

4. Cultural Capital

4.1 What is Cultural Capital and How is it Created?

In the social sciences, culture is a superordinate concept for designating very different civil, artistic, and scientific developments in both the material and intellectual sense that often appear as positive advancements in human relations, cultural techniques, coexistence and prosperity, lifestyles and rights, as well as education and enlightenment. In culture, certain historical events and activities have occurred, which means that no culture ever starts from the beginning, all the same it is inevitable that cultures always develop. In contrast with the concept of nature, the cultural perspective shows that people are not just determined according to their biological or genetic situation but can unfold their own individual construction of reality in coexistence with others; and these constructions vary greatly across different times, countries, and social groups. At the same time, discourses on culture up to the present increasingly show that the cultural belief in progress or specific accomplishments can also always be reflected on critically and deconstructed.

“Cultural studies,” which have developed around the work of Stuart Hall and Raymond Williams have provided a broad theory, which has the impulse for thinking of culture contextualized: it sees culture not only as high culture, not only as high achievements in education, the sciences, art, and lifestyles, but shows that culture also always presents and reflects itself in people’s consumption of all kind of goods—even trivial ones—and all kind of activities including leisure activities. Thus, *the* culture breaks down into different cultures because social positions accompanied by the simultaneous tendency toward individualization in liquid modernity have consequences for the differentiation of the cultural. And areas of tension between elite and everyday culture and high and popular culture arise here.¹

Ziauddin Sardar (2001) maintains that the following aspects, which I have expanded in some respects, are essential for establishing the features of a definition of culture in the discourse of “cultural studies.” These aspects also guide my understanding of culture:

- 1) Culture takes place in practices in which not only cultural aspects are at work but power relations in a society are also always expressed. There is therefore no value-neutral culture; rather, culture is always bound up with certain interests and inequalities. Cultural studies thus refer to agents in cultural domains who differentiate themselves (for example,

¹ For introductory work on “cultural studies,” see, for example, Lewis (2008), Longhurst (2008), Lash (2007).

educational elites, cultural behavior of the middle class, working class, subculture groups) and who have to be connected in an analysis with the power of dominant groups in order to gain an adequate understanding of their effects in general and with respect to inequalities and opportunities of equity as well.

- 2) Cultural theories want to understand the increasingly complex connections in current cultures in as many ways as possible and therefore also have to reflect the social and political contexts in which culture is lived.
- 3) Cultural theories, as expressions of the culture they observe and interpret, can never be value-free or “objective.” Cultural studies always connect with a larger vision of social and political action that is directed toward a reduction or elimination of social inequalities and thereby expresses itself in projects that are as concrete as possible. Thus, for me questions about the forms of capital in this book are focused again and again on problems of equal opportunities and equity.
- 4) It has become very important for the concrete work of cultural studies to overcome the division between cultural knowledge and everyday knowledge that is based on concrete cultural activities as well as to overcome supposedly universal “truths” about culture. Cultures, in whatever shape or form, are constructions of reality.
- 5) As such constructions, they are not arbitrary but express social relations, and they should raise and discuss ethical questions about improving justice against the background of a democratic claim to equality and decent treatment of all and discuss how answers to these questions can be implemented politically.

Cultural capital according to Bourdieu

The discourse of cultural studies can be compared fruitfully with the understanding of cultural capital developed by Bourdieu. For Bourdieu as well, culture is not restricted to what is expressed, for example, in educated texts in literature and the sciences. He also expands the understanding of culture to everyday objects and seemingly mundane actions. In doing so, he makes the relation between cultural capital and ownership relations very clear. According to Bourdieu, a part of cultural capital expresses itself as

(1) *objectified cultural capital*. This is reflected in cultural goods in a material way. It is accumulated in different forms such as in the form of books, paintings, musical instruments, collections, and antiques, as well as villas, luxury homes, and good places to live. This objectified cultural capital is generally handed down in the form of material, but the inheritors also have to understand the significance and value of what they inherit if they want to fully appropriate cultural capital. Economic capital always also appears in the form

of objectified capital because this part of private property can always be exchanged for money. Only the owners of capital who have accumulated adequate property can redeem a large part of such cultural capital. This part of capital, argues Bourdieu, can be used in material economic ways but also as a symbol of status. There is what I call the use value of cultural capital, which is capital that appears when this use value can actually be exchanged on a market in a monetary form. According to Bourdieu, there is also

(2) *embodied cultural capital*. Schemata for thinking and action and attitudes and value orientations are reflected in this capital, which express themselves for example as taste, comportment, courtesy, table and other manners, and rules about good, decent behavior in specific situations. If a child, for example, grows up in a family with high economic capital, he or she will acquire a habitus that differs from his or her peers in a poor family and provides knowledge about how it is proper for an owner of capital to behave in an affluent environment. This habitus, which also manifests itself as an entitled attitude toward life and the working world, will help the child later occupy a social status in accordance with this habitus. One example provided by Bourdieu is this: “The champagne drinkers are opposed to the whiskey drinkers and also, of course in a different way, to the red-wine drinkers; the chance is higher for champagne drinkers than whiskey drinkers—not to mention red-wine drinkers—that they will possess antiques, play golf, ride horses, visit the theater, etc.” (translated from German, Bourdieu, 1992, 146). This example also shows the degree to which such attributions are culturally fluid because fashions change quickly in a consumer society. What remains is the creation of a habitus and therefore also the accompanying time that an investor has to spend if they want to be successful. However, the amount of time that has to be spent is uncertain: is it a good use of time only to be in a good environment or a waste of time not to have sufficiently used the opportunities in this environment? Those who come from uneducated milieus with few cultural possessions only have an opportunity for advancement in this area when they effectively use the few opportunities they are given even in bad situations.

Cultural capital is conceived of very broadly by Bourdieu in its internal constitution and the personal qualities and abilities that are shaped in certain cultural ways of life. It is very clear that—as in cultural studies—cultural capital is supposed to refer to concrete cultural behavior, but does it represent an aspect of capital? Interests and power positions in social domains are always expressed in culture, in forms of ownership, as material or immaterial possessions that someone acquires and makes use of through familial education, public or private education, or artistic or scientific activities. But are education, knowledge, applied cultural techniques, languages, forms of expression of social behavior, etc. always already capitalized? The answer is “yes” for Bourdieu because for him it is capital since it delineates unequal positions in the

social domain, which represent an ability in the broadest sense to make use of “capital.” This is especially evident in education. Through the objectified forms of educational titles,

(3) *institutionalized cultural capital* can be seen in school diplomas, certificates, advancement papers, honors, fellowships, and academic titles. College entrance diplomas, master’s degrees, PhDs, honors and awards, director positions, positions that offer company vehicles, etc. are greatly valued here. And attributions that serve only a motivational purpose but have no capital value, i.e., as an instrument for being positioned better with respect to others (such as praise without the opportunity for advancement), have less value. This kind of capital usually relates to the educational system or other objectifying institutions. It provides access to other kinds of capital and enables one to be better equipped. In this subtype of cultural capital, there is the opportunity to compensate for the rigid inheritance property-owning families enjoy through family bonds with successful education. This would all the more be the case if schools also offered educationally impoverished social classes greater opportunities for such compensation. This seems in general to be the case today in formal terms because in the rankings regarding achievements in school or at the university everyone is supposed to be handled in the same way in democratic societies. But the problem is that the norms of comparison are already adapted to the habitus that is given preference when it comes to success. Because the majority of educators come from the educated classes, they expect a certain habitus from their students and reward them for it. At the same time, affluent families have the resources to intervene if needed for their children through support in order to avoid failure. This capital, which is conveyed by institutions, is also visible externally through certificates and diplomas that secure a certain cultural status. Cultural capital is also convertible through the job market and in connection with social capital into economic capital just as economic capital can acquire cultural property in the form of cultural goods and make use of it as a status symbol.¹ Against this background, Bourdieu conceived of cultural capital as a form of capital that can be accumulated and transformed and that serves as a distinguishing feature for social inequality.

Difficulties for a concept of cultural capital

Culture as a material value is most visible in objectified cultural capital. Here people are differentiated with respect to material and symbolic forms that can also always be realized on markets as exchange activities. It is, however, more difficult to see thorough capitalization in the other two forms. Bourdieu

¹ As discussed with respect to social capital in the concept of Bourdieu on p. 165 ff., cultural capital can be transformed into economic capital.

assumes that such a capitalization is analogous to social capital as an expression of interests and power positions that contribute to advantages or disadvantages in the cultural domain. Everything appears here as relevant capitalization insofar as cultural possessions of whatever kind can be accumulated and thereby express a certain degree of ownership that leads to an unequal amount of ownership. For Bourdieu, such inequality is associated with certain positions in the social domain, which articulate forms of power and rule and define social circumstances (as has already been shown regarding social capital.) In a comparison of forms of capital, it becomes clear that position can no longer be expressed by economic capital alone because social as well as cultural capital define additional requirements for power, rule, and inequality, which we have to take into account in people's current struggles for differentiation and distribution. But should such differences be thought of as thoroughly capitalized?

Bourdieu's approach with regard to cultural capital is understood as a reproduction approach: the various forms of cultural capital very clearly display a cultural origin with respect to used or usable resources and assistance that are essential for cultural and especially educational success. If cultural goods were purely quantifiable, one could assume a mechanistic and deterministic theory that would amount to the simple observation that a low volume of cultural goods in a family is synonymous with a lower-class level, but this would neglect individual opportunities that arise through engagement, educational advancement, and support systems for the improvement of social and cultural capital for disadvantaged people. Such simplifications also run counter to Bourdieu's intention to deliberate on and study forms of capital in practical phenomena both in a way that does not aim at a reflection of seemingly objective and constant (primarily material) relations but shows a world with liquid social and cultural circumstances and positions. In particular, his intentions are the following:

- to show the degree to which there are connections between the cultural reproduction of inequalities, for example, through unequally acquired educational titles,
- to recognize that it is primarily the inheritance of cultural capital that gives rise structurally not only to cultural but also social inequalities,
- to make clear that on the cultural side a certain cultural habitus is created and embodied, which expresses consciously and unconsciously, in accordance with life circumstances, a cultural understanding, represents a certain social position, and perpetuates inequalities,
- to investigate the extent to which the educational system structurally and systematically promotes such inequality or is in a position to reduce it,

- to analyze how the distribution structures in various forms of capital work in various contexts in order to uncover a complex picture of the interdependence of inequality and capitalization.

Seen from the perspective of these research intentions, cultural capital has its own value that supplements economic capital and represents its own “form of capital.” This is true in at least two different ways:

On the one hand, knowledge, education, and cultural achievement can only be bought to a certain degree. Particularly in its immaterial forms, cultural capital cannot be inherited like cultural capital but always has to be earned with some effort. At the same time, there are so-called risks of loss in cultural capital because even educational titles come under inflationary pressure through the expansion of education for the masses, and cultural knowledge also quickly becomes out of date as cultural fashions come and go.

On the other hand, cultural capital often behaves inversely to economic capital (see Bourdieu, 1983). Someone who has success in the cultural domain quickly loses their avant-garde status. The more esteemed someone is in the cultural domain, the less they appear to be able to develop additional adequate alternative prestige in the cultural domain. This is true at least of parts of culture where the rejection of what is popular or salable is opposed to the desire for cultural autonomy and diversity, which itself is often only a fashion in particular cultural periods.¹

Although objectified cultural capital has clear characteristics of capital, this is not equally the case for the other two forms. There are several difficulties involved in developing a plausible concept of cultural capital.

First, the concept of cultural capital is used in Bourdieu in a very broad but at the same time unifying way. With this form of capital, he tries to capture the inequality of cultural events and activities for various social classes; he tries to grasp differences in immaterial and material forms of education and culture that have effects on the creation of a certain cultural habitus primarily through the cultural inheritance from one’s family of origin. Cultural inheritance thereby appeared in the bourgeois past primarily as so-called advanced education, as a familiarity with classical works from theater, music, film, painting as well as jazz, etc. Such an inheritance was apparently not sullied by the utilities of everyday life and thus served as a means of distinguishing the culturally valuable from the mundane. A bourgeois lifestyle, with a sensibility for a free cultural existence not shaped by work and the burdens of everyday life, is thereby distinguished from the proletariat lifestyle that has neither time nor interest in the cultural—given its need to secure its survival. It makes use of its own elaborate language that is supposed to symbolize mental agility as

¹ On the relationship between art and literature with regard to cultural capital, see Fowler (1997). It shows that Bourdieu to some degree also interprets the role of cultural activity in a one-dimensional way. On this, see also Shusterman (1992, 1999).

well as informality, sophistication in style as well as cultivation in expression and manners. It is primarily the intellectuals that function as the bearers and representatives of such culture; they do not exercise particular power in the way the economic or political elite do, but their cultural viewpoint nevertheless can, on the one side, support such power or can, on the other side, help close off cultural domains as possible spaces for the transformation of social lifestyles.

What is difficult, however, for such a perspective on cultural reproduction is that none of these spaces is free from transformation in the power games of the given times. Cultural transformation means making things fluid, which makes cultural inheritance itself appear questionable and uncertain because there is no longer a unity of culture. During the course of last few decades, it has also become clear that not only mainstream culture but even the cultural transformation involved in alternative cultural trends has come under the influence of capitalization. A critical intellect that is not bound by instrumental considerations increasingly appears to be an illusion. Such an intellect has to be able to operate far away from the markets. Against this background, the question arises to what extent the concept of cultural capital can make a common perspective on cultural activities and achievements available when culture itself appears increasingly more fragmented, liquid, conflicted, and uncertain. In the move away from structuralist models, many authors in cultural studies, those who rely on Foucault's analysis of power, radical feminism, and deconstruction have therefore raised the question of the extent to which the bourgeois habitus of the past can even be grasped as a form of cultural identity today because such social identities are now much more contradictory than in previous times and have to be grasped empirically in light of this.

Consequently, in culture there is still a distinction between educated and trivial literature or art and popular "art," but the distinction increasingly disappears in light of consumer strategies such that the distinctions that make a difference with respect to the social are constantly in flux. The cultural habitus is also thereby transformed. On the one hand, this cultural habitus rests on differences that have been culturally standardized—for example, cultural classes are reflected in the price levels at businesses, the stars given to hotels, the price classes in airplanes, the boundaries between luxury and junk, etc. On the other hand, all goods increasingly penetrate the consumer market such that affluent classes need not be as shy in approaching everyday popular culture, and the lower classes can participate in luxury design (the IKEA strategy). This critical turn clearly means that cultural capital can no longer be an uninterrupted and distinct form of the reproduction of social inequality

through the creation of a cultural habitus as Bourdieu had imagined in his work.¹

An additional difficulty is the attainment of a developmental and social-psychological perspective, which in addition to the social-science perspective is also important in the analysis of cultural socialization processes. The observation may be enough here that psychoanalytic models in particular are compatible with Bourdieu's representation of the unconscious part of the habitus, whereas the conscious part of the habitus can be supported and even expanded upon by newer psychological approaches. It has also become important in recent psychological theory formation to relate the creation of cultural *habits*, attitudes, expectations, and behaviors with regard to the educational environment, cultural context, and interaction relations to the creation of a self (analogous to the cultural habitus) and thereby at the same time also always to bear in mind the transformability of this self (of the habitus).² From this perspective, a cultural habitus configured in social-scientific terms, as in Bourdieu's approach, appears not to be open enough to psychological questions. Conversely, these approaches can learn from the social-scientific perspectives about the extent to which the economic, social, and cultural circumstances are intertwined with psychological aspects. Therefore, in research on socialization both perspectives have to be connected because both are essential to understanding human interaction, cooperation, and communication (see chapter 6).

A fundamental difficulty here is due to the fact that people live in a culture that can be divided into various cultural affinity groups and their associated domains. The culture of a country or a region expresses a power of persistence, and people who live in this culture adapt themselves through norms and values in their practices, routines, and institutions. This image from modernity has persisted up to this day, but it has also become more fluid because social development and capitalistic markets also exercise enormous acceleration pressure on cultures. Where it was previously important to train behavior in certain norms and values with status-related virtues and to develop a national cultural habitus, the transitions between cultural affinity groups have become more permeable and fragile today but also more conflicted and uncertain. Consumption driven by markets is the basic model for this. What was for Bourdieu a distinguishing feature for milieus a few decades ago, i.e., beer drinkers vs. wine drinkers, could be misleading today because the distinguishing criteria between various cultural milieus are always being dissolved

¹ Bourdieu accused cultural studies of often being too speculative and empirically imprecise, but his model can also be criticized for not sufficiently describing the contradictions in individual forms of capital and thus not being able to describe their interaction adequately.

² This is strongly related to the constructivist turn in this research. See for example Ormrod (2004, 2006), Slavin (2006), and Woolfolk (2005).

and reconfigured despite their powers of persistence. This is true, for example, of the key differences between the useless but original things and useful but unoriginal things, which in the past helped define meaningful consumption for the French upper class. It was already obvious earlier that the useless things could be and must be expensive, but today in light of consumer behavior it can be concluded that for the very rich trivial (but expensive) usefulness for private entertainment has moved increasingly in the foreground. The rich and super-rich find themselves in the domain of mundane, although expensive, usefulness in their global competition to display their wealth through consumption.

A cultural transformation is taking place through the ecstasy of consumption. The dissolution of distinguishing cultural criteria is occurring on the one hand under increasing globalization. Here, formerly local cultures are connected together and mixed through worldwide markets, forms of exchange, and especially the Internet. The local presence of an event can very quickly be resolved into a global event, and all places and activities gain global ubiquity. There are very different interpretations of such globalization: economic discourses rest, for example, on an interpretation of the transition from heavy to light capitalism, the transition from industrial production to services, or the opposition of advantages and disadvantages of globalization for individual countries and their development levels. Bell (1976) emphasizes three major changes in this context: 1) the transition to the service economy, 2) the significance of scientific and technological innovations for the future, and 3) the emergence of new technological elites and the beginning of new struggles over distribution. Key aspects of his analysis have already been developed.¹ What has become obvious on the cultural side is that the western cultures impart their values in a dominant way (Boli & Thomas, 1997).

Culturally oriented theories in particular emphasize the networking and information age, particularly the general and cross-cutting features of communication that grow with or against existing local cultures. Their interpretations in general describe a transition in scientific and technological revolutions—steam engines, electrical technology and the chemical industry, communication techniques (computers, the Internet)—in order to make sense of current cultures in terms of these changes.² Social-scientific theories attempt to describe the change in social relationships in the age of globalization; they look for the winners and losers, for explanations of systemic connections and relations in these transformations, and they have increasingly abandoned the

¹ Bauman (1998, 2000) describes the transition from “heavy” to “light” capitalism particularly vividly. On the general assessment of globalization and its economic effects, see for example Kellner (2000), for an introduction, and Waters (1995), Bauman (1997), Harvey (1989), Jameson (1991) for more detailed discussions. See also above chapter 2, p. 75 ff.

² On the information age, see for example Castells (1996, 2001), Lyon (1988), Masuda (1981).

picture of a single cause and essential force of development.¹ “Heavy” capitalism constructed fundamental cultural conditions and ties that were costly in their reproduction. “Light” consumer-oriented capitalism also grants a reduction of cultural effort for the upper class without losing the distinction gained primarily through social exclusivity (see above p. 80 ff.).

Cultural events and activities are not capital but are primarily use values that range between genuine personal interests and preferences to developed interests and power positions in forms of symbolic rule. It is only in the form of objectified cultural capital that they are always already exchange values that can be obtained through the market. The cultural habitus is in contrast primarily a cultural embodiment. But in particular windows for action, which I will describe below in terms of surplus values, the cultural habitus can be transformed into exchange values in order actually to be transformed into a monetary benefit. That is when cultural capital arises. It is very important for me to introduce this distinction because otherwise there is the danger that we will consider everything cultural to be already capitalized and thereby lose the fine distinctions that lie between cultural use and market-related relevance.

Cultural use values in transformation

Education and upbringing do not appear capitalized according to the self-understanding of participants; rather, they appear as personal, private, and related to the individualization of development. The ranked comparison with others in the social domain can also become an initial burden or assistance. Anyone who treats their children with tenderness, warmth, and comfort does not think of the later capitalization of such “foundational trust” in human interactions but just wants to act humanely. At the same time, this is a cultural activity that expresses a “care of the self” in historical cultural terms (see also Foucault, 1990). It involves the acquisition of use values that are supposed to allow a human life of prosperity, security, and education, but that at the same time are supposed to be exchangeable on the market in some way. What has changed for cultural use values in the last decades?

Discourses on culture and education see transformations either primarily in the significance of diversity, multiculturalism, and dealing with increasing heterogeneity (often on the use value side) or primarily in terms of effects on the labor market, credentialism, certifications, and the capitalization of education (mainly on the exchange value side).² The list could be expanded to include many other domains and specialized discourses because no one can

¹ Bauman (1993 a, b, 1998, 2000) in particular.

² For an introduction to this, see Morrow & Torres (2000). Capitalistic nationalism (Morrow & Torres, 1995), enlightenment universalism in ideas about education (Carnoy, 1974, Torres, 1998, Willinsky, 1998), globalization and multiculturalism (Featherstone, 1995, King, 1997), and finance capitalism (Cole, 2012), for example, are regarded critically.

simply ignore the new interpretation and new classification of cultural phenomena in the global liquefaction of a consumer society where upbringing and education become consumer goods on the market in addition to having a multifaceted use value side. It is important not to underestimate social and cultural changes here. The more complex, contradictory, and uncertain the culture is in the liquefaction of modernity,¹ the more complexly and unconsciously the cultural conditions and capitalizations that accompany this fluidity unfold. Cultural capital is under pressure both from embodied “inheritance” through upbringing and education and from the real inheritance of material educational goods and life circumstances that are passed from generation to generation.

In earlier times, cultural education was always bound in its higher forms to the production of culture. Creating poems, journal entries, artworks, etc. at least complemented the reception of the normatively loaded works and goods that were culturally preferred. Thus, one not only enjoyed the music of others but tried to learn an instrument oneself; one did not just read other’s texts, one produced a great quantity of records and letters; one did not just marvel at other’s artworks, one produced them on a small scale for oneself. However, such a putative higher culture always had a fictional, illusory side because the cultural game did not go so far that the upper bourgeois or the upwardly mobile could transform the use value in the area of the production of art into an exchange value. The establishment of a wide repertoire of cultural use values through upbringing and education served the upper classes and the bourgeoisie in classical capitalism primarily for creating their own cultural-technical requirements in order to preserve prerogatives in social and cultural domains and to develop virtues (which often appear to be bourgeois ideas today). This includes:

- Delaying gratification and making long-term investments, through one’s own efforts in education with self-denial, in order to experience higher enjoyment as well as entertainment and variety through a better social and cultural position later.
- To give preference to work on a subject in order apparently to derive for oneself powers of discipline, self-constraint, cultural techniques, patience, adaptability, subordination, etc. from the demands of the world, as is the case with the demands of classical education, and to legitimize the prioritization of oneself.
- To actively maintain a subordination of the individual to the production processes, whether it is on the small scale of discipline in education or on the large scale of life or one’s profession.

¹ Bauman describes this strongly in his series on “liquid modernity” (2000, 2003, 2005, 2007 a, b).

- To accept a subordination of the individual to social and gender-related differences and existing social circumstances, which are perceived and experienced as given and unquestioned cultural differences.

Such classical capitalism and its virtues do not disappear now with the transition to a consumer society as one might mistakenly believe; rather, a transformation takes place in the cultural habitus itself, which has become “liquid” just like the period in which it exists.

Culture and consumption

More and more people create their construction of reality from the perspective of consumption because it offers them more freedom and possibilities than the old picture of capitalism. Consumption is nothing new for capitalism, since it has always had to do with possessions, but what is new in consumer society is the thoroughgoing construction of all people as consumers as well as the internalization of an attitude and life goal that is primarily focused on consumption. For consumers, the short-term nature of their decisions in actions is important; consumers are no longer prompted as strongly as they were before to make long-term investments but are supposed to live from the perspective of the rapidly changing market. This has become abundantly clear in the consumption of goods. No goods, even the especially coveted goods, can deliver over the long term what they promise in the short term. The essence of all consumer goods is to become consumer waste as quickly as possible in order to make room for new goods.

This daily process in all domains and categories of consumer life does not stop for culture and especially not for education. All cultural goods are captured as products in the ecstasy of consumption and driven relentlessly into the waste bin. This creates a transformed cultural habitus. Education, cultural techniques, values, etc. also want to be consumed as consumer goods. Critical reflections for example are therefore unattractive as mass goods; there must be an easily consumable how-to pamphlet. Even reading requires more dedication than consuming an audio-book or YouTube-video. Film adaptations push reading into a visual medium and condense it. Consumer goods such as watches, cars, real estate, etc. suddenly become cultural goods that are talked about in supposedly highly cultured classes more than classical educated questions. And with this transition, cultural expectations collapse because educational waste necessarily creates a changed cultural habitus. If controlling one’s own education to such a degree that one could ironically scorn it because one had grown socially far beyond one’s teachers was previously esteemed, it has become increasingly more important today to recognize the subtle differences between what has educational value and what is

personally entertaining to playfully deal with the transition.¹ Liquid modernity sees it is a matter of individual happiness to celebrate the cultural habitus as a consumer, whereby the economic and social circumstances quickly define what should be celebrated here.

In the pursuit of cultural meaning today, those with economic capital increasingly employ people with high cultural competence to regulate and manage their businesses and homes. They have to grant them a degree of freedom that might even run contrary to their own economic interests because as employees they are on the one hand tasked with improving the culture of the capitalists but at the same time have to maintain and shape their free understanding of culture because the capitalist himself has not learned what this culture is or what it could be. Thus, designers set up the house, and cultural experts are relied upon when it is a matter of shaping objectified cultural capital; and children are left to elite schools that are sought out more because of their high price than their pedagogical conception.

The growing cultural waste accelerates the half-life of knowledge and the construction of what is considered culturally lasting and valuable. But this is very detrimental to knowledge and education itself. This is because it becomes increasingly undecidable what is actually important and what is transitory. The sciences are also affected by this, also cultural studies, which is characterized by increasing complexity and confusion which increasingly facilitate the production of garbage. Short-lived fashions in ever-shorter intervals also increasingly inflate the sciences, which affects the *soft sciences* more than the *hard sciences*. But the hard sciences are also not protected from the pressure to produce garbage as they move closer to the production of goods and technological progress. The garbage they produce is characterized by the rapid change in the profitable spheres of research, by moving away from unprofitable basic research or broad research, and by turning toward areas that can offer especially strong profits for those who control such research financially (see chapter 6.3.3).

Use value and exchange value in cultural capital

To develop a habitus that is as relevant as possible to the culture, individuals generally endeavor in the appropriation of use values in the cultural domain to collect as many values as possible, in all their useful forms, in order to be able to make use of them in economic and social domains. The more this process in culture goes after the broad masses, the more a paradox arises: the use value with high opportunities for exchange value, which is still sufficiently secure, such as, for example, a college degree, becomes devalued

¹ In his “Critical Pedagogy,” Henry Giroux in particular has described the relationship between cultural change and educational changes in numerous publications. See for example (1992, 1996, 2008). Chapter 6 discusses the capitalization of education in detail.

the more it becomes a common good. This is the curse of consumer society because it wants as many people as possible to be consumers. Within the framework of the expansion of education, more and more educational certificates are received by more and more people so that competition minimizes or destroys the distinction being pursued. The struggle in the socio-economic domain is a competitive situation in which all the cultural intentions that are accumulated in the habitus are compared. Only those who either fall out of the competition because they possess inordinately high economic or social capital or because they have nothing more to gain since they will always be in a losing position can afford to forgo competition.

But what remains constant in this transitional process in terms of cultural affiliations? A transition from contents to procedures can be seen because we recognize various cultural milieus today less according to certain contents that apply for this particular milieu than according to the *use* of reference standards and the quality of consumer goods that can be implemented in practices and routines. At least four very different perspectives have developed here from a cultural point of view:

- 1) People define their cultural status strongly in terms of their hopes and expectations and the cultural connections they already have. They find cultural claims and satisfaction with a cultural status especially when their cultural opportunities meet these expectations and can be lived out given their income and the time they have available. A possible way to approach describing such hopes and expectations is through studies on satisfaction and happiness that people project into their life circumstances.¹
- 2) Cultural affiliations are always social attributions that designate someone as part of a culture and that accord them a different position, rank, or place in the existing cultural domains in comparison with others. Culture can be lived with very different costs, but the cultural comparison group that is distinguished from other groups by more or less or by alternative forms of culture contributes to social position and produces ideas about one's own satisfaction in the cultural spectrum. This essentially leads to satisfaction of one's own cultural habitus and status. There arises an opportunity here, when one has very few economic resources to accumulate against capitalization, alternative forms of use values whose purpose does not reside in profitable sale but in, for example, social forms of exchange.
- 3) Cultural capital manifests itself primarily in cultural possessions that are materially tangible and can be exchanged, traded, bought, and sold. This part can be measured in a cultural basket of goods. On the other side, in

¹ For an overview with extensive references, see <http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/>.

idealistic notions about culture that hardly correlate with a material value but correlate to a high degree with an imaginary, immaterial, or social value, individual competencies and qualities are collected, which are often difficult to measure even as use values and generate no capital but represent perchance preconditions for later capitalization on the market. An increase of cultural use values in the virtual presentation of oneself through the Internet is particularly visible here.

- 4) Cultural values are closely related to new forms of work, communication, and information. Castells (1996, 229) mentions, for example, that there are increasingly different kinds of services provided in the areas of production and services, and different kinds of service jobs are growing strongly. Management roles are also needed in many areas, and they offer the opportunity for advancement for a new group of employees or even contract-workers. At the same time, work in marketing and the information and media sectors is becoming increasingly important and diverse. The *knowledge economy* arises in the form of goods as well as services that combine cultural use values with exchange values and manufacture and advertise particularly profitable use values that lie outside of exchange-value thinking.¹ At precisely the point where industrial production runs up against the limits involved with the materiality of goods, the *knowledge economy* is able to act with more freedom. Companies such as Google and Facebook are examples of a new industry that no longer needs large machines and manufacturing plants. This is also accompanied by the simultaneous opening of occupations in the high and low salary ranges. It appears that in the long term, higher-value work could grow more strongly than lower-value work, which would lead to new claims related to culture. However, Castells already warned in the 1990s against drawing conclusions about the cultural progress of society as a whole from such developments in some areas of the information society, which can offer better and more skilled work for some employees. The differing economic and social development in various countries and groups of people is so contradictory that despite global effects cultures differ significantly from one another in the types of claims they make. One key reason for this, as Morrow & Torres (2000, 35) conclude, lies in the employment structures that always provide an important background for the opportunities and limitations of culture-related competencies and differences.

The immediate utility of cultural use values or objectified cultural capital for materially graspable exchange values can be identified against this background very clearly, but it can be identified only hypothetically for ideal use

¹ Peters et. al. (2000) and Marginson et. al. (2010) describe the *knowledge economy* in particular in relation to questions of creativity and mobility and with regard to social effects.

values until the market is entered. Cost-benefit considerations used in economics cannot simply be applied to the hypothetical side. In theories about utility, there was already a change in understanding in the 1930s, which was based on people calling into question whether utility could be measured (see Robbins, 1932, Frey & Stutzer, 2002). Utility has to be conceived of in very narrow terms in order to be measurable. However, the more we move into the very open domain of culture and its increasing diversity in liquid modernity, the more difficult it is to concretely grasp even the utility involved in the motives, motivations, interests, dreams, visions, desires, and tenacity of people, which also involves pursuing goals that appear unattainable. In the research, people have helped themselves identify utility empirically by starting with the individual choices and preferences of goods rather than with utility in order to derive use values indirectly from these choices. This transition was not accidental because with the growing material wealth and associated cultural wealth of industrial countries, the perspective has shifted from the utility of production to the choice of useful consumption. Empirical studies have to be cautious here not to measure this as mere consumer habits so cultural capital is not conceived of in a very one-dimensional way. We should keep in mind here in any case that constructions of reality should not be measured according to what empirical studies can now do with their fine statistical methods of questioning but according to how they can be used in an expansive way to pursue more complex inquiries. And there is a lack of perceptive empirical studies here that explain in a more precise way the actual costs that are involved in the use value side of cultural activities and how these can then be transformed into exchange values. Just as we need a basket of social goods in empirical studies, a basket of cultural goods could also provide us with more precise information about the monetary relevance of the cultural exchange value side of things.

The goal everyone has to set for themselves with respect to culture is to find a balance between use and exchange values in cultural activities. Adopting, calculating, or refusing a part of one's own subjectivity, as Stuart Hall (1980 a, b) conceives of things, stands in tension with societal forms of the life-world, the economy, the social, and the cultural. Culture is no longer a good "in itself," as it was still thought of in the bourgeois Enlightenment; it is no longer a good whose morality lies beyond mundane utility and which is not measurable but individually and collectively felt or experienced or representable in an artistic way in the "highest perfection of form;" it is a good or value that is sought after and sold, and in this demand for consumption it first generates its exchange value through its use value. This applies to all mundane cultural goods, which as material wealth (the pattern that has been mentioned previously: my car, my boat, my house, etc.) populate our worlds; it also applies to the higher intellectual goods (my photos, books, databanks, furnishings, etc.) that I first have to buy on the market in order to consume them as

part of my cultural world. As much as many people want a radical change and an alternative, freedom from exchange relations and capitalization, they can only find this in present societies in other alternative places of exchange. This alternative place of exchange beyond mass production is generally however even more expensive. The illusion may grow here of living one's culture freely outside of all markets and places of exchange without thoughts about utility, exchange, mobility, careers, income, recognition, etc.; but this is very unlikely because then cultural solitude and a renunciation of cultural appropriations through others would also have to be taken into account. The formation of cultural groups according to shared interests attempts to demonstrate this again and again against all market movements, but this usually involves only the illusion of purposelessness. This is because the cultural habitus shaped in the activities of such cultural groups can hardly free itself from achieving conversions of exchange values in cooperation and communication if these groups enter a market where at least their costs are supposed to be covered.

The economic domain previously often seemed mundane and unworthy in comparison with the cultural. The caricatures of the *nouveau riche* from the perspective of the culturally established are well known, but the development of culture could not sustain this distinction because the visible expression of cultural activity always appears in material goods. The transformation in the cultural self-understanding of modernity has been enormous in this context. Whereas culture was previously thought of as an individual or collective event in which the individual was supposed to be elevated through conscientious learning and educational work to the zenith of true and comprehensive knowledge, aesthetic and personal maturity, and morality, which was often thought of idealistically as independent of economic status, the capitalization of the cultural world up to today reveals exactly the opposite:

- Culture and education have not been and are not acquired independent of social and cultural origin, i.e., access to culture is very different for people depending on their socioeconomic status, and inclusion and exclusion as well as possessions in many forms determine cultural opportunities.
- Culture today is no longer primarily derived from tradition and national characteristics, and nationalistic ideologies are being increasingly restrained (although they still have an influence and always come to the fore when people fight about the culture being overrun by foreign culture).¹

¹ Such as in Huntington (1996) whose "Clash of Civilizations" argues from the perspective of a divided world where different cultures end up in conflict. His interpretation focuses on the oppositions in diversity but less on the opportunities in diversity.

- Cultural goods in the form of recognized products of art, architecture, titles, degrees, symbolic legacies, and merits¹ are wholly associated with the individual possession of economic capital because they are always costly.
- Those who create culture are themselves dependent on income, which is provided to them either by capitalists or people with money in exchange for their works or by states, in order to carry out any of their cultural work.

In view of this change, Bourdieu's forms of capital are also in need of a new interpretation. Cultural capital in particular appears in signs of dissolution that should be taken into account. This has already been clear for some time because the rigid cultural distinctions between groups and classes of people derived from French culture would not have had distinct significance in many other places in the world.² DiMaggio & Mohr (1985) had already claimed that their study of the United States showed that the connection between cultural capital and social origin does not have as strong an effect as Bourdieu's studies would suggest. This finding is connected with the expansion of education. If more people have educational success, there is a decoupling of privileged cultural class circumstances from cultural achievement, which increasingly appears more attainable to the lower classes as well. This creates upward social mobility, i.e., there are opportunities for advancement. In a comparison of the competitors, however, the effects of social capital and the privileging of a cultural habitus speaks against such opportunities for upward mobility. In applications for better positions these effects continue to prevail because these candidates are preferred or make their careers more quickly. In addition, there are significant differences between countries regarding the breadth of educational expansion and the real opportunities for upward mobility or the risks of downward mobility. As a rule, here, in competitive situations people are preferred who demonstrate a cultural background that fits the person making the hire. Bourdieu could already recognize in his research that in the expansion of education an inflation of educational titles was occurring, which required new differentiators if the elite wanted to set themselves apart from the masses.

With regard to use and exchange values, a tripartite stratification has become increasingly evident in cultural education: (1) there are elites that place particular value on special certificates or expensive education; (2) the middle-

¹ Legacies function as immediate normative endowments to posterity who then orient themselves on the models of their predecessors; earnings also act as paid recognition, which has the direct effect on posterity of making them wish to orient themselves on the model. The German therapist Helm Stierlin has worked on these connections.

² Hartmann (2007) showed how differently the elites are educated in various countries. France and England are particularly elitist in this regard.

class is oriented primarily toward publicly accessible educational titles in the context of the expansion of education and seeks out a broad basis for cultural education; (3) low-skill people that are considered distant from education and whose cultural capital is regarded as low on the whole remain restricted in terms of cultural use values.

Against this background, I would like to redefine cultural capital. It retains its specificity for me as its own form of capital, but the aspects of education that express it as learning capital as well as the dimension of body capital retained in it have long shown themselves, in my view, to be independent dimensions; these dimensions sometimes also operate against the cultural domain, distinguish themselves from it, reveal other social spaces, positions, and circumstances and require a more refined definition.

Upbringing and education change from cultural to learning capital

I would like to consider this briefly for cultural educational capital as opposed to learning capital, as I will redefine institutionalized cultural capital in chapter 6. Education previously for the most part has been considered a part of cultural capital. This includes values, norms, cultural practices such as art, music, reading, writing, and other activities from museum and theater visits to cultural practices in communication, eating, drinking, seeking relationships, courtesy, manners, and everyday life in general. But the fine distinctions that make the difference cannot be represented today seamlessly in cultural capital. There are three forces acting on the erosion of cultural capital:

- 1) Cultural use values have lost great parts of their power to distinguish in an adequate and clear way different social classes and milieus. Consumer society makes all goods cultural so that the dividing line between high and low culture is based on the price of consumer goods and the conscientious embodiment of cultural education has become more and more an own field of operations. Although in cultural use values there is a competition for distinction between cultural agents so that the privilege of one's own cultural position can be marked, the relevance of this for exchange on cultural markets relativizes all independent characteristics. The ownership class still searches for features that distinguish it, but they find them today increasingly in the mundane world of price differences.
- 2) The expansion of education leads to the fact that cultural education as a distinguishing feature is under pressure and requires new distinguishing features. And here prices are increasingly the distinction that makes the difference. There are new configurations of capitalization of education that arise, which find expression in the increase in private schools, elite educational institutions, access to educational institutions determined by where people live, classifications of educational degrees according to

rankings, etc. These differences have become so essential that a learning capital can be identified as an independent configuration that forms a cross-section of all other forms of capital. It is an independent and easily distinguishable domain of capitalization. This domain has developed in order to compensate for the loss of distinction in cultural capital for the ownership class and raise the opportunities for participation particularly for the middle classes.

- 3) The educational system has developed a life of its own in its institutionalized forms as bureaucracies, which is always running behind cultural developments and is never effectively adapted enough in its methods and curricula to the expectations of life outside the classroom. This system is thus less a signal for “true” education that can provide a defense against consumer society and is instead a comprehensive bureaucracy in which ranking procedures, supposed objective evaluations, certification processes, and selection practices take more and more precedence over cultural content. This extends from kindergarten to quality management at businesses. Scientific and job-oriented disciplines and system-oriented education all operate on this system as lobby groups in order to pump more stuff and formal controls into the system; they thereby put in place a clandestine curriculum with an overload of consumable contents for which there is not adequate time, which leads to an increase in the rate at which material is forgotten instead of to a comprehensive education. In this overload, the institutions shove their burdens onto the teachers and offer a system that maintains and develops culture less and less and increasingly focuses on the certification of learning and on certification procedures.

Against the background of these three forces, it becomes clear that learning capital grows out of cultural capital as its own form of capital. Cultural use value is reconfigured in learning capital because it is no longer important and critical as it was previously that

- a broad general education or certain cultural behavior mirroring courtly culture or elites is required for the acquisition of educational titles in the form of credits and certificates,
- a music instrument or other “noble” cultural technique has to be learned in order to make great achievements in other educational domains or to receive adequate recognition in society,
- one has to have read a large quantity of “good” books in order to receive a certificate,
- a high degree of culture must be evident on the basis of knowledge of certain composers, classical music, operas or theater pieces, and through participation in certain cultural events, because for many these no longer appear to be an essential part of the current cultural habitus.

In summary, the distribution of cultural goods in all three forms described by Bourdieu has to be extended. It is much clearer in education in the past few decades that there is an increasing separation of cultural education in the broad sense from certified learning, which no longer has to be synonymous with comprehensive or general education. Higher education in particular has shown in the context of educational expansion and the many new areas of knowledge that have come out of specialized studies that the breadth of classical education is anachronistic in light of the requirements of liquid modernity, which constantly has to distinguish dead weight from innovation. This is a paradox: the more increased knowledge is called for in education, the more unlikely it becomes that there will be generally educated people who can build upon familiar cultural values and teachings alone. This is the moment of the birth of learning capital.

Use and exchange values of cultural capital in transition

Given my distinction between cultural and learning capital, Bourdieu's approach can be made more detailed by including an additional separable domain. The educational system indeed actually reproduces the social structure by reflecting and transforming cultural reproduction primarily according to existing statuses in terms of cultural possessions against the background of economic and social circumstances, but it also splits this process into two additional levels:

- 1) Upbringing and education actively reproduce and produce a cultural habitus, which can characterize itself through a variety of cultural orientations and develop in diverse ways. The childhood home primarily provides the resources through existing cultural and social use values as well as economic capital, which are able to facilitate and promote such education in the first place. Certain cultural milieus arise here that do not necessarily have to follow the pattern according to which the rich are well educated and the poor are impoverished in their education, although there is clearly pressure to preserve the social level that has been obtained. However, cultural values, norms, and practices experience their own cultural devaluation because capitalization in all areas of life in the past decades has demolished the arts, sciences, and critical reflective work as activities, which promise less benefits in terms of income and status than stock trading and real estate or other mundane businesses that require little cultural education but a high degree of success in terms of certifications and expertise through proven studies (= learning capital) in addition to social capital and a newly weighted cultural capital. Against this background, learning capital, which I define in detail in chapter 6, becomes increasingly important as the domain of new distinctions that go beyond the helpful first very broad construction of cultural capital.

2) One can still agree today with Bourdieu that economic capital has to be transformable into cultural capital in order to lead to educational titles that can in turn promise those who possess the titles monetary advantages, but the successful owners of capital no longer need to have a grasp of classical literature, music, art, and ritualized conventions at the highest bourgeois level in order to be distinguished and to move into the economic elite. The cultural domain has also become divided in this regard: on the one hand, cultural claims have remained a distinguishing feature in certain parts of the cultural habitus, but the broad acquisition of cultural qualifications is becoming less of a distinguishing feature. It even appears here that primarily the middle classes still rely on the old model of cultural education because they imagine opportunities for upward mobility that have long since moved into other domains. On the other hand, the distinctions in the cultural domain are displaced in a culturally new and specific world of learning capital, which can implement the certification of educational and behavioral achievements according to the model of selective bureaucracies. The “true” differences have to be paid for at very expensive top schools and universities. Worldwide, the distinction between public and private schools and selection based on tuition fees is relied upon. In Germany, the selection is carried out through the excessive selectivity of the school system itself. Cultural dead weight is however becoming increasingly unnecessary, and the curricula and skill sets are streamlined in order to allow for more cultural flexibility. However, there are large national differences here. Increased orientation toward action should create a stronger connection between school and life. Some countries attempt the impossible task of retaining and expanding the content of as many subjects as possible, which makes orientation toward action impossible and brings about a new heyday for rote learning. The more the universities demand rote learning because of the overcrowding of their certification procedures, the more significance of the parallel bureaucratic world is shown. But it serves professional life and life outside of the occupation less and less. For successful participants, objectified cultural capital in combination with social capital increasingly moves into the foreground of their aspirations and conversations, and the old cultural capital might only be something for artists, scholars, teachers, and the emerging newcomers in the middle classes who still believe in the distinguishing worth of culture.

In the chapter on learning capital, I will set out how this detaching and transition process takes place and inexorably continues. It relieves property owners and the upwardly mobile in social and cultural positions from the burdens that no longer fit the consumer habits or the recruiting practices for better positions in a thoroughly consumer-oriented society. We can see the degree to which

this change has taken place already with the so-called “struggling arts.” Included here are creative, culturally comprehensive, educated, reflective undertakings, which require a lot of time but whose benefits in terms of income, job security, recognition, and social status are rather low compared with business and the banks. Anyone who really counts themselves as among the “elite,” according to Hartmann (2007), acquires learning capital in economically relevant domains and can be satisfied with a minimal amount of cultural education as long as the social capital is right and the habitus of upper-bourgeois self-esteem remains pronounced along with high self-assertive tendencies. Managers and bankers no longer discuss William Shakespeare, Walt Whitman, Dali, or Picasso but the best cars, watches, and trendiest real estate. When they decorate their homes, old editions of Shakespeare and Whitman will be included in their elegant library, and a Dali or Picasso might be hung on the wall as an acquisition to demonstrate their high class—but all of this will be orchestrated by cultural experts. At the same time, all of this is increasingly being replaced by technical virtualization because the significance of culture is changing insofar as status symbols can be acquired in ways other than the traditional ones.

This change expresses the transition from classic entrepreneurship with an educated habitus and a representative attitude toward culture to *shareholder value*, which associates its money with accelerated and consumer-oriented demands, quite well. Educational equality and inequality also change in the acquisition of the use and exchange value of cultural capital:

- The embodied cultural use value that one needs today as a condition for increasing one’s own power on the market can be grasped and created in a more open way when, as exchange value, it finds new forms of differentiation through private schools and elite universities with high tuition fees where little more is learned than in other places but the special certification from a particular institution already stipulates the advantages that will be gained through invested economic capital.¹
- Education thus expands as consumption, and acquisition of consumption practices is often confused with education. A monetary habitus that determines what is culturally valuable according to price can replace a habitus that understands culture and that wants to know which cultural goods it is purchasing. A multitude of consultants and experts helps by declaring something cultural which is really only marketable.
- Education has already extended itself ad absurdum through its half-lives. Comprehensive knowledge might still be useful for memory artists and

¹ At least the difference is not so great as the cost difference between studying in Munich or Cologne with no tuition fees so far and studying at Harvard or MIT might suggest. If studying somewhere costs a thousand times more, one will not have learned a thousand times more, even if the university is better equipped.

game shows on television, but it hardly functions any longer as cultural capital. What is important is the certificate such as, for example, a university degree; and the large quantity of material in education today increasingly serves the purpose of testing rather than the creation of actual cultural education or practical competence. Applied sciences may be a partial exception here, but in the commercialization of degree programs educational feed is handed out which is supposed to be transformed in a fragmented way in various testing modules into a certification. Certification serves the purpose of selection, and real life can only begin afterward.

- Although in the research on cultural capital familiarity with the arts and literary forms is strongly at the foreground so claims can be made on this basis about later chances of success (see for example DiMaggio, 1982, DiMaggio & Useem, 1978 a, 1978 b, DiMaggio & Mohr, 1985; Mohr & DiMaggio, 1995), this already appears outdated because now only specific certificates from ranked institutions stand in the foreground, and in their curricula art and literature are increasingly marginalized. Thus, the claim that high cultural capital (i.e., a high use value from the education provided by one's family of origin) necessarily leads to higher education and thereby to good opportunities for income is no longer necessarily true. Family homes with high cultural use value might help produce more elevated cultural capital in their offspring, but for the certifications of an elite education that lead in particular to more elite circles, high economic and social capital are also required. This might only be possible on the basis of cultural capital alone in petit bourgeois or middle-class milieus.
- In this regard, the model of reproduction for social inequality through cultural use and exchange value has to be rethought. Children from educationally strong families surely do have more use value at their disposal than children from educationally deprived classes. And culturally better exchange value surely does reveal itself in better educational success, which has an effect on one's social situation. But at the same time, new forms of differentiation emerge, which in the context of educational expansion qualify use and exchange values (see for example the detailed discussion in chapter 6 on this).

Virtual use value in capitalization

Mass media and the Internet have resulted in changes in acquisition, purchasing, and distribution situations with regard to cultural activities, which can be described as the increasing virtualization of use and exchange value aspects. Although cultural practices are not all equally affected by this, over the past few decades larger portions are falling under the influence of virtualization. In the media all use values are turned into exchange values insofar there

is a monetary benefit of the public presence of agents in the media. This exchange value not only raises potential income, it establishes positions of power and recognition that can then deliver benefits on the market outside of the media. The mass media takes up more time through films, TV, videos, radio, and the Internet across all cultural groups. More and more time in people's lives in industrialized countries is occupied with the TV and streaming services, which despite a certain variety of programming nevertheless promotes virtual simplicity that is characterized by average cultural expectations. Even people with high cultural aspirations have to lower their expectations or abstain from participating in mass culture, which occurs rather infrequently in practical consumption. Media consumption is high across all social classes, which implies as well a cultural opening of society as a cultural enforced conformity by average expectations. The diversity of tastes often overshadows the increasing cultural mundaneness of offerings here; at the same time, the masses can participate virtually through TV in the most important events involving semi-elites. Here a media regime is created that shapes its own world from forms of exchange, power, and ownership, which influences and dominates the cultural habitus in a certain and is sustained way through particular formats. Culture connects here not only with the media but also primarily with money, profit interests, and positions of power. The continuous capitalization of the media in this respect thus follows not only financial profit interests but also the privileging of ideologies that favor the market as a self-regulating system and suppress the critical voices on economic development in marginalized areas (see for example Ott & Mack, 2009). As an information platform, the Internet is also a memory repository for every individual life, which leaves behind more or less significant traces. Networks and circles of friends such as Facebook and others organize one's own appearance, which can also be marketed in a professional way as a home page. The opportunity emerges here through technology to create a virtual self that can pretend to have more forms of capital than it does in real life. Because these measurements are for the most part quantitative and formal, such as for example the number of registered friends or number of links to oneself, there is a great opportunity for the users to calculate virtual exchange value in a way that is significantly higher than the cultural use value. What is interesting in this development is that cultural and social capital develop together in close connection so that they almost become indistinguishable.

4.2 The Surplus Value of Cultural Capital

In order to describe and analyze the surplus value of cultural capital, the investment that is made first needs to be investigated. The same aspects that were discussed for social capital are also relevant here:

- 1) *Time*: Creating, maintaining, and using cultural capital requires time. This time is also taken away from other activities such as working hours and influences the use of free time; there is also pressure to make the best use of this time (= does this cultural activity really deliver as much as I am expecting?). Time is spent generating use value so that it can be transformed into a monetary benefit in a particular window for action such as placement in a job, a promotion, labor activities, services, etc.
- 2) *Effort*: Questions regarding whether the effort is worth it also arise immediately when one spends time on something. How much culture should I want, and how much can I afford? How does this culture supplement my economic and social capital, and what is its relation to body and learning capital? And how can I minimize the additional effort depending on the situation by appropriating cultural possessions materially and intellectually as quickly as possible or with as little financial investment as possible? The effort strongly determines the scope, width, and depth of my cultural possessions. And these determine the quality and constitution of my windows for action for gaining at some point the benefits that are prepared through my investments but are not always certain.
- 3) *Resources*: Cultural activities consume resources. The more one strives for a bourgeois habitus or even an upper-bourgeois cultural habitus, the more resources are required because the objectified cultural resources invested are themselves a means whereby people are distinguished from one another. The quantity of resources invested (my books, my movies, my educational qualifications, my additional training as well as my material cultural possessions such as houses, apartments, furnishings, clothing, leisure activities, art, etc.) generates distinctions that set me apart from others (for a classical analysis of this, see Bourdieu, 1987 a). In its symbolic presence, the cultural habitus itself also embodies the status of symbolic power it has achieved and is able to express.

What benefits do I derive now from cultural activities and resources? What kind of surplus value can be generated?

4.2.1 Production of Surplus Value through Cultural Labor

In people's cultural activities, they produce useful things as in other areas, which then appear to have a use value. We can really talk about cultural capital only after such use value can be transformed into wages, income, or benefits, i.e., can be exchanged in some form on the market, because it is only at that point that a connection between investment in something (which up to

this point has remained purely personal) and its utility in a form of exchange becomes evident on the basis of benefits (= capitalization).

More and more cultural use value flows into wage labor, freelance labor, or other profitable activities. It is difficult, however, to specify clearly which cultural capacities for cooperation and communication, cultural labor, cultural education, or other cultural techniques should be calculated and how this should be done. To simplify this in practice in daily life, educational and training systems, educational certifications, and training certifications were created in order to express on this basis comparative values and tariff systems and allow for classification into various income groups. Qualifications in business also contain aspects of cultural labor. People talk about the work, company, or business culture in this regard, which is associated with certain monetarily valuable achievements in the company. Such qualifications, which indicate, for example, technical skills as well as methodological and social skills always also involve cultural norms and values as well as procedures for comparison. These values, which are initially associated with investment costs, are always use values according to which the users will later learn what kind of exchange value they can generate if they are brought to the market. In tariff systems or rules regarding how people are grouped, companies generally ensure that the use values generated can be transformed into exchange values. On the basis of this practice, there are certain benefits that can in principle be achieved through cultural labor. This generally occurs through mixed forms primarily involving social and learning capital. In the guides and rules for many companies now, the monetarily valuable exchange of cultural use values, which arise, for example, through the creation of cultural competencies, the application of cultural techniques and their stabilization as a cultural habitus through taste and habits up to the point of virtualization, is now included in rules about groupings of persons and careers in order to align the subjective and cultural character of qualifications. There is a narrow connection between these cultural expected qualifications and money income or protection from layoffs.

In light of the difficulties associated with calculating the transformation from use to exchange value, time, effort, and resources can be observed and measured in three levels for this form of capital:

- (1) All cultural activities that are reflected in cultural goods carry a price that allows them to be exchanged for a monetary value. A cultural basket of goods allows these material goods (from books and cultural accessories to furnishings, art objects, apartments, and cultural use values of all kinds) to be measured. *Objectified cultural capital* is easily measurable and has therefore been measured in diverse ways. The number of books in a household provides significant information about

educational experience or distance from education. The number of visits to museums, the theater or opera at least shows cultural activities, although caution is required here because there are more cultural activities than can be experienced in these outdated institutions. The educational objects in a household can ultimately be categorized; they extend over all possessions from furnishings to apartments and symbolically laden amenities. “Tell me where and how you live, and I will tell you who you are.” Media use and the personal share in media representation, such as on Internet sites, can be investigated in more detail in order to trace virtual capital and its costs and benefits.

- (2) If we consider the level of *embodied culture*, it can be clearly defined in learning capital with its certifications and degrees. Learning capital, i.e., the expenditures for school and degrees that are necessary in order to reach certain positions and income levels, can be calculated well on the expenditure and revenue sides. With regard to wage labor for such cases, there are job requirements and wage groupings that are reflected in salary or income expectations.
- (3) However, the communicative and cooperative side of qualitative cultural use values, which arise through observation of and participation in culture or specific cultural milieus, is more difficult to determine. People do not calculate in a monetary way regarding the acquisition of cultural use values that are not based on material because, for example, it is not very interesting to them how much time they invest in reading a book if they want to read the book, and while reading they do not consider that reading this book could later have significance as a possible exchange value for textual and reading comprehension when competing with other candidates. Instead, they focus primarily on qualities such as the effects on their understanding, significance, motivations, preferred writing styles, etc. In this respect, only an outside observer will be able to see the degree to which a private use suddenly is transformed into a value because through its utility on the market, especially on the job, relationship, and marriage markets, suddenly an advantage can be gained over other competitors.

When attempting to define cultural capital, it is important to sufficiently distinguish use and exchange values at these three levels. Not all cultural activities can consistently be understood in terms of capitalization. This is because these activities remain private; they remain activities in a use that expresses itself personally and which (initially) has no effect on conversion into monetary forms. This was also true regarding the economic and social capital discussed in previous chapters. We do not look at life itself as a whole here, when we are considering a comparison of incomes, job security, life and educational circumstances, cultural, social, and economic conditions, but at the

degree to which social and cultural domains have effects in activities on monetary income and benefits. Such income and benefits are realized in situations of exchange, which is what capitalization is really about. And because this capitalization penetrates into increasingly more domains of human life, it is important to analyze the effects on the various forms of capital we can identify so that we do not lose our perspective in these domains and beyond them.

Although I distinguish learning capital from cultural capital because I want to treat it separately, there remains, as embodied cultural use value, a mixture in the tension between cultural habit formation and cultural independence; it is a mixture that can no longer be defined today as the construction of a culture, *an* essential taste, *an* indispensable participation in certain events, or *the* optimal form of virtualization. The diversity in the social domain is reflected in culture. If we do not just want to make superficial statements, such diversity requires different and more complex empirical research. The cultural habitus can only be grasped meaningfully if the context is expanded. It can be grasped meaningfully

- in the preference for long-term studies over short-term measurements,
- in the attempt to observe culture not only in its main or average groups but also in its subcultures,
- in cross-disciplinary projects, since personal development can always be observed not only in social-scientific terms but also in psychological, pedagogical, and other terms,
- in biographical research and research on socialization that is concerned with an understanding of historical forms including leaps and uncertainties,
- in media research that critically investigates the virtualization of culture,
- in research on teaching and learning that studies the creation of a cultural habitus in the family and at school,
- in the application of primarily qualitative methods and procedures that use image analysis and targeted experimental settings in addition to interviews and questionnaires.

The goal of all such research would in particular be to trace the mechanisms according to which a cultural habitus is preferred by groups that are socially relevant for the culture and the effects of such preferences. A crucial domain for such research on effects is studies on inequality because we know from selection practices that the preferences take place strongly with regard to bourgeois norms and in terms of use values necessary for educational success (see Hutmacher et al, 2001). The self-awareness of a culture regarding its constraints and cultural techniques, which are always presupposed for all participants or with the admission of certain positions and ranks, is an essen-

tial area of research for counteracting the self-forgetfulness of cultural assumptions. Because although today it is often claimed that there is increasing cultural diversity, people are often silent about the conditions for participation in higher ranks and positions within a culture and the role of institutions in this regard. Bourdieu's thesis remains relevant here, namely that social position can always be inferred from the cultural habitus, even if a growing number of cases show the opposite, namely that a cultural habitus is no longer sufficient to put those who find themselves in struggles about distribution of wealth on the winning side.

Self-reflexive, social-critical research that questions cultural capital is certainly not mainstream research today. It is actually a marginalized area that offers few incentives. As a thematic field, it is complex, which means it is difficult to research, and the results here are usually critical of societal developments; and the methodology is difficult, which means it is not very attractive when pursuing an academic career. But these are all reasons that should really speak in favor of the research. It allows for conclusions about cultural backgrounds and for an investigation of profound dimensions that are mostly overlooked or ignored in the mass of statistical data and interpretations.

But how should we interpret the results of such measurements with regard to costs and benefits? The villa of a *nouveau riche* speculator might be full of books because certain requirements demanded certain contents; it might be furnished by an expert for a lot of money; the aesthetic is determined by advertising and the requisite exclusivity; and the owner might thereby function as a symbol of a cultural lifestyle that will be displayed in later advertisements for "beautiful homes" without himself having personally embodied the cultural capital that Bourdieu sees as an expression of the fine distinctions in culture. Consumption displaces what previously was regarded as a necessary personal achievement with regard to culture. A person's presence on the Internet is cultivated by professionals who ensure their page is ranked at the front for each cultural habitus and generates a lot of hits. *Shareholder value* is transformed into *cultural money value*—even rich and established upper-class families are no longer free from this. The cultural transformation has long captured cultural capital formation in its use and exchange values and provides it with new meaning. Cultural capital has thus become less of an expression of the social reproduction of classes. But this applies, however, only when we regard learning capital as the "new" capital that takes mainly care for social reproduction as will be discussed in chapter 6. I refer to the *institutionalized capital* in educational titles as learning capital. But after subtracting this capital, an institutionalized cultural capital still remains, which manifests itself in cultural institutions, organizes itself according to these institutions and fights for wide distribution. Those who are occupied in the cultural sector work here. I want to mention some selected data that make clear why social reproduction by this "rest" of cultural capital strikingly decreased in the last decades.

The cultural expenditures for states cover theater, music, libraries, museums, collections, exhibitions, conservation and care, cultural affairs abroad, art schools, and cultural management.¹ To give an example from a traditionally strongly culturally shaped country, the percentage of such expenditures in Germany is about 0.38% of the gross domestic product, which highlights the relatively low value of this area. If we consider participation in theater, opera, concerts, and museums, which is generally thought of as highly cultural, empirical studies show that participation in European countries is extremely low even for countries that are particularly traditional in their educational offerings. Gerhards (in German, 2008) reports on a 12-point scale that the average value for 27 European countries is 1.88 for estimated visits to such institutions; the Netherlands is at the top with 3.33, Germany is in the middle with 2.15, and Portugal is at the bottom of the list with 1.09 (*ibid.*, 14). With a high value of 12, these results show how little the effect of supposed high culture on visiting practices is. In addition, desirability effects often make such representative surveys appear higher in their values than actual visits show. However, the shortage revealed in the statistics for the respective institutions when they report their visits shows an overall shortage of cultural goods because the demand is often higher than the supply. What is clear for lifestyles that are often considered highly cultured is that participation in this area is rarely broad, and only certain strata actually make use of these institutions. But at the same time, use by the so-called upper stratum is no longer typical because there are strong differences in lifestyles even among the elite now. Nussbaum (2010, 2 ff.) refers to the dramatic cuts in the cultural domain that have affected the humanities and especially the arts in all capitalist countries over the last decades. When we think of human progress in particular, we should not concentrate only on economic gains but on progress with regard to social creativity that is not primarily money tied, we should focus more on equality, necessary conditions for stable democracy, equitable gender and ethno-cultural relations, the quality of life of all people, and above all on political freedom, health, and education. These are all factors that hardly correlate right now with economic growth in empirical terms (*ibid.*, 14). The upper classes and elites are not rebelling against losses in these areas because they also consume mass culture. This change is explained in the research by the fact that high culture is no longer as strongly dependent on income as it was previously, the exclusivity of culture has been dissolved by mass media, and high culture itself has become questionable in critical movements regarding culture, so new alternatives have been developed (*cf. Schulze, 2007*).

The Internet not only symbolizes the variety of information but also the massification of culture. It makes everything present virtually without being able to establish criteria for distinguishing between good and bad presence.

¹ These are categories that, for example, are recognized by the German Federal Statistical Office.

Such socialization is left to the user who, however, cannot easily become educated about this distinction because he or she is constantly using the Internet without critical distance. Although there may be wiki platforms for sifting and evaluating information, the results always remain precarious and open. The flood of Internet porn sites and advertisements with banal advisors and misleading information runs counter to the benefits gained by countries that do not censor the media because of fundamental democratic principles regarding information. In education at home and in school in particular, the Internet has taken on an increasing omnipresence for students and educators, which determines possible answers according to the hits that can be attained. This has affected classical educational goods particularly strongly. Whereas previously classic texts have to be read and interpreted carefully according to text passages in order to develop literacy and literary understanding, search machines help students today quickly find synopses that summarize all the possible interpretations in a clever table, which can be memorized quickly before class or a test so they can attain their educational certification. So cultural information literacy is developed, which however completely misses the goal of developing literacy and literary skills. The curricula exacerbate this tendency by making a literary cannon mandatory for which the Internet now offers guides on interpretation that are consumed by both students and educators so no mistakes are made in a situation in which education has become output oriented. Cultural use value is determined by the exchange value of quick access and manageable costs.

But why should we mourn about the lost “high culture” of the past? In practice, there are only limited opportunities to gain an attractive position in the fields of so called high culture. The only thing that could lead to a higher valuation of cultural capital would be greater opportunities for sufficiently attractive positions. But the percentage of the labor force in society in the traditional cultural sector is very small. Gerhards (in German, 2008, 19) reports 2.4 percent are occupied on average in 27 European countries; the Netherlands is at the top again with 3.8 percent, Germany in the middle with 2.8 percent, and Romania is at the bottom with 1.1 percent. In other countries the percentage is even worse. What is striking here is that the cultural available positions given by the state offer not seldom the only chance to get work in cultural affairs outside of usual commercialization. It must be said that for the reported percentages these opportunities are extremely narrow, and the opportunity structure is furthermore subject to substantial shortages observable in all rich countries. Cultural costs in national budgets are always only on top, when there is an amount to spend nobody else cares about. The more culture is offered in privately capitalized forms, the more unfavorable these shortages become to establish cultural diversity in qualitative forms.

The low percentage of cultural workers in the overall workforce shows that capitalist societies do not bear the costs of culture to the degree that is repeatedly claimed in discussions of culture. For the newcomer, it is risky to capitalize on a cultural habitus in an artistic, scientific (out of the mainstream), or culture-related way given the shortages in occupations in these areas. The trend changes here from classic temples of education, such as museums, theaters, and opera houses, to mass media and the Internet. In cultural education we face a paradox: on the one side, we encourage our children in diverse cultural activities when they are young, on the other side we hope that they will decide to take a good paid and secure job outside the cultural domain when they are older. For the top income levels this is also expressed in the increasing profitability calculation for higher cultural institutions, which intensifies their trend toward closeness to admitted elite groups. Here they can have some parts of higher cultural education because the social capital gained will always be enough to get the better jobs. But on the whole, there is a pressure on cultural taste, which even the elites can hardly resist because they also consume mass culture in films, TV, and the Internet. Popular taste, which in the past was in particular supposed to be held distant through cultural education and participation in putative high culture, has become dominant through educational expansion and the mass media and devalues cultural capital as a means of distinction. It also devalues the creators of culture and their acquisition of a molded cultural use value and opens up access for those who enter through the media and cheap labor without having accumulated long-term cultural capital. Nevertheless, cultural capital can, in connection with economic and social capital, be seen as a source of power, but considered on its own it has lost a lot of its previous power. This is reflected in the fact that the profitability of time invested in education and cultural learning is increasingly less able to guarantee benefits. The inflationary proliferation of cultural practices along with concurrent massification always leads to a reduction and dissolution of exclusivity.

Frugality and willingness to invest previously also guaranteed certain benefits for economic capital, but this has long since changed regarding the economic. And it is similar for cultural capital; long periods of waiting and endurance are no longer needed to acquire and enjoy cultural surplus value. What is more important is the skillful combination of effects in order to balance different quantities of forms of capital and engage them in a positive direction. In short, anyone who focuses only on specific cultural labor has to expect occupational dead ends and social decline.

Cultural capital refers in its surplus value to a form of capital that can go in many directions. The profits can be of an egoistic nature, when for example one attempts to raise the quantity of all forms of capital, but they can also serve merely to secure a certain civic status or appropriate cultural knowledge

as criticism or erudition in order to direct this use value critically against developments in society that are believed to be false. This is most interesting in rare cases where authors generate profits with their cultural criticism of capitalization. But the use-value side of things always offers the chance to escape capitalization by refusal to participate in the market. Cultural liberties open up here beyond capitalization, which however at some point somewhere have to be supported financially by someone. And doesn't everyone in a cultural niche hope for a strong market—even if they hope to put this to use in alternative ways?

To the extent that someone aspires to a certain income and carries out a paid or appropriated job, a surplus value in the form of exchange appears in the cultural domain. I spend a certain amount of cultural time, make an effort, use resources, and expect something in return. This compensation is not always measured directly in money. Thus, I can, for example, generate attention in the media through my cultural capital and present my ideas without costs in order to derive benefits from this presence in terms of income, power, earnings, social capital, etc. It is precisely the openness of cultural capital that makes it so important in terms of earnings even if it is very difficult to measure independently and evaluate in cost-benefit terms.

If I generalize this view, then it becomes clear that cultural capital is always refereed to specific situations and specific contexts of use. In cultural diversity, differences are expected. The cultural habitus of a successful politician must reflect power dynamics in his or her confident appearance, verbal acuity, reasoning skills, and decisiveness. A teacher needs a pedagogical habitus that demonstrates knowledge, reveals a communicative attitude and skills, and also relies on their specialized expertise. An artist will emphasize their empathy, creativity, and the uniqueness of their work and perspective. And a competitive athlete will emphasize her or his physical discipline and the agility and suppleness of their movements in comparison with the achievements of others. This diversity and contextual-dependence of cultural use values makes it appear impossible to present a unified conception of this use value, as is the case with all goods and services. There is already a great deal of diversity in the difference between cultures, and this diversity also arises in the differences between users and the liquidity, contrariety, and uncertainty of cultural situations themselves. And there is not just one mechanism regarding surplus value that can be achieved through cultural capital. However, this form of capital should nevertheless not be underestimated. It still operates today by, on the one hand, combining with other forms of capital and increasing or diminishing their effects; and on the other hand, the capitalization and commodification of culture has led to the fact that in almost any situation it is transformed into tangible forms such as learning capital and consumer and cultural goods. On the side of exchange value, it is particularly clear when we are inclined to overly expensive prices for cultural activities how great the

desire is for a super-elevation of the cultural. The majority of cultural activities appear nevertheless to be underpaid because the desire does not reach far enough in a consumer society to prevent people from looking for a good bargain.

In the analysis of the use of these differences in actions through cultural and educational advantages, there are at least four aspects, which are necessary for understanding the essential elements of action in dealing with cultural capital:

- 1) Culture is available subjectively and culturally educated people here develop a different status or habitus. Cultural upbringing and education take place as personal development in the context of the family and friends as well as in the educational system and broader culture. Cultural use value can be acquired in diversity. There is a general cultural market that is more or less connected with all areas of cultural development. An individual cultural path can be created, designed, and presented in the use values of this capital, it can be marketed in the exchange values.
- 2) Culture is available objectively when there is a culture of opportunity, which however is expressed differently depending on the country, through the number of people employed in the cultural sector, and determined according to the resources allotted for culture. The forms of the availability of cultural participation including virtualization increase to the level that one cannot get a comprehensive overview of them; and they work together with social capital in processes of inclusion or exclusion and are judged in terms of their relevance. Objective and subjective forms of culture mutually condition each other and strengthen or weaken each other in the context of major cultural movements and fashions.
- 3) Culture generates values that appear in people's cultural habitus. These values can, however, only be exchanged in a situational way insofar as a certain habitus or a certain cultural habit and attitude is in demand on the market or plays a role in entrance into social groups or participation in partnerships or relationships. The cultural habitus is a use value and then an exchange value when its subjective and situational quality can be transformed into monetary gains within a window for action. The cultural habitus is especially suited to multiplying other effects and other forms of capital. It is the difference that can generate further differences.
- 4) However, gains or profits that are generated on the basis of culture are always risky given the openness of such effects. It requires a specific situation to which the cultural habitus has to be suited or for which the habitus can have significance. The higher the cultural diversity of a society is, the more difficult it is to be armed with the right specific habitus for all situations on the market. A habitus based on high culture is indeed

still effective today, but its effectiveness cannot be generalized to the degree that it could previously. A virtual habitus that is open to technological and media-based opportunities, that signals a willingness to swim along with the virtual current, but at the same time does not forget to signal its individuality, appears today to be an important prerequisite for successfully combining cultural and social capital in order to generate gains.

These four aspects cannot always be calculated precisely, and neither the respective costs nor possible benefits are really calculated in capitalism. At the same time, all participants in a culture learn this from childhood:

- Culture is primarily lived through consumption and is divided into forms of mass culture, which is inexpensive to cheap, and elite luxury culture, which is expensive to unattainable.
- Culture as educated high culture (measured primarily in time to achieve the goals) is therefore increasingly detached from the paid luxury culture of desired elitist lifestyles (measured in cash for fast satisfaction).
- Given these distinctions, culture makes a difference to people's status and habitus (expended time to embody culture and money as the main source for success), and this difference can strengthen or weaken the mechanisms of other forms of capital.
- People can thus not remove themselves from or refuse to participate in culture because it belongs to a coherent self-image and the image others have of oneself and leads to stratification in terms of being cultured or uncultured.
- Cultural goods exist in different forms of objectification that extend from certifications and universally recognized degrees to meaningless private or esoteric attributions. On the material side cultural goods are connected with possessing enough money to afford a visible cultural capital.
- The virtualization of culture also means presenting oneself virtually in a beneficial way.
- The subjective side of culture appears to mean that anything goes, but in the use of culture for strengthening cultural capital or supporting other forms of capital specific achievements and wealth are expected in order for one to be successful.

If we look at the effectiveness of cultural comparisons of people with each other, the context of comparison within cultural affinity groups always appears to be a distinguishing factor. The comparison I make within a cultural group by including myself and excluding others creates the necessary precondition for an individualized (not collectively unified) culture, which continually produces new differences on the basis of new distinctions. People distinguish themselves here not only according to personal taste and preferences such as wine or beer, classical music or pop, cars or bicycles, TV or books, etc.

but at the same time express through their context and the style of the distinctions they make their inclusion in a certain status or habitus that is distinguished from others and allows them to oppose themselves to other groups or milieus.

4.2.2 Production of Surplus Value through Supply and Demand

Cultural labor creates costs primarily through the time that I have to expend in order to embody cultural knowledge and to produce, acquire, maintain, interpret, and display cultural objects. In a materialistic world, we like to look at the high point of culture, which shows itself in certain tangible results, is proven in situations and events, and expresses the apex of cultural understanding. And the time required to understand such culture gradually, appropriate it, actualize it, and maintain it recedes in the background. A tension thus arises, which the capitalization of culture makes more difficult because there are large deviations depending on supply and demand:

- On the one hand, culture increasingly puts pressure on objects and events to directly display themselves and be experienced so they can be celebrated and maintain their validity, provided that cultural success is even achievable through a supply that is in demand.
- On the other hand, the long period required for the production, creation, or sale of such objects and events creates costs that can be assessed as too high or too low only upon closer examination in terms of market developments over the long term; but these costs also appear highly risky because cultural success really cannot be measured in terms of economic success since this cultural success greatly depends on the dynamics of present cultural styles and fashions.

It is evident on the basis of this tension in capitalism that so-called high culture may still in part be relevant as a distinguishing feature for certain elites but altogether is already being replaced by a mass culture that is available to everyone. As consumers, all people are subject to comparison with each other because money is distributed in quantitatively different ways but is not an indicator for good or bad culture. The mass media and the Internet increase these effects.

According to Bourdieu (1987 a), there are no universalizable definitions of cultural achievements that could accumulate in the cultural habitus. It is a part of the fine distinctions to remain in the flux of distinctions and deal with them in a playful way, which testifies to true connoisseurship which cannot operate at a distance from the market. That is precisely why people admire artists who create their art and fashion completely independent of the market, as long as nobody thinks about how the artist managed to survive. When we start to

think about it, the idyll of such artist quickly disappears. However, we regard individual counter-examples very highly. There are sometimes top positions in the cultural sector that generate special surplus value through the mechanism of supply and demand. Depending on talent and reputation, heights of surplus value can be reached that give the illusion that it only requires special efforts or luck to achieve such positions. But it is often forgotten that this requires a market that provides the basis for the realization of such surplus value. Agents of the market have long taken possession of artists of whatever stripe in order to participate in this surplus value. And the market and art do not follow the same laws. Today's art, which small groups of people consider particularly valuable, may not be ready for the market until later, or may never be ready, because their validity is first established through comprehensive marketability.

The first rule for the marketing of culture is to generate demand for culture. But such market strategies are costly and are therefore difficult to realize given the amounts of cultural offerings compared. It is already difficult enough for culture even to reach possible buyers and customers. In addition to time needed for creating culture, a lot of time has to be expended on advertising in order to make the cultural choices known to people.

Culture, however, is not exchanged only for money. It is exchanged for time and participation, for the attention of visitors and interaction partners, and against the perception of the offer, which in turn are prerequisites for exchanging culture for money. There may also be demand that cannot be realized because the price and effort appear to be unaffordable for interested parties. There is also part of culture beyond commercialization insofar as cultural activities can actually be experienced individually and in groups as exchange and as coexistence. We recognize sometimes at such moments how important this can be for our life, but at the same time we can sense, in different ways depending on our lifestyle but nevertheless as a cultural trend, how the time for such things is increasingly being lost. The opportunity structures for so-called high culture still gave us when well-educated the chance to spend free time with our own cultural activities, but mass media and the Internet have become so omnipresent that they increasingly also fill up this time. Supply creates on our part a demand as a kind of vacuum, which we have difficulty resisting. Mass consumption in free markets at the same time destroys the environment, which has to be paid for as its own value in order to compensate for this imbalance (see Sagoff, 2004).

There are also at least four aspects in the analysis of the utilization of the difference between supply and demand, which are particularly important when we consider cultural actions:

- 1) There is market on which cultural needs, goods, or services exist or are produced. There is a demand for the exchange of certain cultural goods

or services. Cultural opportunity structures or supply structures that play a controlling role demand arise from this market.

- 2) There is a cultural supply that can be seen and judged by market participants, and there are choices.
- 3) There are also other means of exchange in addition to money that allow cultural exchange to be accomplished, and these means of exchange are available as distinguishing features in various social classes. This point requires that culture cannot always be acquired with money alone.
- 4) Cultural exchange interactions are actually realized on the competitive market, and market mechanisms are retained, i.e., prices for goods and services sink with high supply and rise with low supply in relation to demand. The cultural market is in short no anti-capitalistic idyll.

4.2.3 Creation of Surplus Value through Illusion, Deception, and Fraud

When considering questions of culture, there are always cultural pessimists who see the decline of old values if not the entire West because of the increasing diversity and plurality of liquid modernity. Speaking in psychological terms, they follow the supposition that the losses are higher than the gains, which is a view that is familiar from economic thought. If someone loses a certain value and the next day they gain something of equivalent value, they often regard the loss from a psychological point of view as higher than the gain. And things seem to be similar with respect to cultural questions: the negative descriptions prevail especially when the loss of old values and outmoded education can be seen better than the gains that could arise through new values and more open education but do not yet appear tangible enough. It was the illusion of the older form of education and putative high culture that people could possess this education if only they wanted to. This assumption, however, overlooks the conditions under which people enter into culture. Possession is always a prerequisite. In the past, such possession was in particular an expression of elite cultural differences that have in part been dissolved through democratization and the expansion of education and are able to appear in new forms today.

Opposed to the cultural pessimists who despair over the dissolution of elite forms of culture without ever saying so explicitly, there is a large group of people who are optimistic about culture especially when it draws from the old experiences of the educated bourgeoisie. Here creativity, learning art and music as education in the higher sense, keeping journals, and the development of literary interests are associated with the highest cultural values, and optimists who became important through the expansion of education now also want to convey these values to their offspring. But when looking at things from a sober perspective, many of these new cultural and educational participants

would be dismayed if their children actually became an artist or a musician or wanted to be producers of culture because capitalized culture only supports them in a very limited way. The “starving artist” is the other side of the desire for culture; this course in life has still been offered to students at school as an opportunity for cultural development, but they are quickly advised against it because it could be economic suicide.

Against this background, illusion and deception grow enormously in the cultural domain. As in the advertising world of mass culture, there is the trick of appearing to be more than one can actually be. In order to pull this off, cultural possessions are often displaced into material possessions. By showing what one has, one also shows what one intends to have. In this way, the symbolization of culture, which is expressed alongside titles and the legitimations of learning capital, is mediated in a particularly materialist way. It appears in books, home furnishings, jewelry and accessories, in the distinctive semantics of fashion, and in whatever is “in” or “out.” Because the fluctuations in supply and demand through cultural fashions and the half-life of cultural knowledge and imitation are very high, some strive to raise the rarity of their cultural efforts very high in order to generate exclusivity. This is analogous to the exclusivity model in fashion. Such exclusivity begins with mundane stores and reaches up to the luxury brands of a luxury culture, which are overvalued, constructed and used in illusionary distinction from mass culture. Through overpricing, they create a fictionalization of culture and rarity, which can be expanded to the level of deception and fraud. Thus, people encounter and secure their position in mutual competition where it is all about how well they have fared, how perfect their children are, which excellent schools they have discovered, and which values they have achieved here and there in order to find some consolation against the uncertainties that they try to suppress.

The greater the chances of gains appear, the greater the willingness is to enter into risk. It is particularly high where the demands on one’s time in the acquisition of cultural capital can be shortened, for example, by cutting corners, lying, fraudulently obtaining or faking documents, or cheating. On the cultural market itself there is also copyright infringement, counterfeiting, and exploitation as means of reaching profit targets. All of this happens according to the three levels I pointed out previously.

Illusions are a cultural standard of presentation in almost all markets. Although previously in particular one’s own biography had to be polished in hiring procedures, it is part of the cultural and virtual habitus today to practice this to a greater degree. Thus, for example, research can be presented in an unpublished talk as one’s own research by leaving out sources; copying something down is like writing it oneself, and the ideas of others reformulated in new situations can appear to be one’s own ideas. Fraud has to be proven, which is why it is usually only discovered when there is written evidence in a

published form. Such cultural illusions combine directly with social capital because it is mainly through this connection that they can be effective. They are constructs of a self-image that is oriented by comparative scenarios in advertising and culture; the illusion of the self is co-created through the illusions of culture.

Deception is an enhancement of illusion. Deception is carried out in order to make cultural achievements that require effort easier, to ensure cultural objects can be acquired as cheaply as possible, and in order to claim other's achievements as one's own as much as possible without being punished.

Fraud is when deception is proven and punished. Cultural fraud may always be self-deception because it can never lead to the actual educational appropriation of a cultural habitus, but the increase of cases of fraud in the cultural domain also shows how highly the extra gains are regarded when people risk carrying out such fraud.

There are also four aspects in the analysis of the utilization of illusion, deception, and fraud that are essential for allowing such practices to have effects in cultural actions:

- 1) Cultural goods are goods like any others. In education, there is a minimum fictional and partially real creation of cultural achievements associated with certain costs (time, resources, effort).
- 2) The fictionalization of this achievement is described in a plausible way for "common sense" and demonstrated in order to appear culturally credible and ensure that gains can actually be achieved, i.e., here is a supply according to created or suggested or partially existing desires that are advertised for on the basis of illusion.
- 3) Cultural exchange is put into action through sales, trades, contracts, obligations, bonuses, etc. and thereby proven to be successful.
- 4) Surplus value is achieved either in addition to an actually existing value or on the basis of pure deception, i.e., it either increases the existing normal value and surplus value realization and strengthens demand, balances these two areas, or generates gains without any trade-off.

4.2.4 Production of Surplus Value through Parasitic Gains

Because the cultural habitus is always appropriated through a past and in a family with existing cultural capital, cultural capital is thoroughly parasitic.¹

¹ Serres (1982) offers a philosophy of parasitic human communication in modernity. For him as for me, the idea of something being parasitic does not have moral overtones; rather, it is the description of an essential aspect of social life.

This is true primarily for the cultural progress of generations. Inheritance does not occur here as in economic capital in a material way or as in social capital through networking with friends or associates; it occurs through educational appropriation, socialization, enculturation, i.e., through participation in a cultural educational environment, appropriated language games, and the incentive to develop one's own cultural habitus. Social opportunities depend directly on such cultural appropriation, which, for example, can be seen in the creation of one's own circles of friends and acquaintances and the creation of networks through partnerships and marriage. Cultural fit is a crucial point of the connection between the cultural habitus, acquired education, and social capital. Educational homogamy in the search for a partner depends, in addition to economic and social opportunities for mobility, decisively on cultural fit and the maintenance of an achieved status, in particular on the cultural expectations in view of common desires, life scenarios, and biographies.

Cultural diversity and mass media as well as the Internet have made it more difficult for culturally hegemonic distinction practices for putative high culture or exclusive cultures to operate as means of distinguishing people. At the same time, the boundary has really only been pushed downward but not eliminated. The relationships that are not respectable now primarily are those that lie beyond educational expansion, i.e., relationships involving the unskilled or poor. For a successful cultural habitus, a certain body and learning capital has to be attained, which can subsequently be refined through supplemental cultural endowments (expressed in cultural consumption habits, one's own cultural understanding, and cultural production among other things).

Parasitic gains also arise in this form of capital through mere participation in existing conditions, through the use of existing structures and relationships, through results that do not require any counter-actions on one's own part, and through often limited or at least common involvement in the context of existing cultural relationships. The lower the minimum personal effort is, the higher the surplus value is that flows from such circumstances; this passes down existing cultural relationships, maintains existing differences in the cultural habitus, and uses them to distinguish between cultural and social positions. The total gains here can, however, first be realized in combination with social capital.

4.2.5 Summary

The surplus-value functions of cultural capital can be represented in their connections in the following way:

	Form of cultural capital	Surplus value arises as the difference	Gains in form of action
1.	value of cultural labor and goods with incurred material and educational costs (time, effort, resources)	between the costs of cultural labor and goods <i>versus</i> achievable gains in exchange values that fit the cultural markets	the exchange value of cultural labor and goods exceeds the costs in the long term
2.	supply and demand	between ordinary existing and extraordinary/rare cultural activities and goods with invested costs <i>versus</i> later gains that are actually achieved	competition qualifies the incurred costs and the realizable surplus value through fluctuations of the volume of gains and the opportunities for realization of exchange values
3.	illusion deception fraud	between the cultural world and its costs <i>versus</i> the fictional world created through illusion, deception, or fraud.	the market is influenced actively in order to secure profits and generate extra profit by overpricing
4.	parasitic participation	between participation in the cultural capital of others <i>versus</i> one's own minimal input	inheritance and socialization help to secure cultural relationships and goods and gain extra profits

Chart 20: Surplus Value through Cultural Capital

4.3 The Social Use of Cultural Capital

A large part of current cultural goods consists of knowledge and information, media, advertising, corporate design, cultural goods, homes, furniture, art, infrastructure and transportation, public places, and service routines. The transformations of associated use values into exchange values are often fluid. It is partly a matter of clear material cultural capital that is present on the markets in the form of goods, but it is also partly a matter of use values in public or private domains, which can have a complimentary effect on certain uses. For example, an advertisement as an expression of culture is always associated with the economic objective of sales, but in order to be able to

consume advertisements, the potential customer already needs an existing culturally sensitive way of perceiving things and communicating. The advertising strategy consists precisely in identifying the existing use values and qualities of this perception in order to orchestrate the attack on the consumer with the greatest possible success. The production of advertising creates costs; the use of private use values and perceptual habits in the customer is, however, free, although—in the long term—advertisement also helps create different perceptions and communication habits. This example expresses a new networking of culture that expands according the market. Globalization not only opened the markets, established light forms of capitalism over heavy forms, grew international business with various subsidiaries, and allowed the world to grow together with global advertising campaigns and consumer habits; it also led politically to the fact that national sovereignty was diminished because the capital flows no longer stop at borders, and all countries want to profit as much as possible in all markets (see Burbules & Torres, 2000, 14). This has two consequences for culture: on the one hand, it means an increasing standardization and homogenization of cultural norms, values, practices, and routines. On the other hand, it also means fragmentation through local or opposed directions (*ibid.*).¹ “Glocal approaches” attempt to describe hybrid forms here.²

Often the negative effects of globalization are seen on the economic side (increased unemployment through migration of capital, volatility of capital, erosion of wages and assets, increased poverty, increased losers in society), and the positive effects in contrast are attributed to culture (diversity through migration, more variety in opportunities, permeability of culture, mutual inspiration, more choice, etc.). Seen realistically, both sides are in an indissoluble relationship because culture is thoroughly capitalized. The effect is paradoxical: through the capitalization of all areas of culture, such cultural capital also has a negative effect on cultural diversity because it increasingly behaves in a market-based way. The effectiveness of political decisions by industrial countries and their consequences for the present are well known and have been described at length in chapters 2 and 3.

The example of neoliberalism shows that cultural capital is expressed from a social point of view in certain values, interests, and temporal horizons. It is full of content and thus also is an expression of social development and certain power relations in historical periods. If in democracy only certain contents appear favored, if the breadth of cultural and scientific differences cannot be developed in a sufficiently pluralist way, in particular when media rejects plurality and favors certain interests (as with lobbying groups that are subject to capital), then culture drifts in certain directions determined by the masses,

¹ Benjamin Barber (1995) describes this, for example, clearly in his book “Jihad vs. McWorld.”

² See for example Arnove & Torres (1999) for a discussion of this in relation to education.

which makes the potential of culture one-sided. Mass media and the Internet through its network of cultural opinion makers and manipulators in particular needs democratic and pluralistic regulations. And this is paradoxical as well: the apparent freedom of the market and all of its possibilities are not sufficient for creating plurality because profit interests are systematically connected with the mundane and often banal nature of the goods that populate the market. Cultural plurality hardly results from my being able to choose between different detergents or car brands; it results from a substantive and intentional diversity that always also has to stand outside of consumption if cultural meaning is to be negotiated. Such meaning can only arise through political regulation and democratic agreements outside of markets because otherwise the economic potential of dominant companies and their corresponding policies dominate everything. Unfortunately, however, political regulatory bodies are also under pressure because they are also connected to particular interests, which have the tendency to work against the development of critical cultural attitudes if plurality is not practiced in a radical way; this means democratic participation by apparently marginal groups is not increased, and the diversity of opinions is no longer discussed freely. The public part of mass communication in particular, insofar as it still exists in capitalist countries, faces the great challenge here of resisting both political quota thinking and the consumerism of alleged mass taste.

Cultural critical writings and studies in particular unlock background issues and questions regarding cultural capital, the way it is constructed today, how it is distributed, which interests groups it serves, and what kinds of inequalities it still produces. In the context of the empirical turn in almost all humanities and cultural disciplines, such cultural criticism is however marginalized and replaced by mostly superficial empirical work that often is sponsored by lobbies. As this chapter shows, culture and cultural capital cannot easily be measured. It is already difficult enough to provide guidelines for the governmental side of things, which would help to develop cultural capital and its use in as equitable way as possible when governments, given their current levels of debt, do everything in order to avoid such development. However, a positive list of requirements for political and public engagement in cultural development would be useful:¹

- In societies as well as individual lives, cultural activities represent an essential quality for such lives when they can be developed in an adequately diverse way for different interests as the form of expression for the search for meaning and understanding, design and creativity, as

¹ There is a diversity of initiatives worldwide that support more involvement in the cultural domain and emphasize participatory approaches in particular. There are numerous examples here. One example is the Manifesto for the Culture of the European Union. See http://ec.europa.eu/culture/index_en.htm.

the disruption of routines and habits, and as opportunities for renewal and visions. The state has an influence on cultural development by providing adequate resources for cultural diversity in theaters, museums, community colleges, language schools, and support for cultural groups and activities in the arts and culture; it also enables free access for social groups that would otherwise be excluded. In addition to educational support, such a comprehensive support for diverse cultural initiatives is an important indicator for an adequately stocked basket of cultural goods in a society.

- In the development of the culture industry, it is necessary for government policy to also offer state-financed or state-supported non-commercial offerings in addition to commercial offerings and to support public service media institutions in order to keep culture sufficiently open for diversity and specialization.¹ A strong cultural quality of life does not arise through the mass distribution of certain models but through the diversity of interests and cultural differences.
- Creativity is a key in many occupations that are in demand today. But creativity only happens in a sufficiently supported cultural environment that does not obstruct the sense for novelty, active design and formation, new points of view, and unfamiliar paths. Cultural activity has long expanded into areas in this regard that include leisure and sports in addition to narrower understandings of culture in literature, art, theater, and museums. In the face of budget cuts, which always impact cultural areas particularly strongly, it would make sense to set aside a certain amount of the respective budgets for the support of culture and therefore also quality of life and actively promote cultural policy through clear definitions of responsibilities.
- Support for those who create culture should be active and sustainable. This can be done in particular by supporting culturally precarious incomes through government projects, co-financing through tax relief, and incentives for foundations and non-profit initiatives. Cultural projects are also in a position to motivate people in difficult life situations, provide unemployed youth with new perspectives, and awake a variety of interests without immediately needing to transform this into economic values. Cultural activities can provide meaning for the lives of people as an alternative to profit chasing in business and offers other models for creative, communicative, and social activities. To do this,

¹ The publicly financed TV system for Germany differs here from the US and other countries. Public financing through taxes or fees at least guarantees wider political and cultural coverage, which can operate relatively independent of private interests. At the same time, considerations of viewer numbers have increased in the past few years, which undermines the possibility for cultural diversity.

cultural education and opportunities for qualifications have to be provided more often than they have been. The expenditures in the cultural domain should be increased and also better distributed. And it should not be matter here of only serving the demands of the educated bourgeoisie; diverse offering should also be developed especially for the youth.

- Cultural subjects must also not be further marginalized in education by reducing time dedicated to them in the curriculum and thereby reducing respect for them. When this happens, cultural one-dimensionality is promoted through the understanding of cultural goods as consumer goods, which reduces chances for diversity and creativity in culture. Artistic and culturally productive subjects and contents provide an opportunity for working against the dominance of cultural consumption through individual cultural production (see Bamford, 2006). These subjects are also an essential means for strengthening equality of opportunities.

4.4 Individual Use of Cultural Capital

For surplus value and its creation, the owner of this form of capital has to recognize the differential forms through which gains can be made in relation to costs. As has already been described for the other forms of capital, intensive production of use values in cultural appropriation is in the interest of the individual here to enjoy the advantages. If we look more closely at the form of surplus-value production, it becomes clear that subjective latitude and the uncertainty of foreseeable results are very high. Chart 21 (see below) provides a summary of the individual strategies from which the surplus value of cultural capital can arise.

- 1) First, the difference is between the costs incurred in terms of time, effort, and resources and the advantages one can gain in terms of access, mobility, and improvement of one's own position or the positions for one's descendants or relatives in the context of cultural power. The currency for effort is cultural participation; the time spent expresses the sustainability of efforts, and the resources include achievements in terms of cultural adaptation and cultural activities for attracting attention, admiration, and recognition in cultural affinity groups. However, the use value of cul-

tural activities and efforts is first capitalized when it can actually be exchanged for some benefit (as wages, income on the cultural market, etc.).




Chart 21: Forms of Surplus Value for Individual Cultural Capital

2) In cultural relationships, everyone is in competition not only with each other but also within the various groups and circles with their inclusion and exclusion mechanisms. Culture requires on the one hand the adoption and approval of conventions in the respective groups; and on the other hand, it requires the ability to express oneself with special abilities and talents and to help strengthen certain cultural groups and circles. Cultural conventions or special achievements never lead immediately to a better job or higher income, but they directly contribute to increasing the probability of actually achieving both on the market.

- 3) “More apparent than real.” More and more people live according to this motto these days, especially insofar as they are influenced by mass media. Illusions are part of a cultural habitus that sees “copy & paste” as an opportunity rather than a problem. Illusion does not consist so much in the adoption of the intellectual possessions of others and a no-holds-barred exploitation of all information networks; it consists in still presenting one’s self as original, as remarkable, and as creative in order to reap benefits in competition with others. The transformation into deception and fraud is a gradual one against this background.
- 4) A cultural starting position is always better when one does not have to work for it. This increases the power to move in the “right” or trendy cultural circles. The most important prerequisite here is one’s own cultural pedigree, the successful staging of which is essential to cultivating a cultural habitus, which already fosters its own expectations for success through mere participation and thus also expects more than others.

The implicit effects of cultural capital should not be underestimated. But at the same time, this form of capital has differentiated itself, and it always has effects only in combination with other forms of capital. This is especially true for the possibilities for cultural productivity for families. In capitalist countries, there are too few resources available for mid and lower status groups in particular to participate in cultural events. But on the whole the expenditures compared with total budget expenditures in many countries are very low. The expenditures generally remain under 10 percent of total expenditures and also include leisure and entertainment in the broadest sense. Culture is increasingly conveyed today through mass media, which makes culture available with limited costs.

Similar to the previous chapter, we may consider the consequences of cultural capital for important areas of life:

- *Income:* Cultural capital can only indirectly contribute to securing income. It depends in this regard on connections especially with social capital. The less the state provisions for the formation of cultural capital affects a broad range of people, the more individual initiatives are left to counteract this. Private and profit-oriented interests in the media sector have closed the holes left behind by deficient governmental commitment and operate to create culture as mass taste, which does not leave even the previous cultural elites untouched by this phenomenon. Nevertheless, there remain differences that are revealed in the cultural habitus and are important for securing certain jobs or attaining a certain income. Even if this cultural habitus has become mundane through the mass media, it still defines membership in terms of culture and social position. The up-

wardly mobile in particular have to learn the linguistic code of the established culture, cultural techniques, cooperation, politeness, self-esteem, and self-confidence.

- *Unemployment and employment:* Lack of cultural capital expresses itself especially in the fact that people have less trust in their own abilities, less flexibility with regard to changes in roles, and less skills with regard to communicative adaptation.
- *Opportunities for social mobility:* Cultural capital is always also a perspective on global developments and a reflection of cultural origin and development. This includes a critical view of one's own mobility compared with social expectations. The culturally educated person learns early to compare their own potential with the local and global conditions and to adapt strategies that open the best opportunities for social mobility. Against this background, alternatives for action and communication arise more easily. Cultural investments, activities, membership, and the associated attitude also open up social networks that can help a person secure social mobility as the maintenance or improvement of their possessions or living standard. Connections with learning capital are, however, extremely important here.
- *Opportunities for consumption and housing:* Culture is measured more so than ever in terms of consumption and appears in a person's housing situation as evidence of cultural achievement. The necessary consumer goods such as mass media and the Internet are not enough for describing a high degree of cultural relevance. Books, newspapers, journals, and conversational and communication materials and practices are also a part of this; they first allow one to develop a comprehensive and reflective cultural habitus. Even if a profanation has taken place here as in all habits of cultural consumption, it is the distinctions in the profane, mundane things that make the difference as before.

Summing up some of the considerations in this chapter, there are three scenarios that capture individual dealings with cultural capital:

- 1) *The ownership scenario:* anyone who wants to acquire large amounts of cultural capital is always dependent on a certain pedigree and assumed cultural contexts. It is especially difficult here for the upwardly mobile in particular to get ahead of the advantages others enjoy. But those who have arrived also have the problem that they cannot senselessly waste their resources and possessions, which they have had to acquire through their own efforts. For culturally established parents, nothing is a greater threat than when their children no longer can or want to take part in the established culture, conventions, and associated learning capital. They will spare no expense to prevent such losses.

- 2) *The upward mobility scenario*: cultural upward mobility is always difficult because there are always such different starting points. But abilities and talents in particular can help one to achieve a certain cultural capital through a great deal of effort and to stage it in such a way that one can enjoy advantages through one's own efforts. However, this can only happen in combination with body or learning capital because the devaluation of cultural extraordinariness in the times of mass culture delivers a special social status for very few cultural activities.
- 3) *The uncertainty scenario*: in light of mass taste, which increasingly affects even the elite, cultural capital is threatened by significant uncertainties. However, a cultural habitus, which consists of cultural techniques and linguistic achievements, also reproduces itself and documents the security of cultural membership. Anyone who wants to leave this uncertain situation needs cultural use values in order to raise their opportunities for participation not only in the cultural domain but in others as well. And anyone who relies completely on the cultural domain in order to develop their own culture, which resists the culture accepted in a consumption-oriented world, may raise their risk of economic uncertainty but may also enjoy cultural freedom.