictly speaking – not an *agens instrumentale*, but more an *instrumentum agentis*. In order to answer the last argument, namely that about the direct action in substantial generation, Capreolus once more adopts this distinction and says that an accident does not reach the terminus of a generation as a *principium quod*, but that it does do so as a *principium quo* or *instrumentale*.⁶⁷

As mentioned above, the accidental character of the soul's potencies is assigned to the second accidental category, namely quality. And this is where the Franciscan Peter Auriol

Paris 1894, 73-74); *Quaestiones in II librum Sententiarum*, d. 16, q. un. (*Joannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* XIII, Paris 1893, 39-40). Capreolus refers to this below, in the objection to the second conclusion. Scotus himself immediately afterwards differentiates his answer in order to save some *auctoritates*. Cf. Nicholas of Orbelli's account, below, 30-31.

⁶⁶ Thomas, indeed, thinks that man's perfection comes to pass according to its essence, although it is accidental to him. Cf. A. SPEER, "Das Glück des Menschen (S.th. I-II, qq. 1-5)", in *Thomas von Aquin: Die Summa theologiae. Werkinterpretationen*, ed. A. SPEER, Berlin-New York 2005, 141-67.

⁶⁷ Cf. JOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Defensiones* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2 (ed. PABAN et PÈGUES cit. above n. 61, 204-05).

(d. 1322) joins the debate. He refers to the possible intellect, which is thought of as pure possibility without any notion of actuality. But accidents or qualities are surely not deprived of any actuality. So, according to Auriol, at least one of the soul's potencies does not appear to be an accident.⁶⁸ But the agent intellect is not a quality either, for, first, it contains "virtually" all intelligible forms, and, second, it is described as a substance in actual being (*substantia actu ens*).⁶⁹

Capreolus devotes a lengthy answer to Auriol, which cannot be discussed here in its entirety. The first thing the Dominican states against the Franciscan friar, however, is that the possible intellect is a pure potency solely in the genus of intelligible things (*intelligibilia*), not in the genus of existing things (*entia*). It is pure possibility when it comes to cognize things, yet it is an actual being in itself. As such, it can be an accident of the category of quality. And in this perspective, the possible intellect is able to know itself, not through an intellection that is its essence, but exactly through an intellection that is a quality inherent in the intellect – a view that Auriol had opposed. Capreolus adds six arguments against his thesis that the possible intellect is a being in itself and answers them successively. In his fourth and fifth answer, Capreolus uses quotations from Averroes in order to show, on the one hand, that the possible and agent intellect are called *virtutes* and, on the other, that both are understood as certain acts.⁷⁰ With regard to the agent intellect and the "virtual" containment of the forms, Capreolus says that the containment of the forms is to be understood like the containment of the colors in light (*lumen*). It is not that the intelligible forms can *ex se* be induced from the intellect, but it is the intellect that makes potentially intelligible things actually intelligible by means of the forms, just as light makes potentially visible things actually visible.⁷¹

The Franciscan Adam Wodeham's (d. 1358) view is similar to that of Scotus.

⁶⁸ Auriol argues that the possible intellect, if it were an actual being, would have to know itself, which is contrary to its commonly assigned functions. The possible intellect is furthermore deprived of any species, precisely in order to receive any given species. This would be impossible if the possible intellect were an actual being, i.e., a substance or an accident.

⁶⁹ Cf. JOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Defensiones* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2 (ed. PABAN et PÈGUES cit. above n. 61, 198-99); PETRUS AUREOLI, *Quodlibet*, q. 7, a. 2 (*Quodlibeta sexdecim Petri Aureoli*, ed. Rome 1605, p. 79bE-80bA).

⁷⁰ Cf. JOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Defensiones* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2 (ed. PABAN et PÈGUES cit. above n. 61, 209); AVERROES, *Commentarium magnum in De anima* III, c. 4 (ed. CRAWFORD cit. above n. 27, 386.90-104 and 385.54-59); c. 5 (410.684-411.691).

⁷¹ Cf. JOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Defensiones* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2 (ed. PABAN et PÈGUES cit. above n. 61, 210-11). In order to reject the conviction that the agent intellect is a substance, Capreolus refers to Aquinas' *Summa*, which describes the intellect as a *kind* of substance. Cf. *Summa theologiae* I, q. 79, a. 1, ad 1 (ed. CARMELLO, cit. above n. 36, 382).

Wodeham appeals to the principle of economy and refers to the common authority for the identity thesis, namely the treatise *De spiritu et anima*. Adam asserts one indistinct soul that is named differently according to its different duties (*officia*): insofar as it vegetates, it is called *anima*; insofar as it contemplates, it is called *spiritus*, and so on. Thus, to Wodeham it is all about the same principle of action. He states that if we take away everything else from the soul as an intellectual nature, it is destined to have knowledge, and he states the same for the soul as will.⁷²

Capreolus gives seven arguments against Wodeham. The second argument consists of a quotation from Thomas Aquinas' *De spiritualibus creaturis*, in which Thomas underlines that *De spiritu et anima* is a pseudo-epigraph, i.e., a text without any authority, and that it is simply wrong in many respects. This quotation also stresses the idea of a *totum potentiale*, which Capreolus understands as an answer to Wodeham's denomination thesis according to different duties. That is to say, it implies a differentiation that is stronger than the differentiation according to duty, namely one according to potencies, and nevertheless stresses the unity of the soul.⁷³ The second motif, which sounds quite strange and which assumes that if we prescind anything else, the soul is still born to have knowledge, gives Capreolus the opportunity to strengthen his/Thomas' view. Insisting on the fact that the potencies of the soul cannot be separated from the soul's substance is not a sophisticated remark, but it gets directly to the heart of the entire argument. It is possible to know the essence of the soul without any reference to its potencies; however, it is not possible to know a soul existing without its potencies. This is clearly the notion of the potencies as proper accidents that belong to the definition of the soul and hence are more essential to the soul than mere accidents.⁷⁴ Accordingly, if the soul were spoiled by these

⁷² Cf. JOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Defensiones* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2 (ed. PABAN et PÈGUES cit. above n. 61, 199-200). Capreolus solely seems to know Adam's *Lectura Oxoniensis*, but he uses it extensively, as William Courtenay makes clear; cf. W.J. COURTENAY, *Adam Wodeham. An Introduction to His Life and Writings* (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought 21), Leiden 1978, 152. See for Wodeham's position book I, d. 3, q. un. (Paris, Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne, MS 193, ff. 79rb-85va), and <http://adamwodeham.org/text/textdisplay.php?fs=b1-d3-qun> (last accessed 18 September 2015). A critical edition of Adam's *Lectura* is in progress under the direction of Olli Hallamaa (University of Helsinki). Jeffrey C. Witt (Loyola University Maryland) is in charge of distinction 3 of book I. I am grateful for his help on all Wodeham matters. See also J.T. SLOTEMAKER and J.C. WITT, "Adam de Wodeham", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2012 Edition), ed. E.N. ZALTA, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/wodeham/> (last accessed 18 September 2015).

⁷³ Cf. JOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Defensiones* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2 (ed. PABAN et PÈGUES cit. above n. 61, 211); THOMAS DE AQUINO, *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 11, ad 2 (ed. M. CALCATERRA and T.S. CENTI, in *Quaestiones disputatae* 2, Torino-Rome 1949, 413-14).

⁷⁴ See above 13.

first-mentioned accidents, it could not know nor will *a fortiori*, for it would lack its immediate principle to do so.⁷⁵

I have treated both accounts *in extenso* in order to show that both follow a certain ‘masterplan’. Both Denys and Capreolus gather different opinions on a topic and reorganize them according to systematic (Denys) or historiographic (Capreolus) issues. Both accounts display some kind of inner dynamics. Denys the Carthusian, on the one hand, offers a twofold approach, according to the general and the more specific problem. He starts with Thomas and ends with Bonaventure, first stressing the difference between the potencies in themselves and with the soul and then pointing out the unity between them. He seems to emphasize the aspect of unity. John Capreolus, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with defending Thomas against Scotus and all others who favor the real identity between the soul and its potencies. In the course of his treatment, he also has a certain tendency to narrow the topic down: from the discussion of the general item, he then concentrates on the intellectual potencies and finally on memory in particular. The polemical character of his work, however, brings about a more lively debate on the issue and sets us on track for the following; however, the critical positions are primarily referred to in order to strengthen Aquinas’ position.

One thing that seems to be unexpected, especially when we consider modern scholarship,⁷⁶ is the fact that both accounts ignore the question whether there is a plurality of souls in man, a closely related topic. Aquinas’ position of one single soul, which guarantees the unity of man in the hylomorphic composite, was until his time an unheard-of position. Before and even after Aquinas, most authors favored a plurality of substantial forms, in which the soul is the highest, yet not the only substantial form. Some assume a form of corporeity (*forma corporeitatis*) that is responsible for the shape and existence of the body and its features and that is supplemented and ‘re-modeled’ by the added soul (see, e.g., Scotus). Others, such as Ockham, not only assume a form of corporeity but also speak of two different souls in man, namely a sensitive one (including vegetative faculties) and a rational or intellectual one. Denys and Capreolus seem to ignore the wider problem, which, however, appears reasonable, too. For both accounts go back to late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century debates, while the two souls theory only starts

⁷⁵ Cf. JOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Defensiones* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2 (ed. PABAN et PÈGUES cit. above n. 61, 211-12).

⁷⁶ E.g., BIENIAK, *The Soul-body Problem at Paris*.

with Ockham.⁷⁷ Moreover, when it comes to the specific item, i.e., when the higher potencies are concerned, the two souls theory is indifferent. Memory, intellect, and will are in all feasible theories subsumed under one soul, namely the intellective one, be it the unique form or one among others. Nevertheless, this particularity shows quite well that both authors have a limited perspective on the matter and seem to take Aquinas' single form theory for granted.

IV. The Historical Context: Theologians Contemporary to Capreolus and Denys

Another common feature of both accounts is their "backwardness" or, as one could say with Maarten Hoenen, their scholastic traditionalism.⁷⁸ Denys' account bridges a gap of two centuries, Capreolus' in fact only about one century, and between the accounts themselves lies probably more than half a century. It is not simply spans of time, but also different intents, that distinguish the two texts. Capreolus designs his *Sentences* commentary solely to defend Thomas' positions against manifold critique. His historical background is the debates and critiques of Thomas' theses in the second half of the fourteenth century in Paris, which later on were interpreted as a prefiguration of the struggle between the "via moderna" and the "via antiqua." The *antiqui* are, e.g., Thomas and Albert, whereas Ockham, Wodeham, and Gregory of Rimini are qualified as *moderni*. Ockham is explicitly referred to as the "father" of the *moderni* by Capreolus.⁷⁹ The main

⁷⁷ For several, mostly Franciscan positions, cf. W.O. DUBA, "The Souls After Vienne" (above n. 4). Duba presents two groups of Franciscans whose positions both go back to Scotus's theory. The first group (including Hugh of Novocastro, Francis of Meyronnes, and Himbert of Garda) defends a certain plurality of souls, whereas a second group (including Landulph Caracciolo, Francis of Marchia, and Gerald Odonis) assumes only one single (intellective) soul. Both, however, argue for the additional substantial form of corporeity. Cf. *ibid.*, esp. 245. See, on the contrary, D.A. CALLUS, "Two early Oxford Masters on the Problem of Plurality of Forms. Adam of Buckfield – Richard Rufus of Cornwall", *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie* 42 (1939), 411-445, esp. 411-413, who lists some masters defending the unicity of substantial form thesis and argues that the plurality thesis is not the traditional one in the 13th century.

⁷⁸ Cf. M.J.F.M. HOENEN, "Zurück zu Autorität und Tradition. Geistesgeschichtliche Hintergründe des Traditionalismus an den spätmittelalterlichen Universitäten", in *"Herbst des Mittelalters"?* *Fragen zur Bewertung des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts*, ed. J.A. AERTSEN and M. PICKAVÉ (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 31), Berlin-New York 2004, 133-46. Admittedly, Ruedi Imbach points out, with regard to Capreolus, that his work can be interpreted as a response to the actual debates of his time; cf. R. IMBACH, "Le contexte intellectuelle de l'œuvre de Capreolus", in *Jean Capreolus en son temps (1380-1444). Colloque de Rodez*, ed. G. BEDOUELLE, R. CESSARIO, and K. WHITE (Mémoire dominicaine. Numéro spécial 1), Paris 1997, 13-22.

⁷⁹ Cf. JOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Defensiones* II, d. 2, q. 2, a. 3, §4 (ed. PABAN et PÈGUES cit. above n. 61, vol. III, 190). On Capreolus's relationship to these thinkers and his contribution to labeling their thinking as "via moderna," see S. MÜLLER, "The Ethics of John Capreolus and the nominales", *Verbum* (Budapest) 6.2 (2004), 301-14.

targets in the actual case, however, are, e.g., Scotus and Auriol who represent a way of thought that is strongly connected with the Franciscan Order, especially concerning the dissociation from a common Dominican doctrine.⁸⁰ Denys, on the other hand, writes some decades later, and he was surrounded by the ongoing struggle between Thomists and Albertists⁸¹ in Cologne in the two different study houses, namely the *Bursa Montana* (Thomists) and the *Laurentiana* (Albertists). Though having studied in the *Montana*, Denys is far from simply being a Thomist.⁸² One reason for the fact that the discussion in Denys' account seems to be less lively is probably the lack of a thorough disagreement between Thomas and Albert in this case.⁸³ Thus, Denys only tries to sharpen the understanding of the real distinction position and finally just hints at Scotus and others who do indeed advocate the opposite.

In this section, I will look at some of Capreolus' and Denys' contemporaries, in order to present another narrative on the powers of the soul. This account will necessarily be very selective. First, I will skip the period from the 1360s to 1380s, in order to get an idea what closer contemporaries of Capreolus and Denys were interested in. Second, it is not feasible with respect to time or space to be exhaustive. Nevertheless, even the authors chosen at random give a surprisingly coherent picture, so that we might tentatively conclude that other authors dealt with almost the same material. Finally, the following survey is meant to contribute to a different picture than the ones King and de Boer sketch,

⁸⁰ The crucial period of this struggle spans from Thomas' death to his canonization in 1323. A first phase is the Dominican Order's fight against criticism from outside, namely against William de la Mare's *Correctorium*, which is handed down in the so-called literature of the *correctoria*. The second phase is an internal struggle to define the theology of Thomas as fundamental for all members of the order. In this context, we have campaigns against Dietrich of Freiberg, Meister Eckhart, and Durand. For an interesting *relecture* of this struggle, cf. A.A. ROBIGLIO, *La sopravvivenza e la gloria. Appunti sulla formazione della prima scuola tomista (sec. XIV)* (Sacra doctrina. Bibliotheca 53.1), Bologna 2008.

⁸¹ On Albert's influence, cf. K. PARK, "Albert's Influence on Late Medieval Psychology", in *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980*, ed. J.A. WEISHEIPL, Toronto 1980, 501-35.

⁸² See above, 17 with n. 60. For an account of Thomism (and Albertism) in Cologne, cf. H. GORIS, "Thomism in Fifteenth-Century Germany", in *Aquinas as Authority. A Collection of Studies Presented at the Second Conference of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht, December 14-16, 2000*, ed. P. VAN GEEST, H. GORIS, and C. LEGET (Publications of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht. New Series 7), Leuven 2002, 1-24. For the Cologne study houses (*bursae*) and the university respectively, cf. G.-R. TEWES, *Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Studien zur Geschichte der Universität zu Köln 13), Cologne 1992, and E. MEUTHEN, *Die alte Universität* (Kölner Universitätsgeschichte 1), Cologne-Vienna 1988.

⁸³ As confirmation, one can refer to the work that explicitly uncovers the differences between Thomists and Albertists, namely the *Problemata inter Albertum Magnum et Sanctum Thomam* of Heymericus of Campo. Heymericus is especially interested in the divergent notion of universals, in physical matters, and the generation and life of the soul, but not in the relationship between the soul and its powers. Admittedly, in q. 11 he discusses the problem whether the powers are specifically distinct when they have different species than their objects; cf. q. 5, ad rationes in contrarium (ed. Cologne 1496, ff. 17v-18r).

namely that Aquinas' and Ockham's views respectively were the mainstream views. In the fifteenth century, there are at least two popular views, namely an Thomistic and a Scotistic view.⁸⁴ Let us look more closely at some examples. I will group the positions discussed below according to their authors, arranging the authors according to their 'school' teaching – Thomists first, then non-Thomists, i.e., 'nominalists' and Scotists. I concentrate on Cologne Thomists of the fifteenth century in the first part and on the 'Scotist' Nicholas of Orbellis and the 'nominalist' Gabriel Biel in the second part.

The first Thomist is the founder of the Cologne study house of Thomists, Henry of Gorkum (d. 1431). Born in the diocese of Utrecht, he studied in Paris and eventually became master there. He went to Cologne in 1419 and a year later was elected rector of the university. In the same year, he founded the *Bursa*, which was later called *Montana* (after Gerardus de Monte).⁸⁵ Whereas Henry in his *Sentences* commentary is more concerned with the theological issues of this question,⁸⁶ in his *Quaestiones in S. Thomam*, an obviously Thomistic work, he explicitly discusses the question whether the soul naturally differs from its potencies, which flow from it.⁸⁷ The third proposition of the 30th question clearly states the difference between soul and potencies and between the potencies themselves in account with the different acts and objects. In a compact statement, Henry reports Thomas' most important arguments for the real difference. The first argument brings up the attribution of potency and corresponding acts to the same genus, which in the case of the soul's potencies is the accident of quality. The second argument refers to the distinction between first and second acts, which is the only means by which an ongoing actual operation of the life functions is avoided. Henry also mentions

⁸⁴ James Weisheipl lists the question on the soul and its powers as one among several distinctive features of Thomistic thinking; cf. J.A. WEISHEIPL, "Thomism", in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, 2nd edition, vol. 14, Detroit 2003, 40-52, at 42, number 4; see also R. CESSARIO, *A Short History of Thomism*, Washington, DC, 2005, 22.

⁸⁵ Cf. A.G. WEILER, *Heinrich von Gorkum (†1431). Seine Stellung in der Philosophie und der Theologie des Spätmittelalters*, Einsiedeln-Zürich-Cologne 1962; C.H. LOHR, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries. I.1. Medieval Authors A-L* (Corpus philosophorum medii aevi subsidia 17), Firenze 2013, 199a-200b; O. WEIJERS, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200-1500)*, vol. 4: *Répertoire des noms commençant par H et J (jusqu'à Johannes C.)* (Studia Artistarum 9), Turnhout 2001, 61-63; J.T. SLOTEMAKER, "Henry of Gorkum's *Conclusiones super IV Libros Sententiarum*: Studying the Lombard in the First Decades of the Fifteenth Century", in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. III, ed. P.W. ROSEMAN, Leiden 2015, 145-73.

⁸⁶ Cf. HENRICUS DE GORICHEM, *In primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 3, and *In secundum librum Sententiarum*, d. 16 (ed. Basel 1498; reprint Frankfurt/Main 1967).

⁸⁷ Cf. HENRICUS DE GORICHEM, *Quaestiones in S. Thomam* I, q. 30 (ed. Esslingen 1473; reprint Frankfurt/Main 1967, without foliation): "Utrum anima intellectiva ut actus corpori unita naturaliter a potentiis ab ea effluentibus realiter sit distincta."

the denomination “proximum principium operationis,” which Thomas attributed to the soul’s potencies in alignment with the soul as a remote principle of action.⁸⁸ In order to prove the distinction of the potencies from each other, Henry hints at the different operations the soul possesses and finally at the different objects.

Gerardus de Monte (d. 1480), the second rector and eponym of the *Bursa Montana*, studied at the University of Cologne from 1421 onwards. He taught in the Arts Faculty, became dean there, and finally served as rector of the university. He was also professor of theology and dean of the same faculty.⁸⁹ Gerardus deals with the question in an additional article to his *Decisionum S. Thomae, quae ad invicem oppositae a quibusdam dicuntur Concordantiae*. Yet his treatment is rather short and confines itself to reconciling what Aquinas says in his *Sentences* commentary with what he asserts in his *Summa*.⁹⁰ In the first work, Thomas states that memory, intellect, and will are really distinct potencies, which in his *Summa* he denies. Assembling some more quotations from Thomas, Gerardus tries to show that there is some equivocation in the terms of *potentia*, *intelligentia*, and *voluntas* in order to reconcile the contrary positions in Thomas’ texts.⁹¹

A more profound treatment is found in a *De anima* commentary by another rector of the *Bursa Montana*, Lambert of Heerenberg (d. 1499).⁹² Lambert began his studies at the

⁸⁸ HENRICUS DE GORICHEM, *Quaestiones in S. Thomam* I, q. 30 (ed. cit. above n. 87): “Tertia propositio: potentiae distinctae ab anima et plures in ea differunt ab invicem penes per se actus et obiecta. Haec propositio patet secundum suas partes. Unde quod potentiae animae distinguantur ab anima patet; cum enim actus et potentia dividunt ens et quodlibet genus entis, semper potentia et eius proprius actus sunt eiusdem praedicamenti substantiae vel accidentis. Cum igitur proprius actus potentiae animae sit de genere qualitatis, sicut sunt scientiae et virtutes et actus earum, constat quod potentia erit de illo genere et tamen anima est de genere substantiae. Rursum nam anima secundum suam essentiam est actus, si ergo secundum suam essentiam esset potentia, sequeretur quod eius esse esset agere, et sic quamdiu aliquod vivens esset, haberet actu opera vitae. Ex hiis patet quod, cum actus materiae primae sit forma substantialis, quod potentia materiae non distinguitur a materia. Et quia potentia nominat proximum principium operationis, hinc est quod calor vel alia qualitas activa respectu formae substantialis se habet ut potentia animae.”

⁸⁹ Cf. LOHR, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries*. I.1. *Medieval Authors A-L*, 139b-140a. For Gerardus and his agenda, see also M.J.F.M. HOENEN, “Comment lire les grands maîtres? Gérard de Monte, Heymeric de Campo et la question de l’accord entre Albert le Grand et Thomas d’Aquin (1456)”, *Revue Thomiste* 108 (2008), 105-30.

⁹⁰ A similar approach can be found in PETRUS DE BERGAMO, *Etymologiae seu Concordantiae conclusionum in quibus Thomas de Aquino sibi contradicere videtur* (ed. Cologne 1480). With respect to Petrus’ *Concordances*, an interesting workshop (“Thomas Problematicus”) took place in Freiburg in June 2012. The publication of the proceedings is in preparation by Maarten Hoenen, Mario Meliadd, and Silvia Negri.

⁹¹ Cf. GERARDUS DE MONTE, *Decisionum S. Thomae, quae ad invicem oppositae a quibusdam dicuntur Concordantiae*, add. 1 (ed. G. MEERSSEMAN, Rome 1934, 97).

⁹² Cf. H.G. SENGER, “Lambert von Heerenberg”, in *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, vol. 13, Berlin 1982, 433-35; IDEM, “Was geht Lambert von Herrenberg die Seligkeit des Aristoteles an?”, in *Studien zur mittelalterlichen Geistesgeschichte und ihren Quellen*, ed. A. ZIMMERMANN (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 15), Berlin-New York 1982, 293-311; LOHR, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries*. I.1. *Medieval Authors A-L*, 360b-362b.

University of Cologne in 1450, became professor in the Arts Faculty and dean of the same faculty, and later was a professor and dean of the Faculty of Theology. He also served as rector of the university. Dealing with Augustine's position, Lambert refers to the already known differentiation of accidents in *communia* and *propria*. The soul's potencies are *accidentia propria* and in that way flow from the essential principles of the soul, whereas all other *accidentia communia* merely flow from the individual principles of the soul.⁹³ Moreover, he underlines the distinction between *totum universale, integrale, and potestativum* and emphasizes that only in the latter case is it possible to have multiplicity in unity, i.e., to distinguish between the soul's potencies without losing the soul's unity in essence.⁹⁴

Turning to another theologian, the Dominican John Versor (d. 1482), we leave Cologne and come back to Paris. Versor was master of theology there and rector of the university.⁹⁵ In his commentary to the *De anima*, John unsurprisingly uses exactly the same arguments as his confrère Henry of Gorkum does. The first argument for the real distinction refers to the difference between divine and created being: divine being means the identity of *esse* and *agere*, created being means the absolute diversity of both. The second applies to the generic similarity between act and potency. From the accidental character of the operations, one might conclude that the potencies are accidents. The third argument

⁹³ LAMBERTUS DE MONTE DOMINI, *Expositio circa tres libros De anima* II (ed. Cologne 1498, f. 23vb): "Arguitur: Augustinus dicit quod potentiae animae non sint in anima sicut accidens; ergo sicut substantia in eo cuius est substantia. Dicendum quod duplex est accidens, scilicet commune et proprium. Iam verum est quod potentiae animae non sunt in anima sicut accidens commune, sed bene sicut accidens proprium, quia ipsae potentiae fluunt ex essentialibus principiis animae in communi consideratae, quod est proprium accidentibus propriis, accidentia autem communia fluunt ex principiis individualibus." For the standard argument for real distinction see *ibid.*, 23va. For the mention of the *duplex accidens* in John Versor see *Quaestiones iuxta textum de anima* I, q. 3: Sciendum est quarto (ed. cit. above n. 96).

⁹⁴ LAMBERTUS DE MONTE DOMINI, *Expositio circa tres libros De anima* II (ed. cit. above n. 93, f. 23vb): "[...] Circa quod sciendum quod totum universale inest cuilibet suae parti secundum essentiam et potestatem sicut animal homini. Et ideo potest hoc totum simpliciter praedicari de suis partibus divisim sumptis. Sed totum integrale, sicut domus, nec inest partibus secundum essentiam nec secundum potestatem, et ideo tale totum nullo modo potest praedicari de suis partibus divisim sumptis. Ista enim est falsa praedicatio 'lapis est domus', 'lignum est domus', sed totum potestativum inest cuilibet parti secundum essentiam et non secundum potestatem. Et ideo hoc potest praedicari de suis partibus coniunctim acceptis, ut sicut potest dici calidum, leve, lucidum sunt unus ignis, sic etiam potest dici quod mens, notitia, et amor sunt substantialiter anima. Et ergo sicut calidum, leve, lucidum distinguuntur ab igne realiter, sic etiam istae potentiae distinguuntur realiter ab anima."

⁹⁵ Cf. LOHR, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries. I.1. Medieval Authors A-L*, 341a-350b. For Versor as an 'Albertist', cf. E.P. BOS, "John Versor's Albertism in his Commentaries on Porphyry and the *Categories*", in *Chemins de la pensée médiévale*, ed. P.J.J.M. BAKKER, with E. FAYE and C. GRELLARD (Textes et études du moyen âge 20), Turnhout 2002, 47-78; see also P. RUTTEN, "'Secundum processum et mentem Versoris': John Versor and His Relation to the Schools of Thought Reconsidered", *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 292-336, who denies any school affiliation for Versor.

alludes to the false understanding of the soul as the immediate principle of operation, for the soul would then have all its operations in act.⁹⁶ John also contributes to the understanding of the generation of potencies, seeing them as emanating from the soul's essence, yet following the threefold order of the vegetative, sensible, and intellectual potencies. In accordance with this perspective, the order of priority changes. According to the way of perfection, the intellectual power is prior to the others; according to material causation, the vegetative and sensible potencies are prior.⁹⁷ In his tenth question of Book II, John also refers to the distinction of potencies pursuant to their objects, since the objects diversify the operations, which on their account induce a differentiation in the potencies.⁹⁸

In his third question of Book III, John finally deals with the possible identity of memory and soul. Once again, he agrees with Thomas on the identity. The arguments are still the same: parting from Aristotle's characterization of the intellect as *locus specierum*, there is only a rational distinction within the intellect that merely leads to a distinction in denomination. As a receiver of *species*, it is called intellect; as a container of the *species* after the actual act of cognition, it is called *memoria*.

Looking at fifteenth-century Cologne (with a side glance to Paris), it is not surprising

⁹⁶ JOHANNES VERSOR, *Quaestiones iuxta textum de anima* II, q. 8, conc. prima et responsiva, a. 1 (ed. Cologne 1496, without foliation): "Potentiae animae ab eius essentia realiter sunt distinctae. Probatur, quia sicut se habet essentia ad esse, ita potentia ad agere; ergo per locum a transmutata proportione: sicut se habet esse ad agere, ita essentia ad potentiam. Sed in omnibus creatis esse realiter distinguitur ab agere. Ergo et essentia a potentiis. Secundo, potentia et actus ad idem genus referuntur, cum potentia et actus dividant ens et quodlibet genus entis. Ergo si actus non sit de genere substantiae, ergo nec potentia ad illum actum. Sed operatio animae et cuiuslibet creaturae non est in genere substantiae, ergo nec potentia illicitiva ipsius, sed sunt accidentia distincta ab anima; sunt enim naturales potentiae de secunda specie qualitatis. Tertio, anima secundum totam suam essentiam est actus. Igitur si essentia animae esset immediatum principium operationis, habens animam semper actu operaretur opera vitae, ut habens animam semper est actu vivum. Sed hoc est falsum, quia anima secundum quod est actus et forma non ordinatur ad ulteriorem actum, sed est ultimus terminus generationis. Ideo cum sit in potentia ad alium actum, scilicet ad operationem, non convenit hoc sibi secundum suam substantiam, sed secundum suam potentiam. Ergo potentiae animae ab ea realiter sunt distinctae."

⁹⁷ JOHANNES VERSOR, *Quaestiones iuxta textum de anima* II, q. 8, conc. prima et responsiva, a. 2 (ed. cit. above n. 96): "Quantum ad secundum articulum dubitatur utrum una potentia animae oriatur ab alia. Pro dubio sciendum est quod illorum quae naturali ordine procedunt ab uno, sicut primum est causa omnium posteriorum, ita secundum est causa omnium sequentium ipsum. Sed in potentiis animae est triplex ordo, ut iam dictum est. Ideo respondetur ad dubium quod una potentia animae procedit ab essentia animae mediante alia, quia essentia animae comparatur ad potentias, et sicut principium activum et sicut finale et quo ad aliquas sicut materiale, et agens et finis habent rationem perfectionis et susceptivum rationem imperfecti, ideo potentiae animae quae procedunt via perfectionis sunt principia aliarum per modum finis et efficientis, ut sensus est propter intellectum et non econtra. Sed via generationis sunt priores aliae per modum causae materialis."

⁹⁸ Cf. summarily JOHANNES VERSOR, *Quaestiones iuxta textum de anima* II, q. 10, conc. tertia et responsiva (ed. cit. above n. 96): "Potentiae secundum speciem distinguuntur per actus et actus per objecta."

that Thomists there defended Aquinas' solution. Yet it is interesting how cut and dried their treatments are, especially when we consider how Capreolus endeavored to defend Aquinas. It seems that in a Thomist context the question was considered essential, yet there was no interest in developing it further or even challenging counter-arguments. Moreover, it seems as if it had become 'mainstream' – at least in a Thomist context.

When we turn to non-Thomist approaches to the question in the fifteenth century, we observe another 'mainstream', following Scotus' position. The two theologians we will consider below, Nicholas of Orbellis and Gabriel Biel, do not simply follow Scotus, however, but seem to elaborate on Scotus' identity position. So their treatments are less cut and dried and more 'dynamic'. Biel especially picks up different ideas (above all from Ockham) and binds them together in a neat position.

The Franciscan Nicholas of Orbellis (d. 1475) was professor at Paris and Poitiers. Known for being an expounder of Scotus,⁹⁹ he refers to all of the aforementioned arguments of Aquinas, but only at the beginning of his own arguments, which he borrows strictly from Scotus' treatment,¹⁰⁰ thus opposing Aquinas' position with Scotus'. In his response, Nicholas refers to the first arguments in Scotus' *Quaestiones*. He claims that the principle of economy has absolute priority. He also states that a scarcity of principles brings about a certain nobility, after which he adds the argument for nobility: that which more immediately reaches its goal is nobler. Nicholas subsequently skips all the other arguments and then paraphrases Scotus' conclusion: the potencies of the soul are *unitive* or *realiter* in the soul, yet they differ *formaliter*. From this perspective, he characterizes them as similar to the *passiones entis*, for the notion of "ens" contains in itself the notion of "one," "true," and "good" *unitive*, whereas the reasons are formally distinct from one another.

This is not the solution we know from Capreolus' report, however, and, indeed, it seems a bit closer to Thomas' view. Actually, Scotus states at first that the soul as an

⁹⁹ C. LOHR, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Narcissus – Richardus", *Traditio* 28 (1972), 281-396, at 288-90; O. WEIERS, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200-1500)*, VI (Studia Artistarum 13), Turnhout 2005, 166-68.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. NICOLAUS DE ORBELLIS, *Compendium* II, d. 16 (ed. cit. above n. 48, ff. 71vb-72ra). For Thomas' arguments see JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Reportata Parisiensia* II, d. 16, q. un. (*Joannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* XXIII, Paris 1894, 68); *Quaestiones in II librum Sententiarum*, d. 16, q. un. (ed. cit. above n. 65, 24-25); for Scotus's arguments cf. *Reportata Parisiensia* II, 74, and *Quaestiones in II librum*, 38-39. The other arguments that Scotus reports, such as those of Hervaeus Natalis or Henry of Ghent, were passed by unhesitatingly by Nicholas ("Omissis variis opinionibus..."; f. 72ra).

indistinct principle may cause distinct actions, but then he changes his answer so as to save some authoritative sayings that state that the potencies flow from the soul. He therefore presents the above-mentioned view of the real unity with the formal distinction. As one can easily imagine, it is not the answer Scotus favors in this case, and therefore the account in Capreolus seems in some way more accurate than the account of the Scotist Nicholas.¹⁰¹ Once again, in his answers to every argument from Thomas, Nicholas stresses the unity of the soul and its potencies.¹⁰²

Another theologian who is known for his sympathy for Scotus' positions, yet is mostly referred to as a "Nominalist," is Gabriel Biel (f. 1495). Biel studied at Heidelberg, Erfurt, and Cologne. He obtained the chair for the 'via moderna' at Tübingen in 1484 and served twice as rector there. Spiritually, he adhered to the Brothers of the Common Life at Urach.¹⁰³ Biel devoted quite a lengthy article to our problem, which he also divided into two parts: a general one and a more specific one. The first considers the soul in relation to its sensible potencies; the second refers to the relationship between the soul and

¹⁰¹ I would like to call the view Orbellis defends the 'position of embarrassment' of Scotus. I am fully aware that some or even many scholars would disagree with that interpretation, especially because of the fact that part of Scotus' profile results from the 'formal distinction'. Peter King, e.g., interprets the 'formal distinction' position of Scotus as very close to that of Aquinas. He argues that even Scotus' (formal) distinction has to be grounded in a distinction present in the world and hence must be 'real'. Cf. KING, "The Inner Cathedral", 268. Van den Bercken gives a similar interpretation. He believes that this view of Scotus is nothing else than "a real distinction, albeit a 'minor form' of it," arguing that it is a middle position between the position Scotus refers to earlier (and which we know from Capreolus) and the real distinction thesis (of Aquinas and the Thomists) and that it is in line with the Franciscan tradition (e.g., with Bonaventure); VAN DEN BERCKEN, "John Duns Scotus in Two Minds", 230. Yet, I wonder why Scotus would have elaborated so much on a real identity thesis when he immediately afterwards 'corrected' it into a minor form of the thesis he wanted to oppose, namely Aquinas'. Another interpretation is that of Richard Cross, who argues that Scotus became agnostic on the point whether one could distinguish the soul and its potencies or not; cf. R. CROSS, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition*, Oxford 2014, 147. For Scotus' formal distinction, see also M. GRAJEWSKI, *The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus. A Study in Metaphysics*, PhD Dissertation, Washington, DC, 1944; S.D. DUMONT, "The Question on Individuation in Scotus's 'Quaestiones super Metaphysicam'", in *Via Scoti: Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti. Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale, Roma 9-11 marzo 1993*, ed. L. SILEO, Rome 1995, vol. I, 193-227; IDEM, "Duns Scotus's Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction", in *Vivarium* 43.1 (2005), 7-62; T. NOONE, "La distinction formelle dans l'école scotiste", in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 83 (1999), 53-72; IDEM, "Ascoli, Wylton, and Alnwick on Scotus's Formal Distinction: Taxonomy, Refinement, and Interaction", in *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, ed. S.F. BROWN, T. DEWENDER, and T. KOBUSCH (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 102), Leiden-Boston 2009, 127-50; and most recently K. EMERY Jr. and G.R. SMITH, "The *Quaestio de formalitatibus* by John Duns Scotus, Sometimes Called the *Logica Scoti*", in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 56 (2014), 91-182.

¹⁰² Cf. NICOLAUS DE ORBELLIS, *Compendium* II, d. 16 (ed. cit. above n. 48, f. 72ra-b).

¹⁰³ For Gabriel Biel, see H.A. OBERMAN, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology. Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism*, Cambridge, MA, 1963; M. SCHULZE, "Biel, Gabriel", in *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, vol. II, Munich-Zürich 1983, col. 127; *Gabriel Biel und die Brüder vom gemeinsamen Leben. Beiträge aus Anlaß des 500. Todestages des Tübinger Theologen*, ed. U. KÖPF and S. LORENZ (Contubernium 47), Stuttgart 1998; D. METZ, *Gabriel Biel und die Mystik* (Contubernium 55) Stuttgart 2001.

intellective potencies.

In article 2 of the question in his *Sentences* commentary, book II, distinction 16, Biel starts with the three well-known arguments of Thomas' *Summa*, which he opposes to Scotus' principle of economy. He then proves two conclusions in which the soul is and is not identified with its potencies, according to two different understandings of *potentia*, an answer that alludes to Ockham's solution.¹⁰⁴ At the end, however, he considers that the necessity of a power distinct from the soul, which elicits the act of sensation, still remains unproven. Moreover, Biel points to the argument of regress: either the soul is able to produce the accidental potencies, in which case it could produce the accidental operations as well, or one has to assume a medium there, which leads to an infinite regress of mediating accidents. Biel answers the counter-arguments in Thomas' *Summa* by drawing attention to a possible equivocation in the potency–act relation. The argument stated that act and potency refer to the same genus, namely the accident of quality. Biel replies that we are not concerned with things that are in potentiality with respect to their existence, but with immediate principles of life-actions. While in the first case there has to be a correspondence with the genus, such a correspondence is not proven in the latter case. Then he reveals another inconsistency: on the one hand, Thomas understands the soul as principle of the potencies; on the other, he characterizes the potency as accident, the soul as substance.¹⁰⁵ Biel's remarks remind one of Richard of Mediavilla's critique, which overlooked Thomas' distinction between proper and common accidents. From this perspective, even Biel seems unaware that what he criticizes was exactly Thomas' concern. How can a substantial soul cause accidental operations? Aquinas answered by assuming some proper accidents, which are able to cause accidental operations and yet form such a unified whole with the substance of the soul that there is no need for any further mediating accidents. Biel's remarks are all the more surprising, because in the immediately following section of the second part, he summarizes Thomas' position with respect to the intellective potencies quite well.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Cf. GABRIEL BIEL, *In secundum librum Sententiarum*, d. 16, q. un., a. 2 (*Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum. Liber secundus*, ed. V. SIEVERS, R. STEIGER, W. WERBECK, and U. HOFMANN, Tübingen 1984, 367-68); cf. GUILLELMUS DE OCKHAM, *Quaestiones in III Sent. (Reportatio)*, q. 4 (*Opera theologica* VI, ed. F.E. KELLEY and G.I. ETZKORN, St. Bonaventure, NY, 1982, 135-39).

¹⁰⁵ Cf. GABRIEL BIEL, *In II Sent.*, d. 16, q. un., a. 2 (ed. WERBECK and HOFMANN cit. above n. 104, 369.K2-9).

¹⁰⁶ Cf. GABRIEL BIEL, *In II Sent.*, d. 16, q. un., a. 2 (ed. WERBECK and HOFMANN cit. above n. 104, 370.L6-371.L18).

After giving some authoritative quotations for the real distinction, Biel proceeds to the contrary opinion. Here he presents both solutions that Scotus gives in his *Quaestiones*: the one that Scotus favors, Biel characterizes as more probable, and Nicholas of Orbellis skips; and the second, in which Scotus tries to reconcile his answer with some authorities, which Orbellis labels as Scotus' major answer. Therefore, it is possible that Biel knew Scotus' position directly. In summarizing all other positions, Biel relies heavily on Ockham's account.¹⁰⁷ In fact, the whole article with its two parts is a composite of Ockham's question 4 of book III and question 20 of book II of the *Sentences* commentary.¹⁰⁸ Once again, Biel presents two understandings of *potentia*, which he borrows from Ockham. If one accepts the term 'intellect' as denoting the intellecting soul or the act of intellection (and with respect to the term 'will' likewise), one can say that there is a real difference between the potencies intellect and will and the soul.¹⁰⁹ If one accepts both terms as defining the immediate principle of action, one has to state an identity of both potencies with the soul, in reality as well as according to reason.¹¹⁰

In arguing for the second conclusion, Biel makes use of some well-known principles of Scotus', namely the principles of *paucitas* and that of nobility. (1) As a diversity neither in act nor in *modus principiandi* proves a diversity in principles, there is no need to assume something additional to the soul as principle of its acts. (2) Since what reaches its goal more immediately is nobler, one has to assume a direct acting of the soul in order to make it nobler.¹¹¹

After having commented on the aforementioned authorities, Biel comes to comment on the arguments. To the first argument, which holds that distinct operations require distinct principles, he answers that this is not always the case. Suppose that there are many intellects that differ specifically: one has to assume many different intellects according to this principle. Biel's immediately following remarks integrate the considerations just

¹⁰⁷ Ockham refers to this other conclusion of Scotus; cf. GUILLELMUS DE OCKHAM, *Quaestiones in II Sent. (Reportatio)* q. 20 (*Opera theologica* V, ed. G. GÁL and R. WOOD, St. Bonaventure, NY, 1981, 435.4-5).

¹⁰⁸ For Ockham, see GUILLELMUS DE OCKHAM, *In II Sent.*, q. 20 (ed. GÁL and WOOD cit. above n. 107, 425-47); III, q. 4 (ed. KELLEY and ETZKORN, cit. above n. 104, 130-48). The critical edition of Biel renders the textual dependence rather evident.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. GABRIEL BIEL, *In II Sent.*, d. 16, q. un., a. 2 (ed. WERBECK and HOFMANN cit. above n. 104, 375.M65-67 and 375.N1-3).

¹¹⁰ Cf. GABRIEL BIEL, *In II Sent.*, d. 16, q. un., a. 2 (ed. WERBECK and HOFMANN cit. above n. 104, 375.M68-72 and 375.N18-20).

¹¹¹ Cf. GABRIEL BIEL, *In II Sent.*, d. 16, q. un., a. 2 (ed. WERBECK and HOFMANN cit. above n. 104, 377.N47-378.N59). As a confirmation, Biel – with Scotus – points to God as the most perfect and noble being, in Whom being and acting coincide; cf. *ibid.*, 378.N60-64.

mentioned into his general account of cognition. He says that, with regard to the same object, the intellect can have an intuitive and an abstractive notion, and so forth, but it still remains the same intellect. This idea reminds one of his theory of cognition in which, following Ockham, he gets rid of many unnecessary principles, such as the intelligible *species* themselves, and sees the intellect as immediately grasping its object.¹¹²

Finally, Biel presents his third conclusion, which states that the potencies of the rational soul, namely intellect and will, are really the same and differ neither naturally nor formally (*non distinguuntur ex natura rei aut formaliter*).¹¹³ The natural or real identity has been proven before, by arguing that there is no criterion to distinguish them.

Biel also rejects the position that there is no formal distinction – a position that Scotus presented in his second statement. Biel argues first by referring to the non-distinction in nature: in created beings, one has to assume a formal identity where one finds an identity in nature or reality.¹¹⁴ Second, Biel refers to the dissimilarity of exemplar and image. While in God we have to assume such a unity of diversity, according to the super-blessed Trinity (*superbenedicta Trinitas*), it is different with respect to its image in created beings. The reason for this is that in created beings there is no real co-substantiality with regard to things that are really distinct.¹¹⁵ Finally, Biel criticizes this position as finicky, for it is quite difficult to know a real distinction if there is at the same time an essential identity. Thus, it is all the more difficult to recognize a formal distinction if there is such an identity.

Hence, although Biel often quotes William of Ockham, the “father” of the *terministae*, his position is closer to that of Scotus (and more precisely to Scotus’ proper one). Biel disagrees with Ockham on the plurality of souls. Moreover, he assumes just one substantial form, the rational soul, which is responsible for all the operations of the composite.¹¹⁶ Although with respect to the single *substantial form* theory Biel deviates from Scotus (insofar as Scotus argues for a form of corporeity), he is closer to Scotus

¹¹² Cf. F.J. BURKARD, *Philosophische Lehrgehalte in Gabriel Biels Sentenzenkommentar unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Erkenntnislehre* (Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung 122), Meisenheim/Glan 1974, 105-24.

¹¹³ Cf. GABRIEL BIEL, *In II Sent.*, d. 16, q. un., a. 2 (ed. WERBECK and HOFMANN cit. above n. 104, 382.R1-2).

¹¹⁴ Cf. GABRIEL BIEL, *In II Sent.*, d. 16, q. un., a. 2 (ed. WERBECK and HOFMANN cit. above n. 104, 383.R6-13).

¹¹⁵ Cf. GABRIEL BIEL, *In II Sent.*, d. 16, q. un., a. 2 (ed. WERBECK and HOFMANN cit. above n. 104, 383.R14-20).

¹¹⁶ Cf. GABRIEL BIEL, *In II Sent.*, d. 16, q. un., a. 2 (ed. WERBECK and HOFMANN cit. above n. 104, 360.C11-19).

when it comes to the *single soul* theory. Biel argues against Scotus' doubts, which lead him to maintain a weaker thesis, namely that the authorities to which Scotus refers neither belong to the ecclesiastical canon nor speak of a formal distinction.¹¹⁷ Moreover, all the talk about flowing out from the soul is to be interpreted as referring to the potencies' acts, and for that reason the real and formal identity of the soul and its potencies would be the best solution, to avoid trouble with these authorities.¹¹⁸

V. Concluding Remarks: Modern vs. Medieval Accounts

Let us come back to the narrations mentioned at the beginning of this article. Peter King presents Aquinas's real distinction thesis as the mainstream view. As we have seen, this is not true absolutely speaking. For Bonaventure, one could at least refine his position as a "co-substantiality" position; Giles of Rome believes the powers to be qualities; regarding Durand, one must say that his view tends to or prepares Ockham's solution (I will return to this below). With respect to Scotus' position, King mingles his interpretation with his criticism, supposing that only a distinction in reality could bring about a formal distinction and thus reading Scotus as defending a position close to Aquinas' or the 'mainstream view'. This critique of Scotus is already found in Gabriel Biel. Yet this is not what Scotus intends. On the contrary, Scotus first and foremost defends the real identity thesis, in which the soul's essence is the immediate principle of all its functions and operations. Only in the end does he endorse his formal distinction, in order to save some authorities. Since the general context is the 'trinitarian theology' (according to which the soul is the image of the Trinity), Scotus had to introduce some distinction, similar to the triune God.¹¹⁹

I think that it has become clear that just by starting with Denys and Capreolus and

¹¹⁷ Cf. GABRIEL BIEL, *In II Sent.*, d. 16, q. un., a. 2 (ed. WERBECK and HOFMANN cit. above n. 104, 383.R22-24).

¹¹⁸ Cf. GABRIEL BIEL, *In II Sent.*, d. 16, q. un., a. 2 (ed. WERBECK and HOFMANN cit. above n. 104, 383.R24-32).

¹¹⁹ Biel has identified Scotus' unnamed authorities as Averroes in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*; cf. GABRIEL BIEL, *In II Sent.*, d. 16, q. un., a. 2 (ed. WERBECK and HOFMANN cit. above n. 104, 374.M14-18). VAN DEN BERCKEN, "John Duns Scotus in Two Minds", 231-34, argues rather that Scotus tries to save mostly Franciscan authorities/authors who defend the solution that the soul and its powers form a virtual whole. Moreover, van den Bercken refers to William of Alnwick (234-38), who interprets Scotus in exactly this way, while I have relied on Biel and a certain, longer tradition of testimonies for my reconstruction of Scotus. One might argue that Alnwick is closer to Scotus, with respect to time and personal relationship, but is he also congenial to Scotus?

considering a few other sources of their time the picture becomes much more refined. First of all, it has become clear (against King) that Aquinas' Aristotelian approach is completely alien to his predecessors' view (apart from Albert the Great's, obviously; see Künzle's study). It did not even become mainstream soon afterwards, as the *Correctoria* struggle shows.¹²⁰ Second, it has become clear that Scotus' position is opposed to Aquinas' and anything but reducible to Aquinas'. Indeed, Scotus ends his account by referring to a formal distinction. But – apart from the fact that by this he does not intend to agree with Aquinas – beforehand he had strongly argued for a real identity. In the later reception of Scotus, we note exactly this twofold understanding of Scotus: Adam Wodeham, Gregory of Rimini, and Gabriel Biel, e.g., take over Scotus' real identity position, while William of Alnwick and Nicholas of Orbellis accept Scotus' formal distinction position. Moreover, as said above, Gabriel Biel gives an interpretation of Scotus' formal distinction position by saying that it was a mere solution of embarrassment.

If we still look closer, it becomes clear that there were not only extreme positions (of distinction or identity), but several middle positions. Henry of Ghent and Richard of Mediavilla interpreted the powers of the soul as relations (*respectus*).¹²¹ From this perspective, both seem to stress the unity of the soul, conceding, however, at the same time that the soul needs different principles in order to operate. Durand of Saint-Pourçain suggests a combination of the identity and distinction thesis and thus adopts the principle of parsimony.¹²² He maintains an identity between the essence of the soul and its

¹²⁰ The still essential article on the so-called *Correctoria* struggle is L. HÖDL, "Geistesgeschichtliche und literarkritische Erhebungen zum Korrektorienstreit (1277-1287)", in *Recherches de la Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 33 (1966), 81-114.

¹²¹ For Henry and Richard, cf. above, 12-13 with n. 44.

¹²² DURANDUS DE SANCTO PORCIANO, *In primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 3 pars 2, q. 2 (red. C) §§26-42, ed. G. GULDENTOPS: http://durandus.phil-fak.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/sites/durandus/Durandus_C_I_Prol-3.pdf (last accessed 21 September 2015): "Quicquid sit de conclusione, ratio tamen ista non placet, quia cum dicitur quod forma perfectior unica existens dat plura esse immediate, ergo potentia talis forme unica existens et unum cum essentia potest immediate principiari plures actus, constat quod non est simile, quia illa plura esse que dat forma perfectior non sunt plura realiter, set unum tantum includens unite perfectiones plurium; propter quod potest esse ab una forma includente perfectiones plurium; set actus anime sunt plures realiter et quedam eorum nullum ordinem habentes ad inuicem, et ideo non possunt immediate causari ab una natura realiter. Alius modus dicendi est quod potentie sensitivae differunt realiter ab essentia anime. [...] Et hec fuit minor; sequitur ergo conclusio, scilicet quod potentie anime dicunt aliquid absolutum additum essentiae anime. De potentia autem intellectiva uidetur idem esse, potissime propter primam et tertiam rationem, que eque concludunt de potentia intellectiva quod differat realiter ab essentia anime, sicut potentia sensitiva." Ibid., q. 4 (red. C) §§5-20: "Alius modus dicendi est qui uidetur michi probabilior, quod una res absoluta siue essentia anime siue aliquid additum essentiae, ut uerius credo, est intellectus et uoluntas habens rationem duarum potentiarum propter hoc quod est principium duorum actuum subordinatorum, qui sunt

vegetative faculty. With respect to the cognitive powers, namely sense and intellect, he argues for the real distinction, but criticizes Aquinas' arguments for the position. With respect to man's higher faculties, namely intellect and will, he explicitly states that the identity thesis is more probable. From this angle, Durand is close to Ockham, but not as radical as Ockham.¹²³ The latter claims the identity position for the higher faculty of the rational soul as well, meaning that in Ockham the rational soul as a single and unique form is the immediate principle for its different actions cognizing and willing. Yet Ockham sets the rational soul as a substantial form against the sensitive soul, which in his view is another substantial form. Ockham's main reason is that the rational and sensitive soul are principles of such different and sometimes opposing acts that they cannot be traced back to one single (substantial) form. Durand, on the other hand, is content to trace them back to two (really) different powers.

Another interesting middle solution is to be found in Giacomo Zabarella, who speaks of the powers as "conditions and aptitudes." Contrary to what Peter King suggests, Zabarella does not defend the mainstream view of Thomas, but accedes to Aquinas' position that we have to distinguish between the soul and the faculties as well as the faculties among themselves, yet at the same time he agrees with Scotus' or Ockham's position that we do not have to assume a third entity, mediating between the (substantial) form and the (accidental) acts.¹²⁴ Thus, Zabarella's position is neither nominalistic nor Scotistic nor Thomistic,¹²⁵ but something in between.

From this perspective, it is even misleading to state that everything changes with Ockham or that Ockham's view was 'mainstream' after Ockham. At least in the fifteenth century, we find all positions defended. In Cologne Thomist circles, we observe a defense of Aquinas' real distinction. This position then seemed to have been a criterion of Thomist

intelligere et uelle, ita quod intellectus et uoluntas in nullo absoluto differunt, set solum per respectum ad diuersos actus."

¹²³ For Ockham, cf. above, 23.

¹²⁴ JACOBUS ZABARELLUS, *De facultatibus animae liber*, c. IV ("Vera sententia et eius declaratio"), in *De rebus naturalibus libri XXX*, Cologne 1590, 619-58, at 625-26: "Ego in hac controversia, licet magis ad Thomae et aliorum praedictorum opinionem accedam, eam tamen penitus recipere non possum, sed adhibendam ei esse puto quandam correctionem; arbitror enim totam huiusce rei veritatem in duobus dictis esse constitutam: alterum aduersus Scotum tale est: 'Facultates animae sunt re distinctae ab ipsa animae substantia et sunt qualitates secundae speciei,' alterum uero aduersus Thomam et alios est: 'Facultates animae non sunt agentia media inter animam et operationem, ut Thomas et Aegidius existimarunt, sed sunt solummodo conditiones quaedam et aptitudines animae ad operandum.'"

¹²⁵ D. DES CHENE, *Life's Form. Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul*, Ithaca-London 2000, 146, n. 7. For Zabarella's psychology in general, cf. also E. MICHAEL, "The Nature and Influence of Late Renaissance Paduan Psychology", in *History of Universities* 12 (1993), 65-94, esp. 73-74.

identification – without further development or dispute with other positions (unlike in the early 1280s at Paris). More sophisticated defenses of Aquinas’ position are to be found in Capreolus’ and Denys’ accounts, however, with late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century discussions in mind. In fifteenth-century non-Thomist circles, Scotus’ solution survives, e.g., in Nicholas of Orbellis’ account, and even in the position of a genuine follower of Ockham, Gabriel Biel. In fifteenth-century Padua (i.e., already before Zabarella), we find similarities to ‘Ockhamist’ psychology – in the context of an eclectic Averroist-Thomist approach to the soul that is, once again, neither genuinely nominalistic nor Scotistic nor Thomistic.¹²⁶

To be clear, this survey was as selective as the others, but it does not make a statement about ‘mainstreams’, or better, it claims that there is more than one ‘mainstream’, at least in the fifteenth century. Moreover, it began with two late-medieval accounts in order to structure the debates, identify the lines of demarcation, and become familiar with some names immediately, but avoiding a search for modern topics in medieval debates or a discussion of arguments that interest *us* in medieval disputes. It prevents us from generalizing before looking into the sources. This does not mean that all other narratives are to be substituted by suggesting a more ‘medieval’ approach. Some narratives are valid and valuable accounts, yet they could be supplemented or corrected here and there in order to reach a historical picture of the debate as precise and as multifaceted as possible. Other narratives are merely superficially historical and should be substituted by really historical approaches – or turned into really systematic surveys – whatever their purpose then might be in the field of *Medieval* philosophy.

¹²⁶ As similar features of ‘Ockhamist’ psychology in Padua, one can identify (1) the two souls theory, namely that man has an intellectual or rational soul as well as a sensitive soul as two forms, and (2) the distinction between two kinds of powers, namely powers as principles and powers connected to the organs. The first characteristic, however, may go back to Jean de Jandun’s interpretation of Aristotle *via* Averroes and Thomas Wylton; cf. J.-B. BRENET, “Âme intellectuelle, âme cogitative; Jean de Jandun et la *duplex forma propria* de l’homme”, in *Vivarium* 46 (2008), 318-41.